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ABSTRACT 
Keith Bartlett, 'The Development of the British Army during the Wars with France, 
1793-1815'. 
The British Army that fought the engagement at Waterloo in 1815, was 
outwardly little changed from that which was engaged in the initial campaigns of the 
Wars, twenty-two years previously. Line upon line of red-coated, musket-armed 
infantry, manoeuvred as chess pieces across open fields, deciding the issue by volley 
and bayonet, having spent a hungry night exposed to rain and cold. The cavalry were 
still beautifully and often impractically clad, and were always seeking the decisive 
charge, on their unfed and often sickly mounts. The Army's commander still viewed his 
troops as 'the scum of the earth', who were rarely paid, and predominantly enlisted for 
life. It would therefore appear that little had altered from 1793 to 1815, and that this will 
be a study of continuity rather than change. However, this thesis will show that despite 
outward appearances, the Army that took the field at Waterloo was intrinsically 
different from the one that entered the conflict in 1793, being modernised in line with 
other institutions of state, and other European armies. This thesis is first and foremost 
intended to be a contribution to the history of the British Army from the outbreak of war 
with Revolutionary France in 1793, to the reduction of the forces after the battle of 
Waterloo in 1815. It proceeds from an assumption that the understanding of not only 
that history, but the history of the developing British state, will be significantly 
advanced through a study of the operation of, and the changes which took place within, 
the Army during the Wars with France. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARMY 
The British Army that fought the engagement at Waterloo in 1815, was outwardly 
little changed from that which was engaged in the initial campaigns of the Wars, twenty-
two years previously. Line upon line of red-coated, musket-armed infantry, manoeuvred as 
chess pieces across open fields, deciding the issue by volley and bayonet, having spent a 
hungry night exposed to rain and cold. The cavalry were still beautifully and often 
impractically clad, and were always seeking the decisive charge, on their unfed and often 
sickly mounts. The Army's commander still viewed his troops as 'the scum of the earth', 
who were rarely paid, and predominantly enlisted for life. It would therefore appear that 
little had altered from 1793 to 1815, and that this will be a study of continuity rather than 
change. However, this thesis will show that despite outward appearances, the Army that 
took the field at Waterloo was intrinsically different from the one that entered the conflict 
in 1793, being modernised in line with other institutions of state, and other European 
armies. This thesis is first and foremost intended to be a contribution to the history of the 
British Army from the outbreak of hostilities with Revolutionary France in 1793, to the 
reduction of the forces after the battle of Waterloo in 1815. It proceeds from an assumption 
that the understanding of not only that history, but the history of the developing British 
state, will be significantly advanced through a study of the operation of, and the changes 
which took place within, the Army during the Wars with France. 
1.2. IDSTORIOGRAPHY AND METHODOLOGY FOR THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARMY 
In terms of methodology the thesis will take the form ofa thematic study, within 
the bounds of what is termed 'new' history, and will seek to discover a trend in the 
development of the Army during the course of the period under discussion. For the 
purposes of the study, the model created by Peter Burke will be used, to outline what is 
meant by the much-vaunted title of 'new' history.l He establishes six points which define 
I Peter Burke, 'Overture: The New History, its Past and its Future' in Peter Burke (ed.), New Perspectives on 
Historical Writing (Cambridge, 1992) 2-6. 
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what new history is not, to compare it with the 'old' historical methods. First, he states, 
traditional history is essentially concerned with politics. While this thesis involves the 
study of political responses to the Army and the Wars with France, it is deflnitely not a 
political study. The use of a purely 'political' or even 'high political' methodology would 
have produced an interrupted view of the subject and the period, broken up by the rise and 
fall of ministries or personalities. Such a study can be highly successful, but would fail to 
achieve enough of an over-view to enable a trend to be observed, being bogged down in 
day to day politics. In terms of this study, the failings of such a method is best observed by 
reference to Kenneth Boume's Palmerston: The Early Years,2 which being a high political 
study, sees the conflict between War Office and Horse Guards as a battle of personalities, 
rather than another campaign between civil, military and royal authority, dating back to the 
Commonwealth. There will be occasions within the thesis that a political methodology will 
be used, but only where it is unavoidable for the sake of clarity. Most notably this will be 
seen in the examination of recruitment, where the Secretaries of State for War had such 
different ideas about how to solve the problem of manpower. In most other areas it is the 
intention of the study to be driven by the discernible trend of development within society 
as a whole, and the Anny in particular. The ambition and aspirations of individual 
politicians is only of signiflcance to this study while they affect the Anny, and once that 
ambition takes them away from their military brief, they must also be taken away from the 
thesis. 
The second essential of traditional history is that it should be a narrative. Military 
history has produced more than its fair share of this style of historical writing. For the 
period under discussion W.F.P. Napier' s History a/the War in the Peninsula,3 Sir Charles 
Oman's History a/the Peninsular War, 4 and Hon. lW. Fortescue's History a/the British 
Army,5 are all accomplished works, but written in a purely narrative form. The six, seven 
and nineteen volumes respectively, of these studies, are sufficient evidence of why such a 
style would have proved impossible to use to write this thesis, in terms of word-count 
alone. Instead, this thesis will use a thematic approach, of the type pioneered by Femand 
Braudel, in his Mediterranean, 6 to examine the structures of the Anny, rather than seeking 
1 Kenneth Bourne, Palmerston: The Early Years, 1784-1841 (London, 1982) 80-181. 
3 W.F.P. Napier, History of the war in the Peninsula and in the South of France, from the year 1807 to the 
year 1814 (London, 1876) 6 volumes. 
4 C.W.C. Oman, A History of the Peninsular War (Oxford, 1902-1930) 7 volumes. 
5 Hon. J.W. Fortescue, A History of the British Army (London, 1910-1930) 19 volumes. 
6 Femand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip Il, translated by S. 
Reynolds (London, 1972-3) 
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a strong story-line through which to describe the day-to-day minutiae. Narrative studies are 
not limited to the early part of this century. To the list of esteemed academic military 
historians must now be added a new breed - the illustrative historian, whose books are 
numerous and repetitive, while still being steeped in the old history of military narrative, 
with a preoccupation for counting stitches, and a tendency towards gloss. But these works 
are written to a new agenda, aiming towards a mass market, and despite their lack of 
footnoted sources, they have succeeded in whetting the appetite of numerous people who 
would hitherto have been oblivious to the study of military history, and must therefore not 
be dismissed out of hand. Most notable and productive in this field has been Philip 
Haythomthwaite, whose vast knowledge of the printed sources on the subject has resulted 
in many of his works being quoted in far more academic pieces. It is the proliferation of 
such coffee-table histories that is one reason to suggest that another study of the Wars with 
France 1793-1815 would be superfluous. However, as with the earlier narrative works, 
such studies fail to grasp anything beyond the public face of the Army, and this thesis will 
show that it is but a thin veneer. 
The third of Burke' s essentials of traditional history is that it should be a ' view 
from above', the study of the great men of the period. This thesis intends to avoid such 
emphasis, which John Keegan suggests, 'automatically distorts perspective and too often 
dissolves into sycophancy or hero-worship.,7 Richard Glover' s Peninsular Preparation: 
the reform of the British Army, J 795-J 809,8 is arguably the best study to date of the 
military during the period under discussion, but suffers from just such a distortion. It 
covers the Army under Frederick, Duke of York, as the Commander in Chief, and vastly 
overemphasises the importance of the Duke. Glover writes from a very militaristic 
standpoint, being critical of the government for not prosecuting the War to the detriment of 
all else. In ending his study in 1809, he obviates the need to get involved in the Duke of 
York's wrangles over the Mary Anne Clarke affair, his subsequent resignation, and the 
subordination of the post of Commander in Chief, to that of the Secretary at War, even 
after his return. This creates a very clear-cut picture of the state of the Army, and one 
which is misleading. While the importance of York's contribution to the development of 
the Army is unquestionable, his was just one element of that development. Parallel to that 
was a development of the civilian structures of the Army, which were kept deliberately 
7 John Keegan, The Face a/Battle: A study of Agincourt, Waterloo, and the Somme (London, 1991) 27. 
8 Richard Glover, Peninsular Preparation: the reform of the British Army, 1795-1809 (Cambridge, 1970). 
13 
away from the control of any Commander in Chief. In addition, and of most importance, is 
that after 1809, the Army continued to develop and grow, not achieving its numerical 
zenith until 1812, nor its optimum efficiency until 1813-14.As this study will show, the 
cult of Wellington, in particular, and the proliferation of literature concerning him, 
seriously overstates his contribution to the development of the Army during the course of 
the period under discussion. Jac Weller's studies of Wellington in India, Wellington in the 
Peninsula, and Wellington at Waterloo,9 despite being powerful works, are nevertheless 
tainted by their choice of focus. 10 Even the work of S.G.P. Ward in Wellington 's 
Headquarters, 1 1 despite being of immense quality, still suffers from the same orientation, 
which further highlights the necessity for its reappraisal. 
The fourth element of traditional history is that it should be essentially document-
based, with Rankean emphasis on 'official records emanating from governments and 
preserved in archives. ' 12 Typical of this type of study are the books of Charles M. Clode, 
whose Military Forces of the Crown,13 in particular, is a collection of facts derived 
exclusively from official documents. Despite this, it is still a bible for anyone engaged in 
the study of the Army during the nineteenth century, and this author is no exception. This 
thesis makes no apology for its extensive use of the major national archives. However, it 
has been its aim from the outset to examine more than the generally trawled sources, and to 
find new and untapped collections of papers. As will be shown below, it has been 
successful. In addition, the use of other less traditional sources, such as diaries and letter 
collections have been used to corroborate or contradict the information contained in official 
sources. 
The study of events, according to Burke, is the fifth essential of traditional history. 
This thesis will not get bogged down in this way. Events will be used to illustrate how or 
why developments took place within the Army, and with what effect. While being aware of 
9 Jac Well er, Wellington in the Peninsula, 1808-18/4 (London, 1962); Wellington in India (London, 1972); 
Wellington at Waterloo (London, 1991) 
10 This view is supported by Keegan, Face of Battle, 27. 
11 S.G.P. Ward, Wellington's Headquarters: A study of the administrative problems in the Peninsula, 1809-
J 814 (Oxford, 1957). 
12 Burke, 'Overture: The New History,' 4. 
13 Charles M. Clode, Military Forces of the Crown (London, 1869); see also Clode' s, The Administration of 
Justice under Military and Martial Law (London, 1872), and The Statutes Relating to the War Office and to 
the Army (London, 1880); See also PRO WO 123/124/-, ' Schedule of the Regulations, Circular Letter, &c., 
which have been issued since the publication of the Collection of Regulations on 24th March 1807' ; WO 
123/182/-, 'Memoranda prepared for the information of the Secretary of State for the War Department', 
1865. Both of these pieces were prepared by Clode. 
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the chronology of the key moments in the period under discussion, as with the avoidance of 
'high politics', a concentration on events would make this structural and thematic thesis 
disjointed, and would hinder the study of significant trends. In particular, the thesis will not 
include the obvious 'battle piece', 14 despite being a study of an army at war. As Geoffrey 
Best suggests, the fighting does 'not seem to merit more weight in the total analysis of war 
than the many other elements ... which military historians ... usually neglected.' 15 While 
reference will be made to engagements which materially affect the developments within 
the Army, this thesis will concentrate on the structures which enabled the Army to fight, 
rather than the fighting itself. Even the scholarly works of Piers Mackesy, in his Statesmen 
at War, War in the Mediterranean, and British Victory in Egypt, 1801,16 are essentially 
operational histories, centred around single or multiple engagements, which create 
somewhat false points of reference, and disrupt the observation of general trends in Army 
development. 
Finally, Burke suggests that traditionally the study of history is essentially 
objective, giving its readers the facts and leaving them to make up their own mind about 
the issues. Lord Acton' s instructions to the contributors to The Cambridge Modern History 
in 1902, 
that our Waterloo must be one that satisfies French and English, Germans and 
Dutch alike; that nobody can tell, without examining the list of authors, where the 
Bishop of Oxford laid down his pen, and whether Fairbaim or Gasquet, Liebermann 
or Harrison took it Up,17 
was typical of nineteenth and early twentieth century historians attempts at objectivity. 
Lieutenant Colonel Gurwood's Wellington's Despatches,18 W.F.P. Napier's History of the 
War in the Peninsula, 19 Sir Charles Oman's History of the Peninsular War, 20 and Hon. 
lW. Fortescue's History of the British Army,21 are all examples of this genre. However, the 
14 Keegan, Face o/Battle, 30, 36-46. 
I~ Geoffrey Best, 'What is Military History . . . ?' in Juliet Gardiner (ed.) What is History Today ... ? (London, 
1988) 13. 
16 Piers Mackesy, War in the Mediterranean (London, 1956); Statesmen at War: The Strategy o/Overthrow 
(London, 1974); British Victory in Egypt, 1801: The End o/Napoleon 's Conquest (London, 1995). 
17 Lord Acton, Lectures on Modern History (London, 1906) 318, quoted in E.H. Carr, What is History? 
(London, 1961, 1987) 9. 
18 Lieutenant Colonel Gurwood, The Dispatches 0/ Field Marshal the Duke 0/ Wellington, during his various 
campaigns in india, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, The Low Countries, and France, from 1799 to 1818 
(London, 1837-1839) 13 volumes. 
19 W.F.P. Napier, History o/the war in the Peninsula. 
20 C. w.e. Oman, A History o/the Peninsular War. 
21 Fortescue, A History o/the British Army. 
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former has been found to be edited to paint a more favourable picture of its subject,22 while 
examination of the latter works reveals that they are written to the agenda of both their 
authors and the period in which they were produced, and so confirm that pure objectivity is 
an unrealistic aim, and it is one to which this thesis does not strive. 
Comparison has been used in many instances, throughout this work, although other 
institutions or armed forces have not been studied in depth. This would have broadened the 
thesis too much, and the quantity of sources necessary to cover such areas would have been 
impossible to come to terms with in the time available. In any case much useful work has 
already been conducted into areas such as the French23 and Prussian24 armies, and aspects 
of other institutions of state.25 John Tosh states that this method 'enables us to separate the 
essential from the particular and to weight our explanations accordingly.'26It has proved 
particularly useful in this study, in terms of assessing the origins and uniqueness of the 
developments within the Army, and assists in broadening the compass of this study, 
establishing it as part of the historical debate, not only concerning the Army, but of Britain, 
and also of Europe. 
The reason behind the choice of the time scale of the study would seem to be self-
explanatory, beginning at the outbreak of the War with Revolutionary France in 1793, and 
ending with the defeat of Napoleon in 1815. However, most studies of military structure 
avoid periods of war, and instead examine the peacetime army. According to Keegan, 
Action is essentially destructive of all institutional studies; just as it compromises 
the purity of doctrines, it damages the integrity of structures, upsets the balance of 
relationships, interrupts the network of communication which the institutional 
historian struggles to identify and, having identified, to crystallise. War, the good 
quartermaster's oPf0rtunity, the bad quartermaster' s bane, is the institutional 
historian ' s irritant. 7 
22 C.M. Woolgar, 'Wellington 's Dispatches and their Editor, Colonel Gurwood' , in C.M. Woolgar (ed.) 
Wellington Studies I (Southampton, \996) 189-210. 
23 See for example, John R. Elting, Swords Around the Throne: Napoleon's Grande Armee (London, 1988); 
Alan Forrest, Conscripts and Deserters, (Oxford, 1989); Alan Forrest, The Soldiers of the French Revolution 
(London, 1990). 
24 See in particular, Peter Parrett, Yorck and the era of Prussian Reform, 1807-1815 (Princeton, New Jersey, 
1966). 
~ See for example, N.A.M. Rodger, The Wooden World: An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy (Glasgow, 
1986); Penny Corfield, Power and the Professions in Britain, 1700-/850 (London, 1995) 
26 John Tosh, The Pursuit of History: Aims, Methods and New Directions in the Study of Modern History 
(London, 1991) 124. 
27 Keegan, Face of Battle, 29. 
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So why study the British Army at a time of such disruption to the very structures the thesis 
is attempting to examine? The first is that the period has been neglected by academics, 
despite being sandwiched between two excellent relatively recent studies. J.L. Pirnlott's 
'The Administration of the British Army, 1783-1793', which covers the years between the 
end of the American War ofIndependence, and the beginning of the Wars with France,28 
and Hew Strachan, Wellington's Legacy.·The Reform of the British Army, 1830-54,29 which 
takes the Army to the beginning of the Crimean War. The second reason for the choice of 
this particular period for the subject of the study, is that of the current historical debate 
which surrounds it, and which will be discussed below. The fmal reason for not choosing a 
peacetime study is, in the words of Michael Howard, 'that it loses sight of what armies are 
for. ,30 The study of an army at war is a very important element of history, but one which 
has been somewhat neglected of late. An investigation of a major conflict sees a nation 
tested and stretched to its limits, drawing on their resources in fmance, raw materials, 
manpower, technology (both materiel and theoretical) and the will of all concerned to fight, 
continue to fight, fund or merely tolerate the continuance of the conflict. It is a study of a 
nation in extremes, and despite the difficulties it presents, it is a study worth conducting. 
Although there are numerous studies of almost every aspect of the Army, and of 
varying degrees of rigour, there does not exist a single authoritative study of the whole 
period of the Wars, which sees the Army in anything other than a narrow operational role. 
This thesis seeks to address this omission. The time is surely overdue for the Army to be 
studied in a much broader context than merely that of a military force, and therefore this 
work will seek to achieve this. 
The works of numerous authors, most notably John Brewer, with his Sinews of 
Power,31 and Linda Colley in Britons,32 discuss the idea that the prosecution of war during 
the eighteenth century, was for the former, the driving force behind much of the 
modernisation, of what is termed the 'fiscal-military state,' and for the latter the catalyst in 
nation building. It is therefore extraordinary to find a plethora of studies into the fmance of 
28 J.L. Pimlott, 'The Administration of the British Anny 1783 - 1793', Unpublished PhD Thesis, (Leicester 
University, 1975). 
29 Hew Strachan, WeIJington 's Legacy: The Re/orm 0/ the British Army, 1830-54 (Manchester, 1984); see 
also Hew Strachan, .From Waterloo to Balaclava: Tactics, Technology, and the British Army, 1815-1854 
(Cambridge, 1985). 
30 Quoted in Keegan, Face o/Battle, 29. 
31 John Brewer, The Sinews o/Power: War, money and the English state, 1688-1783 (London, 1989) 
32 Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837 (London, 1992) 
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the state, others into the various institutions, and more into the nationalism of war-time 
Britain, but not one looking at the point at which British exploits were supposedly directed 
- the military. Brewer and Colley do include the Army, and in the latter case the amateur 
military, within their argument, but as neither are primarily military historians, they are 
directed beyond military structures, and therefore fail to gain a certain understanding of the 
field, which this thesis will address. 
The study seeks to place the Army in the context of the developing state, and so 
will concentrate on just that institution, only dealing with others where they directly 
influence the Army itself. For the purposes of the study the Army is taken to mean the 
regular infantry and cavalry formations, together with the administrative, supply and 
support structures which served them. It excludes the Militia and Volunteers, as they have 
been studied in detail in recent years,33 the medical services,34 and the troops of the East 
India Company and the Board of Ordnance, except where their inclusion is beneficial to the 
study. A detailed study of these latter formations merits a separate research project.35 It was 
decided at an early stage in the research to concentrate on the Army, which was the most 
important military force at the time, one which can be isolated from the others, and in 
which, and concerning which, the most important developments and reforms can be seen to 
be driven. 
1.3 SOURCES FOR THE STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
ARMY 
O.R. Elton suggests that the first demand of sound historical scholarship, is 'a 
broad-fronted attack upon all the relevant material. ,36 It was with this in mind that a survey 
of the vast array of sources available to a student of the period under discussion, was 
conducted. As the study was interested in the Army as an instrument of the state, the most 
33 See for example, S. C. Smith, 'Loyalty and Opposition in the Napoleonic Wars; The Impact of the Local 
Militia, 1807-1815.' Unpublished DPhil Thesis (Oxford Uiversity, 1984); Colley, Britons, 283-320; Austin 
Gee, 'The British Volunteer Movement, 1793-1807', Unpublished PhD Thesis (Oxford University, 1989). 
34 Sir Neil Cantlie, A History of the Army Medical Department, 2 volumes (Aldershot, 1974); Richard L. 
Blanco, Wellington's Surgeon General: Sir James McGriggor (Durham, North Carolina, 1974), cover the 
medical services, but little else is written on the subject. R. Glover, Preparation. vii, chose to omit them from 
his work, stating that their study demanded a 'professional author'. I would concur with his fmdings. 
3' I intend to look at this project at a future date 
36 G.R. Elton, The Practice of History (London, 1967) 66. 
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obvious starting point for the research were the nwnerous government generated 
docwnents contained in the main national archives, in particular the Public Record Office. 
The main records for this thesis are contained in the War Office papers in the Public 
Record Office. They are an essential body of infonnation, which despite their many lost, 
missing or destroyed docwnents, still add up to a vast, unique and relatively 
comprehensive holding, and somewhat of a luxury, rarely enjoyed by students outside the 
field of military history. No study of the Army would be complete without thorough use of 
this archive. The PRO holdings, along with most of the national archives have been 
researched extensively in previous studies. However, the importance of these archives, 
although well read and well studied, is in the manner in which they are used, the questions 
asked of them, and the expectations of the student. In this work there has been an 
awareness from the start, that it would be the questions asked of these archives, and the 
way in which the answers are used, that would make this study original. 
In order to obtain a fresh insight and a different perspective to those who have 
studied this topic previously, all record repositories in Britain were contacted, requesting 
infonnation concerning their holdings of docwnents relating to the period under 
discussion. As a result of this survey, a great deal of infonnation has been gleaned from 
several regional archives. Often dismissed as being of only local importance, several 
sources of national interest have been discovered, that have been overlooked by many other 
students of the period. Most notable among these has been the John Rylands University 
Library in Manchester, where the papers of Robert Hugh Kennedy, the British Commissary 
General in the Peninsular War, have proved essential in the understanding of the subject. 
Kennedy was at the hub of the campaign, and therefore the changes imposed upon the 
Anny are clearly noticed within his papers. Ward also quoted from a small selection of 
Kennedy's papers which he had purchased, and these together with another holding of 
Kennedy's papers in Edinburgh, gives, for the first time, a near-complete view of the 
workings of the Commissariat, and the Army generally, at the heart of arguably the most 
important campaign of the Wars. 
Extensive use has also been made of the diaries and personal letters of the period 
under discussion. Of course there are the usual problems in the use of such material , 
perhaps more-so in military history than in other areas, due to what Keegan tenns ' the 
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Bullfrog Effect,' the embellishing of war stories by soldiers.37 However, such 
contemporary accounts are essential to the understanding of the characters involved in a 
study, that could so easily become impersonal, and they are also useful as a test of the end 
result of any military development. It must be noted that it is rare for a reform of the Army, 
as discussed in this thesis, to be noted by a serving soldier. What is more usual and 
significant is that, as in the case of supply, criticism concerning this element of the 
soldiers' life, all-but disappears, suggesting an improvement in the supply system 
described in archive material. 
The Parliamentary Papers, provide another useful body of information. While 
clearly showing how developments progressed through Parliament, with insights into the 
tempering of certain measures to placate Royal or Parliamentary sensibilities, there is scant 
information as to the origins or reasoning behind the reforms. The Parliamentary Debates 
of Hansard/8 are essential for the detail of the high-profile debates, although they give little 
information of everyday Army development. 
Despite reservations over the previously published secondary works, they have still 
been used extensively. There are few areas of the Army on which nothing is written, of 
whatever quality, and this has saved a great deal of time in getting bearings in certain areas. 
The most important works must be those mentioned above, Clode, Glover and Ward, 
which between them give enough information to begin any research project on the period 
under discussion, with a degree of confidence. To this list must be added the unpublished 
doctoral thesis ofPimlott,39 which covers the development of Army administration from 
the end of the American War ofIndependence, to the beginning of the Wars with France. 
This has been essential in the understanding of the complex period before the beginning of 
the study, and has saved much time, by describing the origins of a number of the reforms 
of the Army that remained issues during the period of the thesis. Much that is contained in 
PirnIott's thesis is of great importance to the discussion of the development of the Army, as 
related to the development of the state, and it is unfortunate that his work was produced 
prior to the proliferation of work resulting from Sinews of Power, which would have given 
it greater relevance in the broader historical field. 
37 Keegan, Face of Battle, 33 . 
38 T.C. Hansard, The parliamentary debates. from the year 1803 to the Present Time: Forming a 
Continuation of the Work Entitled "The Parliamentary History of Englandfrom the Earliest period to the 
Year 1803" (London, 1793-1815); PD. 
39 J.L. Pimlott, 'Administration of the British Army'. 
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1.4 THE QUESTION OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARMY 
By examining the sources described the thesis will introduce the structure of the 
Army at the beginning of the conflict, outlining the changes which occurred during the 
course of the period under discussion. The study will be in three parts. Part I, will cover the 
administrative areas of the Army; Part n, will look at the make-up of the forces, and Part 
III will examine the logistical arrangements. Chapter 2, Structure, will examine the 
interaction between the various offices of both the military and civil administration and 
will begin to test the hypotheses suggested by recent historians of the long eighteenth 
century, that government and its influence expanded, and that there was a general move 
towards a 'modernisation' of state structures, and to 'professionalism' in public life.4o 
Chapter 3, Finance, will study how financial structures functioned under the pressures of 
the Wars, and the extent to which the desire for economic efficiency provided the impetus 
for change within the Army. Chapter 4, Composition, will look at the composition of all 
ranks of the Army, and discuss the various methods by which the manpower question was 
addressed during the Wars. Chapter 5, Training, will examine the training of the Army, 
beginning with the development of new and uniform drill systems, and expanding upon the 
improvements made in the field, and the innovations of light infantry. It will also look at 
the increasing professionalism of the Army, and promotion within its ranks. The education 
of soldiers, and the motives for its introduction will also be examined. Chapter 6, Supply, 
will examine the supply of all items to the Army, an area noted for its failings during the 
course of the Wars, discussing the design, manufacture and standards, but most importantly 
the improvements in the process of the issue of such items. Finally, Chapter 7, Transport 
and Communication, will look at the transport arrangements, focusing on traditional and 
innovative methods of moving troops and supplies. It will also examine the means by 
which the Army communicated while fighting a global war. 
The thesis was structured under these broad headings for several reasons. First, as 
stated above, a narrative in whatever historical style would have produced a work of vast 
proportions. Second, by breaking the Army down into these areas of study, the whole topic 
became a manageable project. Third, to have used a broader thematic structure, specifically 
40 For example, Brewer, Sinews of Power; COl\ey, Britons; Corfield, Power and the Professions. 
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developing themes such as professionalism, corruption, class, etc., would have proved 
unwieldy, as each area of study produced different findings that would have disjointed the 
thesis, and would quickly have become repetitive. Fourth, by studying the topic in this 
way, a better assessment of the general trends prevalent during the period under discussion 
can be made. Finally, after careful consideration, it has been decided that this is the most 
effective method to both answer the questions posed, and produce an intelligible picture of 
the subject, within the bounds of a project of this type. 
From the outset this thesis is intended to transcend the boundaries of a purely 
military monograph. Instead it will examine how the Army as an institution of state, 
reacted, not only to the Wars with France, but to the developing society in which it was 
founded. The key feature of this study will be the examination of change. Although there is 
little doubt that by 1815, the Army was a changed institution, hitherto, historians have 
failed to recognise the significance of what lay behind that change. This study will question 
whether change was government or Army led. By examining the different aspects of the 
Army it will suggest that the changes occurred within the wider agenda of the 
modernisation of the state. By examining aspects of that change, this thesis will explore 
how far the Army became a testing ground for key innovations which would later affect 
nineteenth century government policy. For example, in policies which followed the 
direction of centralisation, localisation, nationalisation, or even laissez-faire. This will 
necessarily involve a questioning of the notion of the 'long' or 'short' eighteenth century.41 
It will also ascertain if the changes to the Anny were effective in the long or short term, or 
whether they were merely a response limited to the immediate pressures of the Wars. 
Finally, this study will determine the extent to which the Army, as an institution at the end 
of the Wars, had been integrated into the state and society. 
1.5 THE BRITISH ARMY IN 1793 
The opening campaigns of the Wars with France in 1793 proved disastrous for the 
British Army. Despite earlier attempts at reform, 42 the force entered the conflict, in the 
41 The debate by historians over the duration of the 'eighteenth century', and whether it can be usefully 
categorised as a 'long' or short' have been helpfully summarised in W.A. Speck, 'The Eighteenth Century in 
Britain: Long or Short?', in The Historian, 51, Autumn 1996, 16-18. 
42 Pimlott, 'Administration of the British Army', 30-2, et al. 
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words of its most famous historian, Fortescue, with 'their ranks still wasted and thin. ,43 
The 7,000 British troops under the Duke of York in the Low Countries, lacked logistical 
support, and seriously outnumbered by the French, suffered successive defeats at the hands 
of the Revolutionary armies, buoyant after their victories at Jemmappes and Valmy in 
44 1792. One French observer wrote ofthe early stages of the Wars, 'To doubt the defeat of 
an army, sent by the British ministry to any part of the continent to contend against our 
troops, would have been imputed to disaffection.'45 Even in the West Indian campaigns of 
1794, where the military expeditions did not end in failure, the climate, together with 
supply and manpower problems left the commanders over-extended and distraught.46 
The deficiencies were obvious and public. The British Army, which entered the 
conflict in 1793, was vastly outnumbered by French forces, that included the swarming 
levee en masse, which overwhelmed opponents, by sheer weight of numbers. It was 
deficient in command at all levels, with royalty still expecting to lead; a shortage of good 
commissioned and non-commissioned officers; and the lack of a coherent system of 
promotion, that placed men in command who were deserving of such a post. The training it 
had received was both insufficient and disparate, with little assimilation to a uniform 
standard, and no acknowledgement of the need to respond to French innovation. In supply 
it lacked any co-ordinated structure, with uniform and equipment still being part of the 
pecuniary interest of the regimental colonels, and open to numerous abuses; the transport 
arrangements were made by a variety of departments and individuals. It lacked any 
semblance of a practical organisation or direction towards a common aim, and with the 
acquisition of food still being the responsibility of individual soldiers, they were vulnerable 
to the effects of shortages, which diverted their attention away from their primary purpose. 
Food was only one of the areas in which the welfare of the British soldier was deficient, for 
in accommodation, family and financial arrangements, there was little provision for men 
who were often treated with contempt by the rest of society. Financially, the Army itself 
was struggling to come to terms with a system that had been devised using peace-time 
estimates, which created an immediate log-jam in all departments, amid inefficient post-
43 lW. Fortescue, Historical and Military Essays (London, 1828) 211; see also R. Glover, Preparation, 215 . 
«Forrest, Soldiers of the French Revolution, 68-82. 
45 Charles Dupin, A View of the History and Actual State of the Military Force of Great Britain (London, 
1822) 11, 2. 
46 GRE-A, 186, a, Henry Dundas to General Sir Charles Grey, 6th December 1793; 186, b, George Rose to 
Evan Nepean, 6th December 1793; 186, c, Commissioners Victualling the Navy to George Rose, 29th 
November 1793; 2242, Prescott to Grey, 25th October 1794; 2243/35-8, Grey to Henry Dundas, 12th April 
1794; 2243/54-6, Grey to Dundas, 8th July 1794. 
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holders and vested interests. Above all was a structure of command in which checks and 
balances avoided one man taking control, preventing the rise of a powerful military, and 
standing in the way of the efficiency of a modem fighting force. It was therefore clear that 
drastic change to the Army was necessary, if it was to survive, let alone make any 
impression on its opponents. 
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CHAPTER 2 STRUCTURE 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The eighteenth century British Army was a feared institution. It was feared for 
itself, as a result of the dominance of the Cromwellian Army during the Commonwealth, 
and it was feared for its potential if manipulated by one person, which was the legacy of 
James II's attempts to fill its ranks with Catholics. As a result of this fear a system of 
checks and balances on Army power had developed, which was, by the period of this 
study, a double edged sword, preventing the rise of an Army to threaten the stability of the 
state, but also preventing it becoming an efficient and cohesive military force. The 
confusion and military defeats of the first months of the Wars, revealed that improvements 
in the Army were essential if the conflict was to be brought to a successful conclusion, but 
modernisation would require the removal of safeguards which prevented the misuse of 
Army power, and that would require trust in both the reformed structure, and more 
importantly, the Army itself. 
This chapter will examine the structure of the Army and its administration, 
establishing their state in 1793, examining the changes that occurred during the course of 
the Wars, affecting this vital area, and assessing their implications. 
2.2 THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF 
It is not surprising that there were problems during the first months of the Wars, for 
in 1793, as at the outbreak of any conflict during the eighteenth century, the Army was 
effectively leaderless. The Commander in Chief was technically the head of the Army, 
being responsible for its patronage, training and discipline, although by the period under 
discussion neither for the raising of men nor their operation in the field.) His office was 
) While the Commander-in-Chiefwas in overall command of the anny, the Ordnance Department was under 
the authority of the Master General of Ordnance. He therefore controlled the artillery, the construction and 
maintenance of all military works in Britain, and the supply of anns and accoutrements to the forces. The 
Secretary of State for the Home Department was ultimately responsible for the raising of forces, and their 
operation in the field was controlled by either the Foreign or Colonial Secretaries of State, depending upon 
where in the world the operation was taking place. See below 29; 2.5 The Secretary of State for War and 
Colonies. 
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funded, in peace and war, from the Army Extraordinary Fund, which was not subject to 
Treasury control,2 giving the holder of the post a great degree of independence of action. 
Traditionally a Commander in Chief was only appointed during times of war, while in 
peace the King fulfilled the role, through the Secretary at War.3 This had been the case 
from the resignation of Conway in 1783, to the appointment of Amherst upon the opening 
of hostilities in 1793.4 Therefore, at the beginning of the period under discussion, a void 
existed in the administration of the military which needed urgently to be filled, if the Army 
was to operate effectively. 
There had been several attempts to establish the post of Commander in Chief 
permanently. The earliest recorded attempt was led by Army officers in Parliament in 
1740,5 and the latest by General Burgoyne in 1789.6 This was dismissed by the government 
of the day which stated that such a role was unnecessary in times of peace. 7 It is significant 
that it was the Army officers in Parliament who observed the need for such change, for 
they were clearly the best placed to asses the needs of the Army. However, it would be the 
civilian authorities who would arbitrate on such a necessity from this period onwards, and 
the Army officers in Parliament were neither numerous enough nor influential enough to 
effect such a reform on their own behalf. 8 The testing of the decision of 1789 was not 
necessary again, as the declaration of war in 1793 brought with it the appointment of a new 
Commander in Chief. 9 
Much has been made of the failings of the seventy four year old Lord Amherst, who 
took the role at the outbreak of the Wars, after he had been out of touch with the Army for 
several years. 10 Clearly he was out of his depth, in what rapidly became a global conflict. 
2 Clode, Military Forces of the Crown, 11 , 333 . 
3 Ibid. 11, 336. 
4 Amherst had been appointed to the acting rank of Commander-in-Chief during 1788, but was not installed 
permanently until the outbreak of war in 1793 . Captain Owen Wheeler, The War Office Past and Present 
(London, 1914) 56. 
5 Parliamentary History (1740) 902. 
61bid. (1789) 1310; Burgoyne suggested that one of the King's sons should be appointed to the post; Clode, 
Military Forces of the Crown, 11,255. 
71bid. (1789) 1318. Sir William Younge, the Secretary at War stated that he would represent the interests of 
the army. Clode, Military Forces of the Crown, 11, 283 suggests that this was the first time in any Parliament 
that 'they had such a person as a responsible military minister.' 
8 See 4.6 Officers, 147. 
9 PRO WO 3/ 11/36, William Fawcett, Adjutant-General, to Colonels Commanding Regular Cavalry and 
Infantry Regiments, 14th February 1793. 
10 Fortescue, Essays 211; and more recently R. Glover, Preparation, 215, take for granted that the failings of 
Amherst were the cause of the problems experienced by the army from 1793-1795. 
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But of equal importance in the debacle of the early years ofthe Wars was the failure of the 
Army as a whole to successfully change from a peace-time to a fighting force. Pimlott 
observes that at the outbreak of each war during the eighteenth century the same weakness 
can be found in the assimilation of the forces and the administration to the different roles 
required of them. I I It was a situation that would never change while governments persisted 
in their attitudes that a peace-time Anny needed no head except the monarch. However, it 
is a point which was not lost on the authorities at the end of the conflict, when the post of 
Commander in Chief was maintained, to be paid for by Parliament. 12 The failure of Lord 
Amberst in his role as Commander in Chief, and equally the success of the Duke of York, 
who held the same post from 1795,13 reveals that the personality and ability of the man 
could seriously affect the development and workings of the Army. 
The achievements of York as Commander in Chief are described in depth by 
Glover,14 who credits him, almost solely, with the reforms of the Army from 1795 to 1809. 
It is impossible to describe the positive changes that took place in the Army of the period 
under discussion without acknowledging the major contribution of York. It was during his 
tenure as Commander in Chief that the bulk of the reforms which would change the Army 
completely by 1815, were set in motion. Burgoyne had suggested a 'Prince of the Blood' 
should assume the head of the Anny,15 and despite his failings as a field commander,16 
York was able to exert enough influence to force through changes which were essential to 
the development of the Anny during the period under discussion. 17 However, York was 
criticised by contemporaries for exceeding his duties as Commander in Chief, meddling in 
areas which were not part of his role, and more importantly in aspects of [mance, an 
anathema in the military administration. IS But, such accusations are misleading as the 
duties of the role of the Commander in Chief had never been defined, and remained that 
way until 1812.19 Indeed, there were several occasions when the Commander in Chief had 
been allocated duties by the cabinet, more appropriately the responsibility of the Master 
11 Pim Ion, 'Administration of the British Army,' 31. 
12 Clode, Military Forces o/the Crown. 1I, 333, 354-5. See below 29. 
13 PRO WO 4/ 156/375 , War Office Circular, 13th February 1795. 
14 R. Glover, Preparation, passim. 
15 Parliamentary History (1789) 1310. 
16 See below 2.6 Commanders in the Field, 42-4. 
17 See below 2.9 Conclusion, 63-4. 
18 Clode, Military Forces of the Crown, 11, 339. 
19 Royal Warrant, 12th May 1812; See below 2.3 The Secretary at War and the War Office, 31 . 
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General of Ordnance, most notably in the erection of coastal defences.2o This not only 
further expanded his role, but also reduced the authority of the Master General, and further 
excused York for exceeding his authority. Glover also provides evidence to support the 
subordination of the Master General.21 Without drawing any conclusions, he points out 
that, despite holding a cabinet post, the Duke of Richmond, Master General until 1795, and 
Lord Cornwallis his successor, were all-but ignored by Pitt, while at the same time York 
was in the ascendancy.22 This was particularly important during the early years of the 
Wars, when Pitt, together with Grenville and Henry Dundas, formed a triumvirate of 
military decision making,23 thus enabling any restructuring of the unwritten military 
authority to be implemented by the consensus of those making the strategic decisions. In 
addition, it was seen fit for the Commissioners of Military Enquiry to investigate the 
Master General, without conducting a parallel enquiry into the office of the Commander in 
Chief.24 It therefore seems possible that there was a movement towards the 
acknowledgement of the precedence of the Commander in Chief over the Master General. 
While this would not enable Ordnance decisions to be made by the Commander in Chief, it 
would ensure that the expenditure within the Anny, would take precedence over that of the 
Ordnance, and that the latter would be less able to influence policy in their favour. This 
subordination of the Master General to the Commander in Chief would create a simplified 
command structure, but one in which the checks and balances of the dual authority over the 
military forces was removed. 
During the course of the period under discussion the office of the Commander in 
Chief expanded to an unprecedented level. Based in Horse Guards it became the fount from 
which all orders emanated, and the base in which Anny data was processed and 
disseminated. At the outbreak of the Wars in 1793, Arnherst's staff consisted merely of his 
own secretary, and the expenses of the whole office during the first year of war amounted 
to only £1029. By 1814 the annual cost of the office had risen to £976I.25 Almost 
Amherst's first move as Commander in Chief was to request the transfer of the Adjutant 
20 1I'h RCME (1810) 23-4; 15'h RCME (1812) 320-1. 
21 R. Glover, Preparation, 23; Richmond eventually ceased to attend cabinet meetings, Mary ElIen Condon, 
'The Administration of the Transport Service during the War against Revolutionary France ', Unpublished 
PhD Thesis (London University, 1968) 9-10. 
22 R. Glover, Preparation, 23. 
23 J. Watson, The Reign ofGeorge 1Il (Oxford, 1960) 365; Pimlott, 'Administration of the British Anny' , 38; 
lan R. Christie, Wars and Revolutions: Britain 1760-1815 (London, 1982) 219; David French, The British 
Way in Warfare, 1688-2000 (Ltmdon, 1990) 90. 
24 1 ill RCME (1810) 23-40. 
25 Dupin, Military Force of Great Britain, 1, 45. 
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General and the Quartermaster General from the staff of the Secretary at War to that of the 
Commander in Chief, as was usual when Britain was at war.26 Jt was around these two 
offices in particular that the expansion of Horse Guards took place.27 
In war the Commander in Chief would also serve as the link between the King and 
the Army, and while he was 'entrusted with the organisation, instruction, and discipline '28 
of the troops, he would never be involved in any of the finances of the Army which was 
always the function of the Treasury.29 In 1808 the duties of the Commander in Chief were 
clarified, emphasising three areas of operation in separate departments within the one 
office. These were promotion, civil and miscellaneous, and confidentiaPO At the same time 
a formal link between the Commander in Chief, the Secretary at War and the King was 
established for the first time. With George III, the link could be quite strong, the King 
insisting on being consulted on all martial issues.3) However, increasingly, as the King's 
illness kept him away from affairs of state, it was the link: between the Commander in 
Chief and the government, in the form of the Secretary at War, that was to be of greater 
significance.32 This was particularly the case after 1811, as the Prince Regent took little 
interest in military matters, and Palmerston, who took over the post of Secretary at War in 
1809, involved himself fully in military affairs.33 This was to be the cause of friction 
between the Duke of York and Palmerston, from the outset. 
To the end of the American War of Independence, the Secretary at War had held the 
subordinate position,34 being seen by Lord Ligonier, the Commander in Chief during the 
26 Clode, Military Forces of the Crown, H, 340-1. 
27 See below, 1.4 - Adjutant General and Quartermaster General, 34-9. 
28 Dupin, Military Force of Great Britain, 1, 3-4; see also PRO WO 411961160, W. Dundas to W. Huskisson, 
15 th January 1803 . 
29 Clode, Military Forces of the Crown, I, 20 I, 265, 348. 
30 Memorandum Relative to the Promotion Department in the Commander-in-Chiefs Office, 28th August 
1808' Memorandum Relative to the Civil and Miscellaneous Department in the Commander-in-Chiefs 
Offic~, 28th' August 1808; Memorandum Relative to the Confidential Department in the Commander-in-
Chiefs Office, 28th August 1808. 
3) George lll, 1I; Pimlott, 'Administration of the British Army', 368; Wheeler, War Office, 56, states that the 
King believed himself to be 'a Heaven-sent military administrator'; James Hayes, 'The Royal House of 
Hanover and the British Army, 1714-60,' Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, XL (1957-8) 328-57, states 
that George II and III took both interest in and command of the army. 
32 Pimlott, 'Administration of the British Army,' 46, states that when the King was incapacitated in 1789, 
'no army business whatsoever was conducted. ' This is in complete contrast to his illnesses in 180 I, 1804, 
and 1810 to the establishment of the Regency, when there is no appreciable reduction in army business, 
revealing an Army administration able to function without the monarch. 
33 Clode, Military Forces of the Crown, II 264; Bourne, Palmerston, 105-110. 
34 Piers Mackesy, The War for America (London, 1964) 14-15; H.C.B. Rogers, The British Army in the 
Eighteenth Century (London, 1977) 33 . 
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Seven Years War, as merely 'a superior type of clerk.'35 Indeed by the terms of his military 
commission this was the case.36 However, during the period under discussion, as the 
responsibilities of both the War Office and Horse Guards increased, the involvement of the 
two offices in the workings of the Army created a conflict of interest,37 which was only 
settled, after protracted discussion,38 by a Royal Warrant in May 1812.39 It established a 
channel for dispute between the two offices, but most significantly clarified the position of 
both parties, in that all disputes between the them were to be settled by reference to the 
Prime Minister andlor the Chancellor of the Exchequer. These political office holders 
would be part of the same administration as the Secretary at War, therefore making an 
unbiased arbitration unlikely. In addition the warrant established the Commander in Chief 
as an office to be paid for out of the Parliamentary budget rather than the Army 
Extraordinary Account,40 thus potentially rendering even it subject to political 
interference.41 This situation made the maintenance of the post of Commander in Chief at 
the end of the conflict easier, but was also a cause for concern, as in doing so it weakened 
another major constitutional safeguard, that of monarchical involvement. The remaining 
martial powers of the crown were those which permitted the declaration of war, the 
granting of subsidies, and the formulating oftreaties,42 all of which were made under the 
direction of government. Only the royal veto remained independent of civilian government. 
Clode sees the maintenance of the post as a means of keeping the patronage of a newly 
expanded Army away from the crown,43 and while it would never remove the 'secret 
35 Rex Whitworth, Field Marshal Lord Ligonier (Oxford, 1958) 215. 
36 See for example BL Add. Ms. 37934, 45/6, Commission of William Windham, 11th July 1794; Clode, 
Military Forces of the Crown, 11, 264. 
37 Memorandum Relative Upon the Office of Secretary at War with Reference to the General Commander-
in-Chief, 16th August 1811. Several other members of the cabinet contributed to a series of ' observations' on 
the subject during the course of 1811. Clode, Military Forces of the Crown, 11, Appendix CXXX, 714-22 ; 
Appendix XXXI, 722-3. 
38 CUL, Percival, xiii, 18, Prince Regent to Percival, 28th February ISII; 30, Percival to Prince of Wales, 
9th March 1811; 31 , Percival to Prince of Wales, n.d.; 32, Prince of Wales to Percival, 5th March 1811 ; 34, 
Percival to Duke of York, 4th Arpri11812. 
39 Royal Warrant, 12th May 1812. Disputes between the two departments were in future to be settled through 
reference to the Prime Minister and/or the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who would arbitrate, and take the 
dispute to the monarch if necessary; Clode, Military Forces of the Crown, Il, 265. 
40 The Extraordinary Account consisted of ' sums which have been voted for the Ordinary Service of the 
Anny, and have not been taken out of the Exchequer,' 5th RCPA (1781) Appendix 6, 586; by inference this 
Account was surplus money, and was open to abuse, as it was checked only annually by a Treasury clerk, 
with little military knowledge, 10th RCPA (1783) 527; see also section covering the modernisation of the 
duties of the Paymaster in 3.3 The Paymaster General, 71-3 . 
41 The Royal Warrant stated that the budget allocation for the office of the Commander-in-Chief was to be 
no longer paid for as an Army Extraordinary but directly by the Treasury, following a vote in Parliament, 
Clode, Military Forces of the Crown, 11, 335. 
42 Dupin, Military Force of Great Britain I, 2. 
43 Clode, Military Forces of the Crown, 11, 354-5. 
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influence' of a monarch,44 it would ensure that the Army remained independent of the 
sovereign. When the Finance Committee of 1828 accepted that the Commander in Chief 
would answer only to the Secretary of State for War and Colonies, without reference to the 
King,45 any safeguard was effectively removed, in favour of civilian - political - control. 
By 1837 Wellington stated that 'the Commander in Chief cannot at this moment move a 
corporal ' s guard from hence to Windsor without going to a civil department for 
authority. '46 The transfer of the military into the control of the civilian authority was 
complete. 
2.3 THE SECRETARY AT WAR AND THE WAR OFFICE 
The effective removal of the seniority of the Commander in Chief came as the post 
of Secretary at War, as the head of the War Office, achieved both greater significance and 
authority.47 During most of the eighteenth century the Secretary at War had been an office 
responsible to the King,48 but this had been drastically altered by Burke during 1782-3.49 
By removing the responsibility for payment of the Army from the colonels of regiments, 
(or more correctly, their agents) and transferring it to the Secretary at War, the control of 
the colonels over their corps was reduced, and their ability to benefit fmancially from the 
Pay List was removed.50 In addition, the allocation of financial responsibility to the 
Secretary at War meant that that post was forced under the control of Parliament as the 
arbiter of public money, and made it subject to the vagaries of party politics.5I He was also 
given the responsibility for all aspects of spending on supply for the Army. The Secretary 
at War was a Privy Councillor, the spokesman on Army affairs in the Commons,52 and 
44 John W. Derry, Charles, Earl Grey: Aristocratic Reformer (Oxford, 1992) 11 . 
45 4th Report of the Select Committee on the state of the Public income and Expenditure of the United 
Kingdom (1828) 8-9. 
46 Clode, Military Forces of the Crown, n, 331 . WeIJington reiterated his comment the following year. 
WeIJington to Lord Melbourne, 4th January 1838, quoted in Cl ode, Military Forces of the Crown, IT, 
Appendix CXL VII. 
47 See Appendix 2, 267, for list of Secretaries at War. 
48 Hampden Gordon, The War Office (London, 1935) 38-9. 
49 Act for the better Regulation of the Office of Paymaster General of his Majesty's Forces, 2nd July 1782, 
22 Geo Ill, 81, Parliamentary History, XXUI, 134-5; Amendment to the Act, 3rd June 1783, 23 Geo. III 
c.50, Parliamentary History, XXJII, 993. (Pay Office Act) 
50 See also 3.3 The Paymaster General, 71 . 
51 Burke's Act was stimulated by the need to reform the Pay Office, the post of Paymaster General, and the 
fmancial structure of the army as a whole, as revealed in 5th RCPA (1781) and 6th RCPA (1782). 
52 O. Anderson, 'The Constitutional Position of the Secretary at War, 1642-1855,' JSAHR, XXXVI (June 
1958) 167. 
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from 1794 to 1809, a member of the Cabinet.53 As with the post of Commander in Chief, 
there was never a written description of the duties of the Secretary at War,54 and this 
merely adds weight to the argument of those who follow Fortescue's line that he was a 
'rather mysterious functionary.'55 Even the Royal Warrant of 1812 merely clarified the 
position of the office in relation to that of the Commander in Chief,56 establishing the 
Secretary at War's superiority, without describing the duties he was expected to perform. 
Through the course of the period the work-load of the Secretary at War increased 
along with the expanding Army, so that from 1782 to 1796 his staff at the War Office 
increased from twenty two to thirty five,57 and from 1798 to 1806 from forty one to 112,58 
despite legislation to the contrary. 59 Even with this expansion, at least one department was 
still unable to fulfil its duties in 1808, and resorted to paid over-time for its staff,60 
although the Commissioners of Military Enquiry of that year noted that the War Office was 
the only government office to work five rather than six hours daily.61 However, the 
Commissioners also informed of an increased efficiency in the War Office as a whole. All 
of the staff, except the Secretary at War, whose appointment was made by the government 
of the day, had been in post for some time, and therefore were familiar with the running of 
the office.62 By the end of the conflict the posts of Deputy Secretary at War and First 
Clerk, were seen as posts to be ' confided to responsible individuals of much experience,'63 
and as that experience increased, so to did their expectation of greater remuneration.64 Most 
members of staff were solely employed by the Secretary at War, with only an unspecified 
few holding more than one office.65 Previously a typical second post would be that of an 
unnamed clerk who was the military secretary of the Duke of Richmond, whose dual 
53 Gordon, War Office, 57; Palmerston refused a seat in the cabinet, believing he was too inexperienced, 
Boume, Palmerstan, 89. 
54 6th RCME (1808) 277. 
55 Fortescue, History afthe British Army, IV, 872. 
56 Royal Warrant, 12th May 1812; see above 26. 
57 l1h RSCF(1797) 358, 399, Appendix Q2. 
583rJh RSCF (1798) Appendix AI ; 6th RCME (1808) 280-83 ; See also PRO WO 40/32/3 'Staff of the War 
Office, 1809' 20 th December 1809. 
59 6th RCME (1808) 300, states legislation was introduced in 1783 and 1805 to limit the number of clerical 
staff. 
60 Ibid., 285-86. 
61 Ibid.. 288. The Admiralty, Treasury, Navy, Commissioners of the Navy; Commissioners of the Public 
Accounts, were all stated to work a six hour day. 
62 Ibid., 301. 
63 Dupin, Military Force of Great Britain, I, 169. nI 
64 PRO WO 4/426/346-353, Palmerston to Harrison, 23 September 1814. 
65 6th RCME (1808) 290. 
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employment would mean prolonged absence from the War Office.66 By 1808 the second 
jobs were stated to be compatible to their roles in the War Office, and 'the interruption to 
the business of the office, from the holding of these other employments, is not very 
·al '67 Th . 1 d maten. ese mc u ed clerks who were employed as translators and agents.68 
However, the Commissioners still suggested that even this type of employment should end, 
and concurred with the findings of the Select Committee on Finance in this respect.69 The 
main criticism that was levelled at certain members of the War Office staff, was the 
continued presence of sinecures. The contract for the compiling and printing of the Army 
List, which was held by Mr. Wilkinson, a principal clerk, was criticised, as the work was 
actually being done by a Mr. Ray within the War Office, at public expense.70 Likewise, a 
Mr. Merry, the Chief Examiner of Army Accounts, had been awarded the contract to 
supply coal to the Gibraltar garrison in 1793, with the approbation of the King. The 
Commissioners reported that such sinecures should continue only during the life of the 
present holders, and that in future all contracts of that nature should be submitted for 
competitive tender, as it would benefit the public, as well as reducing the confusion of such 
offices.11 The sinecure of the publication of the Army Lists was negotiated away by 
Wilkinson over the course of the next four years.72 In return for permitting the Stationary 
Office to produce the lists, and for the government to take the profits, he was to act as 
agent for the sales, and receive an emolument for each copy sold. The new system did not 
take full effect until 1812,73 but reduced the cost of producing the Army Lists by half,74 
and Wilkinson's income for this duty, from £103.3s, to £62.l1s.6d. in 1812, and £64.l7s. 
in 1813.15 The same system was also introduced for the production of the Militia Lists.76 
Merry relinquished his sinecure in return for the post of Deputy Secretary at War, and a 
66 ibid., Appendix 16. 
67 ibid. , 290. 
68 ibid., Appendix 8, numbers 11 , 23, 24, 25. 
69 22nd RSCF (1797) 452, Ill; 6th RCME (1808) 290. 
70 6th RCME (1808) 303. 
71 ibid., 291-3 . 
72 PRO WO 4/514/119 Harrison to Secretary at War, 8th July 1808; WO 4/5141122, James Pultney to 
, 51 
Harrison, 1st August 1808; WO 26/41/63-7, Harrison to Secretary at War, 1 August 1808; WO 40/28/4 
Harrison to Secretary at War, 30th Novem~er 1808; WO 4~515/~20-2, 'memorandum respe~tin~ the 
Publication of the annual Army List submItted to the consIderatIOn of the secretary at War, 24 December 
1811· WO 4/515/420 Pa1merston to Wilkinson, 8th February 1812. 
" th 
73 PRO WO 4/515/517-20, Wilkinson to Merry, 19 October 1812. 
74 PRO WO 4/515/417-24, Wilkinson to Secretary at War, 24th December 1811 . 
75 PRO WO 4/5161162, Wilkinson to Merry, 17th September 1813. 
76 PRO WO 4/5141120, Harrison to Secretary at War, 15th July 1808; WO 26/41/68-73, Harrison to Secretary 
at War; WO 4/514/122 Pultney to Harrison, 1st August 1808. 
33 
salary of £2,500 per annum, the year after the Commissioners' report.77 The removal of 
these sinecures would lead, not just to greater professionalism of War Office staff, but 
would also emphasise that the Crown no longer had complete control over the patronage of 
the Army's civilian departments. 
Despite the increase in the staff of the War Office, by the end of the conflict, 
rationalisation ensured that the office costs were more or less pegged. Substantial savings 
had been made by buying off former officers, who had previously been given weighty 
pensions, with lump sums. A report on the costs of the office in 1813, revealed that while 
wage bills increased by £ 1444 .15s, the previous year, the savings on allowances and 
pensions amounted to £5399.12s.4d, a net saving of £3954.17s.4d. 78 The saving made 
during 1813 was only £1000,79 but clearly the costs involved in the running of the office 
were being reduced. The increase in wage costs were as a result of an increase in the 
perceived expertise of the staff in the War Office, with many of the clerks dealing with 
tasks that had originally been intended for officers of a higher rank, and so requiring a rise 
in wages. 
The cost of the War Office had been traditionally met from fees , the money 
obtained from the recipients of pensions, leave of absence and half pay warrants, and the 
purchasers of commissions. These had been consolidated into one Fee Fund in November 
1797.80 However, from 1802 this proved insufficient and the deficit had to be made up 
from grants from Parliament. 81 By 1808, the cost of maintaining the War Office had 
increased so much, it was suggested that since the proportion of the budget met by fees was 
so negligible, it would be more efficient if the entire cost of the Office was derived from 
Parliamentary grants.82 The recommendation was approved by the House of Commons, 
taking effect in December.83 This was in keeping with the findings of the Commissioners 
for Examining Public Accounts, who were instrumental in the removal of fees from the 
business of the Customs and Excise departments, and had expressed that there was 'great 
77 PRO WO 40/32/3 George Harrisan, Treasury Office, to Merry, 20th December 1809. 
78 PRO WO 4/4261246-252, ' Increase and diminution in salaries, emoluments and expenses of the War 
Office.' 17th March 1813. 
79 PRO WO 4/426/346-353 Palmerston to Harrisan, 21" March 1814. 
80 IgJh RSCF (1797) 359; PRO WO 26/371290, War Office Circular, 1st November 1797; 36h RSCF (1798) 
681,685, Appendix A2. 
81 6th RCME (1808) 297-99; 
82 Ibid, 300. 
th 
83 PRO WO 26/41 /41, J. Pultney to Paymaster General, 29 December 1808. 
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reason to believe it may be applied to every department of govenunent. '84 Although it had 
taken some time, it had brought the War Office in line with other offices of state. This 
change in the source of fmance for the War Office was in many ways merely a cosmetic 
exercise, as by 1808, it was believed by those employed within it, that 'in matters of money, 
the War Office is considered as subordinate to the Board of the Treasury' and· , , 
although it is in the King's name the Secretary at War usually acts, yet, in many 
instances, he receives particular instructions from the Board of Treasury, and from 
the Secretary of State, and in various instances, where the Secretary at War may not 
think: proper to take upon himself the responsibility of a measure, he either makes 
an official application to the Board of Treasury, or applies personally to the King's 
confidential Servants for their concurrence. 85 
The War Office had become completely integrated into Parliamentary government, without 
recourse to the check of monarchical approval, nor any independence over its finances. The 
old sinecures had been removed, and in their place were salaried office holders, with 
substantial levels of professionalism and efficiency, and a career structure that would 
ensure fmancial reward for increased responsibility. In addition the War Office had been 
established as superior to the office of the Commander in Chief, further subordinating the 
military to the civilian. The maintenance of the office in 1815, ensured that a permanent 
civilian administration was maintained over the military, establishing the continuity of 
professional civil servants directing Army affairs that remains today. In 1837 the the Royal 
Commission under Lord Howick even recommended that it took over all military authority 
from the Commisariat , Master General of Ordnance and the Commander in Chief. 86 
2.4 ADJUTANT GENERAL AND QUARTER-MASTER GENERAL 
As stated in the discussion of the office of the Commander in Chief, two other posts 
within the Horse Guards, and subordinate to those described above, came to prominence 
during the Wars with France. Originating in 1673,87 it was not until the Duke of York's 
84 Journal of the House o/Commons, xxxviii, 714. 
85 6th RCME (1808) 279. Evidence given by Mr. Lewis, 'whose experience in the business of the War Office 
has been very great.' 
86 pp {I 837) xxxiv,8-16, 27th February 1837. 
87 PRO WO 24/3, 'General Establishments of all His Majesties guards, Garrisons, and Land Forces, 
Commencing the xith of November 1673.' The post of Adjutant General appears on Estimates for the first 
time. 
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tenure of the Commander in Chiefs post, that the offices of Adjutant General and Quarter-
Master General achieved such importance,88 although General Stewart, Adjutant General 
under Wellinton in the Peninsula, still complained that both offices did not have the 
importance they had in the armies of other states.89 During times of peace the two offices 
came under the jurisdiction of the Secretary at War, but when a Commander in Chief was 
appointed, as with Amherst in 1793, they became a part of his staff,90 although their actual 
appointment only came under the control of the Duke of York in 1795.91 Initially the 
occupants of the posts held the brevet rank of Army colonels.92 However, as the Wars 
progressed and their departments expanded, they were granted general officer rank and 
pay.93 Within both departments, all expenditure beyond the accepted estimate had to be 
sanctioned by the Secretary at War, who also had to authorise staff appointments.94 This is 
further endorsement of the subordinate role which developed for the Commander in 
Chief's office, and the departments within it. 
The funding of the departments had traditionally been through estimates submitted 
by the Secretary at War, with the monies deposited in the accounts of the office holders, 
making them 'public accountants.' An enquiry of 1782 had found that officers of the 
Quartermaster General's department had gained £417,592 at the public expense in this 
way.95 This system continued until 1803, when, as a result of a recommendation from 
Charles Yorke, the Secretary at War, both the departments were requested to, 'render half-
yearly Accounts (with vouchers) of their actual disbursements, for the salaries of their 
Clerks, for stationary, and for the other usual contingencies of their respective Offices ' .96 
By 1810 this system was so well established that the Quartermaster General stated 'it is a 
general principle in the Quartermaster General's department that no officer of it is to 
become a public accountant. ' 97 In this manner a major step in the modernisation of military 
88 Captain Owen Wheeler, The War Office Past and Present (London, 1914) 68-9. 
89 DoIL0/C/18/521298-306, Stewart to CastIereagh, 24th August 1809. 
90 Clode, Military Forces of the Crown, n, 340-1. 
91 John Sweetrnan, War and Administration: the significance of the Crimean War for the British Army 
(Edinburgh, 1984) 77. 
92 Rogers, British Army in the Eighteenth Century, 35 . 
93 PRO WO 4/196.160, William Dundas to Huskisson, 15th January 1803; 11th RCME, (1810) Appendix 11 , 
A4,80-1. 
94 11th RCME(l810) 6, 15. 
95 Clode, Military Forces of the Crown, I, 136. 
96 11th RCME (1810) 33, Appendix 11, AI. Charles Yorke to Duke of York, 19th January 1803. 
97 NLS, Murray Papers, 60/45-7, Murray to Cathcart, 16th June 1810. 
administration took place, with two of the principal office holders losing their rights to 
process funds through their own accounts. 
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Although the two departments 'ranked together with regard to their consequence 
and importance in the Army,'98 the Adjutant General's office was always responsible for a 
greater work-load, and, as a consequence, employed a larger staff. In 1792 the department 
occupied two rooms in Crown Street, Westminster,99 and employed the Adjutant General, 
his deputy, and two clerks, at a cost excluding wages of £520.100 By 1808 the staff of the 
office had increased to include the Adjutant General, a Deputy Adjutant General, an 
Assistant Deputy Adjutant General, (and eleven other Assistants in the military districts), 
fourteen clerks, three messengers, and an office keeper,lol at a cost of £1537.1s.1d. per 
year. 102 Even after the Wars, the cost of the department continued to rise, and by 1827 had 
reached £6806.6s. 2d. 103 
The duties of the Adjutant General's department were 'all matters relating to the 
discipline, arming, and clothing of the Troops,'l04 and as a consequence 'must depend on 
the state of the Military Force of the Country, and means which it has been judged 
necessary from time to time to adopt for the purpose of maintaining, regulating, and 
increasing that force.'105 Through the period under discussion the department's duties 
would clearly expand along with the augmentation of the Army, and also that of the 
various volunteer corps. However, the department 'assumed a new and important 
character,' when it took over the responsibility for regular regimental returns for troops in 
Britain in 1793,106 and foreign stations in 1795,107 together with the regulation of officers 
movements when in Britain, in 1797,108 and the compilation of returns for submission to 
98 11th RCME (1SIO)3 . 
99 Clode, Military Forces of the Crown, JI , 340. 
lOO 11th RCME (I SIO) 6. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Clode, Military Forces of the Crown, 11, 341 . 
103 4th Report of the Select Committee on the State of the Public Income and Expenditure of the United 
Kingdom (1828) 192. 
10411thRCME(1810)3 . 
105 Ibid., 4 . 
106 PRO WO 3127/161, William Fawcett to Generals of Districts, 22nd July 1793. See also 2.8 Inspection, 53. 
107 PRO WO 3/19/ 101 , William Fawcett to General Prescott, 5th December 1798; Clode, Military Forces of 
the Crown, n, 341. 
108 PRO WO 3/171286 Harry Calvert to Officers Commanding in Chief on Foreign Stations, 11 th November 
, th 
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the monarch, the Commander in Chief, and the government, in 1798.109 It expanded still 
further in 1807, when the duties of the newly abolished post of[nspector General of 
Recruiting were transferred to the control of the Adjutant General. I 10 The absorbing of 
these duties was seen as a means of simplifying that area of the administration of the 
Army, while at the same time saving the public money. Although only reducing the 
manpower required from 252 to 216, by merely dispensing with the services of the 
Inspector General, General Whitelock, £3400 per annum in wages was saved. I I I With these 
additions, tied to the Adjutant General's traditional role of the issuing of General Orders to 
the whole Anny, the department became the key to the implementation of reform and the 
maintenance of control throughout the Army, which was to prove essential in its 
development during the course of the Wars. 
The department of the Quartermaster General was responsible for the movement of 
the troops, including the procuring of information which would enable such movement. It 
expanded along with the other departments within the office of the Commander in Chief, 
as the needs of the Wars dictated. In 1793, the department was contained in one room 
within the War Office, and consisted the Quartermaster General and his secretary.1I2 By 
1809, this had increased to the Quartermaster General, his Deputy, thirteen Assistants, 
seventeen temporary Assistants, three Deputy Assistants, three temporary deputy 
Assistants, two draftsmen, a confidential clerk, six clerks, an office keeper, a housekeeper, 
a servant, and three messengers.1l3 However, when the department's records were 
requested by the Commissioners of Military Enquiry in 1809, only those after 1803 could 
be produced. I 14 Such a situation is all-the-more surprising for a department within the 
office of the Commander in Chief, at the time of the dominance of the Duke of York, when 
his reforms and efficiency are usually what is noted. It would suggest that he did not have 
as tight a control over the Army as is usually stated, if he did not even have such control 
over one of his own departments. 
There were two major additions to the duties of the Quartermaster General ' s 
department during the course of the period under discussion. The first concerns the 
109 Clode, Military Forces of the Crown, 1,387; 11, 34J. 
110 PRO WO 30/44/37, General Order, 1st June 1807; 11th RCME (1810) 4. 
I11 II th RCME (1810) 7. 
112 Clode, Military Forces of the Crown, 11, 340. 
113 IIth RCME (1810) 15. 
1141bid., 13. 
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movement of troops, I 15 which prior to 1803 had been a somewhat complicated affair. To 
move a body of men an order was made out in the Quartermaster General ' s department in 
the form of a memorandum, with notes to all Commanders of Districts through which they 
would travel, as well as to the Barrack Office, Commissary General, and the Admiralty 
Transport Board if necessary. This would be sent to the Secretary at War, who, after 
copying and endorsing would send it on to the relevant parties. In 1803 it was suggested 
that the Quartermaster General ' s department be made responsible for all areas of 
movement, and for all correspondence connected with it, with both civil and military 
departments, on receipt of a formal signature from the Secretary at War or his Deputy. I 16 
The suggestion was implemented, despite it ' being attended with a considerable addition of 
expense to the Public,' 117 as clearly it would simplify the movement of an ever-expanding 
Army, expected to operate across the globe. It also placed the movement of troops under 
the control of the Quartermaster General, directly sanctioned, not by the Commander in 
Chief, his direct superior in Horse Guards, but by the Secretary at War in the War Office. 
This is further evidence of the subordination of the Army to civilian authority. By the 
simplification of the system of transport responsibility for the movement of troops was 
placed under the jurisdiction of one man, the Secretary at War. 
The second area of expansion came with the establishing, during 1805, of the Depot 
for Military Knowledge. I 18 It was to be the repository for drawings, books, plans, maps and 
memoirs, along the lines of the French Depot. 119 It received a grant of £2000 to set it in 
motion, under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel John Brown. 120 Initially the establishing 
of the Depot was delayed through lack of space, which was not solved until an additional 
storey was added to part of Horse Guards, and an extra room acquired from another 
department. 121 However, by 1809, so little had been procured by the depot, that the initial 
£2000 had been sufficient for its maintenance for the previous four years.l22 This is another 
liS Ibid. , 13; see also 7.2 Shipping, 222-28. 
116 PRO WO 11630/465-9 Robert Brownrigg, Quartennaster General, to York, 26th March 1803 ; WO 
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surprising example of the inefficiency of the Quartermaster General's department, and one 
which would prove very costly, particularly during the early campaigns in the Peninsula. 
The departments of the Adjutant General and Quartermaster General expanded to 
unprecedented levels following their transfer to the control of the Commander in Chiefs 
office in 1793, although at all times their expenditure beyond the estimates was controlled 
by the Secretary at War. In 1803, later than most other departments, the holders of these 
offices ceased to be public accountants, with all payments made under the voucher system, 
and their pay increased to £1 per day above that of their normal Army pay.I23 The main 
area of expansion of the Adjutant General's department was in the inspection of the troops 
and the compilation and dissemination of data, which was to make it the key department in 
the implementation of reform and the maintenance of control, throughout the Army. The 
addition of transport co-ordination to the duties of the Quartermaster General, brought the 
movement of troops under the control of one man for the fust time, but this responsibility 
was not vested in a military man, but in the civilian Secretary at War. The efficiency of the 
Quartermaster General's department, despite being part of the jurisdiction of the Duke of 
York, during his tenure of the office of Commander in Chief, was called into question first 
by its inability to submit any documents prior to 1803, to the Commissioners of Military 
Enquiry in 1809, and second by the early failings of the Depot for Military Knowledge. 
These latter problems might suggest that the question of efficiency could be another reason 
why civilians increasingly came to dominate the affairs of the Army. 
2.5 SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (AND COLONIES) 
The ultimate civilian authority over the Army was vested in the Secretary of State 
for War and Colonies, which was itself a product of the Wars with France. In 1793 the 
structure of government placed the Army under the control of two offices; the Foreign and 
Colonial Office, which was responsible for the Army abroad; and the Home Office, which 
was responsible for the Army in Britain. This separation of authority was potentially 
disruptive, with each demanding troops for its own purpose, and was changed within a year 
of the outbreak of the Wars, upon the creation of the office of Secretary of State for War. 124 
123 PRO WO 4/196/160, W. Dundas to W. Huskisson, 15th January 1803. 
124 This change was not merely for military expediency. When the Portland Whigs joined Pitt's government 
in July 1794, part of the arrangement involved the Duke of Portland taking over from Henry Dundas at the 
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In 1798 the office took over responsibility for colonial affairs. This was seen by Dupin as 
an obvious marriage. He stated that, 
In England, where the navy is far more powerful than the Army, the government of 
the colonies is associated with the superintendence and direction of military 
operations; while, in France, where the maritime authority has much less influence 
in the government, it is yet entrusted with the command of the colonies. But a 
sufficient explanation can, I conceive, be given of this apparent political paradox. 
From the very circumstance that the dominion of the seas is possessed by the 
British navy, the transport of troops and stores from mother-country to the colonies 
becomes merely a secondary object, gained without danger or difficulty. There are 
not more obstacles to communication between Great Britain and America than , 
between England and Ireland, and the ministry of war can dispatch succours across 
the Atlantic and the Irish Channel with equal facility. It is, therefore, natural that 
the executive power of the Army, and the defence of the colonies, should rest in the 
same hands. But in France, on the contrary, the greatest obstacle to the defence and 
preservation of the colonies arises from the contingencies of the ocean. 125 
Glover criticised the amalgamation as effectively creating two half-time posts. 126 However, 
rather than weakening both offices, the amalgamation can be seen as an integral part of a 
policy of colonial expansion and consolidation. It would aid the development of the British 
Empire throughout the nineteenth century, moving the emphasis of the military away from 
the European theatre of war, and placing it firmly upon the defence of British colonial 
interests. 
During the Wars, the Secretary of State was the military voice of the cabinet. His 
was the ultimate authority over the Army and the Ordnance, in respect of their employment 
and supply, and therefore the figure most likely to attract criticism. Neither Glover or 
Fortescue have much in the way of praise for any holder of this office, excepting 
Castlereagh.127 But neither had time for any civilian interference in military affairs, and so 
a directing civil office would be seen as a disruptive influence. Instead the Secretary of 
State was an integral part of the political structure of Great Britain, and any conflict of 
interest between the various offices of state 128 was merely a consequence of cabinet 
government. 
Home Office. The new Secretaryship therefore owed as much to Pitt's desire to keep Dundas close to him, as 
to the perceived need for a Minister of War. Later Correspondence o/George. 111, Vo!. II, 1-220. 
125 Dupin, Military Force o/Great Britain, 1,32-4. 
126 R. Glover, Preparation, 15. 
127 Fortescue, County Lieutenancies, 234; R. Glover, Preparation, 32. 
128 R. Glover, Preparation, 28. 
The Secretary of State was rarely a military man, but that was not considered of 
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great importance, as his role was the direction of policy rather than the intricacies of the 
Army. Dupin observed, 'It will be seen that the duties of the minister of war and colonies 
have no relation to the technical details of the military service, and are of a nature almost 
entirely political' .129 However, in 1809 it was deemed necessary to add a second Under-
Secretary of State to the office of the Secretary of War and Colonies. This post was to be 
filled by a military officer, who was to advise the Secretary on martial matters. 130 This 
would prove vitally important in the understanding of the developing civilian authority 
over the military. 
2. 6 COMMANDERS IN THE FIELD 
In military operations the role of the Secretary of State was purely directional. The 
government chose the military commander, but imposed no specific plan on him, instead 
giving him a general object for the expedition, and leaving the military decisions to him. 
However, this required a good working relationship between the two, and could be the 
source of friction. The Letter of Service of the field commander effectively gave him 
absolute authority over the troops under his command, J3I permitting him to hold Courts 
Martial, and issue warrants for the settlement of expenses. Ward sees the creation of such a 
powerful military officer as precisely what Britain had been trying to avoid for 150 
years. 132 But, it is difficult to see in what other manner the Army in the field could be 
controlled, when at times it was completely out of contact with its civilian masters. l33 This 
virtual delegation of ministerial authority was tempered by the fact that the commander had 
no power to select his own senior officers, beyond his personal staff,134 and he still relied 
upon the structure of the Army in Britain for supply. The view of the elder Pitt had been, 
that in order to render any general completely responsible for his conduct he should 
be made as far as possible inexcusable ifhe should fail, and that, consequently, 
129 Dupin, Military Force a/Great Britain, I, 38. 
130 Ward Wellington 's Headquarters, 16. 
, d 
J3I See for example, PRO HO 5111471118, Royal Warrant, 2n September 1793 ; WO 6/201242, Royal 
Warrant for York, Ilrh September 1799; GRE-A, 829, Portland to Grey, 9th August 1796. 
132 Ward, Wellington 's Headquarters. 32. 
133 See 7.7 Communication, 243-52. 
134 See for example, PRO WO 3/1 11214, Fawcett to Duke of Richmond, Commander of Southern District, 
15 th November 1793, informing him of appointments to his staff; Ward, Wellington's Headquarters , 31-2. 
whatever an officer entrusted with a service of confidence requests should be 
complied with. 135 
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At the outbreak of the Wars with France, through the inability of the state to comply with 
the wishes of their field commanders, this statement was found to be true. Blame for failure 
was diverted from the field commanders and on to those in higher authority, such as 
Amherst. 136 By the time of Moo re's appointment to the command of the Army in Portugal 
in 1808, the Secretary of State, Castlereagh, was complying with Pitt's suggestion, and 
furnishing him, as best as he could, with all his requests for men and supplies. l37 In this 
way any criticism of the expedition was directed at the general, and not the minister. 138 
In the same manner the Duke of York's active service ended due to his own 
incompetence as a field commander, and through the ability of the government to chose the 
leader of armies on foreign service. Taking control of the expedition to the United 
Provinces in 1793,139 his failure was such that it generated substarltial criticism in Britain, 
and much popular debate, 140 which ensured that he did not command another field Army. 
The debate was resurrected when, as Commander in Chief, he was in line to command the 
Army against an invading French force,141 a debate which was only solved by the passing 
of the threat of invasion. Significantly, his failings ensured that the command of the Army 
by any member of the royal family became less likely. During the Wars, most of the royal 
dukes and princes held general officer rank, but without any active involvement in the 
135 Beckles Wilson, The Life and Letters of James Wolfe (London, 1909) 410-11, as quoted in Ward, 
Wellington 's Headquarters, 32-3. 
136 See above, 2.2 Commander-in-Chief, 24-9; see also for example GRE-A, 186a, Henry Dundas to Grey, 
6th December 1793, regarding the difficulties experienced in supplying Grey with Fresh meat. 
137 Dupin, Military Force of Great Britain, I, 37. 
138 See for example PD, XIII, (1809) 799-802, 805-809, House of Lords, 24th March 1809. 
139 PRO HO 51/147/108 or 109,128, Commission of York as General and Commander-in-Chief offorces in 
the United Provinces. 
140 See for example, An Englishman, The Prince of Wales, A Second Plain Letter to His Royal Highness, 
wherein His Plain Duties to Himself. his Wife, His Child, and to the Country, are more plainly shewn than in 
the first; also that His Royal Highness is an accomplished gentleman, a virtuous man, a good Christian, and 
a sound philosopher. With remarks on the correspondence upon his claim for military rank and employment; 
which likewise prove the Duke of York to be a great author, a good swimmer, and an able general (London, 
n.d.); An Englishman, The Duke of York. A Leller to HRH, or, A Delicate Inquiry into the doubt whether he 
be more favoured by Mars or Venus, with Hints about Dunkirk - Holland - The Army - The Case and 
Treatment of the Hon. A. C. Johnstone - Remarks of General Fitzpatrick's consistency (London, 1807); The 
Present State of the British Army in Flanders; with an Authentic Account of their Retreatfrom Before 
Dunkirlc. By A British Officer in that Army, who was living on the 24th of September (London, 1794). 
141 The Bonne-Bouche of Epicurean Rascality; dedicated to the worst man in His Majesty 's Dominions; 
containing more ample elucidations of the conduct of His Royal Highness the Duke of York, as Commander 
in Chief; with some remarks on the policy of his commanding the army in case of invasion: to which is added 
a postscript, containing a corrosive Styptic to the poisonous Effects of a Pamphlet announcedfor 
Publication, entitled. "The Agent and His Natural Son. " (London, 1807). 
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conflict. The Duke of Gloucester, the king's brother, became a Field Marshal on 12th 
October 1793,142 and died on 25 th August 1805, without ever taking command of a force. 
Prince Edward, Duke of Kent, became a Major General on 2nd October 1793, a full General 
on 12th January 1796, and a Field Marshal on 5th September 1805. 143 His only active 
command was of a brigade during the Grey-Jervis expedition to the West lndies, during 
1794, but even here, having arrived in March, 144 he was little more than a 'spectator,' at the 
taking of Martinique, 145 and he returned to the Nova Scotia as Governor the following 
month. 146 In 1802 he was appointed Governor of Gibraltar, 147 but his efforts to restore 
order resulted in a mutiny l48 and his recall, after which he took no further part in the war, 
despite requesting active duty. 149 Prince Ernest, Duke of Cumber land, and Prince 
Adolphus, Duke of Cambridge, were both commissioned in the Hanovarian Anny in 
1792,150 seeing service with the Duke of York in the Low Countries. 151 On 25 th April 1808, 
they were both promoted to full Generals in the British Anny, and Field Marshals on 26th 
November 1813. However, despite several requests for permission to join expeditions, 
neither was permitted to play a part in any active service. 152 
The Duke of Cumber land was forthright in his belief that it was the political 
influence of the newspapers that was preventing the service of the royal princes, in 
particular the Duke of York. He made it clear where he placed the blame for the 
appointment of Sir John Moore instead of York, to lead the expedition in Spain. 
142 All commission dates from Army List, (I 793), (1796), (1805), (1809), (1816). 
143 PRO HO 51/147/ 110, Royal Warrant, 2nd October 
144 George lll, 1030, Prince Edward to the King. 
145 Michael Duffy, Soldiers, Sugar and Sea power: The British Expeditions to the West lndies and the War 
against Revolutionary France (Oxford, 1987) 82. 
146 George lll. 1051, Prince Edward to the King, 23'd April 1794; see also SRO G5\111609, Henry Hamilton 
to Henry Dundas, 23rd July 1794, containing an extract from Governor J. Wentworth from Halifax Nova 
Scotia, on the merits of Prince Edward taking command there, 22nd July 1794. 
147 George lll. 2603, Duke of York to the King, 23n1 March 1802. 
148 John Brooke, King George III (London, 1972) 561. 
149 George Ill, 3597, Duke of Kent to the King, 6th February 1808; The King to Duke of Kent, 9th February 
1808, request for active service, rejected. 
ISO George llI, 806, Prince Adolphus to the King, 2nd November 1792; 809, Prince Adolphus to the King, 
November 1792. 
151 George III 876 Prince Ernest to the King, 3n1 May 1793; Duke of York to the King, 6th August 1793; 
" th Prince Adolphus to the King, 26 August 1793. 
152 George Ill, 17 I 8, Prince Emest to the King, 14th April 1798, request to be given any military post 
rejected; 200 I, Prince Adolphus to the King, 151 August 1799, request to take part in the Helder expedition 
rejected' 2466 Prince Adolphus to the Kin~, 5th July 180 I, request to be given any military post rejected; 
3699 D~e of Cumber land to the King, 30 July 1808; The King to Duke of Cumber land, 1st August 1808, requ~st to join Peninsula expedition refused. 
Ha~ the M~sters not been so frightened by newspapers they would not have 44 
~esltate sendmg out the Commander in Chief, who from his station in life and rank 
m the ~y was the proper person to command, but, fearing the attacks of papers, 
~ey ~acnfice the good of the Army and appointed a man perfectly inadequate to the 
sltuatI?n both from his want of capacity and want of experience ... Should, however, 
he go m the supreme command then the door is open for other Generals to serve, 
and at least 1 might have an opportunity of serving my country, which I long for, 
and really it is a disgraceful thing that in such a great cause as this, that none of the 
King's sons are with the Army. 153 
While Cumberland blamed the newspapers for the choice of Moore for the expedition to 
Spain, his words shed even more light on the reasons behind the decision. Not only had the 
royal princes proved inept in command, they were also too senior to be given anything 
except the head of an expedition. By 1808 York and Kent were the only two Field 
Marshals in the Army, while Cumberland and Cambridge had been promoted to full 
General. Were they to be sent on an expedition, they would almost certainly have needed to 
be given its command, as there were few senior to them who were not of an age to debar 
them from service abroad. That the command of the Spanish expedition was given to a 
Lieutenant General of only middling seniority suggests that the government had decided to 
send a competent officer, rather than a prince of the blood, further distancing the operation 
of the Army, not only from the Commander in Chief, but also from the crown. 
In the same way, the government had superseded Lieutenant General Sir Arthur 
WeIlesley in 1808, even after his victories, and despite his popularity and political 
influence, with two more senior men of the same rank, Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir Harry 
Burrard. Both men were still junior to any of the royal princes, but were chosen to 
command the largest expeditionary force Britain had ever put into the field. Despite 
criticism of the government's ' striking ineptitude' over the appointments,154 it is clear they 
were merely exerting their authority, and appointing more senior men to command a vital 
campaign. That the chosen commanders were inept, is not for this thesis to examine. What 
is important was that the civilian government had the power to appoint their own 
commanders, and chose to overlook the king's sons, and the influential Wellesley, in 
favour of men they preferred, and with whom they believed they could work towards the 
aims of the government, not those of the Army or the crown. 
153 Eldon MSS, as quoted in George JIl, 3699n, Duke of Cumber land to Sir James Scott, 14th October 1808; 
see also The Objections to the appointment ofFrederick, Duke of York and A/bany to the command of the 
British Army in Spain briefly answered (London, 1808) passim. 
154 See for example, Michael Glover, Britannia Sickens: Sir Arthur Wel/es/ey and the Convention ofCinlra 
(London, 1970) 66. 
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A good working relationship was essential between the field commanders and their 
Secretary of State. Despite the problems created by Cintra, Castlereagh was able to work 
well with his family-friend Wellesley,155 as was Lord Liverpool, who took over the 
Secretaryship in November 1809. 156 Wellesley appears to have sought to have a similar 
association with each holder of the post. Despite regularly writing in critical terms 
regarding deficiencies in men, money and supplies,157 he was always deferential and 
accepting of the position of the civilian minister above him. 158 In particular he attempted to 
distance himself from the party politics being waged at home, stating 'we must keep the 
spirit of party out of the Army, or we shall be in a bad way indeed. ' 159 He continued in this 
vein, even when he became the target of opposition criticisms,160 or when his brothers 
became leading figures in the opposition, and his grievances could have fuelled their 
arguments. 161 In fact Wellington's correspondence with the civilian minister increased as 
the war progressed. From April 1809 to April 1810, he sent 147 letters to the Secretary of 
State. This was maintained throughout the Peninsular campaign, reaching 238 for the 
twelve months to April 1814.162 It is significant that the increase in contact between the 
field commander and the Secretary of State developed after the Duke of York had vacated 
the office of Commander in Chief following the Mary-Anne Clarke affair, suggesting that 
the absence of his influence in some way enabled greater contact, and consequently greater 
Parliamentary control of the Army. Even after York's return in 1811, the Duke sent only 
thirteen letters to his office, until the end of the campaign. 163 It shows an awareness on the 
part of Wellington of the established channels of communication, and the protocol of the 
155 John K. Severn, 'The Wellesleys and Iberian Diplomacy, 1808-12' in Norman Gash (ed.), Wellington: 
Studies in the military and political career of the First Duke of wellington (Manchester, 1990) 36. 
156 WD, v, 317, Wellington to Liverpool, 28th November 1809. 
157 See for example WD, iv, 425, Wellesley to Castlereagh, 14th June 1809; viii, 270, Wellington to 
Liverpool, 11th September 1811; xi, 373, Wellington to Bathurst, 15th December 1813; (men) iv, 456, 
Wellesley to Castlereagh, 22nd June 1809; iv, 583, Wellington to Liverpool, 20th March 1810; xi, 459, 
Wellington to Bathurst, 16th January 1814; (money) iv, 528, Wellington to Castlereagh, 24th July 1809;v, 
217, Wellington to Liverpool, 20th June 1810; xi, 517, Wellington to Bathurst, 13th February 1814, 
(supplies). 
158 WD, v, 317, Wellington to Liverpool, 28th November 1809; ix, 270, Wellington to Bathurst, 4th July 
1812; Neville Thompson, ' Lord Bathurst and the Administration of the Peninsular War, 1812-14,' in Alice 
D. Berkeley, New Lights on the Peninsular War. International congress on the Iberian peninsula. Selected 
papers 1780-1840 (Almada, Portugal, 1991) 157-164. 
159 WD. v, 404, WeJlington to Liverpool, 2nd January 1810. 
160 WD. v, 404, Wellington to Liverpool, 2nd January 18 \0; v, 542, Wellington to Liverpool, 1st March 
1810; see also Smith, Earl Grey, 173-4. 
161 Thompson, 'Lord Bathurst and the Administration of the Peninsular War,' 157. 
162 WD, xiii, 146-186. 
163 WD, xiii, 209, eleven to the Commander-in-Chief; ix, 603, one to the Quartermaster General; vii, 441, 
one to the Adjutant General. 
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ml ltary erarc y. Despite his popularity in Britain and within the Army, he did not forget 
that he was the commander of an expedition directed by the cabinet in London, and not 
independent of political, and therefore civilian control. 
2.7 ARMY ORGANISATION 
The dramatic alteration in the civil and military hierarchical structure of the Army, 
was not mirrored in the basic military organisation. The troops a field commander 
controlled were divided into the basic unit of Army organisation, the battalion of 
infantryl64 or the regiment of cavalry. They were commanded by a colonel, although 
always in absentia militarily by a lieutenant-colonel,165 and administratively by an agent, 1 66 
making the colonelcy of a regiment something of a sinecure, the distribution of which was 
held by the king. The colonels had substantial authority, being responsible for all aspects of 
a unit's existence. They were perceived to have even greater power than they actually 
possessed, due to their association with the usurpation of civil authority by the generals 
during the Commonwealth. 167 As a result, checks were placed upon their power, such as 
the purchase system, which removed much of the authority over patronage from them. 168 
Through the period under discussion further limitations were placed upon their control of 
the patronage within their own corps, 169 and an increasing number of Army-wide 
regulations were introduced which took away certain of their powers, such as their choice 
of training system, 170 and restricted the use of others, such as the regulating of uniform and 
equipment. 171 In fact the colonels were to become merely the middle management of the 
Army, men whose power and control was to diminish through the course of the Wars with 
France. In 1793 there were 116 regular infantry battalions and cavalry regiments, which by 
1815, had increased to more than 350. As the Army expanded, and its regulation tightened, 
the proportionate ability of the colonels to affect anything except the management of their 
164 In most cases, the tenn battalion and regiment can be used synonymously when referring to the infantry. 
However, as described later, the addition of further battalions to the strength of certain regiments means that 
using the tenn battalion is subject to less confusion. 
165 This rank was effectively the last permitted to be purchased. 
166 See 3.6 Agency, 82-91. 
167 Clode, Military Forces of the Crown. 1,28. 
168 Ibid. 1,67-8, 72, 85,92. 
169 See for example, GRE-A, 868, Circular Letter, Windham to Grey 30th September 1796; Pimlott, 
'Administration of the British Army,' 91. 
170 See 5.2 Drill, 164-8 
171 See Chapter 6.4 Clothing and Equipment, 202-13 . 
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own corps ecame restncted to those of their number with power and influence beyond the 
Army. 
As a result of the Dutch crisis of 1787, the strength of infantry battalions was raised 
from eight to ten companies, with a strength of about 400 men. 172 Their wartime 
establishment of between 600 and 1000 men was only re-introduced after the Nootka 
Sound crisis, in 1 790,173 although as late as 1807, many regiments still functioned at the 
lower establishment, and were encouraged by the Duke of York to move towards the 
higher figure. 174 No further additions to their strengths were introduced, even during the 
Wars. Instead, within the infantry, there was a move towards the establishment of further 
battalions of the same regiment, with parallel organisations under the same colonel, but 
with separate lieutenant-colonels. m This was particularly popular with Pitt, who used 
recruits from the abortive Additional Force and Voluntary Consolidation Acts, to establish 
the principle in several regiments of the line. 176 The concept was never established Army-
wide, and since seniority within the regiment always lay with the first battalion, there was a 
tendency for the second battalion (and any subsequent battalions) to be weaker, having 
supplied the best men to the parent formation. A regiment which sent out a single battalion 
on campaign would always send its best men, drawn from all battalions, and so any 
remaining battalion would often be both under strength, and full of second rate soldiers. 177 
However, it would ensure that the first battalion was maintained up to strength, a luxury 
which was often impossible for single battalion regiments. Occasionally, more than one 
battalion of a regiment would see service at the same time. In these circumstances they 
would operate as entirely separate entities, and would be treated as such by the field 
172 PRO WO 26/33/195, Royal Warrant, 25th September 1787. 
173 Pimlott, 'Administration of the British Army,' 293-9. 
174 PRO WO 1/635/449, York to Castlereagh, 25th August 1807. 
175 PRO WO 40128/9, lW. Gordon, Horse Guards, to Moore, War Office, 14th June 1808; WO 40/2 813 , 
York to Colonel G. Harris, 73rd Regiment, 23rd December 1808; Clode, Military Forces o/the Crown, 11, 60; 
Londonderry, Cas//ereagh Correspondence, VIII, 65 ; R. Glover, Preparation, 231 ; See also 4 .2 Expansion, 
104-10. Within the cavalry, the idea of additional formations was never attempted. 
176 R. Glover, Preparation, 231; See also 4.3 Intervention, 117-9. 
177 See for example BP, Charles Booth to Thomas Booth, 6th August 1805, 'a second battalion is never so 
well looked after as a first, . . . because the raw recruits joining by one or two at a time keep the battalion, 
(which is nearly composed of them) in constant drill in the marching manual and platoon exercise &c., and 
when they are sufficiently acquainted with which, they join (iffme men) the I s..Batt:n. and ~ reap the 
fruits of oyr labour'; William Booth to Thomas Booth, 19th October 1806, the 1st Battalion of the 95th 
(Rifle) Regiment of Foot was sent on service in 1806, and consisted of men from each battalion over five feet 
eight inches in height, 'most of them above five feet ten and eleven.' Oman, Welling/on's Army, 180, states 
that there were exceptions to this general rule, with certain second battalions remaining in England with near 
full strengths, although he does concede that they would include 'the weak and ineffective men' not only of 
the second battalion , but also the first. 
commander. Sir Charles Oman examined all such formations, and found that even when 48 
these battalions fell below a fighting strength, they would be sent home rather than merged 
with what should have been their parent formation. This is an example of two distinct 
developments which can be observed during the course of the period. First, by sending the 
battalions home to recruit, the separate battalions would theoretically be brought up to 
strength, maintaining several, rather than a single unit for potential use. Secondly, the 
patronage within the entire corps was essential to the power of the colonels, and therefore 
could not be removed without recourse to compensation. 178 Despite the demise of the 
structure of additional battalions in the intervening years,179 it was to be an integral part of 
the reforms of Card well in 1871,180 and a means to massively augment forces during the 
two world Wars. 181 
From 1788, the composition of a line battalion of infantry was eight centre or 
battalion companies, and one each oflight and grenadier. 182 The grenadiers took the right 
of the line, and were considered the smarter men of the unit, invariably taller, although by 
the period in question little specific training was given to them. The light company took the 
left of the line and were given some additional training, in particular to enable them to 
extend and cover the remaining companies of the battalion when formations were 
changed. IS3 Battalions designated as Light Infantry or Rifle, consisted of ten identical 
companies. The compliment of officers in a line battalion in 1793, was two lieutenant-
colonels, two majors, six captains, one captain-lieutenant, and twenty subalterns. 184 A 
sergeant was borne on establishment to cover each officer, and this remained unaltered 
until the development of light and rifle battalions, which were each permitted to carry an 
178 See 2.7 Army Organisation, 46-7. 
179 See for example, GRE-D, 1/9 (I), Memorandum by General Grey on the proposed system for establishing 
the reserve depots for Regiments employed in the Crimea at Malta and Gibralter, watermarked 1854; V9 (3 ), 
Memorandum by General Grey on the augmentation of the army by permanent depots ', December 1853 ; 1/9 
(4)Copy of a memorandum by Sidney Herbert on recruitment for the regular army from militia regiments, 
watermarked 1853. 
180 GRE-D, 11/4 (I), Cardwell to Grey, 19th October 1865; II14 (2), Cardwell to Grey, 16th December 1869; 
1II4 (17) Cardwell to Queen Victoria, 16th December 1869; 1II4 (19) Queen Victoria to Cardwell, 22nd 
December 1869. 
181 See for example, Clive Hughs, 'The New Armies' in Ian Beckett an Keith Simpson (eds.), A Nation in 
Arms: A social study a/the British army in the First World War (London, 1990) 99-126. 
182 PRO WO 3/7/10, Adjutant General to Lieutenant General Matthew, 15th January 1788. The exception to 
this rule were the regiments bearing the old titles of fusiliers, the 7th, 21st and 23rd Regiments, which had 
only one light company, trained in the same manner as that of the line battalions, and nine battalion or 
fusilier companies, with no extra training. 
183 See also 5.4 Light Infantry, 171-8. 
184 The proportion of Lieutenants to Ensigns does not appear to have ever been fixed. 
I' 49 extra leutenant, sergeant and corporal on the establl'shment of h eac company, on account 
of their performing duties in extended order, which needed a greater degree of control. 185 
During the course of the period under examination the duties required of all the unit 
officers increased, with a greater expectation of attendance, 186 a higher degree of inspection 
and control,187 together with a general increase in duties brought about by the onset of war. 
In an effort to reduce the work-load of the field officers of regiments, in 1803 three extra 
captaincies were introduced in both the infantry and the cavalry.l88 Previously the 
companies or troops of these officers had been commanded by their senior lieutenants, in 
the case of the major and lieutenant-colonel, and the senior lieutenant of the regiment in the 
case of the colonels. Although this increase in establishment would cost the public £821.5s 
for each unit, 189 the increase in efficiency it brought about must surely have been worth the 
increased expenditure. For much the same reason, several specific ranks were created in 
both the infantry and cavalry for senior NCOs, which increased a units' compliment, and 
enabled greater efficiency through more control. 
In 1793, a cavalry regiment consisted of six troops, totalling about 600 men. 190 The 
compliment of officers was two lieutenant-colonels, two majors, three captains, eight 
lieutenants, and eight cornets. 191 However, in 1804 a Royal Warrant had to specifically 
encourage regiments to appoint a second lieutenant-colonel and major. 192 This process was 
still not complete by 1807, when due to the numbers of field officers acting as general 
officers, it was emphasised that the additional post was necessary, just to gain ' one 
effective Lieutenant Colonel.' 193 At the outbreak of the war, the establishment of a cavalry 
185 PRO WO 40/29/(8)1 Duke of York to Colonel Trigge, (Colonel of the 681\ 10th September 1808; 
, th th 
WO/40/29/(B) I, York to Secretary at War, 10 September 1808; WO 4/206/292, Pultney to Colonel of 68 
Regiment of Foot, 17th September 1808. 
186 For a full discussion of this subject see Pimlott, 'Administration of the 8ritish Anny,' Chapter 6, 209-58. 
187 See below, 2.8 Inspection, 53-8. 
188 PRO WO 4/189/410-11, Yorke to Agents of all Reg~ents, and thYorke to commanding Officers of all 
regiments, 27 th May 1803; WO 4/189/419, War Office Circular, 27 May 1803; the Foot Guards were to 
increase their number of captains by five in the I SI Regiment, and four in the Coldstream and 3 nI Regiments, 
W04/189/4IS-9, Yorke to the Commanding Officers of the Regiments of Foot Guards, 7th June 1807. 
189 WO 1/952/179-, 'Memorandum respecting the Increases of Pay to the Anny since the Year 1784' War 
Office, IIth February 1815. 
190 Dupin, Military Force of Great Britain, I, 112-3; A regiment of the Household cavalry always numbered 
substantially more than 600 men, often parading as many as 1200. 
191 H.C.B. Rogers, The Mounted Troops of the British Army (London, 1967) 68. 
192 PRO WO 4/207/390 Royal Warrant, 23rd November 1804. 
, th 
193 PRO WO 1/635/449, York to Castlereagh, 28 August 1807. 
regiment was increased to 900 by the addition ofthree extra troops. 194 When sent on 
campaign, a large depot of men was always left in Britain, as the source of drafts of new 
recruits. However, this would mean that the average strength of a cavalry regiment on 
active service was reduced to around 600, drawn up in four troops. 195 
50 
The paper expansion of the Army continued throughout the Wars, 196 while active 
service wastage resulted in units being drastically under strength. By December 1814, 
eighteen battalions of the Peninsular Army numbered less than 350 rank and file. 197 
Battalions of Embodied Detachments, or composite battalions, made up of such units, were 
attempted in 1809,198 consisting of ' A corps of eight hundred Rank and File with a proper 
proportion of Officers & Non Commissioned Officers, having been embodied from the 
Detachments at the Army Depot.' 199 The ability of such units to function is further 
confirmation that a uniform system of administration and training was in use, which 
enabled them to operate together.200 Previously it had only been the additionally trained 
light infantry and grenadier companies of regiments which were formed together to operate 
as a single battalion.201 It was believed that despite supply problems,202 resulting from each 
soldier being entitled to issues of clothing and accoutrements from different colonels, these 
units would be ' in every other respect perfectly efficient. '203 However, despite seeing 
service in the Peninsula,204 they had to be recalled and broken up into their individual 
regiments due to serious disciplinary problems.205 Dundas reported that, 
their discipline as must be the case with Corps similarly constituted may naturally 
be supposed to have relaxed ... Under all these circumstances I have to request that 
194 PRO WO 3/ 1 1138 Fawcett to Colonels of Cavalry Regiments, 12th February 1793; WO 311 1130, Fawcett 
, th 
to Agents of Cavalry Regiments, 14 February 1793. 
195 Oman, Wellington's Army, 194. 
196 See 4.2 Expansion, 104-10. 
197 SD, vol. 8, 495-498. 
198 PRO WO 3/3501289, Calvert to Lieutenant Colonel Cochrane, 2nd Battalion, 36th Regiment, 24th June 
1809. . rd 
199 PRO WO 1/6411221-4, Adjutant General to 1. Robmson, Esq., 3 July 1809. 
200 See also Chapter 5 Training, Section I, Drill, 164-8. 
201 See for example, GRE-A, 200, 'Return of strength of the several corps composing the army commanded 
by Grey, embarked at Barbados on the expedition against M~in~que,' 1st ~ebruary .1794. The light and 
grenadier companies of the whole army were drawn together ID SIX composite battalions; 2243/54-6, Grey to 
Henry Dundas, 8th July 1794. Flank companies sent ~om Ireland. rd 
202 PRO WO 116411221-4 Adiutant General to J. Robmson, Esq., 3 July 1809; WO 116411225, Mr. Moore, 
, " th th War Office, to Adjutant General, 6 July 1809; WO 1~641 /233, W. ~undas to Castlereagh, 7 July 1809. 
203 PRO WO 116411221-4, Adjutant General to 1. Robmson, Esq., 3 July 1809. 
204 WP, General Orders, 9/11211, 16th July 1809. 
205 PRO WO 6/133/174, 1. Robinson, Secretary of State's Office, to Commander in Chief, 9th July 1809. 
Your Lordship will be pleased to direct that immediate measures be taken to orde: 
1 
these detachments home. '206 
By 1813, the tendency, despite the Duke of York's reservations,207 was to allow regiments 
to remain as separate entities irrespective of massive reductions. The preferred solution of 
Wellington in these circumstances became the formation of a Provisional battalion 208 in , 
which two reduced units were each re-structured to four companies, the remaining officers 
and non-commissioned officers being returned to Britain to recruit and rebuild the 
battalion.209 Wellington informed Bathurst, 
Whenever a battalion in this Army, which should have no second or first battalion 
in England or Ireland, should fall below 350 rank and file, fit for duty, these men 
should be formed into four companies; and the officers and non-commissioned 
officers of six companies should be sent home, in order to receive and form drafts. 
These will answer all the purposes of a second or third battalion.21O 
The organisation of a Provisional battalion would maintain the independence of the 
original units, and while operating in one formation, would give the Peninsular Army an 
effective body of experienced troops. Wellington stated, ' I am desirous, if possible, not to 
reduce this Army in old soldiers. One soldier who has served one or two campaigns, will 
render more service than two recently sent from England'.2lI The 2nd battalions of the 24th 
and 58th Regiments of Foot, and the 2nd Regiment of Foot and the 2nd battalion of the 
53rd Regiment of Foot, were each reduced to four companies and linked as Provisional 
battalions during 1813,212 earning the approbation of Wellington for their effectiveness.213 
The use of this solution for reduced strength battalions also met with the approval of the 
battalion commanders, who maintained their independence, and the title of the regiment. 
At least two commanders of such units requested that their corps be linked in this manner 
when their returns fell below 350.214 All parties appeared to gain from this arrangement. 
206 PRO WO 1/641/233, W. Dundas to Castlereagh, 7th July 1809. 
207 WD, x, 629, Wellington to Bathurst, 11 th August 1813. 
208 PRO WO 1/645/139; WD, x, 51 , Wellington to Bathurst, 27th January 1813 ; x, 174-5, Wellington to 
Bathurst, 9th March 1813. The plan had flfSt been proposed without success in a letter to the Secretary of 
State, vii, 525, Wellington to Liverpool, 7th May 1811. 
209 WD, x, 51, Wellington to Bathurst, 27th January 1813; xi, 180, Wellington to Bathurst, 9th October 18\3. 
210 WD. xi, 180, Wellington to Bathurst, 9th October 18\3. 
211 WD. x, 51, Wellington to Bathurst, 27th January 1813; he was to increase their worth to three newly sent 
out soldiers within two months, x, 174-5, Wellington to Bathurst, 9th March 1813. 
212 WP, Commander-in-Chiefs Letter Book, 63-68, Wellington to Bathurst, 27th January 18\3. 
213 WD, x, 629, Wellington to Bathurst, 11th August 18\3. 
214 WD, x, 629, Wellington to Bathurst, 11 th August 1813. The battalions were the 51 st and 68th Regiments 
of Light Infantry from the 7th Division - there is no evidence of this being implemented. 
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and patronage, while the field commander kept a solid body of experienced troops, which 
could be augmented with fresh batches of recruits. He also kept them under his control, 
operating as an active service force and away from the softening influence of the parade-
ground training of home service. This solution had actually been an idea initiated by York 
himself. In 1812 he had formed a provisional cavalry formation of two squadrons from 
each of the 1 si and 2nd Life Guards, and the Royal regiment of Horse Guards, in order to 
reinforce the Army in Spain.2lS Wellington had merely developed the idea, and used it 
effectively to his own ends. 
In the same way, Wellington was to adopt a system of Army organisation and 
control developed elsewhere and use it with unprecedented effectiveness. The 
establishment of a Divisional structure during the Peninsular campaign, introduced another 
tier into the management structure of the expanding Army.216 The previous brigade 
organisation, had proved unmanageable with the increased numbers of men, across the vast 
distances over which the Peninsular War was fought. Earlier campaigns had relied heavily 
on the personal contact of the Commander in Chief with the individual battalion 
commanders.217 However, by 1810, Wellington, as the field commander would only 
practically have contact with his divisional commanders, who would be in control of a 
complete administrative structure within his division, akin to a small Army.218 However, 
the Divisional structure in the Peninsular campaign was novel only in the numbers of men 
employed. The Duke of York had amalgamated several brigades into columns in the Low 
Countries during 1799,219 while Abercromby had structured his forces in Egypt into lines 
of three and four brigades during 1800-1.220 It was not until the Copenhagen campaign 
during 1807 that Divisions of between two and four brigades were formed from a force of 
26,000 men.221 Despite the paper notation of divisions at the battle ofVimeiro in 1808, 
Wellesley operated the Army in detached brigades,222 and it was only when Sir John 
215 PRO WO 1/652/185, York to Bathurst, 17th August 1812. 
216 The best discussion of this subject remains, Oman, Wellington 's Army, 163-6. 
217 See for example, GRE-A, 2249, 'Journal of General Grey, 1796' [actually Lieutenant Colonel Thomas 
Grey] General Orders, 8th June - 30th August 1796; PRO WO 37122/-, 'Brigading of the Army in Portugal', 
9th October 1810. 
218 Stephen Petty, 'The General Orders of the Duke of Wellington, 1808-1814,' in C.M. Woolgar (ed.) 
Wellington Studies I, (Southampton, 1997) 139-63. 
219 Oman Wellington'S Army, 163-4. 
, th 
220 PRO WO 11344/187-90, Abercromby to ?, 19 May 1800. 
th 
221 PRO WO 11188/29-33, Cathcart to Castiereagh, 26 June 1807. 
222 Oman, Wellington's Army, 163-4. 
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Moore took command of the force of 21,000 men later that year, that' genuine' divisions 
were formed for the first time in the Peninsular campaign. m For two months following 
Wellesley's return to the command of the Army in Portugal in April 1809, it was operated 
in a brigade structure, only reverting to divisions after the battle ofOporto.224 This 
structure would be used in the subsequent Waterloo campaign.225 The divisional 
organisation of the British Army was therefore not an invention of the general who would 
use it with success during the remaining years of the Wars with France and in the campaign 
of 1815. It was a traditional system for the control of larger bodies of men, the use of 
which had been experimented with over the course of the period under examination. 
The military structure of the Army was therefore an area of little development 
during the period under discussion. The most significant change came about in the field, 
due to the problems faced through an expanded Army, and reduced-strength battalions. 
2.8 INSPECTION 
Although the structure of the fighting force changed little during the Wars, what is 
apparent is that there were other structural developments that directly affected this area of 
the Army. These were to the means of control of the Army, rather than to its fabric. It has 
already been established that as the Wars progressed the control of the military decisions 
swung decisively towards the civilian ministry. At the same time the everyday working of 
the Army remained in the hands of the Commander in Chiefs office, which expanded, and 
was given the authority to develop new systems of control. The most important of these 
was the inspection system. 
The inspection of the Army although conducted for centuries, had only been 
regulated since 1715.226 Its aim was to provide those in authority with the information they 
223 Jbid; the brigades of the Walcheren army of the same year, were divided equally between two wings. 
while the whole force was refered to as a Division. PRO WO 116411235-8, 'List of the esveral Corp, General 
and StafTOfficers, composing a Division of His Majesty's Army, to be employed upon a particular service.' 
224 WP 9/11212 General Orders, 18th June 1809. The notification to the forces of the establishment of the 
Divisio~al struc~e; PRO WO 37112122, 'Brigading of the Anny in Portugal', 9th October 1810; See also, 
DlLo/c/18/501292-3, 'Weekly State of the Forces on Spain and Portugal under the command of Lieutenant 
General Sir Arthur Wellesley .. .' 15th August 1809. 
225 PRO WO 37/12/87; 88. 'Brigades and Divisions at Waterloo'.l6th June 1815. 
226 PRO WO 26/141197, Royal Warrant, 25th June 1715; WO 261141198, Royal Warrant, 28th August 1715. 
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requrre to manage and develop the forces. However, the emphasis placed on inspection 
had been pennitted to lapse, possibly due to the power of the colonels and their protection 
of their rights over their own corps. It could also have had much to do with the dispersed 
nature of the forces in peace time, coupled to an inefficient administrative system, which 
either failed to process inspection returns when submitted, or respond to any declared 
inadequacies. During the Wars the inspection process became of greater importance as the 
Anny expanded, and attempts were made to implement unifonn standards across the entire 
military force.227 Glover rightly points to the Duke of York taking over the Commander in 
Chiefs office, as the turning point in the enforcing of the system of inspection and 
returns.228 Within three months of York entering Horse Guards, William Fawcett as 
Adjutant General was at pains to remind officers of their responsibilities to submit 
returns.229 Initially concerns were for the more basic and mundane regulations to be 
enforced. A new system of drill and manoeuvre had yet to be assimilated Anny-wide,230 
and maintaining even the most basic of hygiene standards among the troops was a 
problem.23I But, York' s success in this area, meant that it was followed by a campaign 
against the practice of officers being absent without leave,m which developed into a 
refonn of the whole structure of inspection and return, centred around Horse Guards, and 
in particular the Adjutant General's department. 
The responsibility for the maintenance of all inspections became that of the 
Adjutant General's department in 1793, when it took over the task of ensuring the regular 
submission of regimental returns in Britain,m (although the new fonns on which this 
infonnation was to be processed were not agreed upon until three months later) .234 The 
system was expanded to include foreign stations in 1795.235 This meant that for the first 
time, all returns would be processed by one military office. In 1797, officers were required 
to report to the Adjutant General ' s department on returning to Britain from abroad, stating 
227 Each section of this thesis will emphasise this process. 
228 R. Glover, Preparation, 165-9; this point is also made in 11th RCME (1810) 5. 
229 PRO WO 3/131208-9 Fawcett to Lieutenant Colonel Benson, 20th May 1795; WO 3/15, Adjutant General 
, th th 
to Colonel Hon. Alexander Maitland, 49 Regiment, 5 July 1796. 
230 French, British Way in Warfare, 91 ; See also 5.2 Training, 164-8. 
231 GRE-A 2249 General Orders, 17th January - 6th September 1794, Officers were requested ' to be 
particularl; attentive in seeing that the Men 's hands and faces are clean, and their heads well combed.' 
232 R. Glover, Preparation, 168-9. ., nd 
233 PRO WO 31271161, William Fawcett to Generals of Dlstnct; 22 July 1793. 
234 PRO WO 3/111195 WiHiam Fawcett to Prince of Wales, 17 October 1793. 
, th 
235 PRO WO 3/19/101, William Fawcett to General Prescott, 5 December 1798. 
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on what authority they had returned.236 This was part of the attempts of York to end the 
problem of officers being absent without leave, which was not satisfactorily concluded 
until 1800.237 The increase in the role of the Adjutant General's department in the 
inspection and control of the forces continued in 1798, when it became the source from 
which the monarch, the Commander in Chief, and Parliament received regular information 
on the state of the Army,238 ensuring that all parties concerned in the affairs of the Army 
were in possession of the same data. The department completely took over this area of 
military business in 1807, with the abolition ofa separate Inspector General of Recruiting, 
and the absorbing of his duties of investigation and report.239 By 1811 and the publication 
of the General Regulations and Orders, the required inspections and confidential reports, 
ensured a constant flow of information to the Adjutant General, from which a better picture 
of the Anny could be produced than ever before,240 and from which both Horse Guards and 
the War Office could respond.241 
In Britain, the Adjutant General's office was responsible for gathering and 
communicating the information of weekly returns to the Commander in Chief and the 
King, and of monthly returns of the whole Army to the Commander in Chief, the King, and 
the members of both houses of Parliament.242 By 1811, in order for this information to be 
as up to date as possible, commanders of regiments were required to submit: monthly 
returns on the 25 th of each month, to the Adjutant General, the General Officer under who 
the regiment was serving, and the Secretary at War, whether serving at home or abroad; 
monthly information to the Quartermaster General of marches and quarters; monthly 
effective states to the Adjutant General, when on home service, and a certificate outlining 
the settlement of the men's accounts when serving abroad; Quarterly returns of officers 
absent without leave, which was also to be noted on the monthly return; and on home 
service, monthly returns of men engaged on recruiting service. The General Officers 
commanding districts of Britain or foreign stations, were to submit: monthly information to 
the Quartermaster General of marches and quarters; monthly returns to the Adjutant 
236 PRO WO 3/17/286, Hany Calvert to Officers Commandingthin Chief on Foreign Stations, 11th November 
1797; WO 3/17/287-8, Hany Calvert to Regimental Agents, 1I November 1797. 
237 R. Glover, Preparation, 169. 
238 Clode, Military Forces of the Crown, I, 387; I1, 341. 
239 PRO WO 30/44/37, General Orders, 1st June 1807; 11th RCME (1810) 4; See above 2.4 Adjutant 
General, 34-9. 
240 General Regulations and Orders (London, 1811) 279-288. 
241 PRO WO 30/44/37, General Order, I't June 1807. 
2421 lth RCME (1810) 4. 
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General; a quarterly return of officers absent without leave in Britain, and half yearly when 
abroad; a quarterly return in Britain, and a half yearly return abroad, of all general and staff 
officers serving under him, together with copies of all orders issued since the previous 
return; and half yearly confidential reports. On campaign the collation and despatch of 
information to Horse Guards, was the task of the Adjutant General in the field,243 with the 
ultimate responsibility being that of the field commander.244 This tightening of the 
inspection and reporting procedure ensured that all the Army hierarchy were able to build a 
much clearer picture of the actual state of the forces than ever before. 
Perhaps the most significant, and far-reaching element of this area of reform, was 
the establishing of a rigid system of authority over the Army as a whole, and the officer 
corps in particular. The introduction of forms designed specifically for the purpose of the 
returns would enable officers to submit like information, which could be processed with a 
much greater efficiency, 245 and which, according to one observer, would make, 'each 
review, instead of being a mere matter of parade and display ... a lengthened and serious 
military study, and one also of the utmost importance, both to the inspector himself and the 
forces generaUy'.246 Officers were required to read and sign all returns which they 
submitted,247 making them responsible for the information contained within them. In 
addition the practice of officers writing personal accompanying letters with their returns 
was discouraged as unnecessary, instead, 'for the future, all returns and Reports, as well as 
letters on Military and Public Business are to be addressed simply to the Acljutant General 
ofHjs Majesty's Forces London' and corespondents were to 'lay aside" I have the honour 
&c. &c." and to just subscribe his name and rank, '248 therefore removing any niceties 
which might have delayed the process of the documents, or could have been seen as 
attempts to compromise those in authority. The requirement of officers to provide a 
24) See for example, DlLo/CIIS/52, 'Keeping accurately the Returns of all Descriptions of Regiments, 
Making General Returns for the Officers in England or for the Commander of the Forces, corresponding with 
all the detached Officers of the Army and Officers commanding Coprs or all Casualties that occur, making 
Arrangements for the Sick, Convalescents &c. of the Army. Having all this Correspondence regularly and 
accurately kept.' 
244 WD v 403 Wellington to Liverpool, 2nd January IS1 O. 
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245 PRO WO 311 11195, William Fawcett to Prince of Wales, 17 October 1793; General RegulatiOns and 
Orders, (ISII) 278n, 2SSn. 
246 Dupin, Military Force a/Great Britain, 1, 62. 
247 WP, General Orders, 9/1/2/1 11 th September IS09; General Regulations and Orders (London, 1811) 
264. 
248 PRO WO 3/191101 , William Fawcett to General Prescott, 5 th December 1798; WO 3/19/135A, Printed 
Circular Letter, William Fawcett, 10th January 1799. 
d· al 'fi 57 me IC certl lcate when reporting sick,249 alongside the tightening of the rules governing 
absence without leave,250 meant that a greater degree of commitment to the service was 
expected. To this must also be added the introduction of the confidential report, which for 
the first time enabled general officers to report on their subordinate officers and regiments, 
without fearing scrutiny by the party concerned. While it is clear some general officers 
would not take these reports seriously, those who did, provide excellent evidence of the 
reason such a report was implemented. The information they were able to give assisted the 
service, without directly offending deficient officers or corps. In 1803, Sir John Moore was 
able to suggest that the 4th Regiment of Foot had a, 'want of military experience,' and that 
there was 'no great ardour in the officers to distinguish themselves, or to encourage the 
men to discharge their duty, by good example rather than by punishment,' and he blamed 
their commander Lieutenant Colonel Bunbury for these failings. In this way he hoped that 
Horse Guards would find a way to replace Bunbury, without disgracing such a long serving 
officer.251 All these measures assisted in further distancing those in authority from their 
subordinates, producing a professional and bureaucratic system of inspection and reporting, 
which would enable the Army to expand and perform efficiently and uniformly. 
In addition to the achievement of uniformity across the Army, the development of a 
successful system of inspection also enabled the easier costing of the forces. Under the 
terms of the Pay Office Act of 1783, accurate returns were demanded from the whole 
Army, to enable the estimating of annual pay. 252 Through the improvement of the 
inspection and return system, a clearer picture of the state of the military would be 
available, which would therefore enable a more accurate estimate. However, it would be 
this area of inspection and return that would be the cause of the greatest problems for the 
Army administrators, due to the inefficiency of those implementing the system, and the 
sheer volume of information produced. 
249 PRO WO 3/32/257-8, WilIiam Fawcett to Matthew Lewis, 13 th March 1800. 
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Just as the inspection system of the Anny expanded, so to did the government-
initiated investigation procedures. During the course of the eighteenth century, enquiries 
into all aspects of the military were conducted by the Board of General Officers. It was 
established in 1706 under the presidency of Charles Churchill, (the brother of the Duke of 
Marlborough).253 By the later part of the century, its membership consisted of a quorum of 
five from seven General Officers selected from a list of about fifty, compiled from the 
Anny List each October.254 Initially, its terms of reference and powers were broad ranging. 
However, by the mid-century the Board had become principally concerned with the 
endorsing of new patterns for Anny clothing, and by the time of this study it 'seems to 
have degenerated into a forum for the discussion of military trivia. '255 It is not surprising 
that such a body would be unsuccessful in reform, clearly being part of the same vested 
interest they were established to investigate. Many would have had colonelcies in the 
Anny, and therefore also a proprietary interest in maintaining the status quO.256 By 1793, 
even their one remaining sphere of influence, that of clothing, had shown them to be weak 
and ineffective,257 unwilling to step on the toes of the colonels. The Board was maintained 
throughout the conflict, being available for reference on any martial matters as the need 
arose,258 but specifically uniform and equipment. These included a Board for the 
examination of supplies of clothing and equipment to the Portuguese Anny,259 and another 
those of the whole Army in the Peninsula during 1812.260 However, the scale of the 
conflict, and the vast quantity of supplies required, meant that even a group of generals 
could do little to influence what was passed to the Army by contractors, and Wellington in 
253 Rogers, The British Army in the Eighteenth Century, 37. 
254 WO 26126/352-54, Royal Warrant, 26th October 1763. 
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256 Dupin, Military Force of Great Britain, I, 81, states that the command of a regiment ' is so lucrative, that 
a lieutenant-general, or even a general with a staff appointment, is less rich than a colonel enjoying the 
profits of his regiment. - It is on this account that the greater number of commissions of colonel are held by 
major-generals, lieutenant-generals, generals, and even field-marshals.' 
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259 WD, v, 241-2, Wellington to Castlereagh, 20th October 1809. 
260 WD ix 409 Wellington to Bathurst, 8th September 1812. This Board included a civilian member of the 
Commi~s~ G:neral's office, and required them to move to larger premises. PRO WO 4/426/35, Palmerston 
to R. Wharton, 31st August 1812; 55, Palmerston to Harrison, 14th November 1812; 76, Palmerston to 
Harrison, 25th December 1812. 
particular was under the impression that the provision of such boards merely caused 
unnecessary delay.261 
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The second, and most far reaching investigation into the Anny attempted to that 
date, was established during the period under discussion. Despite suggestions linking it to 
the Duke ofYork,262 it had little to do with him, (except perhaps in inference to his aleged 
corrupt practices). 263 Instead, the Commission of Military Enquiry of 1805 to 1812264 arose 
out of Pi tt's attempts to deflect the criticism of the Whig opposition,265 in the aftermath of 
the impeachment of Lord Melville, as First Lord of the Admiralty.266 It was also in a line of 
several such enquiries into various public offices, whose origins had been the 'sound 
principles' laid down by the Committee for Examining Public Accounts in the 1780s.267 
This commission had also been a means of taking 'the wind out of the Opposition' s sails' 
in order to gain time for the government of Lord North.268 During 1797, the Select 
Committee on Finance was established.269 Their terms of reference, and those of the 
Commissioners of Military Enquiry, was to root out alleged corruption, and point to 
methods of saving the public money, in the light of the escalating cost of the war. To this 
end the Commission of 1805 was composed of members with relevant skills in finance and 
law, as well as in the military, in order to make sense of the information they were to 
receive.27o The information was gathered mainly through questionnaires sent out to 
witnesses, although several investigative visits to sites and offices were conducted by the 
Commissioners themselves.271 The eighteen reports272 were produced over six years, and 
formed a detailed survey of the state of the administration of the Anny, and the method by 
which reforms could be carried out. Their recommendations were mostly implemented 
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262 E. Halevy, A History of the English People in the Nineteenth Century (London, 1949) i, 18-19; n.1. 
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267 J.E.D. Binney, British Political Finance and Administration. 1774-92 (Oxford 1958) 282; Reports of the 
Committee for Examining Public Accounts, (RCPA). 
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Bosanquet, B.C. Stephenson, and L. Bradshaw. 
271 Greenleaf, 'The Commission of Military Enquiry,' 177. 
272 Appendix J, 281, for a list of Reports of the Commissioners of Military Enquiry. 
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without opposition, which followed perfectly the lines already laid by their predecessors. m 
These included, the abolition of sinecures;274 the tendering for services;275 the cutting of 
jobs;276 the removal of the payment offees,277 and the restructuring ofthe organisation of 
departments,278 and, as with their predecessors, were in keeping with Max Weber's 
'bureaucratic system of organisation' .279 
It is interesting to note that the reports of the Commissioners covered all areas of 
the administration of the Army, with the exception of the offices of the Commander in 
Chief280 and the Secretary of State for War and Colonies. It is not surprising that a 
government sponsored enquiry would not investigate its own department of state, but it 
seems strange that the office of the Commander in Chief was not examined, when that of 
the Master General of Ordnance, supposedly of the same standing as the Commander in 
Chief, was investigated in 1810-11.281 As stated above, it suggests the emergence of the 
post of Commander in Chief as the senior military office, over that of the Master General. 
Despite such notable omissions, the reports of the Commissioners of Military 
Enquiry greatly assisted in the reforming of the military forces of Britain. The topics 
addressed ensured that the modernisation of the Army as a public body, was kept in line 
with other such institutions of the period, with economies and the introduction of new 
bureaucratic practices. The findings of the Commissioners reveal that the thinking of those 
charged with the reform of the public service was moving beyond that described by 
Brewer. With neither sinecures nor dual employment being acceptable, and a move away 
from funding through fees,282 a clear shift from the typical eighteenth century structure can 
be observed. 
273 Torrance, ' Social Class and Bureaucratic Innovation', passim. 
274 6th RCME (1808) 302. 
275 ibid. 291-3 . 
276 ibid. 296. 
277 ibid 308. 
278 ibid. 319. 
279 Torrance, 'Social Class and Bureaucratic Innovation' , 58. 
280 The Adjutant General and the Quartennaster General's departments, as part of the staff of the 
Commander-in-Chief, were investigated in the 11th RCME (1810). 
28113thRCME(1811). 
282 See for example, 6th RCME (1808) 290, 297-9, 301 ; Brewer, Sinews, 71-3, 75-7, 86-7. 
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Writers on the subject usually point to the emergence of a strong Army 
administration during the Wars with France, as evidence of the steady shift towards the 
control of the Army by the military hierarchy itself, with the three offices of Commander in 
Chief, Adjutant General and Quartermaster General taking the power back from the civil 
authority.283 Ward in particular points to the Commander in Chief overshadowing the 
Secretary at War, who he states became 'merely the regulator of the Army's affairs for 
economics' sake.'284 However, what can be seen from the reform of the administrative 
structure of the Army is that subtly, and out of a procedure of often confused checks and 
balances, a clear structure of authority emerged, contrary to the accepted thesis. Supreme 
direction and control was clearly placed in the hands of the civilian ministers, while 
military officers were permitted to engage in the intricacies of military organisation and the 
daily functioning of the Army. Areas seen to be dominated by the military officers, had 
actually been delegated by the civilian ministers. 
Reform of the Army was generated from three sources. First, much of it was 
Treasury-driven, with the motive of saving the public money, and reducing unnecessary 
expenditure on the vast force engaged in the Wars. Secondly, other areas were reformed as 
part of a general trend towards the modernisation of government departments, not least due 
to the influence of the Whigs, and their attempts to reform the state in general and reduce 
the power of the crown. Finally the military hierarchy itself was involved in its own 
reform, particularly under the direction of the Duke of York, but with a framework 
established by parliament. 
The success of the attempts to save the public money is difficult to assess. Certainly 
individual reforms reduced the costs of certain areas of military administration, such as the 
removal of the posts of Paymaster General and Inspector General of the Recruiting Service. 
However, the scale of both the Wars and Army expansion meant that such savings as could 
be made were absorbed in the massive costs of the continuing conflict, and the constant 
demands for money from field commanders.285 In addition, to successfully prosecute the 
Wars, certain reforms resulted in a greater cost to the public, such as the centralisation of 
283 Fortescue, History o/the British Army, passim.; Ward, Wellington's Headquarters, 17. 
284 Ward, Wellington 's Headquarters, 31. 
285 See also 3.8 Commissariat Accounts, 96-100. 
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the transport system. While savings were made in certain areas, it is not difficult to 
appreciate Dupin's observations that the administration of the British Army was the 'most 
expensive in Europe.'286 
During the course of the period under discussion the post of Commander in Chief, 
as the King's representative in the Army, had been established as the senior military office, 
taking precedence over the Master General of Ordnance. It had achieved a permanence, in 
peace as well as in war, but only at the expense of its independence. Its funding was to be 
derived from the Treasury of the government of the day, via the War Office, rather than 
from the Extraordinary Fund which had given it political autonomy. It was now 
subordinate to the civil power in every way. This is clear evidence of the movement of the 
Army from that of a typically eighteenth century Army of a monarch, to a nineteenth 
century Army of the people. In consequence the position of the Secretary at War within the 
War Office became an even more important civil post, second only to the Secretary of 
State, being the link between the military and civil elements of the Army administration. 
This expansion was due to an increase in duties, through both a larger Army and the 
consolidation of many tasks into the one office. Despite attempts to curtail the numbers 
employed, the sheer weight of work expected from the War Office ensured its even greater 
expansion. Along with this came an acknowledgement that an increased professionalism 
was required from its staff, together with a removal of sinecures, and the end of the holding 
of dual offices, in line with other departments of government. The funding of this office 
was also centralised, moving away from functioning on money derived from fees, to grants 
from the Treasury. In all military departments the ability of staff to operate as public 
accountants was eliminated, removing their ability to make profit from an office, and 
ensuring a further modernisation of the military. 
Many of the checks and balances which had hampered the efficient working of the 
military were removed in favour of a simpler system of control. A hierarchy was developed 
which placed the Secretary of State in control of the Army, with a clear chain of authority 
below him. In theory one man could now impose his will on the Army and control it to his 
ends. However, by the end of the Wars with France the state had confidence that its Army 
was no longer a threat to the stability of Britain, and that the system of government was in 
itself a sufficient check on the authority of anyone man. The movement of troops, their 
286 Dupin, Military Force o/Great Britain, I, 44-5. 
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fmancing and administration was drawn into the hands of an ever-decreasing number of 
people. The ultimate safeguard in this was that the overall control of the military force was 
firmly in the hands of the civilian government. 
Much of the reform of the administration of the Army itself was carried out by the 
military officers of Horse Guards, in particular the Duke of York. Without his 
understanding of the Army, much of the administrative reform would have been 
superficial. The development of a system of inspection was an essential step towards a 
uniform military structure. Such control of the system was only possible with the strong 
leadership directed through his staffby York. It is ample evidence of why the late 
eighteenth century request for a Commander in Chief in peace-time usually requested a son 
of the monarch, for in him would be the inferred power of the crown, that would be absent 
from even the most senior of generals. 
York is universally acclaimed by subsequent authors. Ward goes so far as to 
suggest that he 'carried an influence such as no Commander in Chief had had since the 
King commanded the Army in person. '287 Many describe his involvement in the 
modernisation of the Army, and suggest the implementing of a system of uniform control. 
However the system to which many authors have averted as an historical construct, actually 
did exist. That its architect was the Duke of York is borne out by Harry Calvert in his 
evidence to the Commissioners of Military Enquiry in 1810. He stated that the Army had 
taken on a new character as a result of the 'new system introduced by late Commander in 
Chief,' the Duke ofYork.288 When questioned further he answered that, 
By System introduced into the Army, it was my intention to characterize the 
uniformity of regulations established in and extended to every description of the 
military Force of the Empire, on whatever station employed, as applicable to the 
clothing and arming of the Troops, to their field exercise and discipline, and to the 
interior economy of the several Corps, and the immediate and personal 
superintendance of the whole Army, exercised by His Royal Highness, founded on 
Special and confidential Reports and accurate Returns of every description, 
whereby the actual state of the Army, as constituting one great aggregate body, and 
of every distinct part of it, were constantly under his observation.289 
287 Ward, Wellington's Headquarters, 16-17. 
288 1 lth RCME (1810) Appendix 2,59. 'Examination of Major General Harry Calvert, Adjutant General of 
His Majesty's Forces; taken upon Oath, the 18th April 1809.' 
289 ibid 
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Calvert's words were repeated by James in his Regimental Companion, in 1811,290 and are 
picked up by Ward, who credits Calvert himself with the creation of the system.291 
Surprisingly Glover, who describes so eloquently the reforms of the Duke of York, fails to 
observe the deliberate formation of an overall system of organisation, supply and 
management of the Army. The following chapters will go some way to correcting this 
omission, while taking its development to the end of the conflict, and testing its efficiency. 
That York was permitted to make the Army his own is significant, but as can be 
seen the overall control of the military was never far away from the civil administration. 
From York's fall from grace in 1809 to the end of the Wars, it is clear that the main control 
of the Army was in ministerial hands, and that the system could even be improved upon. 
Failings in the Quartermaster General's department during York's first term of office 
reveal that he either did not have complete control over even his own office, or that he was 
prepared to turn a blind eye to its failings, while forcing through reform in other areas. 
Indeed, the politicians were perhaps better suited to continuing the reform of the Army 
administration, based on the advice of the traditional military officers, together with reports 
from the Commissioners of Military Enquiry, without reference to preconceived ideas, and 
at a distance from military vested interests. 
290 Major Charles James, The Regimental Companion (London, 1811) iii, 109-11. 
291 Ward, Wellington's Headquarters, 19. 
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CHAPTER 3 FINANCE 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Long before the period under discussion, Britain had developed the art of 
mobilising resources to fight Wars. Through the eighteenth century her forces fought in 
four conflicts, funded through loans, which were repaid through taxes at the end of the 
Wars. However, these loans were never completely repaid, and therefore the national debt 
increased. The financial structure of Britain was geared to providing funds to efficiently 
service that debt. This repayment would ensure confidence in the economy, and enabled 
further loans to be raised at the outbreak of the next war. This meant that Britain became 
what Brewer has termed, a 'fiscal-military' state, I with the whole financial structure geared 
towards providing enough funding to fight the Wars. Each conflict during the eighteenth 
century cost substantially more than the previous. The first, the War of the Spanish 
Succession cost the country approximately £95 million; the American War of 
Independence, about £124 million; while the Wars with France cost Britain in the region of 
£ 1039 million.2 In terms of taxation, Britain raised approximately £5.2 million per year 
during the Wars of Queen Arn:te, £9.9 million per year during the American War on 
Independence, while during the Wars France £13.2 million per year was raised from 1798 
to 1801, and £28.3 million per year from 1801 to 1815.3 
While it was considered as inevitable after the cessation of hostilities with the 
American colonists, that another war would ensue, it was clear that if the national debt was 
not seriously addressed, the ability of Britain to fund it would be substantially impaired.4 
This led to the implementation a regime of strict debt management across all government 
spending. In terms of the Army, a rigorous restructuring was implemented, which reduced 
costs while attempting to maintain an effective fighting force,S and, as discussed in Chapter 
1, drastically altered the financial structure of the Army, by the transfer of financial 
authority from the Paymaster General to the Secretary at War. 
I Brewer, Sinews of Power, xvii. 
2 Figures take from, Philip Harling and Peter Mandler, 'From "Fiscal-Military" State to Laissez-faire State, 
1760-1850', in Journal of British Studies, 32 (1993) 48-9; Patrick O'Brien, ' Public Finance in the Wars with 
France, 1793-1815', in H.T. Dickinson (ed.), Britain and the French Revolution, 1793-1815 (London, 1989) 
176. 
3 Patrick O'Brien, 'Public Finance', 177. O'Brien's figures are depressed and expressed in constant prices. 
4 ibid, 171. 
$ Pimlott, 'Administration of the British Army' 121-208. 
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However, no amount of financial restructuring could have prepared Britain for the 
unprecedented levels of expenditure needed to prosecute the Wars with France. In order to 
fund the conflict government borrowing was drastically increased from 1793, with ninety 
percent of the expenditure covered by borrowing, and the national debt doubling to 1798.6 
From 1799, several forms of taxation were used, most successfuUy income and property 
taxes, and by the end of the conflict 64% of British expenditure was covered by taxation.7 
This proved to be a catalyst for further frugality, as not only was there fears that the 
national debt was rising alarmingly, but there was a perceived in-built waste of money in 
old public offices. Philip Harling and Peter Mandler suggested that the 'auditing 
procedures were cumbersome and wasteful; ... and sinecures and other "irregular" 
emoluments abounded,.8 John Torrance has suggested that successive administrations 
believed it to be their obligation to those bearing the burden of taxation to cut down on this 
wastage,9 and that when in opposition, the Whigs attempted to use evidence of such waste 
of public money to embarrass the government, and force through their agenda of reform in 
general. In addition, as a result of the high taxation, there emerged a body of middle class 
public opinion in favour of economy, which could not be ignored. ID Therefore, with this 
middle class 'cry for economy' , 11 the Tories' commitment to debt management, and the 
Whigs advocating the reform of the whole system, there was a clear trend towards 
frugality, but one which would prove fraught with difficulties in the light of the exceptional 
cost of the Wars. 
In addition to the ideology of economy, the conflict was costing so much that there 
was a general shortage of capital. It is estimated that in 1804, the War cost Britain about 
£29.78 million, while at the same time the government gross revenue stood at £40.70 
million. By 1813, these figures had risen to £70.69 million and £76.69 million 
respectively. 12 Christopher Hall points out that this meant the 'proportion of revenue spent 
on the war went from over half to almost the whole total sum.' \3 What resulted, was that 
6 Micbael D. Bordo and Eugene N. White, 'A Tale of Two Currencies: British and French Finance During 
the Napoleonic Wars,' in The Journal o/Economic History, Volume 51, (June 1991) Number 2,310. 
7 Patrick O'Brien, 'Public Finance', 181. 
• Harling and Mandler, 'Fiscal Military State', 48. 
9 Torrance, 'Social Class and Bureaucratic Innovation', 79. 
10 Ibid, 73-4. 
11 Ibid, 74, 76. 
12 N.l. Silberling, 'The fmancial and monetary policy of Great Britain during the Napoleonic Wars', 
OuarterlyJourna/ o/Economics, XXXVllI (1924) 240-7. 
fi Cbristopher D. Hall, British Strategy in the Napoleonic War /803-/5 (Manchester, 1992) 15-16. 
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was also a governing factor, in that area of the confliCt.14 The expedition to Walcheren was 
an example of this, being sent to an area of strategic importance, but close enough to 
Britain to ensure that supply of men and materiel would be cheaper than more distant 
alternatives. IS To the same end, all administrations were involved in penny-pinching, with 
change proposed at the promise of comparatively minimal savings. Palmerston suggested 
cuts to the Wagon Train in 1810, that would result a saving of only £23,433 per year/6 and 
the Commissioners of Military Enquiry reminded the War Office, that a saving of a 
farthing per day per man in the Army, would save £50,000 per annum. 17 In this light it is 
not surprising that the fInancial structures of the Army would be under intense scrutiny. 
Chapter 1 discussed some of the changes brought about by the move towards 
economy and reform, within the general structure of Army administration .These included 
the restructuring of the War Office, and the imposition various investigations into the 
administration of the military, which also had serious implications for the fInancial 
organisation of the Army. This chapter will continue to examine the Army structure, 
concentrating on the areas of fInancial administration. It will study how these structures 
functioned under the pressures of the Wars, and the extent to which the desire for economic 
efficiency either provided an impetus for change, or was compromised by the vast scale of 
the conflict, or by other less tangible factors. 
3.2 ARMY FINANCE 
The expenditure of the Army during the period under discussion was processed 
through two accounts, the Ordinary and the Extraordinary. Ordinary expenditure was 
granted to the Army under the terms of the Mutiny Act, the annual legislation giving 
Parliamentary approval to the establishment, funding and discipline of the Army for the 
following year. IS The preparation of the estimates of Ordinary expenditure was a key 
function of the War Office. Their presentation to, and passage through, Parliament was the 
task of the Secretary at War, who, at the beginning of the period was the only politician 
14 lbid , 19. 
IS Castlereagh Correspondence, VI, 300. 
16 PD (1810) XV, 609. 
17 tl" RCME (1808)323. 
11 For a full description of the Mutiny Act, see Pimlott, 'Administration of the British Army,' 110-119. 
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with direct responsibility for the Anny. This was a major element in the civilian control of 
the military, for although the estimates were compiled using figures supplied by the Anny, 
it was the civil department which formed the submission, and was responsible for its 
successful passage. The Mutiny Act could also be a forum for prolonged political debate, 
which could delay its implementation, and thus disrupt the functioning of the Army. 19 
However, during the Wars, the importance of its swift passage was recognised by all 
oppositions, who rarely did more than go through the motions of objection, reserving 
criticism for areas of ideology, such as corporal punishment.20 The money allocated was 
disbursed by the Paymaster-General to those responsible for the expenditure of the forces, 
namely the Regimental Agents, and the several Deputy Paymasters General, under 
warrants from the Secretary at War.21 The Regimental Agents would deal directly with 
clothiers for the manufacture of uniform, and were also responsible for all other 
Regimental expenses.22 They would channel the money to the Regimental Paymasters, who 
were responsible for pay and certain food purchases?3 The Deputy Paymasters would 
disburse funds to the Commissariat when an Anny was in the field. They were responsible 
for the food and supply of the whole Anny, and would ultimately have to account for all 
funds allocated to a field Anny.24 Each party would then be held responsible, as Public 
Accountants, for the funds allocated to them, until they had successfully submitted their 
accounts.25 
19 PD (1809) XII, 526; Pimlott. 'Administration of the British Army,' Ill. . . 
20 PD (1808) Xl, 1115 -22; (1811) XX, 698 -710; (1812) XXI, 1263-92; See also 1. R. Dmwlddy, 
Radicalism & Reform in Britain, /780-/850 (London, 1992) 121-32. 
21 See Figure 1,69; /1h RSCF(1797) 356-7; 35,h RSCF(1798); Clode, Military Forces of the Crown, I, 110. 
22 This was the case until 1808(?) when they lost control offood and forage ; see below, 2.6 Agency, 82-92. 
13 Clode, Military Forces of the Crown, 11,299. 
24 See below, 3.8 Commissariat Accounts, 96. . 
25 See Figure 2, Process of the Paymaster General's Account, 3.7 Comptrol and Audit, 94. 
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Extraordinary or Contingent expenditure, was all spending for which estimates 
could not be submitted, and therefore funding had not been voted by Parliament. In Britain 
it was allocated under the authority of the General in command of a district, or the 
Commander in Chief, by means of application to the Paymaster General, who would obtain 
a Royal Sign Manual Warrant from the Treasury directing payment.27 On foreign service in 
peace time, the expenses could be incurred upon the orders of Governors and Military 
Officers, without recourse to the Treasury,28 while on active service, the expenses incurred 
by the Army were contracted for by the 'financial agents of the Treasury,' namely the 
26 19/1· RSCF (1797) 356-7; 3Sh RSCF (1798); Clode, Military Forces of the Crown, 1, 110. 
27 8th Report on Public Accounts (1783) 48; Clode, Military Forces of the Crown, I, Ill. A Royal Sign 
Manual Warrant required the signatures of three Lords of the Treasury. 
21 19th RSCF (1797) 350; Clode. Military Forces of the Crown, H, 190. 
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Commissariat and Deputy Paymasters General.29 In addition, Regimental Agents had 
traditionally been permitted to claim any excess, over and above their allocation, which 
would then be charged to the extraordinary budget. 30 The money was distributed from the 
Extraordinary Account, the source of which was 'sums which have been voted for the 
Ordinary Service of the Army, and have not been taken out of the Exchequer.'31 In effect 
this Account was surplus money, and was always considered as open to abuse,32 as it was 
checked only in retrospect, by the Comptrollers of Army Accounts, followed by the 
Auditors of Public Accounts at the Audit Office,33 before being included in the Army 
estimate for the next year, voted upon, and repaid into the Ordinary Account.34 In 1792 
barracks were built in Canada with funding from the ExtraordirIary Account, and without 
recourse to Parliament.35 Despite attracting criticism/6 the same source of finance was 
used to establish the Commander in Chiefs office upon the outbreak of war in 1793,37 and 
such funding was not brought under the direct control of Parliament until 1833, when Lord 
Grey implemented reform requiring full estimates for all Army expenditure.38 However, 
the Commander in Chiefs prerogative to use Extraordinary funds, as head of the Army, 
was not used during the remainder of the period under discussion. This is significant in the 
light of his systematic subordination to the Secretary at War, outlined above.39 It reveals a 
degree of acceptance of the non-financial role of the Commander-in-Chiefs office, 
together with recognition of the authority of the civilian War Office, the staff of which 
were swift to poirIt out any perceived over-stepping of the mark on the part of Horse 
Guards.4o 
29 Clode, Military Forces of the Crown, 11, 190-1. 
30 See below, Section 2.6, Agency, 82-92. 
31 5th RCPA (1781) Appendix 6, 586. . . 
32 Criticism was particularly directed at the Extraordmary Account after the ~encan W~ of Independence, 
and its use in various areas, such as administration, levy money for mercenarIes, and subSistence for 
Pr . ·al forces Pimlo" 'Administration of the British Army,' 149; In addition the Commanders and ovmCl , '.. . . Cc Quartermaster General were stated to have made £417,592 by manipulating the account m paymg lor 
transport, 7th RCPA (1782) 130-8. 
33 10th RCPA (1783) 527. 
34 7th RCPA (1782) passim. 
35 Clode, Military Forces of the Crown, I, 241. 
36 [bid; 2nd RCME (1806) passim. 
37 Clode, Military Forces of the Crown, I, 139. 
31 ibid 
39 2 2 Commander in Chief, 24-30; 2.3 Secretary at War and the War Office, 30-34. 
40 S~e for example, PRO W04/413173, Leverson Gower to Commander in Chief, 14th August 1809. 
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3.3 THEPAYMASTERGENERAL 
The process of refonn of the fmancial structure of the Military had begun in the 
wake of the American War ofIndependence.41 As revealed in Chapter 2, under the tenns of 
Burke's Pay Office Act, the office of Paymaster General effectively lost its independence, 
being made subordinate to the Secretary at War. The post, which was always held jointly 
by two men, was no longer able to fonnulate the estimates by which money for Anny pay 
was allocated, and by which they had been able to accrue funds of surplus money within 
personal accounts, after they had disbursed the allocation to the Regiments for their actual 
strength. The Paymaster General was now forced to use estimates prepared for the 
Secretary at War by the Anny, and all money allocated was to be sourced directly from 
Parliament, being held by the Bank of England until required. In addition, they and their 
staff were to receive annual salaries, paid quarterly, and their ability to take fees, from any 
source, was removed. The intention was to create a simplified system,42 which accounted 
for all money processed through the Anny accounts,43 avoiding the alleged corrupt 
activities of previous members of the Pay Office.44 By 1797 the Select Committee on 
Finance reported that, 
It does not appear to your Committee that the Paymaster General has any active 
control over Public Expenditure; it being his duty to make payments ministerially 
and without discretion, in persuance of Warrants directed to him by the Secretary at 
War or the Treasury ... or in payments of the drafts of the Deputy Paymasters 
abroad, for the Ordinary services of the Anny.45 
They went on to say that, 'The Pay Office must therefore be looked upon as an Office of 
mere Account. ,46 The inclusion of the Paymasters General and the Pay Office into the 
military administrative structure had therefore been achieved. All employees were salaried, 
without either the need nor the ability to take fees, and officially they did not process funds 
through their own personal accounts. 
41 For an analysis of the Pay Office system prior to 1792, see Pimlott, 'Administration of the British Army,' 
155-8. 
42 9th RCPA (1782) 331 . 
43 Pirnlott, 'Administration of the British Army,' 157 . 
.. 6th RCPA (1782) 727. 
45 19th RSCF (1797) 356. 
46 Ibid. 
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Certainly the reforms of the Paymaster General's accounting system in 1783, 
prevented any holder of the office processing public money through his personal account. 
However, it still proved possible for Pay Office staff to manipulate the system, and to 
transfer public money into their own accounts. In 1797 this was detected on two occasions , 
being perpetrated by men who had claimed to be conducting deals to obtain specie.47 Their 
ability to do this was blamed on delays in the accounting process, and it was suggested 
that, 
without an earlier Examination, and Auditing of Accounts, irregularities can hardly 
be prevented; and that temptation will never be wanting to make use of Public 
Money, while there exists a great probability of its being, for a long time, uncalled 
for.48 
This proved to be a constant complaint, but one which was difficult to address, as due to 
the Army augmentation, a massive backlog had built up in all areas of Army accounting. In 
1797. the Select Committee on Finance reported that, 
no Accounts have been delivered by the Pay Office to the Commissions for 
Auditing Public Accounts since the 24th December 1785, being a period of 
upwards of eleven years; and as the whole of the Ordinary and Extraordinary 
Expenses of the Army are paid either directly by the Paymaster, or indirectly by his 
Sub-accountants, it is obvious that the sum not finally accounted for by the Pay 
49 Office must be of an enormous extent! 
By 1807, the Committee on Public Expenditure were informed that it was expected the 
Paymaster General's account for 1782, (the year before Burke's Pay Office Act), would be 
completed by Christmas 1807, twenty four years after the date it was due. 50 It was also 
stated that 'not one Account of any Paymaster General has been fmally settled and 
declared, nor made ready for declaration,' in the previous ten years. 51 With such delays in 
the accounting process, it is easy to see how it was possible to misappropriate funds. 
The delay was caused by the sheer volume of work generated by the expanded 
Army, and was exacerbated by the inability of the Pay Office to employ suitable clerks. 
47 1st RCPE (1807) 5. 
41 1st RCPE (1807) 6. 
49 19th RSCF (1797) 356. 
50 1st RCPE (1807) 6 
51 Ibid. 
Several newly recruited members of staff were dismissed through incompetence or lack 0;3 
basic academic ability, and the Committee on Public Expenditure reported that, 
It would hardly have been deemed requisite to point out the propriety of appointing 
persons duly qualified by their knowledge of writing and arithmetic, ... to discharge 
the duties of Clerks in the Office, if the present Paymaster had not very lately found 
it necessary to discharge some of those who had been admitted into the office on 
account of their insufficiency, and inexperience. 52 ' 
Attempts were made to clear the backlog of Paymaster General's accounts through 
legislation. In 1805, a further Pay Office Act was passed,53 which repealed that of Burke. It 
re-emphasised the contents of the 1782-3 legislation, and further attempted to tighten up 
the accounting process, demanding that all accounts from 1782 to 1804 be made up and 
submitted forthwith. The Act had little effect on the Pay Office, which continued in its 
failure to produce regular accounts. 54 It was even reported that the Office had totally 
disregarded the contents of the Auditor's Act the following year,55 which had stated that all 
future accounts should be delivered within three months of the end of the year. 56 Further 
calls were made for a simpler accounting system, one that would enable a greater degree of 
flexibility within the accounting process.57 It was suggested that it was not necessary for a 
Paymaster General to sign every warrant for the forces abroad, being able to delegate much 
of their work, 58 thus releasing them from unnecessary bureaucracy, and beginning the 
development of the Paymasters General as political office holders, rather than civil 
servants. The suggestions were incorporated in the Pay Office Act of 1808, the intention of 
which was the accelerating of the 'Making-up, Examination, and Audit of the Accounts of 
the Paymaster General of His Majesty's Forces,'59 and it was extended to include the Army 
of occupation in France during 1815. 60 The Act gave the government, without recourse to 
Parliament, the freedom to implement, 
Rules and Regulations for the more speedy and effectual Examination and 
Settlement of the Accounts of Regimental Expenditures, or of such other 
Expenditures for Army Services, as usually have been, or shall hereafter be 
52 Ibid., 8. 
53 45 Geo. Ill, c.S8. 
s. 1st RCPE (1807) 7-8. 
55 Ibid., 7. 
56 46 Geo. III, c.141 , viii. 
57 1st RCPE (1807) 8. 
s. Ibid , 7; 6th RCME (1808) 344. 
S9 48 Geo. 1II, c.128. 
60 pp (1814-15) 11, 839. 
ex~ed in the Office of the Secretary at War, as shall appear to be most 
expedIent, and to facilitate the Final Settlement of such Accounts.61 
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The new system was found to be of some success, and the backlog of accounts 
began to move. In 1801, only 460 of the 9546 accounts for the period 1798 to 1800 had 
been successfully examined,62 whereas by 1812 only twenty six of those remained 
unexamined.63 In 1815 there was a total of only twenty seven accounts outstanding up to 
1814,64 but it would be peace and the subsequent reduction of the forces that would 
ultimately permit the system of Army account to work as it was intended. It was March 
1821, before Palmerston reported that there were no unexamined accounts, for any period 
after 1798.65 
From 1782, the post of Paymaster General had changed from one of a lucrative 
public accountant, through a civil office holder, to a political placeman, under the 
supervision of the Secretary at War, extending the role of the government to take an even 
greater control of the Army, through its finances. As with so many areas of military 
administration, the system fell down due to the sheer volume of work to be processed, and 
needed to be completely overhauled, during the Wars. While the new, flexible, system of 
1808 managed to clear much of the backlog of accounts, and cope with an Army which 
continued to expand to 1812, a turn-round of accounts as envisaged by the legislation, was 
only achieved after 1815. 
3.4 THE WAR OFFICE 
The delay in the submission of accounts, was common throughout the accounting 
process, and the difficulties experienced by the Pay Office were bound to be mirrored in 
the War Office, which was the hub of Army finance. Indeed the Committee on Public 
Expenditure of 1807, investigating the delays in the accounting of the Pay Office, reported 
that, 
61 48 Geo. m. c.l28. ii. 
62 6th RCME (1808) 307. 
63 13th RCPE (1812)36. 
64 pp (1814-15) IX. 271. 
65 pp (1821) XV. 143. 
the whole business of the Pay Office is so intimately connected with that of the V:~ 
Office, that it is hardly possible to report fully on the former without entering into 
an ample examination of the latter.66 ' 
As with the Pay Office, the estimates, on which the 1783 War Office accounting system 
had been based, had been formulated using peace-time figures. Therefore, at the outbreak 
of the Wars, an immediate backlog of the augmented Army's accounts developed,67 which 
increased still further with the additional responsibilities of the non-regular military 
forrnations.68 This deficiency was observed by Mr. Tayler, the Examiner of Army 
Accounts, but he was under the impression that the War would soon be over, that the 
backlog would be cleared at the onset of peace, and so failed even to report it.69 
By 1797 it was clear that the war was not about to end, and the overloaded system 
was not working. Of the 1273 accounts that should have been processed by the War Office, 
since the introduction of the new system in 1783, only 248 had been settled, 159 were 
being processed through the office, but 866 were not even submitted by the Regiments or 
their Agents.7o It was suggested by the Select Committee on Finance, that if the terms of 
the Act of 1783 were not capable of being met, then they should be changed, and if they 
were capable of being met, they should be enforced.7l Attempts were made to alleviate the 
problems by augmenting the staff of the Accounts Department, which, due to its relatively 
recent formation was not endowed with the experienced staff of other War Office 
departments.72 At the outbreak of the Wars the establishment of the Department was the 
Chief Examiner of Army Accounts, his Assistant, and 'thirteen persons,.73 By 1798 this 
had increased to include the Examiner, three Assistants, and eighteen clerks.74 This was 
steadily increased until in 1806, the establishment stood at the Chief Examiner, seven 
Assistants, and fifty one Clerks.75 In addition an Assistant and three clerks were employed 
solely in clearing pre-1797 accounts/6 and another Assistant with 'several clerks' was 
processing accounts from 1797 to 1803 (when the new system was finally up and 
66 1st RCPE (1807) 9. 
67 6th RCME (1808) 311. 
68 35th RSCF (1798) 681 ; 6th RCME (1808) 307. 
69 6th RCME (1808) 311 . 
70 3rd RSCF(1797)41-2; 6th RCME (1808) 303. 
71 19th RSCF (l 797) 357-8; 6th RCME (1808) 306. 
72 6th RCME (1808) 306, 321. 
n Ibid., 306. 
74 36th RSCF (1798) Appendix (AI) 684; 6th RCME (1808) 280. 
73 6th RCME (1808) 280-3. 
76 Ibid , 306-7. 
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runrung). Even WIth this Increase, all clerks were permitted to work extra hours, and most 
were confined to their own duties, to preserve even their limited expertise.78 However, as 
noted in Chapter 2, unlike all other Government Offices, the War Office traditionally only 
worked five hours per day, which did not increase throughout the period, and paid overtime 
was often the only available solution. This could hardly have contributed to the effective 
management of the accounting system. 
In 1797, the recommendations of the Select Committee on Finance were , 
implemented,79 which imposed a production line approach on the completion of accounts. 
Each account remained in the Register Room of the Accounts Department, until all its 
component parts were assembled.8o It then moved, as one piece of work, through every 
stage of the accounting process, returning to the Register Room after each.81 However, the 
new system met with limited success. Mr. Foveaux, the Examiner suggested that this was 
due to it being' formed on an old foundation,' with so much of a backlog of accounts to 
clear,82 and the Commission of Military Enquiry reported that, despite, 
all the endeavour which has been from time to time made to prevent the recurrence 
of the arrears of the Regimental Accounts, that part of the Establishment has for 
many years past been wholly unequal to its duties. 83 
Further calls were made for the simplification of the whole system of military account, in 
particular to enable those without an 'official' education to understand and therefore 
examine it.84 Their suggestions were introduced through the flexibility enabled by the Pay 
Office Act of 1808,85 which sanctioned the use of a single pay list for all ranks, enabling all 
the information to be clearly seen and understood. In addition the flexibility sanctioned by 
the Act, permitted the removal of the necessity for the War Office to pass Regimental 
AccoUflts back to the Regimental Agent before final completion, thus removing one 
77 Ibid, 308. 
71 Ibid, 286. h 
79 19th RSCF (1797) Appendix P5 ; f! RCME (1808) 318-19. 
10 These composed the States and Returns from the Regiment, the Regimental Paymaster's Returns, and the 
Regimental Agent's Abstract Account. 
11 6th RCME (1808)318-9. 
12 Ibid., 321. 
13 Ibid, 286 . 
... ISI RCPE (1807) 9; 6th RCME (1808) 320,322-3. 
IS 48 Geo. 1Il, c.128. 
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complete element of the accounting process, saving valuable time, and eliminating an area 
of Agency involvement. 86 
The Commissioners of Military Enquiry had also recommended that the final 
responsibility for processing regimental accounts should lie with the Comptrollers of Army 
Accounts, as it was not conceivable that the same office that had sanctioned the 
expenditure in the fIrst instance, should ultimately endorse the accounts for that spending.87 
However, this was staunchly opposed by the War Office, who saw the Comptrollers as too 
distant from the business they were to examine, and suggested that their intrusion would 
merely add to the delay in accounting, and prove more expensive to the pUblic.88 After 
much deliberation, the Treasury accepted the Secretary at War' s protestations, and 
sanctioned the augmenting of the War Office for the purpose of further examining the 
regimental accounts, rather than the office of the Comptrollers of Army Accounts.89 This 
not only endorsed the implementation of a new system of processing regimental accounts, 
it also ensured the authority of the War Office over all Army finances. The Committee on 
the Public Expenditure in 1811 confmned this view, reporting that the Secretary at War 
should be responsible for, 
all expenses incurred on account of all ordinary military services, for which he 
should be held responsible, as well as for the regular examination, and audit of all 
Accounts of that part of military expenditure.9o 
Despite delays in the acceptance of a standard fonn on which to process the new 
system,91 its results were readily observed. By 1812, Palmerston, as Secretary at War, 
observed of the previous year' s accounts, 
by far the greatest proportion have already been examined; .and that upon. the fullest 
consideration which they [the Accounts Department] can gIve on the subject, they 
see no reason to doubt the sufficiency, under the present arrangement of the 
Department, to settle the Accounts of this and futur~lears, without any other than 
such temporary arrear as must unavoidably happen. 
86 1" RCP E (1807) 35 Evidence given by Charles Long, 22nd April 1807. 
87 6'h RCME (1808) 354; PRO WO 4/4231244-256, Pultney to Harrison, 13th ~pril 1809. 
SI PRO WO 4/42912, Pultney to Harrison, 9th March I80?; WO 4/429/3, Harrlson to Secretary at War, 25th 
March 1810; WO 4/429/4, Pultneyto Harrison, 13th Ap.nII809. . 
89 PRO WO 4/429/16-18. Harrison to Pultney. 29th Apn11810; WO 4/429118-27, Merry to Harrlson, 24th 
May 1809 (107). 
90 1(th RCPE (1811) 24. 
91'3thRCPE(1812)39. 
92 Ibid. 34. 
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Therefore, after twenty years of attempts to produce a workable system, the War Office 
accounts were finally being processed within the specified time. By the massive increase in 
staff, in a new dedicated department, together with the imposition of an iIll10vative system, 
and a flexibili~ which enabled; stages of the accounting process, which proved 
unnecessary, to be cut; areas of delay to be isolated and extra staff assigned; and ultimately, 
the development of a procedure that worked efficiently, even as the Army expanded to its 
largest ever level. However, the delays in the War Office appear to have been easily 
rectified when compared to those which resulted from the failure of Regimental 
Paymasters and Agents to submit their accounts.93 
3.5 REGIMENTAL PAYMASTERS 
The Regimental Paymaster was responsible for the payment of officers and men, 
together with any purchase made directly for the Regiment, such as additional food 
supplies. In 1793, the post was held by an officer of the Regiment, and although 
occasionally he would be required to give sureties to guarantee his services, 'his 
Regimental Commission (being usually that of a Captain) and his character as an Officer, 
were deemed sufficient to ensure a due performance of his truSt.,94 By 1797, the 
arrangement had proved inadequate to the pressures placed upon it by the Wars, with 
delays being experienced at every level of the accounting process. It was suggested that 
these delays, experienced throughout the Army accounts process, originated with the 
Regimental Paymasters, who found it difficult to conduct the financial business of the 
Regiment, while at the same time attending to their other military duties.95 In addition, the 
nature of the service of the Regiment, which was often broken into detachments, meant that 
it frequently proved impossible to maintain a regular accounting system.96 Several units 
had failed to produce any accounts at all since the introduction of the revised system in 
1783.97 The Select Committee on Finance in 1797, recommended that if the Regimental 
93 19th RSCF (1797) Appendix P2, a, 396. 
\14 6th RCME (1808) 305. 
95 19th RSCF(1797) Appendix 0, 395. The evidence of Messrs. Cox and Greenwood. 
96 {bid 
97 lbid, 356; 35th RSCF (1798) 621. 
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Paymasters were not capable of meeting their terms of employment, then the system should 
be changed.98 
The perceived solution was the new system of 1798, which introduced the separate 
post of Regimental Paymaster.99 The Secretary at War informed the Colonels of Regiments 
that they, 
must make provision for a person, for whom they would be responsible, not a 
serving officer, bearing a Special Military Commission, to take on the role of 
Paymaster solely, without any other duty, and without any expectation of 
promotion. 100 
He was to be appointed by the Regimental Colonel, and was to receive pay at fifteen 
shillings per day,IOI 'the pay of a major,'102 and in terms of hierarchy, he was to be below 
that of the junior captain of the Regiment. 103 In addition he would be permitted to employ a 
clerk, at the pay of a Sergeant, jf the Regiment numbered over 500 men. I 04 He was to pay 
sureties to the tune of £2000 immediately, with two additional sums of £1 000 in due 
course, 105 as the holder of a position of 'public trust.' 106 It was hoped that a full time 
Regimental Paymaster would 'therefore be at liberty to give undivided attention to the 
business of their office.' 107 To that end, strict guidelines were set out demanding the 
mustering of the Regiment on the 24th day of each month, from which a General State and 
Pay List could be compiled and sent to the Agent, and on to the War Office. It was to 
register all ranks, with a separate sheet for officers, and it replaced the bi-monthly returns 
introduced under Burke's Act, which many units had simply disregarded. 108 
91 19th RSCF (1797)3 58 . 
99 War Office Circulars, 18th November 1797, and 6th December 1797, in 35th RSCF (1798) Appendix D, 
661. 
100 6th RCME (1808) 306. 
101 War Office Circular, 15th July 1806. 
102 13th RCPE (1812) 34, PaLmerston to the Commissioners of Public Expenditure, 7th January 1812. 
103 General RegulatiOns and Orders (London, 1811) 6. 
104 War Office Circulars, 18th November 1797, and 6th December 1797, in 35th RSCF (1798) Appendix D, 
661; 6th RCME (1808) 315-7. 
10' War Office Circulars, 18th November 1797, and 6th December 1797, in 35th RSCF (1798) Appendix D, 
661; 6th RC ME (1808) 306. 
106 Clode, Military Forces of the Crown, 11, 302, states that the paying of a surety ,was ~e common rule at the 
time. However, the first legislation to this effect was 50 Geo. Ill, c.85 ; Torrance, SOCIal Class and 
Bureaucratic Innovation', 64. 
107 35th RSCF (1798) 622. 
101 19th RSCF (1797) 356; 35th RSCF(1798) 621. 
The submission of monthly States and Pay Lists should have been an asset to the 80 
whole military, giving a clear picture of the actual establishment of the forces at any time. 
This should have proved invaluable in both the planning and administration of the Army 
during the Wars. Unfortunately the scheme proved over-ambitious for all parties 
concerned, with the monthly returns producing just too much information, for an already 
stretched administrative system. In 1806, the requirement was reduced to a quarterly 
muster for States and Pay Lists, 109 and was maintained throughout the Wars, despite 
attempts to reinstate the monthly returns. I ID In theory, the appointment of an exclusive 
Paymaster to Regiments should also have improved the efficiency of the payment of the 
forces, but most initial incumbents turned out to be anything but 'professional' in their 
performance of the role. By the recommendations of the War Office circulars, which 
introduced the new system, ideally, the men were to be Half-Pay Officers. I 11 But, as they 
were to have no expectation of promotion, it is not difficult to see why it was hard to 
employ men of a sufficiently high calibre. Unlike Excise officers, who had to buy a month 
of training before appointment, 112 there was no formal training for paymasters. This would 
mean that their knowledge of accounting would be limited, and clearly their military 
experience was also insufficient to execute their role effectively. In 1800 the Examiner of 
Army Accounts found that 
many of the new Paymasters were very deficient in the qualifications requisite for 
the effectual performance of their duties; so much so, that the confidence which the 
War Office had expected might be placed in them was withdrawn, and it was found 
absolutely necessary to examine their Accounts with the minuteness and caution 
. . I f h· ·bI 113 that rendered an expeditIous sett ement 0 t em ImpossI e. 
As with the War Office, it was suggested that the whole process of Regimental Accounting 
should be simplified, enabling those without an 'official' education to understand it. I 14 
The failings of the new system were not merely practical, they were also structural. 
The ability to appoint the Regimental Paymasters gave back some degree of patronage to 
109 PRO WO 4/303/162, 165; WO 4/3221177, 121, 127; 
6th RCME (1808) 315. . . . . 
110 PRO WO 40129/11 Secretary at War to Commander In Chief, 7th March 1807; Commander In Cblefto 
Secretary at War 23rd March 1808; Secretary at War to Commander in Chief, 23rd March 1808. 
I11 War Office C~cu1ars, 18th November 1797, and 6th December 1797, in 35th RSCF(1798) Appendix D, 
661. 
112 Torrance, 'Social Class and Bureaucratic Innovation', 64. 
113 (/Ir RCME (1808) 307. 
114 /" RCPE (1807) 9; (/" RCME (1808) 320, 322-5. 
th . 81 e Regunental Colonel, although under strict guidelines. However, in that the Regimental 
Paymaster was considered to be a Public Officer, not liable to military duty, and acting 
d th · ed· th· liS un er e unm late au onty of the Secretary at War, there was clearly a conflict of 
interest, as he was effectively serving two masters. I 16 It brought out the old fears of the 
Army, and its control of its own fmances, with the Commissioners of Military Enquiry of 
1808, being warned that, the 'whole system of account could be destroyed by the command 
of a superior officer.' 117 Ultimately, no conflict developed out of the fears of potential 
divided loyalty, although it continued to generate debate throughout the period. llg The 
Regimental Paymaster was clearly a public servant, as it was with the War Office that he 
lodged his bond, and it was the public, who would be liable for any default, 119 unlike the 
previous system, in which the ultimate responsibility for loss lay with the Regimental 
Colonel. 120 In addition, as a commissioned officer, he would also be liable for dismissal 
under Martial Law, not by the Colonel, but by the Secretary at War. 121 
The efficiency of the Regimental Paymasters was to improve during the course of 
the period, as the Anny and the paymasters became familiar with the new system. 122 By the 
introduction of the flexibility under the 1808 Pay Office Act, into the War Office Accounts 
Department, the passage of accounts was speeded up, and more checks were possible on 
the new paymasters' accounts. As the system was tightened, it became even more 
important for a Regimental Colonel to get a competent man, rather than just a placeman. 
Certainly complaints about the paymasters cease, suggesting that those holding the post 
became more efficient, and the only evidence of any of their number defaulting after 1810, 
refers to men from foreign corps.l23 Perhaps evidence of ultimate success of system is that 
it was not changed until 1856, when the Secretary of State took over the appointment of all 
Regimental Paymasters, 124 ending finally the question of divided loyalty. 
lIS 35,1t RSCF (1798) 622; (/It RCME (1808)306. 
116 Clode Military Forces of the Crown, U, 300-1. 
117 (/It RCME (1808) Appendix 38, 511-3 . 'Memorandum relative to Regimental Accounts upon the present 
System', WiIIiam Merry, November 1805. 
III/dlt RCPE(181l) 20-4; /3 'h RCPE(1812) 33-4. 
119 (/It RCME (1808) 475; / fit RCPE (1812)33-4. 
120 Clode, Military Forces of the Crown, 11, 2. 
121 l3,h RCPE(1812)33. 
122 See 3.4 The War Office, 74-8; 3.6 Agency, 82-92. 
123 PRO WO 4/399n9-82, 'Return of Accountants under the Foreign Branch of the War Office, who have 
become defaulters since the I" January 1810,' 13th February 1822. 
124 Clode, Military Forces of the Crown, 11,302. 
3.6 AGENCY 82 
Despite the removal of many of the delays in the processing of the accounts of the 
Regimental Paymasters, the key area of Anny finance during the period under discussion, 
was that of the Agent. There were, in theory, two types of Agent, the Regimental and the 
Army. The former dealt with the monetary business of individual corps or regiments, while 
the latter was responsible for the whole financial arrangements of Anny offices and 
departments. By the outbreak of the Wars in 1793, the duties of the two types of agent had 
predominantly been taken over by larger houses, who were private bankers, dealing with 
both Army and regimental finances in the same way, and therefore can be effectively dealt 
with under the single heading. 125 
The post of agent had been officially established under William and Mary,126 and 
by the period under discussion its business was stated to be, 
to apply for, receive, disburse and account for Public Money advanced to him under 
General Regulations, or by particular Orders: He is the ordinary channel of 
communication between the Regiment and the Public Departments, and is resorted 
to, not only for providing and forwarding of Anns, Clothing, and other Regimental 
Supplies, but also in the business, public or private, of the individual Officers. l27 
In effect, agents performed all the duties that enabled the regiment or department to 
function. Together with the Lieutenant Colonels of regiments, this arrangement ensured 
that the colonel had little to do, other than oversee the patronage of his corps, and take the 
profit he derived from it. This confirms regimental colonelcies as the only sinecures within 
the bounds of this study, that were not even identified as such, let alone recommended for 
abolition. 
In Britain, the money allocated to each from the Mutiny Act, was disbursed to the 
Regimental Agent from the Paymaster General's Account in the Bank of England. This 
was then passed by the Agent to the Regimental Paymasters for the pay of the officers and 
men, and also to those supplying the Regiment with clothing and equipment. 12S When the 
125 As per /fh RCME (1808)333-66. 
126 Clode, Military Forces of the Crown, I, 74; H.C.B. ~ogers, The Army in the Eighteenth Century, 45h 
127 3sh RSCF (1798) Appendix (M.3) 679, Mr. M. Lewls, Deputy Secretary at War, 12th May 1798; (/ 
RCME (1808) Appendix (59) 574; The latter duties, 'the business, public or private, of the individual 
Officers' will be dealt with in 4.6 Officers, 154, while the fonner wiIl be addressed here. 
128 See 6.4 Clothing and Equipment, 202-14. 
Regiment was serving abroad the Agent only received the allocation for clothing and 
equipment, pay being disbursed via Deputy Paymasters General in the field. 
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Prior to Burke's Pay Office Act, Agents had performed many of the services later 
associated with the War Office, for which they had received payment in the form of 
poundage, a deduction of two pence per pound from all funds processed for their 
Regiments. Under the terms of the Act, poundage was ended for soldiers' pay, being 
replaced by estimated costs of the services provided, but it was still maintained for the pay 
and half-pay of officers. 129 In addition they received the pay of a soldier per troop or 
company, each day. This was allocated to the Regiments as pay for a non-effective, or 
fictitious soldier, known as a Hautbois or Warrant Man. 130 This practice had been partly 
removed under Burke,13I but the payment of Warrant Men continued throughout the period 
under discussion, being re-emphasised by the Pay Office Act of 1805, as part of the 
privileges of the Regimental Colonel. I32 
In theory this was the fmal amount allocated under each heading of the estimates. 
However, as stated above, agents had been traditionally permitted to claim any excess, over 
and above the estimate, which would then be charged to the following year's extraordinary 
budget. 133 It is a striking example of the confusion caused by the legacy of the old system 
of military management, with a private individual contracting to provide a service, being 
recompensed by the government for his trouble, and then being able to submit further 
claims for the same services. However, it was a system that was deeply rooted in the 
traditions of the Army and its civilian administration, and proved to be one area in which 
the reforming zeal of the war years barely touched. 
The system at the outbreak of the Wars ensured that the key to the processing of 
Army fmance was in the hands of the agent. 134 All relevant funds passed through them to 
their client units or offices, and the accounts necessary to finalise the Army budget, were 
passed back though their houses, to the War Office. All this lead to a log-jam within the 
129 Jd" RCPE(1811) 19. 
130 6" RCME (1808) 370-1. 
131 Pimlott 'Administration of the British Army,' 136-44. 
132 ' 58 .. . 45 Geo. II1, c. . XVIll. 
133 pp (1807) IV, 283-91, 'An Account of the Sums ofMon~y Issued ~o each an~ every of~e Anny ~gents 
on the British Establishment, By way of Compensation for hiS and their trouble ID the Affarrs of the different 
regiments of which they have the Management; and for any other Public Expense,' 4th August 1807. 
134 See Figure 2, Process of the Paymaster General's Account, 94. 
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vanous agencIes, ut one which was difficult to remove as there was little effective control 
over them. As agencies were not public departments, once they drew the money to which 
they were entitled, the public effectively lost track of it, until the submission of the final 
accounts. As these were always in arrears, the amount of money unaccounted for was 
substantial. Even though, in theory, agents were not allowed to keep any public funds on 
their books,135 there was great scope for the manipulation of public funds, due to the great 
delays in the processing of accounts, and the lack of any redress on the part of the public. 
When the Commissioners of Military Enquiry selected several agents' accounts at random, 
every one produced discrepancies. The accounts of the 14th Regiment for the year 1795, 
was found to show that the agents, Greenwood and Cox, had exceeded their estimate to the 
public by £1 475.1 Os.8Yut. 136 This would obviously fuel the arguments of those who 
suggested public funds were at risk from the agency system. 
Despite this obvious risk, the agent bore no liability for the funds he processed, that 
lay with whoever had appointed him, whether a regimental colonel in the case of 
regimental agents, or the Secretary at War in the case of Army agents. The regimental 
colonels were responsible for any loss incurred by their appointed agent,137 and were 
recommended to take out take sureties from their agents to insure against potential losses, 
in keeping with others who handled public money, such as the Regimental Paymasters and 
Excise Officers. However, in this agreement between gentlemen, such a sign of mistrust 
was clearly not the done thing, as throughout the period under discussion, only foreign 
regiments appear to have adhered to the suggestion. 138 This was confmned by Mr. Ross, of 
the failed house of Ross and Ogilvie, in his evidence before the Commissioners of Military 
Enquiry,139 who, in their sixth report recommended that it was essential that sureties should 
be taken by colonels, in order to safeguard both themselves and the public. 140 However, 
little heed appears to have been taken of this advice, as in 1812, PaImerston info'rmed the 
Committee on Public Expenditure, that no agent paid any form of security, excepting those 
responsible for foreign regiments, 141 and this was confirmed in information he gave to the 
135 Pimlott, • Administration of the British Anny,' 182. 
136 (/h RCME (1808) 516, Appendix 40. 
137 Ibid., 304. . . 
138 pp (1807) IV,271, Amount of securities given by the Anny Agents for the faithful discharge of the trust 
reposed in them, 3n1 August 1807. . nd 
13~ (/h RCME (1808) 580, Appendix 62, Examination of Alexander Ross (QuestIOns 4 and 5), 22 March 
1808. 
140 lbid , 351. 
141/3,h RCPE {l812)33 . 
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ouse 0 ommons the following year. No attempt was made to enforce the taking of 
security after 1808, which is more surprising considering that after the 1805 Pay Office 
Act, all liability for the default of paymasters and (consequently, in terms of the funds for 
which they were responsible) agents, would rest with the Secretary at War, which in effect 
meant the public.
143 
In this way the agency system can be seen to have become a pseudo 
government department. It was independent and able to make a profit, while supported by 
public funds in the event of loss, and more importantly, without any means of examination 
or redress on the part of the public. All but the accounts they were required to produce 
were deemed private, and their actions were all as a result of their power of attorney from 
the colonels. At the same time, as civilians, they were outside martial law. 
By the outbreak of the Wars, the whole concept of Agency had become enmeshed 
in the respectability of tradition, to such an extent that their removal had never previously 
been considered. When in 1795, the office of the Barrackmaster General was closed, the 
£ 100,000 processed by the house of Greenwood and Cox, the agents for that department, 
was transferred to the Bank of England, but then the same agency was given responsibility 
for its management. 144 This despite their accounting being so poor as to be 'totally 
useless. ,145 Agents had been institutionalised to the point that even parliamentary 
committees were guilty of confusing their status. In 1811, the Tenth Report from the 
Committee on the Public Expenditure, suggested that the new Regimental Paymasters 
should be made subordinate to their regimental agents, placing them 'under the special 
control of the Agent, whose Deputy, in point of fact, he is; and whose Deputy he ought to 
. ,146 Th' uld hid' .. d be rigidly considered in point of practIce. IS wo ave resu te III a commISSlone 
Army officer owing allegiance to a private company, with all the connotations of dual 
loyalty. It is not surprising that committees were confused about the status of agents, when 
even the Commander in Chief regarded paymasters as their deputies, and suggested that 
agents should be considered as public servants. 147 However, this debate was part of a much 
III 
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145 Ibid. 8. 
146 Id" RCPE (1811) 21. 
147 Ibid. 20. 
wider battle over the control of the Army. If the Regimental Paymaster was a servant Of~: 
Agent, then ultimately he was controlled by the Regimental Colonel, from who the Agent 
received his power of attorney, and therefore, ultimately, the Commander in Chief. This 
would give the military authority over its own finances, albeit only to a small degree, 
something which for centuries had been strenuously avoided. 
In the 200 years since their conception, the agents had developed a great deal of 
power, through the unique service they provided, and their friends in high places, many of 
who had personally benefited from their services. In addition many agencies had 
consolidated, producing fewer and larger houses. In 1780 there were fifty one agencies, 148 
and by the outbreak of the Wars this had been reduced to thirty four. 149 In 1804, the oldest 
agency, the house of Ross and Ogilvie collapsed, leaving substantial debts. ISO Its business, 
consisting of the 3rd Regiment of Foot Guards, and seven other regiments, was absorbed 
into the house of Greenwood and Cox, which by 1807 was by far the largest of twenty four 
agencies, acting for 194 regiments. 151 This consolidation brought accusations of dubious 
practice,152 and also fears that the collapse of so powerful a house would have disastrous 
153 
consequences. 
No agency had such friends in high places, as those of Greenwood and Cox. It was 
suggested that forty five MPs held accounts with them, 154 but in particular the Duke of 
York was known to be indebted to the house for several thousand pounds. 155 This served to 
fuel the speculation in certain quarters that agents generally, and Greenwood and Cox in 
particular, were involved in corrupt activities, using the support of their powerful 
friends. 156 The Duke's debt certainly laid him open to allegations of corruption, and of 
assisting in the building of Greenwood and Cox 's monopoly of agency. Sir Francis Burdett 
outlined these concerns during a debate in Parliament during 1812, stating, 
148 The Army Agent (London, 1780) passim. 
149 Army List (1793) 49-317. . . od 
ISO (/h RCME (1808) 580-1 , Appendix 62, Exammatlon of Alexander Ross, Esq., 22 March 1808. 
ISI pp (1807) IV, 295. 
152 Mentorius, Mentoriana; or a Letter of Admonition and Remonstrance, to His Royal Highness the Duke of 
York, Relative to Corruption, Oppression, Cowardly Revenge, Agency-Monopoly, Meretricious Influence, 
and Other Subjects Connected with the Army (London, 1807) 9-10. 
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154 PD (1812) XXILI, 1276-85, 29lb July 1812; PD (1813) XXVI, 1154-5, 7 July 1813. 
us Wheeler, War Office, 106. .. , . 
156 See for example, Mentorius, Mentoriana, passim.; An Inhabitant of Cralg s Co~, Th.e Agent and HIs. 
Natural Son; A New and True Story. With Important Strictures on the Commander In chIef; Relative to hiS 
Duties, and his Confidants (London, 1808) passim. 
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It appeared very suspicious that one man should have engrossed almost the whole 
agency of the Army. If, as was said, an intimacy subsisted between the gentleman 
alluded to and the duke of York, it was not then difficult to perceive the influence 
that occasioned this monopoly, for it could not be considered wonderful that the 
colonels of regiments should have that connection in view. 157 
York was also staunch in his support of the whole agency system, advocating its return to 
the days before Burke's Act took away much of the fmancial control they had had over the 
bodies for which they were responsible. He told the Committee on the Public Expenditure 
that the Army should, 'revert to the practice that prevailed previous to the establishment of 
the new system, [in 1783] and which practice it was never his idea, at any period to 
change.' 158 Such support of an agency structure that was already under public scrutiny, did 
nothing to allay accusations of corruption, and seems somewhat naive in the face of 
popular criticism. The accusations were confmned in the eyes of many when the Duke fell 
from grace over alleged corruption in the area of Army brokerage. 159 
The fall of York gave the opponents of the agency system new impetus, and made 
the situation of agents vulnerable for the first time in their history, with a clear opposition 
against them, and without the support of their most powerful friend. The subsequent 
enquiry into York and Mary Anne Clarke, resulted in the removal of the agents' ability to 
broker Army commissions. However, even despite the damning evidence against them, the 
processing of funds through the agents proved impossible to remove, and even the changes 
that were achieved were hard-fought. 
In 1797, in evidence given to the Select Committee on Finance, Mr. Lewis, the 
Deputy Secretary at War, had suggested that a new system of agency could be adopted, 
provided by a single Army-wide Board of Agency. He stated his belief that this Board 
would save money, and safeguard public funds, in the light of several agency collapses. 160 
Nothing was done about the recommendation, and in June 1800, when the Lords 
Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury wrote to Windham, the Secretary at War, 
IS' PD (l812) XXIlI, 1276-85, 29th July 1812. 
IS8 Jdh RCPE (1811) 20-1. 
IS9 See 4.6 Officers, 154. 
160 J9'h RSCF (1797) 144-5; (/h RCME (J 808) 306. 
enquiring as to what progress had been made in this matter 161 W' dham t ' 
. m was a pams to 
point out that even if a scheme, such as that suggested by Lewis, was possible, 
I am. led to my conviction, that no attempt can be made in my Department to 
abolIsh the present system of Regimental Agency, at least during the War, with 
safety to the public Service. 162 
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That nothing further was done concerning the subject is confinned by a Circular Letter of 
May 1801, which reiterated the status quO. 163 Even requests in the House of Commons for 
infonnation that could lead to the establishment of a Board of Agency, were avoided for 
over five years,l64 with the excuse that ' it would be impossible to give it, from the 
complicated state of the accounts. ' 165 It was not until the investigation of the 
Commissioners of Military Enquiry, that serious recommendations were made which 
initiated change within the system of agency. Being driven by financial considerations, as 
well as professional opinion, the Commissioners focused on three issues which were to 
govern their decisions. First, was the reduction of expense', second, 'the diminution of risk 
attending the public money remaining in the hands of private persons', and third ' the 
acceleration of the general business connected with Regimental Expenditure, and 
especially the fmal settlement of the Accounts belonging to it.' 166 They insisted that 
explanations be given ofMr. Lewis' comments in 1797; that the lack of action on that 
subject should be fully explained; 167 and that all parties concerned address the issue, with a 
view to implementing the three points. While all civil officers agreed that a change of 
system would save the public in the region of £25,000 per annum, 168 the military officers 
questioned were of a different opinion. The Duke of York was adamant that the change 
would be disadvantageous, 169 and Generals Dundas and Harcourt could see no reason why 
a change would prove to be of any advantage. 170 They stated that there had been no loss to 
the public, even when agencies had collapsed, excepting that of Ross and Ogilvie, but were 
161 (jh RCME (1808) 334. th . 
162 PRO WO 411 791240-3, Windham to George Rose, 12 June 1800; WO 411 79/282-5 , Wmdham to George 
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bl t· 1· . 89 una e 0 gIve any exp IClt figures to support their argument, due to the disordered and 
belated state of agency accounts. Despite this lack of evidence, and the damning admission 
of poor accounting, the Commissioners decided against establishing a Board of Agency, 
accepting that during war-time it might be inadvisable to make so vast a change. Instead 
they recommended a system which further subordinated the Agent to the Secretary at War. 
They stated that, ' the system should be regulated by clear and explicit orders to be issued 
from the office of the Secretary at War,' 171 and that all financial matters should be 
processed through the agent, both to and from the regiment. They concurred that a saving 
could be made, and expressed a belief that it could result from a reduction in agency 
charges by up to a third, (the suggestion of the Comptrollers of Army AccountS)172 or by a 
replacement of all charges with a one percent charge on all issues for regimental 
services,173 (the suggestion of Cochrane Johnstone).174 
This subordination of the agents to the Secretary at War was, in Palmerston's view, 
a success. In 1812, he stated to the Committee on Public Expenditure, that he had enough 
power to control them, and declined any further authority, adding that should he require it, 
he could obtain it through the Mutiny Act. 175 Even the accounts were being processed at a 
satisfactory rate, Palmerston stating that, ' by far the greatest proportion have already been 
examined. , 176 It is not surprising that he was so content with the arrangements, for not only 
had he achieved substantial financial control over the agents, he had also only complied to 
those arrangements which suited his purposes. To the annoyance of Horse Guards,177 
Palmerston had maintained his direct contact with the regimental paymasters, as well as the 
agents, which in the opinion of the Commander in Chief, rendered 'the Paymaster in a 
manner independent of the authority of the Colonel and the Agent, and consequently 
lessening that responsibility upon which the security of the Public has ultimately rested. ' 178 
However, Palmerston reminded the Commander in Chief that the finances of the Army 
were the business of the Secretary at War, and had nothing to do with Horse Guards. 179 
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March 1810. 
D · h . 90 esplte suc reservatIOns, the system was to remain in place, with the Secretary at War 
maintaining contact and exerting his authority over both regimental paymasters and agents. 
The reduction in agency charges was to prove more problematic. It was impossible 
to ascertain the state of the agents' accounts at anyone time, due to the delays in the 
system, and their disordered state. During the three debates in parliament on the subject of 
agency, during the period under discussion, 180 opponents of the system claimed that the 
public was owed several thousand pounds by agents, while at the same time, their 
supporters claimed the contrary. Neither side was able to convincingly refute the other, 
since substantive evidence did not exist, due to the state of the accounts. Even the agents 
themselves found it difficult to fmd their way through their own records. No accounts for 
Greenwood and Cox existed prior to 1794.181 When a representative of that house was 
examined by the Commissioners of Military Enquiry in 1807, he stated that his house was 
a creditor of the public of £141 ,156.18s.2d.182 However, after enquiries revealed that the 
public were actually creditors of Greenwood and Cox, a statement was sent to the 
Commissioners by the agents, which revealed that the public were owed £28 ,043 .9s.8d. 183 
While this shows a clear lack of competence, and could so easily have led to further 
investigations, and even allegations of corruption, the excuses of the agents were accepted, 
(despite the disorder of accounts being one reason offered for the collapse of Ross and 
Ogilvie),184 and the agency system was permitted to continue, but with fees reduced by a 
quarter, taking effect from 25th July 1809. 185 
The reduction in agency fees had a significant effect on the cost of the service. In 
1807, Parliament was informed that the total cost of agency for the period from 25th 
186 
December 1805 to 24th December 1806, was £6 ,537,634.l9s.11d. By 1812, the same 
services, for a substantially expanded Army, were costing the public, only 
£4,819,622. 16s.6d 187 Of these totals, the amount allocated to Greenwood and Cox 
remained relatively constant, at 49.9 and 48.6 percent respectively. 
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The Pay Office Act of 1805, had attempted to tighten the accounting practice of the 
agents, along with that of the Regimental Paymasters. 188 Agents were instructed to make 
up their accounts within six months in Britain and nine months abroad, in a 'clear' fashion. 
Any agent not doing so was to be regarded as a debtor to the crown. The funds were to be 
paid into the account of the Paymaster General in the Bank of England, from which the 
agent would draw them, only when required. Finally, all the agents' accounts had to be 
made up at the request of either the Paymaster General, or the Secretary at War. It was an 
attempt to improve the financial management of Army accounts generally, but also to bring 
the agency system into line with other areas of Army administration, by subordinating it to 
the Secretary at War, who could demand accounts, and held the ultimate sanction of 
dismissal, over the agent. 189 However, by 1808, it was clear that the provisions of the Act 
were not being complied with, and it was repealed,190 leaving only the stipulation of the 
time in which agents were permitted in which to make up their accounts. 191 The flexible 
rules which replaced it, that could be altered as necessary without recourse to Parliament, 
encouraged Palmerston in his belief, that by 1812, the object had been achieved, with 
accounts being processed at a desirable rate,192 and with very few instances of extended 
delays. 193 
Despite being under investigation by four separate commissions and committees 
during the course of the period, the system of agency remained in place. Notwithstanding 
continued opposition,194 which gradually reduced the services required of them, and the 
fees they were permitted to claim, the system continued until 1892,195 and beyond in the 
form of private banking which is still used by many Army officers. 196 The consolidation of 
the system also continued through the nineteenth century. There were only three houses by 
1914 197 which was further reduced by the collapse of McGriggor and Co. in 1922.
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urmg e peno under discussion the changes that affected Army agents were few. Most 
significantly they were brought increasingly under the control of the Secretary at War, who 
received their completed accounts, and had the ability to dismiss any agent who 
transgressed. They lost their ability to broker commissions,199 and their fees were reduced 
by twenty five per cent, despite the opposition of a large body of powerful military 
opinion. However, these officers were able to prevent the transfer of agency to a General 
Board, despite there being obvious savings involved. By doing this, a great part of the 
proprietary control of regiments was maintained by the colonels, which would otherwise 
have reverted to a civil department, under an even more powerful War Office. It had 
significance in many other areas, most notably in the supply of arms, clothing and 
. 200 11th d . . eqUIpment. t a so meant at, esplte a check bemg made on agents' accounts, they 
maintained control over substantial amounts of public money, outside the direct 
jurisdiction of either the Comptrollers of Army Accounts, or the Audit Office. 
3.7 COMPTROL AND AUDIT 
As stated above, an examination of money allocated from the Extraordinary 
Account was made by the Comptrollers of Army Accounts. This had been the case from 
1783,201 when it was disclosed that the only audit of these funds was made annually by a 
junior Treasury clerk with little military experience.202 By this date it was suggested that 
h d b ' . ,203·th fi the Comptrollers, under the Treasury, a ecome a mere smecure, WI ew 
responsibilities outside the checking of clothing patterns, and the accounts for victualling 
and supplying forces abroad,204 and were therefore of little use as a check against financial 
corruption. If this had been the case prior to 1783, through the course of the next decade 
the Comptrollers assumed new responsibilities, which ensured that, by the period under 
discussion, they were recognised as an effective check against the perceived corruption of 
Army finance. These included the examination of the accounts of the Paymaster General 
and his Deputies, likewise the Commissaries, all contracts for supplying money, provisions 
199 See below 4.6 Officers, 154. 
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and stores for the Army, all Army accounts both Ordinary and Extraordinary, muster rolls, 
and the provision of clothing for invalids?05 The separation from those they were 
examining was emphasised, as they were ' to report all frauds, neglects, abuses and defaults 
to the Treasury to which Department alone they were to be responsible. ,206 However, 
attempts to make the Comptrollers responsible for all regimental accounts met with strong 
opposition from the War Office, who were able to maintain final control of these fmances. 
The Audit Act of 1788207 marked the establishment, by the Treasury, of the 
Commission on Public Accounts, and the Audit Office. The Audit Commissioners were to 
be independent of government control, although as they were appointed directly by the 
Treasury, without recourse to Parliament, their independence is immediately questionable. 
In addition, the ultimate direction and control of the areas of examination remained with 
the Treasury.208 Throughout the period under discussion, the Audit Office was the fmal 
arbiter of all public spending, and despite criticism by the Committee on Public 
Expenditure in 1810, which questioned its efficiency, 209 it remained unaltered. The 
Committee recommended certain principles on which an audit should be based, and 
observed that there was no independent examination of the actual expenditure of the 
military?1O However, these recommendations, were not implemented until 1846.2l1 By that 
time the offices of the Comptrollers of Army Accounts had merged with the Audit 
Office,212 uniting the civil and military accountants. After passage through the various 
stages of audit,m the Army accounts were submitted to the Treasury, for their final 
discharge, and the granting of a Quietus to all accountants. At this stage the Secretary at 
War would issue a Certificate of Discharge to the Paymaster General, completing the 
accounting process.214 In theory the passage of the accounts was to take no more than three 
months from their arrival in Britain,215 however, the accounting process was one beset by 
delays, throughout the course of this study. 
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During the Wars with France, the volume of accounts which needed to be processed 
by the Comptrollers, and consequently the Audit Office, increased along with the 
expansion of the Anny, to such a degree that in 1806, the Treasury requested further 
Auditors and a third Comptroller be appointed, in order to clear the backlog of unexamined 
accounts.217 The additional staff were pennitted to be employed, and the Comptrollers 
given statutory rights to examine all military accounts.218 In addition, a new patent was 
issued to the Comptrollers, giving them 'the most extensive jurisdiction over the military 
expenditure of the Country.'219 lt was recommended that in all practicable cases, 
examination of accounts should precede payment. However, as it was appreciated that the 
workload of those checking the Anny accounts was great, and that the system was already 
in arrears, it was decided that the Commissariat, both in Britain and abroad, would be 
placed under the Comptrollers, who were empowered to examine finally, all provision and 
store accounts,220 without recourse to the Audit Office. All other military accountants were 
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Commissariat, but only on the authority of the Quartermaster General. 
also exempted from examination by the Audit Office, providing their accounts had been 95 
passed by the Comptrollers,221 although, in practise the Treasury could demand a second 
audit from any public accountant.222 This would pave the way for the merger of the two 
offices of audit, although it would not take place for forty years. In addition, the 
Comptrollers were required to examine, under oath if necessary, all matters concerning the 
expenditure of money, provisions and stores, and it was reiterated that they were to report 
to the Treasury 'all frauds , neglects or abuses.,223 Their Department was to be made a 
depos~tory for every kind of information relating to the areas they were examining, 
ensuring that the accounts of the Anny would no longer be processed by men without a 
knowledge of military finance. 
The success of the Comptrollers of Military Accounts was further emphasised by 
the appointment, in 1814, of a fourth Comptroller, or Auditor General, with responsibility 
~ th P . ul . 224 th . Jar e eruns ar campaIgn, e expense of which had become a preoccupation of the 
Treasury and certain members ofparliament.225 He was to operate with the Anny, and his 
powers were even more extensive than those of the Comptrollers in Britain. He was to 
execute his office under the direction and control of the Treasury, and had the authority to 
require anyone receiving money or public stores, for which they were accountable, to 
render the accounts on oath, and submit all relevant paperwork to substantiate them.226 
However, despite being given such powers, it is interesting to note that the audit he made 
was not deemed final , and that a re-examination by the Audit Office was suggested, 
perhaps to avoid the accusation of the Comptroller being compromised by his proximity to 
those he was employed to police. The presence of the Auditor General was obviously 
deemed a success, as when the Army moved into France, the legislation was amended to 
permit him the same jurisdiction there,227 and an Auditor General travelled with 
Wellington to the Low Countries, for the Waterloo campaign.228 It would, however, be 
more than seventeen years before even the Peninsular accounts were settled,229 which does 
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not suggest that the Auditor General was able to exert much influence over the fmances 0~6 
the Anny, during the single year available to him before the peace. He appears to have 
preoccupied himself with the minutiae of the Army accounts, examining every transaction, 
and demanding their cross-referencing with warrants and vouchers?30 His investigation 
was to continue for a number of years after the war, and his fmdings led to several 
investigations into the handling of the Peninsula accounts,231 resulting in the dismissal of at 
least one Deputy Commissary General.232 
3.8 COMMISSARIAT ACCOUNTS 
All money sanctioned by Parliament, under the Mutiny Act, for the pay and 
allowances of British troops, was processed through the Paymaster General in Britain. For 
troops on home service, the funds were disbursed through Regimental Agents, or Deputy 
Paymasters General of Districts. If destined for those on active service, it was despatched 
to the Army Headquarters, and deposited in the Military Chest, under the control of a 
Deputy Paymaster General. However, he would be unable to issue any of the money 
without the sanction of the Commissary General, on whom he would draw a cheque, and 
who would ultimately have to account for it. In addition the Commissary General would 
have the responsibility for the distribution of all extraordinary funding, released to him on 
the authority of the Commander' s Warrant. He was therefore, in effect, responsible for all 
funding of a field Army,m and after 1806, responsible to the Comptrollers of Army 
Accounts, for the audit of his accounts. 
The state of the accounts prior to the arrival of the Auditor General, could well have 
had much to do with his inability to affect their prompt settlement, and indeed could have 
directly influenced his appointment. In 1813, the accounts were requested for the preceding 
years of the Peninsular campaign, from the Commissary General in Spain, Sir Robert Hugh 
Kennedy/J4 who immediately returned to England.235 It had become apparent that the 
accounts were not in order, and blame was directed at him. The main antagonist was Sir 
230 RHK-M, 2182, 'Report and Observations of the Auditor General's Office,' 13th February I ~ I? 
231 RHK-M, 2182, Kennedy to Herries, 10th September 1816; Kennedy to the Board of CommiSSIOners, 21st 
April 1818. 
23 Morning Chronicle, 4, 12th January 1822. . . , 
233 For a description of this process in the Penmsula see Ward, Wellmgton s Headquarters, 71-6. 
234 RHK-M, 3183/8 Audit Office to Kennedy, 13th December 1813. 
23S Ward, Wellington's Headquarters, 74n. 
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ranClS anng, , a member of the influential banking family, and a long-time advocate 
f bl' 236 
o pu lC economy, and who had been one of the original members of the Commission 
of Naval Enquiry.237 He wrote to John Herries, the Commissary in Chief, declaring that his 
'criticism is the way in which the accounts have been left for years unattended, ' and 
. I dm" . 238 suggestmg ma a IDlstratIon on the part of Kennedy. This came at a time when 
Kennedy was processing more funds than any of his predecessors, following the decision 
to channel subsidies for the payment of the Spanish and Portuguese troops, through 
Wellington, rather than the respective governments.239 This amounted to almost 
£1,400,000 for 1813 alone,24o which could itself have been enough to prompt the 
appointment of an Auditor General, even without the additional concerns for the Treasury 
of alleged poor accounting. However, the appointment of the Auditor General in Spain, 
came as a result of a plea by Kennedy, ' to the Duke of Wellington, to recommend the 
appointment of an Auditor to the Army for the purpose of minutely investigating so vast an 
expenditure past and in progress.'241 It would appear that Kennedy wanted to cover himself 
amid the allegations, and the vast sums of money which had already passed through his 
office, for which he would ultimately have to account, and be liable to possible surcharges. 
Wellington confirmed this, suggesting that the amount already processed by Kennedy 
amounted to around £50,000,000.242 Kennedy hoped to avoid such pitfalls by working with 
the Comptrollers in Spain, and this was supported by Wellington, who saw the 
appointment as a means of relieving ' the Commissary General from the weight of 
responsibility of his accounts of the expenditure of money, and of the issue of stores. ,243 
The apparent inability of the Auditor General, Dawkins, to effect the prompt settlement of 
the accounts, Kennedy suggested was that, 
instead of joining the Army, [Dawkins] fixed himself in Lisbon, and is therefore as 
little qualified to pass just decisions upon the Commissariat arrangements of the 
War, as ifhe had been two thousand miles distant from the Peninsula?44 
236 See for example, Francis Baring, Observations on the establishment of t~e Bank of England a~d .on the 
Paper Circulation of the Country ... 2nd edition (London, 1797) 50-51. BarIng advocated that BntaIn should 
not spend beyond its means, to prosecute the war. . . , . 
237 RCNE (1802-1806); He was also responsible for VIctuallIng In the later years of the Amencan War of 
Independence. Con don, 'Transport Service', 35 . 
231 RHK-M 31B8 Herries to Kennedy, 16th November 1814. 
239 John M. 'She~ig, Guineas and Gunpowder. British Foreign Aid in the Wars with France, 1793-18/5. 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1969) 258-9. 
240 Ibid, 260. 
241 RHK-M, 21B2 Kennedy to John Herries, Commiss~ in Chief, 10th September 1816. 
242 PRO WO 1/260/381, Wellington to Earl Bathurst, 19 D~cember 1813. . 
243 PRO WO 1/258/45-62, Wellington to Bathurst, 13th Apn11813; WD, X, 287-90, WellIngton to Bathurst, 
13th April 1813. . . . 
244 RHK-M, 21B2 Kennedy to John Herries, CommIssary In ChIef, 10th September 1816. 
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This despite Kennedy's express suggestions upon Dawkins' appointment, that, 
it is very ~portant that a part of it [the Auditor's establishment] should be either 
present WIth the Army, or in its immediate vicinity; but I have no doubt that it will 
alread.y ~ave occurred to you, that, without an arrangement of this nature, some of 
the pnnclpal advantages of local investigation will be 10st.245 
Dawkins was also criticised in Britain for the delays in his enquiries/46 but despite 
clashing publicly with Kennedy,247 he was still able to find evidence of mismanagement on 
the part of members of the Commissariat, 'which has subjected the Public to great Losses, 
and Himself to heavy surcharges',248 and for which proceedings were instituted, seven 
years after the end of the war. 
Allegations of maladministration on the part of Commissary Generals were not 
unusual. The fmancial responsibilities of their office had been the downfall of several of 
their number, two of whom had been given terms in jail for their failure to process their 
accounts successfully, or for outright corruption.249 Even those who were able to avoid 
such pitfalls, could wait for many years before fmally being given their quietus. Kennedy 
was not discharged from his 1794-5 accounts until 1805,250 Sir Brook Watson, who was 
Commissary General in the Low Countries during 1793-5, was granted his discharge in 
1812, five years after his death,251 and Kennedy did not receive his quietus for his 1807 
accounts until 1819.252 He was asked to resubmit his Peninsula accounts on numerous 
occasions, prior to their fmal acceptance in 1831.253 Before being granted their quietus, 
many Commissary Generals found themselves surcharged for missing vouchers or 
warrants, or losses of public money. Deputy Commissary Generals Aylrner and Dalrymple, 
for example, were surcharged £33237.1 8s.3 Y..d and £33461.2s.5d. respectively, in 1816, 
245 PRO WO 11260/381-83, Kennedy to Dawkins, 5th December 1813. 
246 Morning Chronic/e, 4, 12th January 1822. 
247 RHK-M, 21B2 Commissary General's Department to Kennedy, 24th July 1819. 
248 Morning Chronic/e, 4, 25th December 1821. 
249 Ward, Wellington's Headquarters , 72; see also 6.2 ~e Commissariat and th~ Con~ct System, 192-200. 
250 RHK-M, 2/B3/passim., 'Copies of my letters respectmg my Dutch Accounts ; particularly, Kennedy to 
Thomas Farquar, 19th August 1805. 
251 Ward Wellington 's Headquarters, 71. 
2S2 RHK~M, 21B2, Discharge of Kennedy as Deputy Commi~sary General to the Baltic Expedition, 3rd 
December 1819. He owed the public thirteen shillings and SIxpence. . 
253 RHK-M, 21B3/8, Audit Office to Kennedy, 13th December 1813; 1328121B2, AudIt Office to Kennedy, 
15th August 1822' 1328121B2 Audit Office to Kennedy, 26th March 1822; 1308/3/83/2, Kennedy to 
William Hill, 27th'March 1828; 130812/84, Kennedy to the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, 
16th July 1831. 
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or at mg to account for the dIfferences in British and 'Foreign' (Spanish, Portuguese, and 
French) weights and measures,254 and Kennedy was still being requested to pay surcharges 
for 1811, of £1291.7s., in 1828.255 Unfortunately, the flexibility allowed to the 
Commissariat in the field, which enabled them to function under such difficult 
circumstances, was not respected in the calm of a post-war Treasury office, which had been 
one of Kennedy' s reasons for requesting the appointment of an Auditor General?56 
Kennedy defended the simplification of the Commissariat system, stating, 
Every person who has ever been with an advancing or retreating Army must have 
observed the confusion which prevails in every Town or Village on the arrival of 
the Troops .... The Marches in the Peninsula and France were seldom accomplished 
before one 0' clock in the afternoon - sometimes not even until four, five and even 
six 0' clock. You will therefore perceive the difficulties under which the 
Commissariat had to act, in providing for the Troops between the performance of 
one March and the commencement of another. And it must be recollected that the 
Commissariat had also those Marches to go through .... The most simple System of 
Account that could be found was then necessary.257 
However, those checking the accounts, after the threat of war had passed, were not 
prepared to make any allowances for a simplified system, and so Kennedy and his sub-
accountants, incurred questionable surcharges, and took many years to settle finally their 
accounts to the satisfaction of the Audit Office. 
The theory of an Auditor General was sound, being able to examine the 
Commissariat accounts in situ, and, in theory, observe any inconsistencies in the 'vast 
expenditure, past and present'. But due to Dawkins' late appointment, a huge backlog of 
unexamined accounts had developed, which proved impossible to examine before the end 
of the Wars. This was not assisted by the reluctance of Dawkins to move with the Army, 
for by being at a distance from the forces, he would not only fail to deal with the 
immediate financial situation, but also fail to develop an understanding and appreciation of 
the mode of conducting the finances of the Army. Kennedy had requested an Auditor, 'on 
the spot' ,258 but had ended up with someone that might as well have remained in London. 
254 RHK-M 2IB2 Kennedy to Herries, 10th September 1816. 
m RHK-M' 31B3i3 Comptrollers of Audit to Kennedy, 'Statement of Surcharge' 24th December 1828. 
256 PRO WO 11260/393-5, Kennedy to Herries, 23rd March 1813. 
m RHK-M 2IB2/ Kennedy to Herries, lOth September 1816. 
251 PRO WO 112601397-4 I I, Kennedy to Herries, 13th April 18 I 3. 
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The study of the financial structure of the Army during the Wars with France, can 
so easily be seen as one of delays. Upon the augmentation of the Army, all departments 
processing funds and accounts reeled at the vast scale of the expanded forces , and the sheer 
volume of the work required to be handled. However, to see it merely as a study of delay, 
would be to miss certain important changes, that developed the fmancial administration of 
the Anny into an effective element of government control, albeit, not one that completely 
followed the established pattern of other financial departments of the state. 
Every financial department increased the number of people it employed as the war 
progressed, since all were geared to a peace-time establishment. All experienced 
difficulties in employing suitable men for the roles intended of them, with the War Office 
in particular suffering from the lack of qualified individuals. Even the Regimental 
Paymasters, who were appointed to specific duties, were found to be inadequate to the 
roles intended of them. While clearly an expertise would develop through the repetition of 
the tasks required, new simpler systems were advocated and eventually introduced, 
enabling those without an ' official' education to be employed. However, no area of Army 
fmance followed the Excise example of requiring a training course prior to entry. From the 
beginning of the conflict, when each Army finance department consisted of an official and 
a number of ' persons' , as with those areas examined in Chapter 1, a definite organisation 
of military finance officers was established. As the war progressed, a clear career structure 
developed, with definite job descriptions and salaried positions within the administrative 
hierarchy, removing the necessity to take fees, and increasing both the professionalism and 
accountability of staff. 
Throughout the period under discussion, there were two clear preoccupations in the 
area of finance. The first was towards economy, and the saving of public money in 
particular. While the costs of all areas of the Army inevitably rose substantially during the 
Wars, there was still a preoccupation with the waste of public funds, and any savings that 
might be made through the elimination of such waste. The second preoccupation was that 
of the accountability of those processing public money. This was given greater impetus by 
discoveries of dishonesty in the Barrack Office, and in high profile cases of corruption, 
such as that against Lord Melville. The most important result, was that the idea of public 
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accoun cy - e processmg of funds through an official's personal bank account, became 
an anathema. In particularly, the Pay Office became 'an office of mere account.' As 
discussed in Chapter 1, the drive for accountability also extended to calls for more checks 
to be placed upon the financial authority of the Secretary at War. This preoccupation would 
ensure that calls for flexible or simplified systems of account would be delayed because of 
difficulties in achieving accountability. The structure of the audit of the Army accounts 
ensured that the ultimate authority over the finance of the forces lay with the Treasury, 
through the Audit Office, and the Comptrollers of Army Accounts. However, this authority 
was in direct conflict with the flexible approach adopted by the Commissariat on active 
service, and in particular during the Peninsula campaign. In that theatre they struggled 
under the pressure of the extended nature of the war, which had meant that an estimated 
£50 million had been processed through the Commissariat in Portugal and Spain, between 
1808 and 1813. Despite establishing the precedent of an Auditor Generals in the field, 
ultimately the distance of the audit of the accounts from the conflict, both in miles and 
time, ensured a lack of understanding of the exigencies of active service. It is, of course, 
important to note that the audit of the military accounts by the Treasury offices, maintained 
the line of civilian control over the [mances of the Army, and was ultimately the only 
check on the dominance of the Secretary at War in this area. 
Initially, the solution to the problem of the delays in the accounting process was to 
employ more staff. Every department expanded to unprecedented levels, and overtime was 
sanctioned in the War Office. But, it became clear that since the war was likely to be 
prolonged, other solutions needed to be attempted. The gradual removal of many sinecures, 
enabled the employment of men who would actually fulfil their duties. The establishment 
of a structure based on clearly defined roles, would obviously assist in addressing the 
problems faced by the various financial departments, as would the introduction of new and 
innovative modes of working, such as the production line process in the Regimental 
Accounts Department of the War Office. In addition the simplified system of account 
ensured that processing was made easier, as did the adoption of new forms on which 
returns were made. However, the reform of the system was fraught with problems. The 
volume of work required was obvious, but less so was the fact that all the attempted 
reforms were based upon the old flawed system. Often the attempts at its reform proved 
over-ambitious, such as the monthly returns by Regimental Paymasters, or revealed a lack 
of understanding of the structures of Army finance, such as the relationship between 
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eglmen aymasters and Agents. It was not until the Pay Office Act of 1808, which 
gave complete flexibility to the government to impose any new system upon the financial 
organisation of the Army, that anything resembling a solution to the problem of delays was 
achieved, and it would be the onset of peace in 1815, that would fmally permit the system 
to work as envisaged. 
Through the Wars, the Secretary at War maintained and strengthened his control of 
Army fmances, despite concerns being expressed at the consolidation of so much power, 
effectively in the hands of one man. Attempts were made to impose the Comptrollers of 
Army Accounts on certain areas of War Office jurisdiction, notably Regimental Accounts, 
but this was successfully opposed, and ultimately the War Office was further augmented to 
cope with the extras work-load. In particular the presence of Lord PaIrnerston as Secretary 
at War after 1809 ensured the prominence of the post. He was adamant that contact was 
maintained by the War Office with all fmancial officers of the Army, namely Regimental 
Paymasters and Agents. This ensured that civilian control was maintained over regimental 
purse-strings, against attempts of Horse Guards to regain control of that area. Significantly, 
the Commander in Chief did not use the only source of funds available to him throughout 
the conflict, accepting that any money required by his office, was obtained through a 
request to the Secretary at War. 
Despite reform of all other areas of Army finance, ensuring a modern system of 
handling public funds, the system of agency remained largely intact well beyond the Wars 
with France. Despite losing their authority to act as brokers, and a proportion of their fees, 
the agents remained powerful and somewhat mysterious figures. They were the placeholder 
to the Regimental Colonel ' s sinecure, and a private company or individual, responsible for 
processing large sums of public money, and enabling regiments and departments to 
function. Even with the prospect of saving a minimum of £25,000 per annum, (a sum 
greater than that estimated to be saved by Palmerston' s Wagon train cuts in 1810), the idea 
of an Army-wide Board of Agency was dismissed, and agents continued, albeit with their 
position under greater public scrutiny, and under the direct authority of the Secretary at 
War. Their disordered accounts, the lack of security for the public funds held on their 
books, and the development of a near monopoly by Greenwood and Cox, led to allegations 
of corruption, and manipulation of the system by their friends in high places, in particular 
the Duke of York, (or vice versa). However, agency power would never be as substantial as 
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it had been at the outbreak of hostilities, being reduced further throughout the nineteenth 
century, effectively ending in 1892. Despite such a long and dubious history, surprisingly 
little information on agents survives. Consequently few authors have addressed the topic in 
any detail, merely adding to its mystery. Although the process of account was tightened up, 
and a greater emphasis placed on the authority of the Secretary at War, it is most 
significant that the agencies remained while all other dated institutions fell. 
By 1812, according to Palmerston, the reformed accounting process of the Army 
was working well, with few accounts in arrears, and certainly the lack of complaints bears 
this out. The Secretary at War had gained control of the financial structure of the Army, 
and had consolidated his authority, against challenges from both Parliament and Horse 
Guards. The civilian authority over the Army was therefore complete, for not only had he 
been able to subordinate the post of Commander in Chief, and with it authority over all 
aspects of the Army, but he had now achieved power over their finances. The fears of past 
generations of the consolidation of the control of the Army in the hands of one man had 
been achieved, not by a General or a King, as had been the concern, but by a politician, 
without even a seat in the cabinet. 
CHAPTER 4 COMPOSITION 
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4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Under the terms of the Royal Warrant appointing him to his post, the Commander 
in Chief controlled the Army in times of war .I But, as has been observed in Part I this , 
authority was tempered during the period under discussion, by the emergence of the 
powerful post of the Secretary at War, the authority of which effectively incorporated the 
Army into the structure of government. Part I mapped the influences on the military 
administration of the developments in the British state, with the evolution of career 
structures, salaries and job descriptions; the tightening of the fmancial control of the Army 
by the central government; and increased accountability to the treasury. Part 11 will assess 
whether these developments in state bureaucracy and administrative structure affected the 
manpower of the Army; whether such reforms were continued into the composition and 
training of the military itself; and whether the Commander in Chief was able to maintain 
control of the main area of his role, through his management of the composition and 
training of the Army. 
This chapter deals with the composition of the Army during the Wars. It will 
examine the expansion of the British military force to meet the needs of a vast global 
conflict; the methods by which this was achieved, both innovative and traditional, together 
with the politics that affected them; and how men of all ranks were enticed into a service 
that both contemporaries and later observers have suggested was harsh and brutal. It will 
attempt to establish who the men were that made up the Army; try to isolate their motives 
for serving; and assess the changes affecting the composition of the Army, that took place 
between 1793 and 1815. 
4.2 EXPANSION 
During the course of the eighteenth century, the size of all European armies 
increased substantially. The British Army was no exception. In the War of Spanish 
I See for example, W04/1561357, Royal Warrant, 13th February 1795, appointing the Duke of York as 
Commander in Chief. 
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during the Seven Years War, and to 190,000 during the American War ofIndependence.2 
At the outbreak of war with France in 1793, it was clear that an Army of even greater 
numbers of men was going to be required, to counteract the vast armies that France had 
committed to the European theatre of war. Between 1793 and 1815 the British Army's 
manpower increased to unprecedented levels. From a peace-time establishment of 17,013 
men in 1793, it almost doubled by 1794,3 and by 1812, at its largest ever, the regular Army 
alone numbered 245,996 men.4 The expansion of the Army had always been a highly 
contentious issue. Even with the threat of the French dominance of Europe, the legacy of 
the past - ofCromwell and the Generals, and of James II's attempts to rule with a Catholic 
Army - was still pertinent, and still part of the opposition to a strong standing Army.s 
Furthermore, there were suggestions that Britain could never compete with France in the 
numbers game, and that it was therefore pointless raising such a vast force. In 1793, the 
French had over 350,000 men available for service, which by 1794 had more than doubled 
to 750,000.6 Major General Le Marchant, who served as a Captain during the early 
campaigns in the Low Countries, was under no illusion that Britain could not compete with 
France. He wrote, 'Whatever reinforcements we have, the enemy will receive threefold, 
and I am therefore confident the game is up, and we are incapable of winning the war.'7 By 
1806, through conscription, and a still active volunteering system, they were able to raise 
in one year as many new recruits as the total number of men serving in the British Army at 
its largest in 1812.8 
In 1802, when the suggested estimate for the Army establishment was put at 
110,000,9 one opposition MP argued that, 
You can never equal the military power of France, and as you can not, why stop at 
11O,000? Why not raise 120, 130, 140,000? If this argument be worth anything, it 
2 Brewer, Sinews of Power, 30. 
3 Clode, Military Forces of the Crown, 1,274,398. 
4 PP (1812) ix 189; (1812-13) xiii, I. 
S See for exam'ple Francis Steuart (ed.), Horrace Walpole, Last Journals During the Reign ofGeorge III 
(London, 1900) 11, 413. 
6 F C . d Deserters 26 34 Even with this number, 300,000 more men were demanded; orrest, onscrrpts an ". 
Forrest, Soldiers of the French Revolution, 68-82. 
7 Denis Le Marchant, Memoires of the Late Major General Le Marchant (Sta?lehurst, 1997) 41 . 
8 El . Sw ds A d TL.-one 326 In 1805-6 the French were able to raIse 200,000 men by tIng, or roun a I ru , ' . . 
conscription alone, with several thousand stIli volunteerIng 
9 PD (1801-3) xxxvi, 1044, 8th December 1802. 
a~plies equally to our raising only 1000. Why, if we can never be equal to Franc~ 06 
raise a man?IO ' 
This idea that the French population was so great that Britain could never compete in the 
military numbers game was a common theme during the course of the period, and little was 
given to whether a populous country could actually get its men into the field. The French, 
always great publicists of statistics, had stimulated the fears by claiming a population of 
twenty seven million. I I These fears were addressed to some extent by the compilation of a 
detailed survey of the able-bodied male population in Britain, as part of the 1798 Defence 
of the Realm Act, 12which was qualified by the census of 1801, and repeated in 1803. I3 The 
census returns revealed that the British population stood at just under eleven million, with 
an estimated four million in Ireland. 14 John Rickman, who had first mooted the idea hailed 
its success, stating, 'France has certainly encouraged her own subjects and alarmed Europe 
by her vaunted twenty seven mjIlions.' 15 Although no information exists to suggest that 
either the census or Defence of the Realm returns were ever used by the government to 
assess the availability of recruits for the regular forces,16 in the manner of a previous 
Scottish survey,17 it did serve as a bench mark against which the levels of recruitment 
could be assessed. 18 By 1811, France was believed to have a population in excess of thirty 
two million, which would have meant that Britain was outnumbered almost three to one. 
10 The Speech 0/ Richard Brinsley Sheridan, Esq. in the House of Commons, (8'h December 1802) on the 
motion/or The Army Establishment/or the ensuing year (London, 1803) 6. 
11 During the eighteenth century the French had used similar propaganda, based around cartography, to 
convince Britain that French America was more populous and so presented a greater military threat. Linda 
Colley, 'Frontier Texts and European Culture', Trevelyan Lectures, University of Cambridge, 20th February 
1997. 
12 38 Geo. III c.27. 
I3 The Defence of the Realm Acts, of 1798, and the Defence Act, and General Defence Act of June and July 
and 1803 'demanded from each country the numbers of able-bodied men in each parish, details of what 
service, if any, each man was prepared to offer to the state, details of w~apons he possessed, details of the 
amount of livestock, carts, mills, boats, barges and grain available, detaIls of how many elderly people there 
were and how many alien and infinn.' Colley, Britons, 289. Many of the returns are missing, therefore a total 
figure is impossible to assess. 
14 pp (1801-1802) vii, 451. 
IS John Rickman, 'Thoughts on the utility and facility of ascertaining the populatio~ of England', in The 
Commercial and Agricultural Magazine, H, (London, June 1800) 391-9, as quoted In D.V. Glas~, Numb~r~ng 
the people: The eighteenth century population controversy and the development of census and Vital statIStiCS 
in Britain (London, 1978) 106-13. 
16 lR. Western, The English Militia in the Eighteenth Century: The Story of a Political Issue (London, 1965) 
246. 
17 SRO GO 51/51244 'General View of the Population ofScotIand drawn up from Sir John Sinc1air's 
Statistical Account of that part of the Kingdom, compared with the returns made to Dr. Webster in 1775', 
January 1798. . . . 
18 C.W. Pasley, Essay on the Military Policy and Institutions o/the Bntlsh Empire (London, 1811) 17. 
Greater alarm was induced by the thesis that this would rise to five to one if those 
populations who France had subordinated were included in the equation.19 
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It is little wonder that there were also calls for Britain to adopt an isolationist policy 
towards the rest of Europe, reducing the Anny to a size that would protect Britain's shores, 
while leaving the other states of Europe to prosecute their own war against France, or fmd 
some other compromise.20 This was never taken up as a serious alternative, with all 
administrations committed to prosecuting the Wars,21 and therefore raising the required 
levels of manpower. With the option of conscription for overseas service, on French lines, 
out of the question,22 other means of meeting the French threat had to be found. The 
solution - or as close to a solution as could ever be achieved - came in a variety of forms, 
which will be examined during the course of this chapter. 
The reduction of the Anny after the American War, poorly managed in its early 
stages, was reformed by Pitt's administration from 1784.23 Infantry regiments that had been 
earmarked for disbanding remained on establishment,24 eventually being returned from an 
eight to ten company strength, before the outbreak of the war. 25 At the same time, priority 
was given to recruiting, to ensure that units were kept up to the new strengths.26 The 
Nootka Crisis of 1790 tested the still-reforming system, and it appears to have responded 
well, with units augmenting, while supported by those on the Irish establishment.27 1793 
was to prove a very different matter, and the need for trained men as opposed to just 
numbers became apparent. 
The peace-time establishment of the Anny in 1793 was set at 17,013, the same 
number of men as the previous year.28 This was clearly too low to fight a war against the 
19 Pasley, Military Policy, 17. 
20 John Stewart, The Traveller, The Tocsin of Britannia; with a Novel Plan for a Constitutional Army 
(London, 1794) 4. 
21 Christie, Wars and Revolutions, 273. States that on taking office in 1806, even Fox jettisoned ideas of 
peace. 
22 Limited conscription was only resorted to on one occasion, in order to raise men for the Navy and 
Artillery, through the Quota Acts of 1796, see 4.7 Conclusion, 162. 
23 Pimlott, 'Administration of the British Army', 30. 
24 ibid 8, 52. These regiments were 66th, 67th, 68th, 69th and 70th. 
2S PRO WO 26/331195, Royal Warrant, 25 th September 1787. 
26 Pimlott, 'Administration of the British Army', 354. 
27 ibid 360-1. 
28 Clode, Military Forces of the Crown, 1,398. 
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masse armIes 0 rance, buoyant following their victories at Jemappes and Valmy in 
1792. By 1794, the British total had increased to 27,289, which according to Emsley, 
meant that together with the navy and embodied militia, one in ten of all eligible males 
were already serving in the regular armed forces. 3o An increase of almost one hundred 
percent, suggests that Pimlott is correct in his assessment of the capacity of the Army to 
augment its forces efficiently. This is further emphasised by rises of equal proportions 
during the next two years. Over the course of the Wars the number of men serving was to 
increase considerably, reaching its peak in 1812. Establishment was maintained at over 
200,000 men until the reductions after Waterloo, never being reduced below 71 ,000 
throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century.3! This reveals the acceptance on the 
part of the country as a whole, that a large standing Army was not only acceptable, but also 
necessary. It was a recognition that this was also necessary due to the commitment of 
British forces to colonial duties, and a realisation on the part of subsequent administrations, 
that to fight a modem war vast numbers of trained men were required immediately. 
Moreover the massive expansion of the Army had been achieved in real tenns. 
Between 1791 and 1821, the population of England rose by 44.097%.32 The Army, during 
the same period, omitting the war-time expansion, increased in size from around 17,000 to 
71 ,000, an increase of 417.65%. As a proportion of the population, the rise was from 
0.219% to 0.634%. Therefore the regular Army increased nearly ten fold in comparison, 
and three times in proportion, to the population from which it was drawn. To the figure for 
regular soldiers serving during the period in question must be added the numbers of militia 
and volunteers. As early as 1805 their involvement had raised the number of men bearing 
arms in Britain to 810,000, one in four of all eligible males.33 Hall suggests that although 
outnumbered by the French forces, the proportion of men Britain was able to field, which 
he estimates at three to four percent of the total population, far outweighed that of France. 
To achieve the same commitment as Britain, France would have needed to muster over one 
million men.34 
29 Forrest, Soldiers of the French Revolution, 68-82, states that the number of men in the French armies rose 
from between 350,00 in 1793 to 750,000 in 1794. 
30 Clive Emsley, British Society and the French Wars, 1793-1815 (London, 1979) 33. 
3! Clode, Military Forces of the Crown, 1,274, 398. . 
32 E A W . 1 and R S Schofield The Population History of England, 1541-1871. A ReconstructIOn 
.. rtg ey . . , . .. 
(Cambridge, CUP, 1981) 577,588. England only has been used d~e .to the .avallabllI~ of data ~c~oss the. . 
period. The figures used are, 1791 , 7.776 million, 1821 , 11.205 million. Difference IS 3.429 millIon, which IS 
44.097% of the original figure . 
33 PD (1805) Ill, 809, 19th March 1805. 
34 Hall, British Strategy, 6-7. 
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In terms of operational effectives, the returns of such substantial nwnbers of British 
troops are deceptive. The commitments at home and abroad ate away at the manpower 
totals. In 1804, 89,185 regular soldiers were stationed in Britain, with 52,204 engaged in 
garrison duties across the empire, from a total of around 150,000 men. After the threat of 
invasion ended, a high level of troops was still deemed essential in Britain, only reducing 
to 55,938, while with 75,760 in garrisons, by 1811, the nwnber unavailable for operational 
duties decreased by just over 11 ,000.35 Therefore, the nwnbers of men needed to prosecute 
an increasingly offensive war, the 'disposable force', could not be found merely through 
the redistribution of the anti-invasion forces, and other means needed to be found. 
British forces were also augmented in a number of other ways, which do not fonn 
part of this work, but will be mentioned here to complete the picture of the Anny 
expansion. Traditionally, mercenaries, and particularly Gennans, had been employed by 
British governments engaged in Wars throughout the eighteenth century. In 1793 the same 
tactic was instituted,36 continuing, despite criticisms,37 throughout the Wars.38 As the 
conflict progressed, a new method of using foreign forces emerged. In contrast to the 
French system of pressing the armies of satellites into the Grande Annee, the British 
system involved the taking over of the organisation, training and supply of the whole 
foreign Anny, commanding it with a proportion of British officers, but always maintaining 
its national identity. It was first developed within the Corsican39 and Sicilian Regiments,40 
then introduced to great effect with the Portuguese Army from 1809,41 and then attempted 
with the Spanish, during the later stages of the Peninsular War.42 The important aspect of 
35 Fortescue, County Lieutenancies. 303-5; Hall, British Strategy, 8; Rory Muir, Britain and the De/ eat 0/ 
Napoleon. 1807-18/5 (London, 1996) 14. 
36 French, British Way in Warfare, 92. States that over 28,000 Gennan mercenaries were hired in the first 
year of the Wars. In defence of this policy Grenville stated that Britain would not be compelled to enlist, ' our 
own youth from the plough, and loom, and thereby not merely put a stop to our domestic industry, but also 
drain the island of its population, and diminish our natural strength' , as quoted in Peter Jupp, Lord Grenville. 
1759-1834 (Oxford, 1985) 155. 
37 See for example, Stewart, The Tocsin 0/ Britannia. 22; Smith, Lord Grey. 59. 
38 French, The British Way in War/are, 92-3 ; Robert W. Gould, Mercenaries o/the Napoleonic Wars 
(Brighton, 1995) 8-9. 
39 Desmond Gregory, The Ungovernable Rock: A History o/the Anglo- Corsican Kingdom and its Role in 
Britain's Mediterranean Strategy During the Revolutionary War (1 793-/ 797) (London, 1985) 88-9. 
40 Desmond Gregory, Sicily. The Insecure Base: A History o/the British Occupation o/Sicily. 1806-1815 
(London, 1988) 48-9. 
41 F.O. Cetre, ' Beresford and the Portuguese Anny, 1809-1814,' in Alice D. BerkeJey (ed.) New Lights on 
the Peninsular War; International Congress on the Iberian Peninsula, Selected Papers, 1780-1840 (Almada, 
Portugal, 1991) 149-56. 
42 Charles EsdaiJe, The Spanish Army in the Peninsular War (Manchester, 1988) passim.; Charles Esdaile, 
The Duke o/Wellington and the Command o/the Spanish Army, 1812-14 (London, 1990) passim. 
this method of supplementing manpower, was that the troops could be treated in almost 11
0 
every respect as a British unit, and so, administratively and militarily it simplified the 
operation of an allied Army for the commander. 
Foreign troops also augmented the British Army indirectly, through the system of 
alliances, but more effectively, the system of subsidy. Britain was able to use its trading 
and manufacturing wealth, through its highly developed taxation system, to avoid diverting 
even more manpower from its own businesses, by financing whole states to continue the 
fight against the French. The on-going subsidising of the Prussian war effort, which 
amounted to more than £5 ~ million, from 1794 to 1815, and that of Russia which reached 
almost £ 10 million, for the same period,43 were only a fraction of the estimated £65 million 
spent in this area, and this figure represented only 8% of the total cost of the Wars.44 
Another source of manpower tapped during the period under discussion, was the 
use of British colonial troops. Traditionally men from throughout the empire had been used 
as either militia or irregular formations. But, during the Wars with France, they began 
increasingly to be recruited as regular units, officered by the British, and included within 
the Army List. They were seen as the obvious answer to both the shortage of troops, 
together with a means of avoiding the European soldiers' susceptibility to the tropical 
climates.45 The colonel of one black corps suggested that by negro recruitment 'the hard 
duty of the troops in such a climate would be saved the British Regular forces, and the lives 
of thousands saved to the country.'46 During the early stages of the Wars, eleven regiments 
of slaves were bought into service in the West Indies.47 This fmancial arrangement cost the 
government anything from £30 to about £80 per man, depending upon the state of the 
market.48 The colonial lobby objected to this arrangement, fearing an attempt at greater 
control from central government, and of disrupting the status quo of the islands,49 but the 
regiments remained in place throughout the Wars, releasing units from British to serve in 
other theatres. However, even with the addition of foreign and colonial troops, it was clear 
43 Sherwig, Guineas and Gunpowder, 366-8. 
44 French, British Way in Warfare, 118. 
45 JRUL, Me1viIle, File 694/61 , ' Memorandum on Extending the Service of East Indian Troops' . 
46 PRO WO 111105/461 , Charles Stevenson to Secretary at War, 14th May 1800. 
47 R.N. Buckley, Slaves in Redcoats: The British West India Regiments, 1793-1815 (New Haven, 1979) 
passim. 
48 PRO CO 318/31 / 141-61 , Henry Bowyer to Windham, 18th April 180:. States that during 1806 and 1807 
slaves cost about £74 per man; Buckley, Slaves in Redcoats, 55, has a pnce range from £56 - £77 between 
1795 and 1800; Duffy, Soldiers, Sugar, and Sea power, 363, gives other costs as low as £30. 
49 Duffy, Soldiers, Sugar, and Sea power, 363. 
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at 1 ntam lOtended to field an Anny against France, a direct expansion of the British 
establishment had to take place. 
4.3 INTERVENTION 
Under the tenns of Burke's Pay Office Act of 1783, the cost ofraising men for the 
Army passed from the regimental colonels, and onto the government. 50 In return for their 
financing of recruiting, Parliament assumed complete control of all policy concerning that 
area. 51 The Wars with France saw this new control tested for the first time, under extreme 
circumstances. Colley states that, 'for five years after the outbreak of the war with 
Revolutionary France in 1793, the British government's response [to the issue of 
recruitment] ... was careful and limited'. 52 This statement must be questioned. In as far as 
no legislation was passed concerning recruiting, except the annual Mutiny Acts, which 
increased the establishment of the military,53 the statement is correct, but the other 
responses, beyond legislation, also need to be examined. None of the initial schemes for 
expanding the Anny were novel, it is true, but neither can their haphazard introduction be 
described as careful, nor their results limited. The ill-fated 'Recruiting for Rank' during 
1794,54 and the far from successful Quota Acts of 1796,55 reveal that there was no master 
plan surrounding the new control of recruiting by government. However, whether 
disorganised or careful, the Anny had doubled in size each year from 1793 to 1796,56 
through traditional recruiting methods, and the equally traditional recruitment of foreign 
mercenaries, which can hardly be described as limited. It was only the greater need for 
manpower consequent upon a developing conflict, that required the introduction of 
legislation to further stimulate recruiting. From the Quota Acts, successive administrations 
introduced twenty one Acts of Parliament, 57 designed to augment the armed forces, most 
often, and most effectively by the use of the militia as a source of men. Glover criticises 
50 23 Geo. III c.50, s.46. 
51 Pimlott, 'Administration of the British Anny ', 181-7. 
S2 Colley, Britons, 287. 
53 Clode, Military Forces of the Crown, 1, 389. 
S4 PRO WO 1/ 167/83 , Amherst to Interested parties, 15th August 1794. 
SS 37 Geo. III c.4 as amended by 37 Geo. 111 c. 24, and 37 Geo. III c.39. Although these Acts concerned the 
recruitment for th'e navy and artillery, they are of consequence in tenns of government intervention in the 
recruitment issue. 
56 See 4.2 Expansion, 105. 
S7 Fortescue, County Lieutenancies, 313-14. 
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e recruItmg po ICY 0 e several governments during the period under discussion, stating 
that all 'lacked the moral courage to take the men they needed for victory by direct 
conscription for offensive service. '58 However, the progression through the conflict takes 
the recruiting of men for the Army from pure volunteers, to the closest form of expansion 
to universal conscription that the country would experience until 1916. This was tempered 
by an acceptance that the standards and conditions of service of the Army had to be the 
same as those for the rest of society. It was also shaped by the terms of a state that was 
developing its systems of government, and attempting to extend them to its Army, as has 
been shown in Part I. The outcome can therefore be seen to be government generated. 
The militia as it was constituted during the Wars with France, was established in 
1757. It was raised by the authority of the Home Office, recruiting soldiers by general 
volunteering, and through the means of a ballot of all eligible men within a county. A man 
could exempt himself from service, by the purchase of a substitute, a practice which was to 
be the butt of much criticism during the period, since a man who was willing to enlist in 
the regular forces , could make money out of first enlisting as a substitute in the militia59• 
Their service was limited to home defence duties, on a part-time basis during peace, but in 
times of war embodiment resulted in full-time service, under martiallaw.6o The militia 
remained embodied during the whole of the period under discussion, except for several 
months during 1803,61 thus creating not only a second tier of semi-regular military units, 
which would compete with the regular forces for the same men, but also one which would 
contain fully trained men at a time when such a commodity was in great demand from the 
Army. This was an ideal source of recruits for the regular service, if only the government 
could find a way to tap the resource. 
The first attempt to use this pool of trained militia manpower was in 1795, when an 
Act was passed to augment regular forces from the soldiers of the militia.62 Such an 
attempt met with little success, since the militia colonels took offence at being used as 
'merely recruiting officers' ,63 and 'drill sergeants',64 although the same year they had 
58 R. Glover, Preparation, 215 . 
59 R. Glover, Preparation, 217. 
60 Fortescue, County Lieutenancies, 15-17. 
61 Clode, Military Forces o/the Crown, 1,48. 
62 35 Geo. Ill, c. 83. 
63 Charles Ross (ed.), Correspondence a/Charles, first Marquis Carnwallis, (London, 1859) 11, 290. 
64 PRO HO 50/30, Lord Carnarvon to Dundas, 18
th 
June 1799. 
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o eIte err ng t to draw lots annually for precedence, for the duration of the Wars, 
which suggests a certain amount of compliance, if not subordination. The militia was a 
source of substantial local patronage, but defended only by a relatively small lobby in 
Parliament.65 It certainly did not have the political clout that had prevented the drafting of 
militiamen during the American War ofIndependence.66 Extensive anti-militia riots took 
place, due to the popularly held belief that balloting was the first step to a general 
conscription,67 and this disorder may well have contributed to the government's perception 
that such compulsory service, if extended to the regular forces, would meet with social 
unrest in the manner which affected French conscription.68 The colonels' objections were 
tempered in 1799, when a call for men to capitalise on the revolution in Holland was 
made,69 which resulted in the successful recruiting of almost 16,000 militia men.70 But, as 
Glover has pointed out, the publicity needed to persuade the colonels to part with their 
men, even for such a worthy cause, resulted in the French being alerted, and the subsequent 
failure of the expedition.7! Such was the opposition of the militia colonels, that no attempt 
at a large-scale recruiting drive from the militia was made again until 1805, when about 
10,000 militia men were recruited into the regular forces72 by means of high bounties, and 
the linking of militia regiments to regular Army units, in an attempt to build a relationship, 
and so aid recruitment. 73 However, the support of militia colonels for this measure was not 
automatic, and regular Army colonels met with a mixed response in their efforts to gain 
recruits for their corps. Sir John Moore complained of this to the Adjutant General, stating, 
I have the honour to acquaint you .. . that I have little personal connection, or 
interest with any Militia Regiment - the only chance therefore that the 52nd has of 
getting any number of Volunteers from the Militia, is by trying a variety of 
Regiments. 74 
65 Joshua Wilson, A Biographical Index to the Present House of Commons (London, 1808) passim. In 1808 
there were twenty MPs who described themselves as Militia Officers. 
66 Western, English Militia, 206. , . . 
67 Ibid. 294-9; Emsley, British Society, 165, 176; Thomas Bartlett, An end to moral economy. the Insh 
militia disturbances of 1793,' in Past and Present, 99 (1983) 41-64. 
68 Forrest, Conscripts and Deserters, 39, 152, 232,235-7; Forrest, Soldie~s of the F:e~ch Revolution, 83-87. 
For a detailed study of French Conscription see, Isser Woloch, 'NapoleOniC ConscnptIOn: State power and 
civil society', in Past and Present, III (1986) 101-28. . 
69 C. W. Vane (ed.), Memoir and Correspondence of Visco unt Castlereagh, Second MarqUiS of Londonderry 
(London, 1848-53) VIlI, 79. 
70 Clode, Military Forces of the Crown. 1,284. 
7! R. Glover, Preparation. 228. 
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He pointed out that while he was having difficulties, the other regiments under his 
d' . th 43rd th nectlOn, e and 95 ,had influence in various corps, and were able to gain the 
required recruits. It was therefore individual relationships, rather than government direction 
that proved of greater consequence. One officer who did transfer from the 1 si West 
Yorkshire Militia to the 52nd, reported that while their colonel had no objections to the 
recruiting of men from his corps, he made no attempt to direct them in their choice of unit. 
This resulted in only three privates volunteering to go to the 52nd, while more than one 
hundred enlisted in the 34th.15 Moore reported to the Secretary at War, that 'the Officers of 
the Militia were in general so averse to the measure and threw so many obstacles in its 
way. '76 But, despite the objections of the militia colonels, from 1805, upwards of 10,000 
men each year volunteered for regular service from the militia,77 with 28,492 militiamen 
responding to the draft in 1809 alone.78 The colonels were placated by being able to retain 
surplus officers and NCOs after the drafts,79 and to recommend officers for commissions 
into the regular Army.80 This gave them the substantial patronage of Army pay, pensions 
and status, which regular service brought. At the same time they were fmding it hard to fill 
militia commissions generally,81 therefore even their local power base was on the wane. 
The subsequent deficiencies in the militia regiments were made up by further ballots, 
which were relatively well enforced by the local authorities.82 There was no recurrence of 
the anti-militia disorder experienced in 1796, suggesting that even if the militia colonels 
objected to the measure, popular opinion supported the strengthening of the Army, in the 
face of the threat from France. It will be seen that it was this area of recruitment that 
enabled the Army to expand during the course of the period, as general recruiting produced 
consistently uniform returns. 83 
Criticism has been levelled at the recruitment of militiamen, most recently by 
Glover.84 He states that 'the strength of a unit in action should be the strength of a team' 
7S BP Charles Booth to Thomas Booth, 20th March 1805; Charles Booth to Thomas Booth, May 1805. 
, th 
76 COL-JM, Moore to Secretary at War, 14 July 1805. 
77 Clode, Military Forces of the Crown, I, 284, 293-4, 295; 300, 301-4. 
78 Fortescue, County Lieutenancies, 223 . 
79 39 and 40 Geo. III c. l, 5.19; 51 Geo. III c.20, 5.33. 
80 PRO WO 1/635/347-59, Castlereagh to York, 7th August 1807; WO 3/585/27-42, 'Instructions for 
Volunteering', 20111 April 1811. 
81 Paul Langford, Public Life and the Propertied Englishman, 1689-1798 (Oxford, 1991) 298-9,303. 
82 R. Glover, Preparation, 250. 
83 See 4.4 Recruiting, 127. 
84 R. Glover, Preparation, 228-9. 
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and suggests that such men could not be part of that team, but merely constitute a 'scratch 
side'. This interpretation misses several points. First, as Oman points out, militia men were 
fully trained soldiers. They were well aware of what they were letting themselves in for, 
since they could not volunteer until they had served at least a year.85 The militia was 
increasingly used in Britain to fulfil military duties and so release regular troops,86 and 
certainly by the time ofCastiereagh's militia drafts they were being used without question 
in the difficult sphere of public order. 87 Secondly, even if the quality of the militia recruits 
is questioned, if a regiment was in need of men, it was far better to enlist militia men, than 
completely raw recruits, or to be under strength. Finally, it was the nature of the training 
and structure of the British Army of the period, to enable all soldiers to brigade with others, 
whether of the same regiment or not. Battalions of detachments, light infantry companies 
and grenadiers were common, and although not ideal formations, were used successfully 
on a regular basis.88 Also, as assimilation to the new uniform system of training took place 
within all forces, integration of units would again become easier.89 Despite his criticism of 
militia drafts, Glover concedes, that 'the system did produce excellent recruits. '90 
The lengths to which those in charge of recruiting were prepared to go in attracting 
militiamen, beyond those employed to enlist civilians, reveals that they were considered to 
be superior recruits. There was a drive to recruit militia NCOs into regular service during 
1800. They were to resign their positions, and volunteer to be recruited as privates, on the 
understanding that they would be reinstated to their original ranks upon joining their 
regular unit.91 By 1811, any militia NCO could transfer to the line at his militia rank, 
providing he brought with him a proportion of militia privates.92 This clearly shows that 
contemporary commanders believed the quality of the militiamen to be at least comparable 
85 C. Oman, Wellington 's Army (London, 1913) 210. 
86 PRO WO 1/631/355-69, York to CastJereagh, 10th November IS05; WO 116311371-93 
'Statement of the Force that will remain in Great Britain as it is proposed to be Stationed in Districts, 
together with the Staff which is recommended for its Establishment', November IS05 ; WO 11632/157-210, 
York to Windham, ISth March IS06. 
87 lan F. W. Beckett, The Amateur Military Tradition (Manchester, 1991) 72-3. 
88 See for example, GRE-A, 200, ' Return of strength ?fthe se~e~al co,rps composing the anny c?mmanded 
by Grey, embarked at Barbados on the expedition aga10st M~m~que, 1st ~ebruary .1794. The hght and 
grenadier companies of the whole anny were drawn together m SIX composIte battalIons; 2243/54-6, Grey to 
Henry Dundas, Sth July 1794. Flank companies were sent from Ireland; PRO WO 1~619/S9, Lt. Col. Cal~ert 
to Officer Commanding 1st Royals, (copy to fifteen other commandin.g offic.ers) 23 March 17?S. The LIght 
companies of all the regiments to be formed together to practice the lIght drills; See also 5.4 LIght Infantry, 
171. 
89 See 5.2 Drill, 164-8 
90 R. Glover, Preparation, 229. . ' 
91 NAM, Papers of Sir George Nugent, Adjutant General's Office Crrcular, Dublm ISth August IS00. 
92 PD (1810-11) I, 304. 
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answer to the recruiting problem, despite the objections of the colonels, regular units 
benefited from the influx of substantial militia drafts, 
Even with the relative success of such drafts, they remained unpopular with militia 
colonels. However, the size of their Parliamentary lobby meant they had very little political 
clout, in comparison to the Army, and since their regiments were embodied, they remained 
under the central control of martial law. Their options were therefore limited, and there was 
little left for them to do in their defence, beyond the obstructive tactics observed by Moore, 
or the alternative of leaving the service. As Henry Dundas stated in correspondence with 
Castlereagh in 1807, 'Depend upon it [recruiting from militia regiments] will disgust your 
most respectable Militia officers, and many of them will leave it. '93 However, the need for 
manpower far outweighed the need to placate militia colonels, and the regular drawing of 
trained recruits from militia regiments continued throughout the Wars,94 By the end of the 
conflict, successive administrations had exerted their authority over the interests of the 
militia colonels, in order to gain several thousand recruits for the regular service. But, 
despite suggestions that militia regiments should become a second line of defence,95 or 
even second battalions of regular units,96 they remained independent until the Haldane 
reforms of 1906,97 and the government had to resort to drafting from their ranks again at 
the outbreak of the Crimean War,98 
In an effort to limit the reliance upon the militia, other formations were raised with 
the specific intention of feeding the line with men, The Army of Reserve,99 part of the 
Additional Force Acts of 1803,100 was seen by Fortescue as an 'deplorable failure',lol since 
it did not reach its target of 50,000 men. It did, however, produce some 30,000 recruits, of 
which over 19,000 volunteered for regular service. 102 In the same way, the Permanent 
93 Vane, Casllereagh Correspondence, VIII, 78. 
94 PRO WO 6/1731180, Bunbury to Harrison, 21" February 181 J. 
95 PRO WO 1/407/85 , Anon. to Secretary at War, 31st March 1806. 
96 Sir Henry Calvert to CastIereagh, February 1809, as quoted in Clode, Military Forces of the Crown, lI, 60. 
97 Edward M. Spiers, Haldane: An Army Reformer (Edinburgh, 1980) 92-115. 
98 Strachan, Wellington 's Legacy, 57. . tit 
99 PRO WO 4/1901220 War Office Circular, 11 th July 1803; WO 411 901236, War Office Crrcular, 8 July 
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Additional Force Act of the following year is also criticised by Fortescue for failing to 
meet the estimated number of recruits, I 03 despite producing 13,000 men. 104 These attempts 
at recruiting are significant in several ways, and reveal three areas of recruiting policy 
generally. First, both attempted to introduce a centralised control ofrecruiting, by enlisting 
men for' general service', rather than for individual regiments, a principle that had been 
introduced in 1799. 105 This idea was unofficially discontinued in 1806, and was officially 
abandoned in 1816. 106 Its failure to attract men was commented upon by Palmerston when 
giving evidence to the Finance Committee in 1828. He stated, 
I believe there is a great disinclination on the part of the lower orders to enlist for 
General Service; they like to know they are to be in a certain Regiment, connected, 
perhaps, with their County, and their friends, and with officers who have 
established a connection with that district. 107 
The second point of note in the abandoned legislation is that the recruits raised were 
placed, not into a front line unit, but into second battalions, where they were trained, before 
being sent to their principal battalion. 108 This practice was continued by Castlereagh when 
he returned to office. He stated, 
Nothing can appear more perfect than the system of second battalions if they can 
have the double quality of being reasonably efficient in themselves for the purposes 
of home defence, while they, at the same time, feed their first battalions on foreign 
service. 109 
Glover points to the reintroduction of this system in the Cardwell reforms of 1871, stating 
that 'relatively few remember that Cardwell was only reviving York's system of seventy 
years before.'lIo In fact, York had merely revived a system instituted in 1756, for the 
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nlIsmg 0 a second battalion by each of the fifteen old regiments of the Army.111 At the 
outbreak of the Wars a number of units still had second battalions, but several were unable 
to maintain them, due to their inability to gain sufficient recruits. The 29th Regiment, for 
example, amalgamated its first and second battalions in 1795,112 whereas the 69th Regiment 
raised a second battalion in the same year, and was able to maintain it to 1816.113 The 2nd 
(or Queens) Regiment, raised and amalgamated its second battalion in 1795, but having 
raised it again in 1804, were able to maintain it beyond the period under discussion. 114 
There was obviously no clear pattern to the raising or maintaining of second battalions 
during the first ten years of the Wars, and much would depend upon the individual 
colonels, and their enthusiasm to raise men. Second battalions were established in ten 
further regiments during 1804, using the recruits from the Army of the Reserve, 115 and in 
1807 thirty more were created. I 16 They acted, as CastJereagh suggested, as a body through 
which recruits could be processed, since in the initial stages of the Wars, they were 
maintained in Britain. This would always place single battalion units at a disadvantage, 
having to detach recruiting parties when on active service. This problem was addressed in 
1809, when a separate recruiting company was established for single battalion units, 117 a 
system also adopted by multiple battalion regiments, when, due to the need for extra units, 
they had more than one battalion in the field, 118 or upon the disbanding of secondary 
battalions in 1816. 119 However, the single battalion regiments still found it difficult to 
maintain their strengths, and during the Peninsular campaign, several were forced back to 
Britain or into provisional battalions. 120 This is further evidence that the use of militia 
I11 PRO WO 4/52/ 144, Barringlon 10 the Officers Commanding, 27th August 1756; SP 44/189/318, Royal 
Warrant, 22nd September 1756. 
112 PRO WO 4/ 160/347. Matthew Lewis to Major General Lord Cathcart, Colonel 29th Foot, 3rd September 
1795. 
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regIments as a means of recruits was an essential part of the recruiting process, particularly 
for single battalion units, who did not have a trained reserve on which to call. 
The final point to be made regarding the perceived failure of the Additional Force 
legislation, is that, as with much recruiting legislation of this period, it was to be less 
successful due, not to government failings, but to the inability or unwillingness of local 
authorities to make it work. The Quota Acts had failed, not least because parishes had 
preferred to pay fines rather than send recruits, or to send unsuitable men. 121 In the same 
way the Additional Force Act, and the Permanent Additional Force Act, were unsuccessful 
due to the failure of local authorities to act upon, or in many cases even under the new 
legislation. 122 The state was still not so expansive as to be able to enforce all legislation in 
the regions. Even the three surveys of manpower and population, models in the 
centralisation of control, relied upon local officials to collect the data. I23 Despite all the 
attempts at a central control of recruiting, it was possible for it all to break down, due to the 
opposition or ineptitude of the local officials. Colley suggests that this could be a reaction 
to earlier Defence of the Realm legislation, in which responsibility passed from the 
localities to Parliament, resulting in certain local magnates giving little support to new 
measures. 124 It could also be a response to the constant stream of demands for manpower, 
and the bureaucratisation and centralisation of the whole recruiting process. 
The localised view of military matters had been understood by those responsible for 
recruiting for some time. Regiments had held a county title since 1782, when the 
government had perceived it as a method of stimulating recruiting for regiments engaged in 
the American War of Independence. 125 However, few had maintained the links with their 
allotted area after 1784,126 although the county name remained in all their titles into the 
period under discussion. The first acknowledgement of the continued efficacy of the 
cultivating of territorial links during the Wars, appeared in the 1796 Regulations and 
Instructions for the Carrying on of the Recruiting Service, which stated that, 
121 R. Glover, Preparation. 215-6. 
122 Emsley, British Society. 104 
123 Glass, Numbering the People. 91; Colley, Britons. 289-90. 
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R' f 120 e~unents 0 Infantry are to send their Recruiting Parties to those Counties of 
which they bear the N~e; by ,:hich means it is hoped that they will acquire a local 
Interest that may matenally asSiSt them in obtaining Men. 127 
A reiteration of the association of regiments with counties was put forward in 1806,128 but 
the success of this type of recruiting scheme is impossible to assess, without examining the 
returns of every regiment. However, the units for which evidence is available, suggests the 
qualified success of the project. The 68 th (or Durham) Regiment, was completely rebuilt 
between the years 1806 and 1808 following service in the West Indies, and during that time 
it was made up of about twenty five percent of men from Durham County. By 1811, this 
had been reduced, mainly through illness, to about fourteen per cent,129 which would be the 
highest proportion of men from the county to serve in the regiment until the Durham 
connection was cultivated again during the 1890s.130 While the 68th were able to utilise the 
county link with Durham during their home service, the absence of a second battalion 
through which to base a recruiting policy, together with the exigencies of the service, 
meant that the local contingent was diluted as the Wars progressed. Despite the 
intervention of the government in introducing the county links, an Army-led recruiting 
regime would always flounder when faced with active service, and is further evidence of 
the need for the policy of recruiting to be taken away from the Army completely, and of the 
efficacy of drafting the militia into the regular Army. 
The most criticised recruiting scheme of the whole period under discussion must be 
that introduced by William Windham. However, it is the first integrated program of 
military recruitment to be attempted throughout the period, and one which took a 
completely different look at the problem of gaining men for military service. Having taken 
the position of Secretary of State for War and Colonies, in 1806, Windham's 'New 
Military Plan' attracted opposition from many quarters, both contemporary and more 
recently.l3l The idea that the regular Army was of paramount importance, and could be 
strengthened without the stimulus of the militia ballot, by means of better pay, pensions 
and the option of short service for soldiers, was imposed upon a military in need of 
127 Regulations and instructions for the Carrying on of . the R~cru.iting Service, (London, ! :96) Article I, 4. 
128 PRO WO 11407/53, Lord Sidmouth to Commander m ChIef, Memorandum on the ralsmg of two types 
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recruIts, m e behefthat 'a better description of men will be induced into the Army.'132 
However, Windham was also driven by ideas of reform of the state as a whole, and the 
place of the Army within it. He stated , 
To say the truth, and,. surely, every gentleman must know it, the improvements in 
the Army - for .I ad~l1t there have been some very material ones - have by no means 
con:esp~n~ed, m this country, with those which have been made in every other 
statIon m hfe; and the service, therefore held out no sufficient degree of 
encouragement. The only two substantial resources we have had, are the bounty and 
the ballot; but the bounty has been carried to such an excess as to have the most 
injurious effect on the service, and to raise the price of the ~arket to us. Indeed, the 
very existence of the bounty affords a strong, and, I think, irresistible argument, 
that the service of itself is not deemed worth the taking. m 
The key to the scheme was the placing of the Army at the forefront of the military effort, 
by improving the conditions of service, reducing the emphasis on the Volunteers, and the 
mjlitia ballot, and introducing a system of universal military trailing. These measures met 
with little contemporary criticism, which was not the case for Windham's main proposal, 
the limited enlistment for regular troops. 
The basic idea of universal trailing had been that of Dundas. In 1797 he had 
suggested that all lineteen and twenty year olds be given military training,134 and 
continued to support the concept in the debates of 1806.135 However, it had been the 
Volunteers that had come out of Dundas' original idea, and he had been unable to control 
their expansion, and metamorphosis. He wrote to Windham, then Secretary at War, in 
1798, stating, 'I know of no other way of doing it but in the way it is now going on, nor do 
I conceive it either prudent or practicable in any other way.' 136 The Volunteers were 
numerically strong, but weak in almost every other area. They were made up of over 1000 
corps, many of less than company strength, that had failed to amalgamate despite 
encouragement, and less than eleven percent of their number had agreed to serve outside 
their own military district by 1799.137 Their commitment was dubious, it being suggested 
132 PD (1806) VI, 666, 3rd April 1806. 
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that much of the increase in Volunteering was due to their exemption from the militia 
ballot,138 and with no compulsion to do anything more than join to gain the benefits, as 
they were not controlled by any military discipline. 139 Their exemption from the militia 
ballot was cited as a contributory factor to the rise in the price required for bounties. 140 
Reform of the system had been attempted under Lord Hobart as Secretary of State during 
1801,141 establishing the Supplementary Militia, and using Prussian models to avoid a 
conflict between the compulsion to serve and a disruption of production. 142 But under 
Windham the Volunteers were left to their own devices, with their Inspecting Field Officer 
being removed, and funding reduced. 
Windham had described the volunteers as 'painted cherries which none but simple 
birds would take for real fruit', and 'children planting sticks and then supposing they had 
planted trees,' 143 pointing to their lack of both training and commitment. While it is clear 
that their presence was numerically and morally significant during the invasion scares, and 
several corps were reported as fit to join the line,144 few believed they were useful for 
anything beyond static duties. The Lord Lieutenant of Cumber land and Westmoreland 
admitted as much, he stated, 
It is really wonderful to see the rapid progress they have made and though I have no 
great reliance on such troops in general, yet I think the Resource this system has 
afforded at this moment forms an essential part of our security. 145 
Glover sums up his coverage of the Volunteers by quoting from Comwallis in 1803, who 
wrote, 
Government have acted properly, in endeavouring only to make [the Volunteers] as 
much soldiers as it was possible to render a force so composed, and no man, 
whether civil or military, will persuade me that 300,000 men, trained as the 
Volunteers at present are, do not add very materially to the confidence and the 
actual security of this country. 146 
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The volunteers were the best that Britain could achieve in the circumstances. A massed 
armed body was required to repel a real threat from France, and what was achieved served 
the purpose. It therefore made sense to consider the cost of such an organisation, when the 
purpose of their formation, the French invasion threat, had effectively passed, and any 
domestic policing assistance from the volunteers had been rejected by several units 
refusing to turn out to deal with disorders in 1800 and 1801.147 In this light the volunteer 
movement can be seen as an expensive extravagance that had outlived its usefulness. It was 
also an armed force, out of the control of the central authority that was increasingly 
asserting itself over the other military formations. Despite Castlereagh's resurrection of 
them upon his return to office in 1807, sheer fmancial expediency ensured that he would 
eventually be forced to cut off all support, leaving only those able to fund themselves, 
which effectively meant a police force in 'the great towns and populous manufacturing 
district.' 148 Despite there being a substantial proportion of MPs who were volunteer 
commanders,149 it does not appear that they ever constituted a Parliamentary lobby to press 
their mutual case. 
It is interesting to note that the fate of the Volunteers was not shared by their 
mounted arm, the Yeomanry. Their services were lauded by the same sources that criticised 
the Volunteers,lso and were increasingly relied upon throughout the nineteenth century, 
with many units becoming part of the military establishment under the Haldane reforms. lsl 
That they could be relied upon is perhaps evidence enough of why they were maintained, 
together with their obvious uses of cavalry, as opposed to infantry, in crowd control, which 
would be their key role. In addition, the Volunteers had gained a reputation for being 
officered by the bourgeoisie, 152 whereas the Yeomanry were very much of the old order. 
Since the threat of invasion had passed, and the home forces role had reverted to policing 
duties it is clear that the force for whom loyalty would be given without question, would 
, 
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e mam me. s pomt IS emphasised by the schemes that were imposed effectively in 
place of the Volunteers, Windham's Training Act and Castlereagh's Local Militia. Both 
were to be controlled by government, avoiding any of the experiences of the lack of 
authority over the Volunteers. 
Windham's Training Act was never implemented, but had called for the 
compulsory training of 200,000 balloted men each year. The drills would be conducted 
under the supervision of a drill sergeant,153 from the regiment 'which now bear the name of 
the particular districts, a connection it is hoped may be established between the Army and 
the mass of the people.'1 54 It was far more in keeping with Dundas' original idea of 
universal training. These men would be the basis ofWindham's New Military Plan, 
forming an armed peasantry, and a body of men with some military training, to replace any 
deficiencies in the line.155 Training could be avoided by either the payment of a fine, or by 
the service in a volunteer corps, 
so as to afford at once an escape for the rich from a service that might be irksome, 
and to promote the purpose of changing by degrees the composition of the 
volunteers from persons who serve for pay to those who willingly serve at their 
own expense. 156 
The intention was to provide a trained populace, who had an affinity to a county, and to the 
regiment bearing its name. Through this it was hoped that recruiting could be stimulated. 
In this deliberate linking of regular to amateur military formations, the origins of the 
Haldane territorial system can clearly be seen, and this has been overlooked amid the 
traditional criticism of Windham's' scheme. 
The Ministry of All Talents lasted just over a year, which was not enough time for 
the Training Act to take effect. When Castlereagh took over at the War Department, he 
replaced Windham' s Training Cadres with the Sedentary, later Local Militia. His intention 
was to create a system very similar to Windham's, keeping the Volunteers down to 
100,000 men in the larger towns, with universal training for all able-bodied men between 
eighteen and thirty. However, from these trained men a 200,000 strong Sedentary Militia 
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would be formed, which would train for an extra twenty eight days in the year. 157 This 
would have provided a substantial force, with better training than any other non-regular 
formation throughout the Wars. Unfortunately, the universal training element was never 
adopted, and only the Local Militia was formed. This force was raised by voluntary 
enlistment, with the deficiencies made up by ballot. Substitutes would not be permitted, but 
a man could avoid service by the payment of a £10 to £30 means tested fine, thus placating 
the wealthy as Windharn had done. 158 The most important aspect of the Local Militia above 
all other non-regular formations, was that it was formed under the direct control of 
government, and although it functioned under military discipline at all times, with its men 
subject to martial law, any attempt at greater Army involvement was strongly opposed. 159 
The whole Local Militia was organised into battalions, with a full compliment of officers 
and NCOs, and a full-time staff, many of who were from the regular Army or militia. 160 
However, the system was by no means perfect, and despite attempts in 1811 and 1812 to 
entice men into the regular service, many obstacles were placed in their way by the Local 
commanders,161 in a similar fashion to those created by the Regular Militia colonels upon 
the initial drafts from their corps. S.C. Smith suggests, 'it is indisputable that Castlereagh's 
initial hopes were dashed', as only ten to fifteen men per regiment volunteered. This means 
that between 2,700 and 3,500 men per year enlisted from the 270 Local battaIions. 162 
However, since ordinary recruiting was producing on average only 10,000 men each year, 
the contribution of the Local Militia takes on a new significance. Its success as an armed 
force is born out by the sound performance of several units during the Luddite unrest in 
1812 163 in direct contrast to the lack of action of the Volunteers under similar 
, 
circumstances in 1800 and 1801. This justifies both Windharn and Castlereagh, in framing 
their non-regular fonnations in the control of the central, rather than the local authority. It 
would serve to restore the faith in such formations and to allay any fears of an armed 
populous. 
The main area of Windham' s New Military Plan, concerned the emphasis placed 
th ul A Y both its recruitment and the conditions of service of its members. upon e reg ar nn, ' 
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As stated, the intention was that 'a better description of men will be induced into the 
Anny,'l64 and Windham suggested that these men would not be enticed into the service 
'Till some change shall take place by which the condition of a soldier shall be made to 
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appear desirable to a larger proportion of the population of the country than it does at 
present.' 165 This he proposed to achieve in four ways. First, the payments to Chelsea Out-
Pensioners were to be enhanced; secondly, the pay of subalterns, for long a contentious 
issue,166 was increased; and thirdly, payments to the widows of officers, and to those on the 
compassionate list, were to be expanded. None of these methods proved at all contentious, 
with the King and the Duke of York accepting their worth. 167 However, the fourth method, 
which was the introduction of limited service enlistment for soldiers, met with substantial 
criticism. The scheme involved a man joining the Army for seven years in the first place, at 
the completion of which he could re-enlist for a further seven years, for an increase in pay 
of 6d. per day. After that period he could again re-enlist for an extra seven years, for 
another Is. per day, or choose to retire on a pension of 6d. per day, or to serve for seven 
years in a veteran battalion. At the end of twenty one years a soldier would retire on a 
pension of Is. per day, without any commitment to the country. Windham stated that, 
The general principle is to raise the value and estimation of the service, and to 
attract the soldiers to it, as well by the credit in which he sees it held, as by the 
advantages which he may expect to find there. 168 
Windham should have expected opposition from the highest quarters. In 1804, several 
Generals were canvassed as to their opinions on short service,169 and almost unanimously 
they voiced their objections. 170 Most agreed with Sir John Moore, who suggested that men 
needed to be encouraged to develop skills as soldiers which they could only do over a long 
enlistment. He continued, in his five page reply that, 
I have heard no complaint originating with him, [the soldier] against the terms of 
his enlistment. Should a change [be made] which may affect Troops who, as they 
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are, ~om?ine qualities very uncommon, and which make them perhaps the best 
so Idlers m Europe?171 
Moore stressed his opinion that soldiers needed to be encouraged to 'look to their corps as 
their country, and to their officer as their only protection.' If a General such as Moore, 
whose humanity is without question, objected to the principle of limited enlistment, it is 
not surprising that Windham's scheme met with such vehement condemnation. However, 
despite the intense criticism, the New Military Plan was put into practice. I72 
The early results did not back up Windham's belief in his scheme, with a similar 
number of men enlisting in the Army during 1806, as during every other previous year of 
the war. In 1805, 11,677 men joined the regular Army through ordinary recruiting, while in 
1806, 11,875 men enlisted. However, the returns for 1807, the fIrst in which the system 
was fully operational, show that 19,114 men enlisted. This rise can only be put down to 
Windham's influence, as the following year, under the direction of Castlereagh, ordinary 
recruiting returned to a more common fIgure of 12,963 men. 173 The terms of enlistment 
was only one factor governing the increase in enlistment. The priority given to the Anny 
enabled an increase in the number of recruiting parties in Britain, in order to capitalise on 
the scheme, and to compensate for the reduction in emphasis on non-regular forces, and the 
removal of the militia ballot. In 1806 the number of parties in Britain was increased from 
around 400 to over 1,100. 174 Glover suggests that this further weakened the weak 
battalions,175 but the results justified a temporary weakening, and had the Talents 
continued in office, the increased attention paid to the recruiting for regular service, must 
surely have raised far more men than was the case after the Portland administration took 
office. 
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Windham' s New Military Plan had not had time to work, before the Talents fell. 
The half finished scheme had therefore had not produced its potential results, and 
commentators have been able to point to this as part of its failing. Windham is doubly 
damned as through the establishment of the Local Militia, and substantial drafts from the 
Regular Militia, Castlereagh was apparently able to solve the manpower problem for the 
Army. However, the introduction of the type of reforms into the Anny that had been seen 
in the rest of public service was Windham's aim from the outset, and in that he was 
successful. His increases in the pay and pensions of soldiers were to be continued by 
subsequent administrations, genuinely raising the status of the soldier to the level of the 
civilian. His limited service enlistment was perhaps a measure before its time, in that it was 
to become an accepted part of Army recruitment during nineteenth century conflicts, being 
used with particular success in 1847, and during the Crimean War. 176 Even the Duke of 
York admitted that some method was needed to encourage men to take the first step to 
enlistment, from which they would get used to soldiering and re-enlist, 'as the great 
difficulty has always been to make a man first engage in a military life, after which he is 
easily induced to extend his services unlimitedly.' 177 and it must be noted that when 
Castlereagh took over as Secretary for War in 1807, while he reintroduced enlistment for 
life 178 he did not remove limited enlistment. He stated, , 
He had no objection to limited service, and he had formerly promoted, to a certain 
extent, engagements limited in space as well as time. But why should limited 
service be in a manner enforced, to the total exclusion of unlimited service, even 
when the men were perfectly satisfied, and desirous to enter without limitation. 179 
By the addition of an extra two guineas to the bounty of a recruit who chose enlistment for 
life few chose the short service option. 180 , 
176 Clode Military Forces O/Ihe Crown, 11, 30-1; Strachan, Wellington 's Legacy, 56,70-5. 
177 PRO ~O 11634/125-38, York to Grenville, 15th February 1807. 
178 48 Geo. III c.15. 
179 P D (1808) x, 988, 8th March 1808. . 
28th J 1805 Only 250 of 9000 men chose short servtce; PD (1819) XXXIX, 988, 180 PD (1805) v 693-4 une . . . . . b th 
th " th d'ff< ce was reduced to sixteen shlllmgs, thiS contmued to e . e case. 15 March 1819. Even when e I eren 
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4.4 RECRUITING 
While an extra bounty could induce men to accept stricter terms of enlistment, it 
was the traditional forms of attracting them, that would bring them to the point of 
enlistment. The system of 'Ordinary Recruiting' had changed little in the centuries before 
the outbreak of the Wars with France. A recruiting party, led by a sergeant, still encouraged 
men to enlist, by every means available to them. Men were given the shilling, and were 
attested to serve the monarch in front of a local magistrate, before being marched off to 
their regiments for training. There was little advice available to those performing the duty 
of recruiting, beyond the experience of other soldiers, and with a shortage of men, and 
rewards to the party for procuring them, there was little incentive to procure volunteers of a 
particular qUality. Consequently, upon the augmentation ofthe Army in 1793, there was 
criticism of the calibre of recruit reaching regiments,181 and the standards accepted changed 
regularl y .182 
As a result of continued criticism, the first uniform regulations for the recruiting of 
soldiers for the Army, were issued in September 1796. 183 These Regulations and 
Instructions laid down in twenty six articles the methods of recruiting to be practised, the 
structure of the recruiting service, and the type and quality of recruit to be sought. Glover 
suggests that no such standards existed for the implementation of the Quota Acts in 
1796,184 but clearly the Regulations and Instructions give an ample description of what 
f 'H' M ' 'F '185 d t' t th constituted a suitable recruit for the whole 0 IS aJesty S orces , an no JUS e 
regular Army. They stated that, for example, 
The Standard for Men raised for the Heavy Cavalry, shall be Five Feet Seven 
Inches, and for the Light Cavalry and Infantry Five Feet Fiv~ Inch~s; but no 
Recruits are to be taken, even of those Sizes, who exceed ThIrty-Five Years of Age, 
or who are not stout and well made ... 186 
181 H C I rt to John Calvert 26th April 1793, in Henry Verney (ed.), Journals and See for example, arry a ve ' 67 
Correspondence a/Sir Harry Calverl (London, 1853) . . . . . 
182 G I 0 d I 0'" December 1792 Five feet SIX mches, and not exceedmg thIrty PRO WO 3/11 /15, enera r er, . ' ., . 
I 5 G I 0 der 14'" December 1793. FIve feet five mches, and not exceedmg years of age; WO 3/11 I , enera r , 
thirty five years of age. . 
183 Regulations and Instructions .. . Recruiting Service (London, 1796). 
184 R. Glover, Preparation, 215. . . 
185 RegulatiOns and Instructions .. . Recruiting Service (1796) Fronttce. 
186 Ibid. Article XIV, 17-18. 
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These requirements would be in a constant state of change throughout the period under 
discussion, as the need for men increased. However, the Regulations and Instructions 
remained in place, a new edition being printed in 1798.187 The articles covered all aspects 
of recruiting, and included the health of the men. Article XV stated that, 'No Recruit is to 
be on any Account inIisted, who has the least Appearance of Sore Legs, Scurvy, Scald 
Head, or other Infirmity, that may render him unfit for His Majesty's Service.' 188 The work 
established that a Field Officer would control each of the twenty four recruiting districts in 
Britain, (fifteen in England, five in Ireland and four in Scotland), and under his authority 
the recruiting parties of the various units would operate. 189 These parties would consist of 
an officer and a number of experienced men who had served at least two years. 190 It would 
therefore seem fair to suggest that the advice laid down, and the experience of those 
involved in recruiting would be enough to recruit only those men suitable to be soldiers. 
However, such was both the need to fill the ranks, and the financial incentives for all 
parties involved, that the quality of men accepted to serve left much to be desired. By the 
end of 1796, this problem had been partly addressed, with the implementation of the 
Regulations and Instructions, and by recruiting officers being ordered to employ 'any 
surgeon of respectability of character' , at the War Office's expense, to examine the 
recruits.191 This was augmented by the addition ofa Hospital Mate in during 1797, 192 
although it was not till 1802 that a surgeon for each recruiting district was appointed to the 
permanent recruiting stafl 193 However, such was the level ofrecruiting, that civil medical 
practitioners were still being employed in 1810.194 
The co-ordination of all recruiting was under the central authority of the Inspector-
General. However, by the period under discussion, the appointment proved something of a 
white elephant, with its holder, General Whitelock costing the country £3400 per annum in 
187 RegulatiOns and Instructions/or the [arrying on o/the Recruiting Service (1798); WO 3/19/206-7, Harry 
Calvert to Major General Whitelock, 19 February 1799, . 
188 Regulations and Instructions ... Recruiting Service (1796) ArtIcle XV, 18; although th,e men sent on the 
, , ' h d t have two years ' service it is clear that the officers do engaged did not have such 
recrultlOg servIce a 0 . ' 
, R bert Blakeney A Boy in the Pemnsular War (London, 1989) 5-6, 
experience, 0 , " D ' . , d 
189lb 'd A ' I 11 5' Article Xl 12' PRO WO 26/36/393, 'Recrultmg Istncts , no ate. I . rtlC e , , " , 
190 Regulations and Instructions , .. Recruiting Service (1796) ArtIcle V, 7th 
191 PRO WO 3/30126, Fawcett to Officer Commanding 46th Regiment, 30 December 1796. 
192 R. Glover, Preparation, 219, 
193 Henry MarshaJl, Military Miscellany (London, 1846) 63 . th 
194 PRO WO 4/467190, Palmerston to Lieutenant General F. Dundas, 26 November 1810. 
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wages, w e mg unable to manage the recruiting service effective]y.195 His duties were 
incorporated into the office of the Adjutant General in 1807196, although the direction of 
recruiting remained firmly with the government. This brought together all recruiting and 
inspection services within one office, establishing a consistent control over the troops from 
the point of enlistment. The whole system was furher centralised in 1813, by the 
establishment of joint depots for recruits. Despite the initial cost of £21 356 it was , , 
expected to save the public about ££8,500 per year. 197 
The Regulations and Instructions and the Inspector General were key examples of 
the involvement of the government in the control of the Anny. Despite the desperate need 
for men, the War Office implemented the scheme, which raised the standard of recruits, to 
a new and uniform level, and so removed a number of potential recruits. This was 
maintained ultimately by transferring the responsibility for the whole recruiting service to 
the office of the Adjutant General, who managed it along with the inspection system. 
Despite the transfer of these areas away from civilian control, it was still the government 
who dictated the direction of recruiting, sanctioned the number of men to be raised, and 
financed the whole process. Despite a regulated system of recruiting being in place, the act 
of enticing men to enlist still relied heavily on the traditional system of the recruiting party, 
together with an ever-increasing array of inducements which contributed to attracting men 
to join the Army. 
4.5 INDUCEMENTS 
It was a widely held view during the period under discussion that men were pushed 
rather than pulled into military service,198 escaping their lot in civilian life by enlisting. In 
1788, Sir William Fawcett suggested that for this reason there was little need to improve 
the conditions of soldiers, except, 'perhaps the addition of a couple of pairs of shoes, to the 
Private soldier, ... might make his lot tolerable.' 199 However, this idea did not prevent a 
195 pp (1805) viii, 125, 'Establishment of the Officer of the Inspector ~enera1 of the Recruiting Service'; 
PRO WO 1/631/195, Lieutenant Colonel Gordon to Edward Cooke, 15 October 1805; WO 1/631 /343, 
Gordon to Cooke 4th November 1805; l/th RCME (1810) 7. 
196 PRO WO 30/~4/37, General Order, 1st June 1807~ Ilt~ RCME (1810) 4. . th 
197 PRO WO 4/426/142, Palmerston t~ H~son, 29 Apnl 1813; 154, Palmerston to Harnson, 15 May 
1813' 156 Palmerston to Harrison, 29 Apn11813. 
198 PRO wo 1I902n5-85, Lord Chatham to Brownrigg, 7th June 1804. 
199 PRO WO 3nn6,William Fawcett AG to Lieutenant General Mackay, 29th May 1788. 
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proposition to those in a position to volunteer. This section will examine the inducements 
developed to encourage recruitment, and will assess the level of their success. It will 
attempt to ascertain whether the contemporary view of a man being pushed into the Anny 
is correct, or whether the inducements were sufficient to pull men from civilian life. 
The first, and most heavily criticised inducement was the payment of a bounty to 
recruits. The Regulations and Instructions list the maximum sums to be paid to a recruit. 
For the heavy cavalry it was £5 . 15s.6d, for the light cavalry £3.13s.6d, and for the infantry 
six guineas, in addition to which, those recruiting him received a percentage.200 
Contemporary evidence suggests that soldiers rarely received the correct amount. A recruit 
in the 71 st Regiment of Foot in 1806 received eleven guineas at Leith,201 while in the same 
year WiIliam Lawrence of the 40th Regiment of Foot received only two and a half guineas 
in Dorchester, despite a rumour that his regiment gave sixteen.202 Since both units were 
entitled to pay their recruits six guineas, it seems clear that market forces were at work 
within the recruiting service, with different areas and different regiments of the country 
generating different bounty payments.203 Clode states that the militia ballot was rightly 
called the 'Parent of High Bounties',204 since it drew those wishirIg to serve in the Anny 
away from regular service, and into the militia as a substitute. This is in keeping with 
Windham's idea, and was one reason why he removed the ballot under his New Military 
Plan. The purchase of substitutes had existed as long as militia ballots, and the cost had 
increased accordingly with each embodiment of the militia.205 The period under discussion 
saw the militia embodied for almost twenty three years, and with every new draft from the 
militia to the regular service, the cost of procuring a substitute would increase along with 
demand on an ever-decreasing commodity. Most who could afford it enrolled in an 
insurance 'club', which for a regular payment would guarantee to buy a substitute if the 
member was unlucky enough to be balloted. Any sum from £ 10 to £60 could be the going 
rate, depending upon the numbers required,206 and the area of the country. Clode states that 
200 Regulations and Instructions ., . Recruiting Service, Article XXII, 23-28. 
201 Christopher Hibbert (ed.), A Soldier o/the 7Ist. The Journal o/a Soldier o/the Highland Light In/antry 
1806 - 1815 (plymouth, 1975) xiii. 
202 George Nugent Banks (ed.), The Autobiography o/Sergeant William Lawrence, A Hero o/the Peninsular 
and Waterloo Campaigns (Cambridge, 1987) 11-13. 
203 See also Section 4.5, Recruiting, 129-31 . 
204 Clode, Military Forces o/the Crown, 1,289. 
205 Ibid., 11,48-9. 
206 T.H. McGuffie, 'Bounty Payments in the Napoleonic Period' in Army Quarterly (1946) 276. 
th f b · 133 e cost 0 a su stItute during 1808 was £45 in Monmouth, whereas in the Isle of White 
only £10.207 In order to compete with the payments that the substitutes could receive the , 
regiments were forced to raise the bounty payments they made to recruits to ever-higher 
levels,208 ensuring that each recruit became an expensive commodity. 
While nonnal recruits were enticed through the standard bounty, even greater 
incentives were directed towards trained militia-men, who could receive an initial bounty 
when they joined the militia, and a second on enlisting into the regular forces.209 In 
addition, men from disbanded regiments, who could not be automatically transferred to 
front line units, were tempted to re-enlist by offers of a second bounty of up to ten 
guineas.2lO Wellington emphasised the need to maintain these experienced soldiers no 
matter what the cost. In 1813, he infonned the government that he had already expended 
800,000 dollars on these men,211 but that he would rather keep the troops he had, than be 
sent up to three times the number of new recruits.212 
Another financial incentive dating from centuries before the period under 
discussion, was the payment of prize money. It originated when the cost of war was met by 
the crown, and therefore any money raised through war was returned to the crown as 
payment. 213 During the reigns of William III and Anne, the prize, along with the cost of 
war had been brought under Parliamentary control and distribution.214 As a reward for a 
successful battle or campaign, it was always a possibility for all ranks,2l S and therefore can 
be seen as an inducement for enlistment. At the beginning of the period under discussion, 
the allocation of prizes were granted to field commanders by the monarch, under 
207 Clode, Military Forces of the Crown. 1,292. 
208 T.H. McGuffie, 'Bounty Payments', 279. 
209 R. Glover, Preparation, 225-6. 
210 PRO WO 40/16/5, Horse Guards to Matthew Lewis, 30th October 5~802 ; WO 40/16/5, Duke of York to 
King, 1st February 1803; W03/36/352, Calvert to Lt. Gen. Nugent, 21 November 1803; WO 1/627/303, 
Clinton to John Sullivan Esq. , 8th March 1804. 
211 WD. x, 246, Wellington to Bathurst, 30th March 1813. . 
212 WD, x, 51, Wellington to Bathurst, 27th January 1813; WD. x, 174-5, Wellmgton to Bathurst, 9th March 
1813. 
213 Cl ode, Military Forces of the Crown, U, 290-6. 
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ar lamen rrectIon, assessed by a Prize Court in the field, and distributed by a Prize 
Agent, whose task it was to sell all seized goods, and turn them into money for 
di 'b' 217 d . 
stn utlOn. A vertlsements would often be placed in newspapers, informing those 
eligible to come forward to claim their prize, to ensure that the allocation was seen to be 
&" 218 H h laIr. owever, t e system was beset with delays,219 which would not have enhanced the 
perception of prize money as an inducement to enlist as a soldier. 220 The problem of these 
delays was first addressed in 1802, when the Duke of York suggested that a 'Regulation' 
be established to prevent the difficulties previously experienced.221 As no such system 
existed, each prize court referred to the same body established after the previous 
engagement, so that the prize money for the Egyptian campaign was allocated using the 
formula introduced by Grey in the West Indian campaigns of 1793-4.222 A Board of 
General Officers was constituted, which was to sit under the chairmanship of General 
Clarke, and examine all further matters relating to the prize system, fixing the rates and 
proportions of all prizes.223 This new system was in place in time to deal with the 
substantial task of distributing the Peninsular prize money, which resulted in the 
distribution of more than one million pounds.224 It was to be distributed on a principle of 
eighths, by which Wellington received one sixteenth of the total himself, while the same 
amount was divided between the field officers. Two eighths were allocated to the field 
officers, while the captains, subalterns and sergeants each received an eighth divided 
between all men of those ranks. The private soldiers received two eighths between them, 
which must have been a great incentive to future enlistments.225 
216 PRO WO 1/311579-81, Charles Grey to Henry Dundas, 20th August 1795; GRE-A, 627, King to Grey 
and Jervis, 22nd June 1795. Granting the commanders the value of the ordnance stores captured at 
Guadeloupe, to be distributed as directed. 
217 PRO WO 1120/377, Christopher Robinson to the Earl of Liverpool, 14th May 1810. 
218 GRE-A, 685, London Gazette, 24th October 1795. Concerning stores and ordnance captured in 
Martinique, St. Lucia and Guadeloupe, March and April 1794. 
219 GRE-A,2179, Fisher to Grey, Sth October 1802. Grey was still involved in the distribution of West Indian 
prizes. 
220 PRO WO 116261547-9, York to Grinfield, 15th July IS03 ; WO 116261543-5 , York to Hobart, 2nd 
November 1803. 
221 PRO WO 11624/975, York to Hobart, 12th December 1802. 
222 RHK-M 4!B1 'Observations to accompany the Return of the Commissioned Officers and other 
Individuals of the' Commissariat who were present at the landing of the 27th August 1799 on the Coast of 
Holland' , 19th May 1800. . 
223 PRO WO 3/351274, Harry Calvert to Generals Trigge, Pultney, Dalrymple, Cralg, Clark, 2nd December 
1802; WO 3/35/327, Calvert to General Alured Clarke, 2nd December IS02; WO 411 89/493-4, Charles 
Yorke to Rt. Hon. Sir C. Morgan, 20th June IS03 . 
224 PRO WO 111133/401-2, Mr. Campbell, [Prize Agent] to Bathurst, 26th June 1815. 
225 WO 111133/407-9, CampbeU to Bathurst, 28th June 1815. 
It has long been accepted that the pay given to soldiers was in no way a 
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contributory factor in enticing men to J' oin the Anny 226 Certain} h d th 
. Y w en compare to 0 er 
occupations the soldier's wage appears to be very low. Monetarily, the wages of soldiers 
were substantially below those of other workers, despite rises during the period under 
discussion.227 In 1791 Sir William Fawcett proposed an increase in soldiers' pay, which 
doubled the amount they received from 6d to Is. per day, which together with an 
allowance of bread, ensured that the soldier would receive 18s.lhd. per year, over and 
above any deductions from his pay.228 This was less than Id. per day, but was the first time 
that a soldier' s pay had deliberately included anything but subsistence.229 Pay was further 
increased during 1797, in the wake of the naval mutinies over wages.230 By the removal of 
several stoppages and responsibilities on the part of the soldier, he was to be left with 2d. 
per day from his pay, after deductions.23l Pay was again increased for long service soldiers 
during 1806, under the New Military Plan232 Despite these increases, soldiers' pay was still 
one of the lowest for which data is available. 
However, a number of key factors have failed consistently to be used in assessing a 
level of income for soldiers. The first is that soldiers accommodation was always provided 
under the terms of his enlistment. As the Wars progressed, more and more accommodation 
of a better quality became available, so that by the end of the period under discussion, there 
was enough barrack accommodation for 115,00 troops in Britain,233 ensuring that fewer 
men would need to spend time in the hospitality of the landlords of public houses. In the 
226 R. Glover, Preparation, 224. 
227 Data of wages taken from, WO 119521179-, 'Memorandum respecting the Increases of Pay to the Army 
since the Year 1784' War Office, 11 th February 1815; Phyllis Deane, The First industrial Revolution 
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1783-1870 (London, 1983) 43 ; R. Coils, The Pitmen of the Northern Coalfield: Work, Culture and protest, 
1790-1850 (Manchester, 1987) 49-50; John Rule, Albion 's People. English Society, 1714-1815 (London, 
1992) 179-8. 
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229 PRO WO 1/952/179-, 'Memorandum respecting the Increases of Pay to the Army since the Year 1784' 
War Office, 11 th February 1815. 
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231 WO 26/37/86-94, War Office Circulars, 25th May 1797; WO 26/37121-4, 126-7, and 129-32, Royal 
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232 PRO WO 412011297-298, War Office Circular, 15th July 1806; WO 4/3 691454-7, War Office Circular, 
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field too, the soldier's accommodation was improved, although it was not until 1811 tha! 36 
the Round Tent, developed in Flanders during 1794,234 was issued to all active forces .235 
The second factor rarely discussed is that of medical arrangements. Obviously, enlisting in 
war time brought with it the increased risks of injury or illness through campaign, but with 
the improvements in medical arrangements, not least those of McGrigor236 and Jenner,237 a 
soldier could expect a much improved response to injury or disease, and could also gain 
every-day medical treatment through his regimental surgeon, free of charge. The fmal 
factor is that of food. At the outbreak ofthe Wars a soldier was expected to provide all but 
a small amount of his own food out of his wages.m However, in April 1795, following 
major food disturbances, in which troops began to feature,239 food was removed completely 
from the list of items that soldiers needed to provide for themselves.24o In its place the 
Army would supply bread to the men, who would pay a maximum of 6d. for a loaf, and 
anything above that would be found by the government. It has been estimated that by the 
end of the Wars, due to the level of inflation, the government was subsidising every soldier 
to the tune of £5 per year for food.241 
The combined effects of these services, for which all other workers would have to 
pay, became more significant as war-time inflation took hold. John Rule has estimated that 
the effects of this inflation resulted in a sixty to sixty five percent rise in the cost of living 
during the war years.242 This meant that most workers experienced at best no difference in 
their standard of living, but more commonly a net decrease.243 As shown above, soldiers 
clearly fall well behind all other groups. However, the main element of the rise in cost of 
living was the high price of food, which, as has already been described, was removed from 
the equation in 1795. In addition, all other items of the expenditure of soldiers were made 
effectively inflation-free by the working of government contracts. Soldiers' 'necessaries' , 
234 PRO WO 11168/63, York to Henry Dundas, 8th January 1794. 
235 Keith Raynor, Unpublished research paper on ' British Army Bell Tents of the Napoleonic Wars' . 
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237 pp (1801-2) ii, 267; PRO WO 311 5212 13, General Order, 15~ November 1803 ; Calvert to FranClS 
Knight, 17th February 1804; WO 4011 4/6, Harry Calvert to Lewls, 27th A~gust 1800; J. Healy Esq., 
Hutchinson, Camp, 4 miles from Alexandria to Secretary at War, II th April 180 I ; Mr. Keate to Matthew 
Lewis, 13th April 1801; Merry to Keate, 18th April 1801. 
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the items he had to provide for himself, did not increase in price throughout the Wars. 
Soldiers were therefore able to function outside the rampant inflation experienced by all 
other occupations during the period under discussion and the . . th· b 
, mcrease m elr pay can e 
seen as a rise in real wages, setting them apart from other groups of workers, and giving 
them a standard ofliving rise over the course of the Wars. Compared with G.N. Von 
Tunzelman's real wage statistics,244 using as its starting point the 6d paid until 1797, or 
even the subsequent 1 shilling, the pay of a private soldier can be seen to rise in real terms 
and confirms a standard of living rise over the period under discussion. This would have 
even greater effect after the close of hostilities, when many other occupations contracted 
and reduced their wages, while Army pay was maintained at its previous level. Pay can 
therefore be seen to have been a greater incentive to enlistment than has previously been 
acknowledged. 
Within the Army, wages were also used to encourage men to stay within the 
service. By the development of a clear career structure, through which the other ranks 
could progress. The rank of Sergeant Major was given to the senior sergeant of each 
regiment of infantry in 1797, and of cavalry in 1800,245 with the holder receiving regular 
pay increases throughout the period.246 In 1802, a 'Sergeant Armourer' was added to the 
establishment of each regiment of both arms,247 while in 1813, the senior sergeant of each 
company of a regiment of foot was given the rank of Colour-Sergeant, 248 completing the 
augmentation of the rank structure. The uniforms and equipment of these ranks were of a 
substantially better quality, setting them apart from the rest of the enlisted ranks. This 
created not only the new ranks, hut movement in the ranks below them, and therefore 
greater incentives for men remain in the Army for life, by advancing through a defmed 
career structure, with clear and attainable increments. It also revealed a narrowing of the 
gap between the senior non commissioned officers and the subalterns above them, as an 
acceptance of the essential role which the former were now expected to perform. 
244 G.N. Von Tunzelman, 'Trends in Real Wages, 1750-1850, revisited', Economic History Review, XXXII 
(1979) 40. . 
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Despite attempts to introduce a scheme of universal Army pensions,249 the 
incentives to enlist did not come in any fonn of superannuation, until 1806, under 
Windham's New Military Plan.25o Under this legislation, a small remuneration was given 
to soldiers who had served fourteen years, and twenty one years, commencing from the 
date of the Act. The terms of these were considered excessively generous by the Finance 
Committee in 1817,251 and were certainly tempered in the wake of their report.252 Clode 
questions 'whether any fair equivalent was ever received for the vast increase in Military 
Expenditure' and suggests that, 'it will probably be found to have added to the cost of 
raising and of retaining men in the Service. '253 It can not be ascertained what effect if any , , 
it had on attracting men to the Army, but it attributed, as Windham had intended, to raising 
the profile of military careers, in line with other areas of governmental improvement, and 
easing soldiers back into society at the end of their service. 
There was an attempt to integrate military personnel leaving the armed services, 
back into society, by assisting them to exercise trades,254 but until Windham's scheme, a 
private soldier would only secure any direct assistance as a result of his discharge through 
wounds or disability received on military service.255 Chelsea Hospital, was expanded in 
1793,256 but could still only accommodate a small proportion of the number of disabled ex-
soldiers being returned from active service, and only a tiny proportion of these could ever 
hope to gain any rehabilitation, in the fonn of a trade. Only, twenty five were employed in 
the manufacture of Army footwear in 1813,257 and fifteen were trained as mat and basket 
makers in 1815.258 At a time of high unemployment, jobs were difficult enough for the able 
bodied to find, but for a disabled man, the prospects must have been slim. The vast 
majority of those disabled by their wounds must have relied on their allowances as out-
pensioners. This money was distributed through an ever-more intricate system of 
government finance, which enabled pensions to be paid out of monies raised by the 
249 See for example, New Military Plan. 24. 
250 47 Geo. Ill, c.69. 
251 ~ RSCF(1817) 53 . 
252 Clode, Military Forces, 11, 288. 
253 Clode, Military Forces, 11,288. 
25442 Geo. IlI. c.69; PP (1802) 612-3, 'An Act to enable such officers, mariners: and soldie~ as have been 
in the land or sea service, or in the marines, or in the militia, or any corps of fenclbles men, smce the twenty-
fourth year of his present Majesty's reign, to exercise trades', 22nd June 1802. 
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Collectors of the Excise, on their travels through the regions, and avoided the need for 139 
pensioners to make a trip to Chelsea.259 The pensions had not kept pace with the high war-
time inflation, but were increased to take this into account during 1812, together with 
additional sums for those who needed the assistance of another person due to their 
d' bT 260 Thr lsa llty. ough the war-time pension system, the government assumed a new 
responsibility for the welfare of soldiers, and encouraged the enlistment in the forces 
through a paternalistic stance. Other allowances were developed, such as 'Marching 
Money' granted to ex-soldiers, and the wives of soldiers not accompanying them on 
foreign service, to enable them to return to their parish of origin.261 The whole system of 
pensions and allowances appears to have worked well, and with only minor modifications 
coped with the massive increase in those being paid at the close of the conflict.262 
Lawrence Stone has suggested that one incentive for enlisting was the desertion of 
family responsibility, either though choice or due to severe economic circumstances.263 
The former is often suggested,264 and it is clear that joining the Anny would be an effective 
way to escape domestic life. The latter, although previously somewhat difficult to 
reconcile, can now be seen to be extremely relevant with soldiers' wages being more 
competitive than previously suggested. A soldier's family would receive nothing but the 
basic poor relief upon his enlistment, but that would be no less than ifhe had stayed at 
home. It would not be until 1807 that the families of Militiamen transferring to the regular 
service received a specific allowance for being separated,265 and despite the suggestions of 
the Duke of York, 266 these were never extended to include the families of all soldiers. 
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However, although soldiers' pay increased in comparison to other occupations, if an 
enlisted man could save a proportion of that, there was no facility to send this home to 
families, until 1842,267 although a similar scheme operating in the Navy from 1758,268 
which was extended to the Marines in 1792.269 Therefore it would only be on home 
service, when families were permitted to travel with the Army, that the benefits of a 
soldier's pay would be felt by anyone other than the man himself. 
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The economic circumstances that are believed to have pushed men into the Anny 
were particularly prevalent during the war, as inflation reduced standards ofiiving, and 
blockades forced many trades to contract. Colley finds that, contrary to a commonly held 
belief among historians, it was the towns that provided men willing to serve in the military, 
in greater numbers than rural districts,270 where work of some description was usually 
available. Possibly the rural workers' next resort to unemployment was to migrate to 
towns, and maybe only then would they end up in the Army. Since attestations only give 
place of residence and place of enlistment, the assessment of such a thesis is impossible. 
Emsley also refers to the effect of fluctuations in the war economy that would force 
townsmen towards a military career,271 and this can be seen in a study of the make up of an 
infantry company of the later part of the period under discussion, conducted by John 
Shy.272 The company was composed of Birmingham metal workers forced out of their 
trades following a fall in the exports to America due to the War of 1812;273 shoemakers, 
suffering from the newly introduced industrial processes and subsequent contraction of the 
military market;274 and, more substantially, textile workers, whose trade more than any was 
susceptible to massive fluctuations in fortunes as a result of the effects of the Wars on 
foreign trade and domestic consumption. m Reports that the pull of the Anny was adversly 
267 Clode, Military Forces, 11, 437. 
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ec mg m ustry, even m tunes of high employment, are often found in relation to cotton 
production.276 
For one group of recruits, it is obvious that the motive for enlistment was to escape 
from their lot. Complaints from deserted masters, concerning their apprentices joining the 
Anny, were common.277 The City of Glasgow was so affected by the emigration of 
apprentices, that it petitioned the Home Secretary to change the law,278 stating that, 'the 
Manufacturers of this part of the United Kingdom will ... sustain a shock which they may 
not for years recover. '279 The legislation that was in force at the beginning of the Wars 
required any apprentice who had enlisted as a soldier, to be returned to his master.280 
However, such was the prevalence of this occurrence, that the Army authorities also began 
to feel aggrieved at losing so many recruits, often after they had undergone training. In 
1806, as more apprentices enlisted in the Army to escape a severe drop in their real 
wages,28t a clause was included in the Mutiny Act, stating that, any man enlisting, and 
subsequently legally being claimed as an apprentice, was to be returned to his master, and 
required to undertake to return to his regiment upon completion of his indenture.282 A strict 
check was kept by the War Office, on those men so discharged, who would be arrested as a 
deserter if they failed to report to their regiments. One example will serve to illustrate the 
system. George Thompson, enlisted in the 2nd Foot at Durham on 25 th January 1812. He 
was found to be an apprentice, indentured to Mr. Thomas Forsyth, a shipwright, from 
South Shields. His indenture did not expire until 28th April 1815, and so he was returned to 
his master.283 On 8th May 1815, Merry, the Deputy Secretary at War, contacted Forsyth to 
remind him of Thompson's obligations to return to his unit, and asking, ' whether the said 
recruit, has proceeded to any local military post for the purpose of rejoining his 
276 See for example, Ibid. , 74; Andrew John Bailey, 'The Impact of the Napoleonic ~ars on the . 
development of the Cotton industry in Lancashire: a s~dy of~e sn:ucture and behavIOur of a fIrm durmg the 
industrial revolution' , unpublished PhD thesis (Cambndge Umverslty, 1985) 5-7. 
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regiment. '284 It was discovered that Thompson was working as a shipbuilder with Mr. 
James Evans, in South Shields, and since he had not fulfilled his obligation, the Inspecting 
Field Officer of the Northern District was informed by Palmerston that, 'you will cause 
him to be apprehended as a deserter,'285 Upon his arrest,286 Thompson was returned to his 
regiment in GOSport.287 While this legislation ensured that the Anny never lost a recruit in 
the long-term, having been forced to complete the very thing he had run away from in the 
first place, his subsequent re-enlistment would not make for a contented soldier. However, 
it reveals a high level of administrative and policing arrangements, to enable the recruits to 
be monitored, and returned to the Anny. 
In 1813, following the report of the Select Committee on Apprenticeship,288 further 
restrictions were placed on the return of apprentices to their masters. Section ninety three 
of the Mutiny Act of that year,289 was interpreted by PaImerston to mean that, any 
indenture of an apprentice, entered into after the age offourteen years, (and therefore 
expiring after the age of twenty one) was invalid, and that any man enlisted under those 
conditions could be retained by his regiment.290 It is not clear how many men this 
legislation affected, but it further emphasised the need of the country for men, and the 
lengths to which the government would go to achieve a stronger Army. It also highlighted 
the weakness of the apprenticeship system,291 which lost even more of its powers by the 
repeal of the apprenticeship clauses of the Statute of Artificers the following year.292 Jt 
would send a message to apprentices, that the Army would attempt to keep them if at all 
possible, and it was certainly conceivable that officers would turn a blind eye towards the 
previous career of a new recruit, once he had enIisted.293 
The Army also provided a means for convicts to escape their punishment, by 
enlisting. The system was used during the American War oflndependence,294appears to 
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have been used throughout the Wars, with lesser criminals being despatched to units 
permanently serving abroad, such as the 20th Light Dragoons, battalions of the 60th Foot, 
the Royal African Corps, and the New South Wales Corps. Initially officers were prevented 
from recruiting in prisons,295 the prisoners being required to petition the Home Secretary 
themselves for release into the Army, and a pardon. In this way several thousand recruits 
left prisons to enlist.296 However, as the need for manpower increased, official sanction 
was given to the active recruitment of men from the prison hulks,297 and while most of 
these recruits still ended up in foreign regiments, at least one draft was used to make up 
deficiencies in the 66th Foot in 1804.298 It was suggested in the House of Lords that the 
authorities were using this method to channel men from the militia and fencibles to the 
regular forces, by causing them to desert and then punishing them with service.299 There is 
little evidence for a concerted policy of this type, but it would be another way of filling the 
ranks with trained men, albeit reluctant ones. Convict recruits could be far more 
problematic than men who had freely enlisted. In 1808, disturbances ensued after delays in 
transporting recruits from the hulks to the Royal Africa COrpS,300 and regiments were 
warned about the prevalence of certain batches of convict recruits who feigned illness to 
avoid duty.30) But the greatest problem would be in the perception of the men by the 
soldiers they were joining. It can not have aided morale or self esteem, to know that the 
authorities believed military service to be a punishment, and not a trade in which men 
should freely enter. The ultimate insult to the service, and one which was staunchly 
objected to by the Duke of York, was that the Army as also used as a punishment for 
marines who broke the law.302 However, this is merely another example of the subordinate 
position in which the Army found itself, for the power to determine recruiting policy lay 
firmly in the hands of the civilian authority, and their aims were to gain more men, from 
whatever source. 
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unng e course of the period under discussion, special attention was paid to the 
enlisting of boys, ilie reason for which, Glover suggests, was that' boys had ilie merit of 
b· h ' 303 H .. 
emg c eap. owever, 10 this statement, be completely misses the point of this type of 
recruitment. Instead of being an 'unpleasant and bibulous trade in children [which] quite 
certainly meant iliat for several years six regiments of foot would be unfit for service', ilie 
idea of ilie scheme was to establish a form of military apprenticeship. Boys, who were 
described as, 'Healthy lads under Sixteen Years of Age, who are likely to grow, may be 
taken as low as five feet one inch' , were initially recruited into a number of battalions 
during 1797, although nothing was stated concerning the intention of the authorities.304 In 
1799, iliey were all transferred into three battalions, the 22nd, 34th and 65 th, and sent to the 
Cape of Good Hope and India,305 which was to become the policy for the whole scheme of 
boy recruits. The War Office later stated that, 
iliey are in no case to be sent to the West Indies, or to join a Battalion on ~ 
Service, until they are equal, in every respect, to the performance of their Duty as 
Soldiers.306 
When second battalions were raised under the Army of the Reserve, ten boys per company 
were permitted to be attached to each of these home service formations.J07 Similar 
legislation was passed in 1805 and 1808, enlisting boys in regiments that were refitting or 
en-route to garrison duty abroad.308 The scheme continued through the Wars, concentrating 
on home service units and battalions bound for the East Indies,309 and was eventually 
adopted for the whole Army in February 1813 .310 
There are several points which need to be addressed concerning the recruitment of 
boys. First, iliat the boys were never considered as part of the operational strengili of a unit 
is clear from ilie legislation, which is at pains to describe a training regime for the youths. 
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The Circular of 181 pll describes every aspect of the instruction to be given to the bOYS,145 
including 'Messing and Cleanliness,' of which it states, 
The utmost attention is required to be paid by the Officers and Non Commissioned 
O~cers to ~h~ Messing, Cleanliness, and General Conduct of these Boys, as from 
thelr.urtr:mlttmg Care and Superintendence, the formation of these boys into useful 
Soldiers IS alone to be expected; and on their Exertions must depend the ultimate 
Success and Benefit which is expected to accrue to the Service from the adoption of 
this measure. 
Glover is highly critical of the drilling of the boys, despite the orders clearly stating that, 
It is essential, that Arms should not be put into the hands of these Boys until they 
have attained some knowledge of the different modes of Marching, Wheeling, and 
of the Fonnations that occur in the Ordinary Field Exercise: - And as their strength 
will not at first be adequate to the management of the firelock, a proportion of 
Fuzils will be furnished for their use, by the Ordnance Department; suitable 
Accoutrements must also be provided for them.312 
The recommendation of 'the utmost mildness and lenity as the best means of establishing 
Discipline, and attaching the Boys to His Majesty's Service,' together with 'the 
Expediency of establishing a Regimental School for the instruction of such of them as 
discover abilities, in the necessary qualifications of Reading and Writing, with a view to 
their becoming hereafter, useful and valuable Non Commissioned Officers' ,3 13 suggests 
very much an apprenticeship scheme, rather than a means of obtaining cheap, second rate 
recruits. An additional purpose had also been pointed out the previous year by Harry 
Calvert, who stated, 
By this arrangement the children of soldiers would find an asylum, many 
unfortunate boys be saved from ruin, and a most valuable addition made to the 
effective Force of the Country, without any considerable expense, as it is presumed 
that Boys of this description, would, after the age of Eighteen, be fully competent to 
perfonn the duties of Soldiers)14 
This is the only evidence found during the course of this study, that suggests the 
development of the tradition of military families among the lower orders, as it was within 
311 PRO WO 3/585n6, Horse Guards Circular - Calvert to Colonels Commanding Regiments, 17th June 
181l. 
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313 lbid. 
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the officer cadre. An extension to this program of training, introduced to the cavalry dur::: 
1813, and continued to the end of the Wars, gives an even clearer picture of the intention of 
the authorities. Boys were to be recruited and offered indentures as apprentices to 
tradesmen within the Army, such as farriers, boot makers, saddlers, trumpeters, armourers 
and artificers.Jl5 In this way the Army would become, to a certain extent, self sufficient in 
trades, while being able, to 'impress on these young Minds those principles which will 
render them good Subjects and faithful Soldiers. 'J 16 
The second point to note is that the cost of boys was in addition to, and not in place 
of regular recruits, and therefore it was not the cheap option. Glover rightly states that the 
bounty given to boys was less that regular recruits.Jl7 However, after an enquiry into the 
costs of the scheme in 1810,318 revealed that in most cases there was little difference in the 
costs of a regular soldier and a boy soldier. The subsequent legislation took this into 
account, granting boys up to fifteen years of age 1 Od. per day, while those over fifteen were 
to be given the same pay as regular soldiers, despite not being included in the line until 
they were deemed fit, and volunteered.3l9 Finally, examination of the service of the units to 
which Glover refers, reveals that each took part in campaigns within the six years he 
suggests they would be unfit for service, earning fourteen battle honours between them.320 
The recruitment of boys can therefore be seen as a successful means of generating military-
minded recruits, without interfering with the everyday functioning of the regiments. 
It is impossible to ascertain the reason why most soldiers enlisted. It is clear, is that 
as conditions under which they served improved, the amount of pushing required from 
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occupation with many more incentives for enlistm' g than at th ... hi any 0 er pomt m Its story. 
4.6 OFFICERS 
It has been shown that through the course of the Wars, the government began to 
develop a greater understanding of the needs of the Army, and methods by which men 
could be induced to enlist in the ranks. The development of the commissioned ranks, in 
line with the forces they were to command, was to prove a very different matter. Britain's 
upper classes were the least militarised of the whole of Europe,321 and yet it was this body 
of men that would need to provide the bulk of Army officers in the new, expanded Army. 
This section looks at the make-up of the body of officers through the period, examining 
how it developed, through various means. It will examine the system of promotion, and the 
social standing of officers, as well as continuing to asses to what extent government control 
extended to this area of the Army. 
By 1793, the body of officers of the regular Army was in a state of stagnation.322 
Despite major reductions in manpower at the close of the American War ofIndependence, 
the number of officers had been maintained, both officially, by the maintenance of two 
supernumerary captains, and unofficially, by keeping two lieutenants and ensigns on 
regimental strengths without the knowledge ofParliament.323 There had therefore been few 
new commissions, since vacancies would be taken up by the supernumeraries. By 1789, the 
numbers of first commissions (the figure by which change of personnel within the 
commissioned ranks can be assessed) were running at an average of230 per year,324 too 
few to cause any real shift in the population of the commissioned ranks. The average length 
of service of each of the officer ranks reveals just how stagnant officer rank was, but also 
how many of the officers had made the Army their career. In 1791 the average length of 
service for lieutenant-colonels was 29 years, for majors it was 25.5 years, for captains it 
was 16 years, and for lieutenants it was 8.5 years.325 It would not be until 1793, and the 
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appointments contained in the London Gazette, 1787-1816 inclusive. 
325 Houlding, Fit for Service, 106. 
outbreak of war with France, that an average of 450 new commissions per year, caused ~:8 
augmentation and attrition, would alter significantly the composition of the commissioned 
ranks, and would continue throughout the period under discussion.326 By 1815, the average 
length of service for lieutenant-colonels was just 3.6 years, for majors it was 3 years, for 
captains it was 2.2 years, and for lieutenants it was 1.6 years.m The Wars had resulted in 
an body of officers that was vastly increased, and one in which the stagnation of 1791 had 
been completely removed, being replaced by a rank structure that had substantial 
movement. 
The means of entry into, and subsequent promotion within, the commissioned ranks 
could be either through purchase or patronage. Despite criticism at the outbreak of the 
Wars, the majority of commissions were still held through purchase.328 This in itself was 
seen as a means for the political authority to control the Army, by stipulating which social 
group could hold rank, effectively through the property qualification of cash, and 
preventing the filling of the commissioned ranks by any authority but that of Parliament, 
who controlled the vast financial resources that would be required. This had been borne out 
by the attempts of James II to purchase a majority of commissions for Catholics, which 
proved too costly for even the royal purse. It was in this context, as a check on royal 
authority and a link to constitutional government, that the purchase system, which 
possessed all the characteristics of an unreformed ancient institution, had the support of 
such influential nineteenth century Whigs as Lord John RusselI, Earl Grey, Lord Panmure, 
and Lord Palmerston.329 In addition, the purchase of a commission guaranteed the holder a 
pension at the end of his service, by transferring to half-pay, or selling his commission 
completely. This, as Richard Glover points out, 'was a convenient financial device for 
saving members of Parliament the unpleasantness of asking their constituents to pay taxes 
to provide pensions for deserving old officers. ' 330 Since the cost of buying out those with 
. f' '11' d 331 fi purchased commissions was eventually to be III excess 0 SIX mI IOn poun s, Illance 
was a key area preventing the abolition of the system. It was therefore unlikely to change, 
326 As above, London Gazette. 
327 Army List, (1816) passim. . . 
328 Anthony Bruce, The Purchase System in the British Army, /660-/87 ~ (L~ndon, 1980~. ThIs remams the 
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329 Bruce, Purchase System, 66. 
330 R. Glover, Preparation, 145. . ,. 
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despite concerted attempts to remove the purchase of office from all other areas of 
society.332 
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Several tiers of commissions were removed from the purchase system during the 
1760s, including surgeons and quartermasters,m and most importantly all ranks above and 
including regimental colonel, together with the whole of the Ordnance.334 In addition, since 
a purchased rank was only created at the same time as a new regiment, and died along with 
its holder, there was an ever-increasing number of non-purchase vacancies available. 
Michael Glover suggests that if left to natural wastage, the West Indian postings, with the 
consequent high casualties, would have accounted for the death of the purchase system.335 
But this fails to account for the reasoning behind it, which was to maintain purchase as a 
check on royal authority, thus preserving the makeup of the commissioned ranks, and in 
turn the constitution. To that end Sir George Younge, the Secretary at War, had no 
reservations about raising new corps rather than augmenting old ones, when manpower was 
required at the outbreak of the Wars, thus creating new purchasable commissions, and 
perpetuating the system.336 In addition the system was also a source of useful patronage for 
the administration.337 In peace-time, in the absence of a Commander in Chief, all Army 
patronage lay with the civilian ministry, therefore the commissions contained in fifty eight 
new regiments of foot, and sixteen new cavalry regiments, raised to meet war-time 
demands, would be a useful addition to governmental patronage, as well as to the Treasury. 
To enter the Army in a commissioned rank, a man had merely to be 'a gentleman 
fully qualified to hold an ensigncy or cometcy.'338 This resulted in many well-publicised 
abuses, including the commissioning of children.339 However, the criticisms of the system 
conflict. It is clear that the body of officers at the outbreak of the Wars could be either 
stagnant, and filled with career soldiers,340 or full of boys who were not capable of service, 
but not both. Since the accusations of the latter are largely anecdotal, or based on several 
332 49 GIll 126 ... vii viii 'An Act for the further Prevention of the Sale of Brokerage and Offices' . 
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335 M. Glover, 'Reappraisal', 227. 
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ID IVI ua cases, It seems faIr to assume that Houldm' g's fi d' fl . b d m mgs 0 ong servIce, ase on 
analysis of the available statistical evidence, are the more correct. This also suggests that 
the whole idea of the mismanagement of Army patronage by civilians should be 
questioned, and assigned to the realms of point scoring by opposing sides in an ongoing 
conflict over government control of the Army. 
The ability of mere boys to progress through the ranks is clear, if somewhat over-
exaggerated. Promotion from Ensign to Lieutenant-Colonel could take as little as three 
months to achieve, or as long as the paperwork took to process the advancement.341 The 
reform of this abuse rested with the Commander in Chief during the Wars, and as has 
already been established, for the first two years of the conflict, Amherst did not shine in his 
performance of that role. It was therefore only upon the succession of the Duke of York to 
the post, that the problems of promotions were addressed. Within six weeks of taking over 
at Horse Guards, York had introduced several measures of reform. All prospective officers 
were to be sixteen years of age, and to have a recommendation from a serving field officer, 
while subsequent promotions were dependant upon strict requirements based on service. 
Every officer was required to have served at least two years as a subaltern before he could 
be promoted to the rank of captain, and have held a full commission in the regular Army 
for a minimum of six years before he became a field officer. In addition, all requests for 
promotion were to be directed through an officer' s coloneJ.342 Even these changes seem to 
permit a remarkably short progression through the ranks. However, it must be observed 
that many of the most notable officers of the period under discussion benefited from this 
system, in particular Wellington, who was a lieutenant-colonel by the age of twenty-four. 
After York's reforms, 'a gentleman fully qualified ' would merely mean that a 
prospective officer had reached the age of sixteen, was able to read and write, had money 
enough for the purchase price of the commission, or had been offered a commission for 
without purchase, and was in possession of a letter from a field officer attesting to his 
suitability.343 In both peace and war, the vast majority of first commissions, were obtained 
without purchase,344 and even those that were paid for were always at the regulation 
341 Bruce, Purchase System. 37-8. . 
342 PRO WO 3128/84, General Order, 12th March 1795; R. Glover, PreparatIOn, 152-3; Bruce, Purchase 
System, 40. 
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pnce. n an Army so greatly expanded, flrst comrrnSSIOns would always be available. In 
particular cavalry appointments which proved difficult to flll, to such an extent that their 
price was reduced during 1793.346 Even first commissions in established regiments of foot 
did not always bring the regulated price,347 one observer suggesting that, 'It is a Fact that, 
at this Moment, Purchasers cannot be found for Subaltern Commissions in old Corps, even 
at half the regulated Price. '348 With supply outstripping demand, the use of flrst 
commissions as a tool of patronage must surely be questionable. 
Money was obviously not the only criteria in assessing a suitable officer. The idea 
of what constituted a 'gentleman' was a question that preoccupied many officers 
throughout the period. Sir John Moore gave an idea of what he considered were not the 
qualities of a gentleman, when reporting to the Adjutant General on the conduct of one 
Lieutenant Lynch, of the 95 th Regiment of Foot in 1804. 
I think it necessary to observe, that his wife is a shopkeeper's daughter in Hythe, he 
married her very lately, not a very eligible connection for an officer to have formed, 
so close to the Quarters of his Regiment.349 
He went on to inform the man's colonel that, 
neither his language, nor his behaviour were those of a Gentleman, ... added to this 
Lt. Lynch is a mean, uneducated, gaming man, not of a Class who ought to have 
. . 350 been recommended to H.R.H, for a commISSIOn, 
Such was the abhorrence of this sort of behaviour, that it was ultimately Lynch's fellow 
officers who had him removed from the regiment, by directly petitioning the Commander 
in Chief.351 Therefore even after the Army had augmented substantially, the old criteria of 
an officer and a gentleman was still of paramount importance, While Napoleon sought to 
, . ffi fi b'ddl'ng their marriage and giving them the Impose such values upon his 0 lcers, or 1 . 
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manel status to go WIth therr social one,352 a British officer was expected to posses such 
virtues prior to joining the Army. 
The rule that an officer must be able to read and write is somewhat deceiving, as a 
higher standard of education was increasingly required. Glover states that it was the lack of 
this ability, that prevented men rising from the ranks, and not social class,353 but clearly 
from the above example, each was considered as offensive. As the Wars progressed, the 
need for a better educated body of officers was apparent, as systems of training became 
more academically based.354 This was in contrast to those of the mid-eighteenth century, of 
which Brewer commented, were 'neither so technical nor so complex that the absence of a 
formal education was a handicap. '355 It would also mean that an officer would need to 
spend more time with his regiment in order to perfect the more complex drills. In terms of 
formal training, British officers were behind members of other professions, and the officers 
of other European powers.356 The Royal Military College at High Wycombe was only 
opened in 1799,357 while Prussia in 1717, Russia in 1731, France in 1751 and Austria in 
1752, had established equivalent military institutions.358 Even after the establishment of a 
military college, only a small proportion of officers passed through its classes, as 
promotion did not depend upon it. Since its main advertisement was a free first 
commission, the fact that most of these were non-purchase in any case, especially during 
the war, meant that few would delay their entry onto the promotion ladder for the year of 
the course.359 Nor would the military authorities encourage the universal taking up of 
places, when there was a general shortage of manpower. 
Despite all the other criteria, the easiest way for an officer to gain promotion would 
always be through purchase. While the supply of first commissions was greater than the 
demand, the reverse would often (although by no means always) be the case for subsequent 
steps up the promotion ladder. Over-regulated prices were often paid, particularly in 
regiments of higher precedence than the 77th Foot and 17
th 
Light Dragoons, that were 
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guaranteed to be retained after a war. Such was the acceptance of this additional cost th!;3 
, 
in 1810, The Gentleman's Magazine saw fit to comment on Captain Robert Craufurd, as he 
'could have got £2500 for his company, ... [but] he would accept no more than his 
sovereign's regulated price, viz. £1500, because he felt bound in honour to adhere strictly 
to the rules of service. '360 Michael Glover has suggested that the over-regulated price was 
not as common as is often inferred, and suggests that when in the West Indies even , 
Captaincies proved difficult to sel1.361 
For those officers who could not afford to purchase their way through to high rank, 
another route was to involve themselves in the constant manoeuvring within lesser corps. 
This could mean several regimental transfers, each one the subject of, at least good 
canvassing on the part of the candidate or his friends, or the services of a commissions 
broker prior to 1809, with regiments used as stepping stones to the coveted position in a 
fashionable line unit. A prime example of this was Henry Miles, a product of the Military 
College of Great Marlow, who began his service as an ensign in the East Middlesex Militia 
in 1807. In his short military career, which was ended by his death at Bergen op Zoom in 
1814, with the aid of friends in high places, he was able to transfer his way to the command 
of the grenadier company of the 1st (or Royal Scots) Regiment of Foot, via the Sicilian 
Regiment. His memorial is a series of letters, written by himself, his father, and Sir David 
Erskine, his friend and commander of his company at Great Marlow, to various members 
of the military hierarchy, advocating Miles' qualities as a young officer, and as one who 
should be considered for advancement. Erskine writes in such matter of fact tenus about 
his method of procuring Miles the patronage of the Duke of Kent, that it is clear such 
courting of patronage was common, if not expected. 
I thought it would be of much use to Lieutenant Miles to obtain for him 
the patronage of his Royal Highness the D~e of Kent;.and, as he was a 
fine looking fellow, I wrote to his Royal Highness, sa~~~ I ~uch 
wished HE would permit him to exchange ~om the Slc~hans mto the 
First or Royal Scots regiment of Foot. To this request his Royal 
Highness was graciously pleased to send me a favourable answer.362 
In this way the type of officer being promoted was also carefully monitored, and the 
officers' class perpetuated, even without recourse to purchase. 
360 Gentlemen's Magazine, 80 (1810) 508. 
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362 Erskine, Biographical Memoir, 53. 
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The purchase system itself was driven by the Regimental Agents, and as with the 
other areas of finance in which they were involved, there were suggestions of corrupt 
activities. In theory they were merely to act as intermediaries between the purchaser and 
the vendor, however they had become heavily involved in the whole system, acting as 
brokers, and allegedly inflating prices in order to make a profit. Greenwood and Cox again 
featured in these claims, allegedly selling one cometcy for £1600, which was £1100 more 
than they had told the vendor they had received.363 It is not possible to assess just how 
prevalent this practice was, but had it been common, it would explain the conflicting 
evidence of over-regulated prices and of the inability to sell commissions. Certainly the 
enquiry into the activities of the Duke of York found that it was incompatible for agents to 
broker commissions, and it was forbidden by an Act of 1809.364 The investigation which 
followed, revealed a far wider use of brokerage than was first suggested, with one large 
firm advertising that they could gain an appointment to any government office, at a 
price.365 There is no record of the prices paid for commissions beyond the regulation price, 
for any point during the period under discussion. It is therefore possible only to speculate 
that the price of commissions fell, with the removal of the broker as the middle-man, and it 
does not appear that the demise of brokerage system had any effect upon the body of 
officers of the Army. 
1. Hayes suggested a model of the social and professional makeup of officers during 
the eighteenth century, which is composed offour groupS.366 The first is nobility and 
landed gentry, who made up about 25% of most regiments, and who with their interest and 
money, would fmd it easier to proceed through the commissioned ranks. The second group 
is the lesser gentry, who made up the greater proportion ofregimentaI officers, consisting 
of lowlier branches of the better families, many of who had entered a trade, profession or 
fanning. Since their birth was lower, their money and interest would also be lower, and so 
their prospects for promotion. The third group was a cosmopolitan one, consisting of 
foreigners, and the traditional 'Army families' such as the Churchills, Lascelles, Howards, 
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and Cam bells. The fourth' 155 P group would COnsIst of promoted rankers, for whom prospects 
would be low, with few progressing far up the promotion ladder. 
The available evidence for the period under discussion suggests a very different 
picture, particularly at the beginning of the conflict. In 1793,367 the number of officers who 
would belong to Hayes' fIrst group was minimal. Most regiments did not have a single 
person with any kind of title, and only in the Guards could anything like the fIgure of25% 
be found. The First Guards were composed of by 27% titled officers. In the cavalry, 
surprisingly, the Household regiments had few titled officers, and the regiment with the 
greatest proportion of titled ranks was actually the 10th Light Dragoons, with 10%. By 
1809,368 the numbers oftitled officers had increased only slightly, with most regiments still 
without anyone in that category. The Army List of 1816,369 reveals a much changed officer 
cadre. Only three of the thirty one regiments of cavalry, and fIfteen out of the 104 
regiments of infantry, was without at least one member with a title. Certain regiments 
appear to have become 'fashionable' within titled circles, despite their lowly precedence in 
the line. In particular the light infantry and rifle units, where the populations of titled 
offIcers had at least doubled, and in the case of the 60th, increased from two to fIfteen, or 
about 10%. This is particularly interesting as it is suggested that these were units in which 
purchase of commissions was least common, and that most promotion was upon merit.370 
Those regiments that did not have an officer with a title, are notable as units who were not 
granted any battle honours. While it is clear that officers would often be granted titles for 
their military exploits,37l a sufficient number of new names appear in the lists to suggest an 
increasing population oftitled officers. It therefore appears that these men populated 
fashionable regiments, such as the Rifles, not just because their flamboyant uniforms 
appealed, but because what also made a regiment fashionable was its record of service, and 
in these units, even those with the ability to purchase, chose instead to remain in their 
regiment, and take promotion through precedence or merit. Despite this signifIcant 
increase, the Army as a whole contained a mere 4% of officers with titles. Only in the Foot 
Guards was a fIgure of25%, in line with Hayes' thesis, achieved,372 and in those units 
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purchase was also most prevalent, with 55% of all commissions being disposed of in that 
way.313 
The fourth category, that of officers promoted from the ranks, can also be 
statistically examined, using the returns from the London Gazette. It is a source of officers 
that is often over-emphasised,374 there being many anecdotal tales of enlisted men being 
commissioned.315 Houlding suggests that during the war of 1739-48, only about 200 men 
obtained commissions in this way, and that during the Seven Years War a similar number 
rose from the ranks.376 In 1789, there were only three occasions where men were promoted 
from the ranks from a total of214 first commissions, which was 1.4% of the total.311 By 
1800, this figure had risen to seventeen out of 472 first commissions, about 3.5%,378 and 
by the end of the war, a figure of 5.4% is found379 They were clearly a significant, 
although tiny element of the body of officers, often being employed as quartelIDasters, 
adjutants or riding masters, roles which utilised their skill and years of experience. But for 
the casualties of war, such men would remain at a lowly rank for the rest of their service. 
This steady increase through the course of the conflict is a sign of both the accepted 
experience ofNCOs, which would be useful to the Army as a whole, and also the attrition 
of officers from conventional sources. This expansion in commissions from the ranks 
continued beyond the Wars, and by the 1830s, between twenty and thirty officers were 
commissioned through this route each year.380 
The other two categories of Hayes are more difficult to isolate. With both titled 
officers and those who had risen from the ranks making up at most only 10% of all , 
officers, it would appear that at least 90% of officers belonged to the second and third 
categories. To this list must be added a group of officers whose wealth was relatively new, 
obtained through businesses such as trade or manufacturing, and also those whose wealth 
was tied up in their commission, who relied upon their Army pay to exist. This group 
would feature more prominently as the war progressed, as traditional sources of officers 
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dried up, and the Army became a method of achieving social acceptance for those 
obtaining a commission.381 
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Through the eighteenth century there developed a large body of officers, for whom 
the Anny was their sole career, and long service the nonn.382 The development of such a 
regime was similar in many respects to that of the civil administration of the same 
period,383 with a clear career structure, regular pay, and an expertise through training, 
particular to that profession.J84 Many civil servants were from the business or mercantile 
classes and used their positions to advance in the social sphere. In the same manner, many 
of the same strata of society joined the militia and regular units during the period under 
discussion, gaining for themselves a position in the newly fashionable military society,385 
and rebuilding the stagnated body of officers with new blood. However, the reliance on this 
class of men by military fonnations, such as the militia and the volunteers, was counter-
productive. It generated criticism from within the traditional martial elites, and David 
Eastwood has suggested that as a consequence many ceased to accept commissions in these 
COrpS.386 As the elites were more prevalent in certain regiments after the Wars, as shown 
above, it appears that there was a move by this class of person, from the non-regular to the 
regular formations. Therefore the rise of the bourgeoisie in the militia contributed to the 
rise of the upper class in the regular service, which was the element of society the civilian 
authority most wished to attract, as shown in the maintenance of purchase. 
Despite attracting a significant element of the social elite, as stated, the Army was 
also attracting men who relied upon their Army pay, and were therefore, by inference, not 
of that wealthy elite. This development is most obvious in the increased calls for 
improvements in the pay of subaltems.387 The author of one treatise on the subject 
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382 Houlding, Fit For Service, 109-10; Brewer, Sinews of Power, 56. 
383 See Chapter 2, Structure, 24-64. 
384 Corfield, Power and the Professions, 25-6. 
385 Brewer, Sinews of power, 79. . . 
386 . d G . R I England' Tradition and TransformatIOn In Local Government, 1780-Davld Eastwoo, overmng ura . 
1840 (Oxford, 1994) 14. th . 
387 PRO WO 3nt76 William Fawcett AG to Lieutenant General Mackay, 29 May 1788, ~O 3/ 10/53, 
' . 26th A t 1791· WO 3/10/54 Fawcett to George Younge, 25 August 1791; Fawcett to Lord Barrmgton, ugus, '. 
An Humble Address ... Subaltern Officers of the Army, pasSIm. 
· 158 
suggested that as many as two thirds of all officers in 1795 joined the Anny and attempted 
to live off their pay.388 He asserted that , 
Every profession, except the Military, gives to the man of genius and perseverance, 
the present means of supporting himself in his proper fashion, besides holding out 
prospects of competency and ease; but a Subaltern Officer, from the income of his 
rank, cannot procure the subsistence of a day.389 
However, many still believed that officers should not depend upon their pay by the state, 
and should be capable ofliving from their own private means.390 This was fine when there 
were enough 'young gentlemen' wanting to serve,391 but was naIve in the extreme, at a 
time when the Anny was perceived to be fmding it difficult enough to fill any of its 
vacancies, without placing even further restrictions on service. The first pay rise for 
officers since the reign of William Ill, came in 1797, which increased by a shilling per day, 
and all stoppages and deductions removed.392 The system of payment was amended in 
1799, to enable all officers to benefit from regular monthly wages.393 There were further 
calls to increase all officers ' pay in 1806, to bring their wages into line with the other 
ranks', that had been increased under the terms ofWindham's New Military Plan.394 
Windham, who had championed improvements to the terms of military service, and 
particularly soldier's pay, initially rejected the suggestion, stating, 
the consequence of the present system was that none could enter the Anny as 
officers, who had not something else besides their pay. This was important in a 
constitutional view since it prevented them from becoming mercenaries and gave 
them an interest in the country they defended.395 
However, the officers eventually received a minimal rise in pay of between 10d. and 
1 s.11 d. 396 The civilian administration had again exerted its authority over the Anny by 
restricting the wages paid to the officers, in order to ensure that the desired social make-up 
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War Office, 11 III February 1815. 
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was maIntained. It would be difficult for those without private means to survive in the 
commissioned ranks, in particular during the pen·ods of high 'nfl t' d· d b 1 a IOn Iscusse a ove. 
None of their wage was made inflation-proof by the addition of allowances in the manner 
of the pay of their men. They had to provide everything they needed themselves, 
irrespective of the levels of inflation, and the cost of messing could be excessive.397 This 
was only addressed in 1811, when an allowance of £25 per troop or company was allocated 
to each regiment for messing.398 However, despite all their hardships, and a number of 
unfilled vacancies, the body of officers was not in a state of crisis during the Wars. Men 
were found who were willing and able to make the Army their career. 
As the social and the professional standing of officers became of even greater 
significance during the course of the conflict, it was reflected in the attitudes of officers 
towards promotion. Clarification was sought for the status, not only of officers of the 
regular Army in regard to the militia and fencibles ,399 but also the comparative ranks of the 
civilian staff, such as members of the Commissariat, the Paymaster General' s Department 
and the Medical Services.4OO In a stagnant body of officers, promotion was as slow for all 
officers, but in the vastly expanded war-time Army, promotion could pass by an officer 
who could not purchase promotion, or whose regiment did not suffer casualties, and so 
permit promotion upon seniority. In these cases there was a heavy reliance on promotion 
by brevet. This involved the raising en-block of a number of officers of the same rank, to 
the next above it. It was in all circumstances a mass promotion, and therefore it was 
impossible to find posts for all those given the new rank. As a consequence, many 
remamed in the same regiment, at the same rate of pay, and performing the same duties, 
with only the authority of the new rank as their gain.401 However, it did give them a prior 
claim to any vacancy in the higher rank. The brevet system was used for promotions from 
captain to major, and above, and was the sole method of promotion to all ranks above 
colonel. The knowledge of a forthcoming brevet often created a rush to gain the next step 
of promotion, in order for officers to maintain their seniority above the mass of brevets. 
Omission from the brevet would mean that an officer had been overstepped by the whole of 
397 BP Charles to Thomas 24th May 1805. 
398 PR~ WO 41211/330, WO Circular, 19th March 1811; WO 1/952/179-, ' Memorandum respecting the 
Increases of Pay to the Anny since the Year 1784' War Office, 11 th February 1815. 
399 34 Geo. III c.16, s.3. st . 
400 PRO WO 41207/321, James Pultney to the Comm issioners of Transports, 21 April .1809. , 
401 PRO WO 11952/179-, 'Memorandum respecting the Increases of Pay to the Arm~ smce .the Year. 1784 
War Office, 11 th February 1815. Under the New Military Plan, officers began to receIve an mcrease ill pay 
for brevet rank. 
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his rank, and therefore legal action could be taken in an attempt to restore his 
precedence.402 The system was staunchly defended, as a means to produce general officers 
by fifty years of age, which was considered the best at which they could fulfil their duties. 
Without the use of the brevet, it was suggested that, 'twenty years hence [it] will leave the 
Army without general officers except those in their dota~e' .403 With the system in place 
promotion to Lieutenant Colonel could be expected to take sixteen years, and to Colonel 
another twelve. If the officer spent seven years as a Colonel, he would then attain General 
Officer Rank by the time he was fifty one, and still active. Without the brevet, the officer 
would be sixty one by the time he reached the same point of the rank structure, and could 
not expect to be Lieutenant General before he was seventy six.404 An officer would 
therefore hold two distinct ranks, his regimental and Army. In this way the promotion 
bottle-neck of the Ordnance was avoided. Within the Ordnance promotion was purely by 
means of seniority, and as a result was very slow. Since there was no retirement age for 
officers, old men clung to their commissions, quite often to their deaths. Despite all 
commissioned ranks possessing a real knowledge of their profession, having graduated 
from the Royal Academy at Woolwich, it was necessary to give junior officers high 
command, above their substantially older superiors, who were unfit for foreign service.405 
Alexander Dickson, who had been a valued commander as a Lieutenant in the Peninsula, 
was still only a Lieutenant-Colonel when he commanded the whole British artillery at 
Waterloo.406 
A significant trend among military officers was a greater emphasis that was placed 
on the service given to the nation. Colley points to the public interest in dead military 
heroes, and specifically their deaths, as evidence of the movement towards this loyalty and 
patriotism.407 It can be observed throughout the body of officers. John Moore's patriotic 
last words, 'I hope the people of England will be satisfied. I hope my country will do me 
justice', were well publicised at the time.408 However, this cult of heroism had effects at the 
402 C d B tw the Honourable Colonel Cochrane Johnstone, and the Departments of the 
orrespon ence e een . b J 803 A 
C d · Ch · .r d th J dge Advocate general during the perIOd, from Septem er, ,to ugust, omman er In le), an e u ' 
J 804 (London, 1805) 7-8. . th 10 
403 PRO WO 3/595/365-8, Torrens to Lieut. Col. Taylor, 20 January 18 . 
404lbid 
405 R. Glover Peninsula Preparation, 143. . . 
406 . ' . kson Manuscri ts: Being diaries, letters, maps, account books, WIth varIOus 
J.H. Leshe (ed.), The Dlc . P cl Dickson G C.B, K.c.H., K. TS., Royal Artillery 
other papers of the late Major-General SIT Alexan er " 
(Woolwich, 1908) I, 32, and IV, 51. 
407 Colley, Britons, 180. 
408lbid 182. 
lowest officer ranks, with an expectation ofpatn· t· d Ifl . . o Ism an se ess courage WIth which 
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subalterns met their fate. The Aberdeen Journal reported the death in action of Captain 
J.U.M. Leith of the 68 th Regiment in 1814 The tenns . hi h th . d· . 
, . ill W C e ill Ictment IS related 
bear witness to the preoccupation with heroism. 
he received the :atal ~hot , ... allowing him only time to say to Lieutenant Stapleton, 
~ho was followmg .him: Lea~ on Slapleton, 1 am no more, " and who in emulating 
~s nOb.le example, IS but too hkely to share his fate, having received a wound 
unmedlatelyafter.409 
This public interest in military heroes can also be observed in monuments and art,410 and 
was responsible for helping to raise the profile of Army officers, seeing them feature as 
men of high social standing in popular fiction.411 
The disparate factors affecting the body of officers were brought together in the 
form of greater control of the whole military. In Chapter 1, it was observed that through the 
greater use of inspection and return, the individual character of units were made unifonn, 
under the Duke of York's 'System'. Officers particularly were affected by this process, for 
the first time being placed under strict a regime of discipline, which insisted they wear the 
regulation unifonn,412 perfonn the regulation drills,413 and remain with their regiment 
unless granted pennission to take leave. In addition they were subject to the confidential 
reporting system, which ensured that Horse Guards were aware of the qualities and failings 
of all officers in the whole Army, on which infonnation they could act to improve the 
service.414 While it appears that every attempt was made to accommodate even those 
officers not making the grade, through this facility, more than any other, those in authority 
could control the body of officers of the Army to a greater extent than ever before. 
409 Aberdeen Journal, 30th March 1814, I. I would like to thank Steven Shannon of the Durham Light 
Infantry Museum, for supplying me with this reference. 
410 WO 6/51/298-301 Bathurst to Marquis Wellington, 17th July 1813; WO 6/51/301-3 
' Regulations by which the motions for erecting monuments to offi~ers who may fall in actions with the 
enemy are limited' ; Alison Willow Yarrington, 'The CommemoratIOn of~e her~, 18?0-1864: mo?uments to 
British Victories of the Napoleonic Wars,' 2 vols. Unpublished p~ Thesl~, (U~IV~rslty ofCam~~dge, 1980) 
passim.; Linda Colley, ' Whose Nation? Class and National ConscIOusness ID BntaID 1750-1830 , ID Past and 
Present, 113 (1986) 105-6; Colley, Britons , 178-182. . .. 
411 In both Pride and Prejudice and Emma, Jane Austin portra~s ~y Colonels ~ hIghly eligIble men. The 
d ·tli be th I and ml·ll·u·a I'S also averted to WIth Wlckharn, a dubIOUS character from the I erence tween e regu ar ' 
militia, being bought into the regulars to calm him down. 
412 PRO WO 26/36/409-22, 'Report of the !oard of General Officers Relative to the Clothing, 
Appointments, &c. &c. of the Cavalry', 18 May 1796. 
413 See 5.2 Drill, 164-8. 
414 See 2.4 The Adjutant Generaland Quartermaster General 34-9. 
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The commissioned ranks changed drastically during the Wars. From a small and 
stagnant group of individual career soldiers in 1793, they became a much larger uniform 
body of professionals, within a career that was constantly moving, and in a force that was 
becoming increasingly a more accepted part of society. The authority over these men 
increased considerably as the Wars progressed, with the Commander in Chiefs Office 
imposing Army-wide regulations. However, the ultimate authority over the commissioned 
ranks always remained the civilian government, who were able to manipulate its 
constituency by raising new regiments, or augmenting existing units, thus perpetuating the 
purchase system. This was also done by controlling officers' pay, and so restricting access 
to the commissioned ranks to those of the prescribed social status, thus making 
professional standing a key element in attracting officers, rather than remuneration415. By 
the end of the Wars with France, the commissioned ranks of the British Army were more 
obviously an officer corps than ever before,416 but one under the direct control of the 
military hierarchy, who were in turn subordinate to the civilian authority of government. 
4.7 CONCLUSION 
The Wars with France were the pinnacle of the eighteenth century British military 
expression. Through various means the military forces raised became the largest ever 
fielded, and would be the largest for almost 100 years. This expansion was driven by 
successive governments, who kept control of the forces through the manipulation of the 
recruiting of all ranks, together with the hold on their finances, as established in Chapter 3. 
While traditional recruiting methods changed little, they were regulated for the first time, 
and innovative schemes were introduced, designed to recruit the type, as well as the 
number of men required. Although stopping short of direct conscription, which would not 
have been acceptable to society as a whole, government-led schemes resulted in the 
enlisting of substantial numbers of men. These particularly included considerable drafts 
from the militia, which were achieved despite local opposition to such central authority. 
415 . "P ,,, . all'sm ' a sociological analysis ( Berk1ey. California, 1977) as M. Sarfatti Larson, The Rise Oj rOJess/On . 
quoted in Corfield, Professions. 24-6, 36,193 . . . 
I P H tington The Soldier and the State: The Theory and politiCS of 416 This is a view supported by Samue . un • 
Civil Military Relations (Cambridge, Massachusetts. 1957) 19-20. 
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The establishing of the Anny as a career worth entering was a significant 
achievement of the war-time governments. The welfare of the troops became an issue, 
initiated by Windham's New Military Plan, and continued by subsequent ministers and the 
Commander in Chief. The conditions of service of all ranks were improved. Most 
significantly the wages of the men were increased, and their expenditure reduced. Through 
this the Army became one of the few professions in which the standard of living improved 
during the years of rampant inflation. A clear career structure was established, which 
recognised the increasing role of the non-commissioned ranks, and encouraged them to 
remain in the Army through increased wages and status. 
The commissioned ranks were also affected substantially. The constituency from 
which they were drawn was broadened, although the tempering effects of low wages were 
always present. The distinct elements of the purchase system, which ensured the type of 
officer recruited by the cost of the commission, was sustained throughout, being supported 
even by the Whigs as a means of maintaining the constitutional safeguards against the 
power of the crown. 
As the Army was incorporated into the state structure, and subordinated to civilian 
authority, as established in Part I, the necessary numerical expansion to prosecute the 
Wars, would no longer be seen as so threatening. A substantially increased Army was 
maintained at the end of the Wars, with little objection, and with an increased social 
standing and universal acceptance, due to the experience of the years of conflict. 
CHAPTERS TRAINING 
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5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 4, the methods by which men were recruited into the Army were 
examined. It was shown that as the Wars progressed, a greater emphasis was placed upon 
the terms of service of the soldiers, as efforts were made to gain enough recruits to compete 
against the might of France. As the Army expanded, control of the recruiting services was 
moved from an independent, centrally controlled department to the office of the Adjutant 
General, streamlining the system, and giving the management of the act of recruiting back 
directly to the Army hierarchy at Horse Guards. Under the direction of the Commander in 
Chief s office, and in particular the Duke of York, the officer corps emerged as a broader 
and more professional body, although its composition was always subject to the 
manipulation of government. This chapter will examine the training of the forces, and will 
question if the government control noted in the other chapters, is reflected in this area of 
the manpower of the Army, or whether the Commander in Chief maintained control of this 
vital part of Army organisation. 
5.2 DRILL 
The mode of warfare during the eighteenth century appears to the modem observer 
a cumbersome affair. In battle it involved the manoeuvring of long, rigid, opposing lines, 
in excess of 600 in frontage, apparently in a chess game which could include tens of 
thousands of men, and which would culminate in the line delivering a volley from as many 
of its muskets as could be brought to bear. Even for such numbers to travel short distances, 
an elaborate system of movement was required, and in all cases practised to the point of 
instinct. Without such systems of drill, an Army would be useless, a disorderly mass 
without the ability to function at all, as Glover suggests, 'the art of drill was the art of 
war.'l 
1 R. Glover, Preparation, 115. 
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Throughout the eighteenth century various systems of drill and manoeuvre 
prevailed, either published under the auspices of govemment,2 or privately developed and 
printed by individual officers.3 Such systems would prove more or less efficient for those 
individual units performing them, but would be chaotic when regiments were drawn 
together in manoeuvres, or, more importantly, battle. By the period under discussion, this 
deficiency was caused as much by the martial policy and recent history of Britain, as by the 
whim of the colonels. First, the dispersal of units on policing or garrison duties meant that 
it was only rarely that units were able to meet and train together.4 Secondly, the American 
war had been one which served to de-train units in the mode of European warfare, rather 
than giving them experience, through the necessity to perform irregular or light infantry 
tactics.5 These had in turn become popular among many in the Army due to their 
flamboyant nature,6 which had led to a backlash from the traditionalists among the military 
hierarchy. 7 
Even before the outbreak of war in 1793, there had been an awareness among those 
in the military, of the need for a uniform system for use throughout the Army. Discussions 
took place at the highest level, between the King, the Duke of York, the Marquis of 
Buckingham, Lieutenant-General the Earl Ross, General Lord Heathfield, Sir William 
Fawcett, and eventually Sir David Dundas, as early as 1787, concerning the perceived need 
for a new universal drill system8• Several systems were assessed, and the one eventually 
chosen was based upon Dundas' Principles of Military Movement. Although it was later 
criticised for its emphasis upon Prussian-like rigidity,9 it was the first universal system to 
be adopted by the British Army, and its practice imposed upon the regiments. 10 It is not 
2 J .F.C Fuller, British Light Infantry in the Eighteenth Century, (London, 1925? 191 , states th.at only three 
systems were in use during the eighteenth century. Houlding, Fitfor Service, lIsts twelve dunng the same 
period. 
3 See for example, A Plan of Discipline, Composedfor the use of the ~ilitia ofl~e County of Norfolk 
(London, 1759); David Dundas, Principles of Military Movements, Chiefly appbed to Infantry, (1788). 
4 David Dundas, Principles, 15 . 
5 Ibid. 13. 
6lbid. 14. 
7 HId· F · fi S . 240· The same criticism was levelled at those returning from the Prussian Anny. 
ou mg, It or ervlce, , 
Parret, Yorc/c, 68. . 
8 H ldi F · fi S . 244 Outlines the events leading up to the adoptIOn of the new system .. 
ou ng, It or ervlce, . . . 
9 C . .. f D d h from several later observers: H. Bunbury, Narratlve of some Passages In the 
ntJclsm 0 un as as come . . . 
G 
. h fi 1799 1810 (London 1854) 46· Fuller British Light Infantry, 189-195; Carol a 
reat war Wit France ram - , " ... . 
O
. (L d 1953) 74 More recent authors have been kmder ID their treatment of hiS 
man, Sir John Moore, on on,· . 
work: R. Glover, Preparation, 118-121; Houlding, Fitfor Service, 238-241,242-248. 
10 tAil C lonels Commanding Regiments, 27th December 1792; 21, Fawcett to 
PRO WO 3/11/19, Fawcett 0 0 
All Colonels Commanding Regiments, 28th December 1792. 
surprising that the new system w b d " 166 as ase upon Prussian pnnciples, since both Dundas and 
the Duke of York had first-hand experience ofP . '1' russlan ml ltary systems. I I The manual 
was published as Rules and Regulations for the Formations, Field-Exercise, and 
Movements, of His Majesty's Forces, in 1792. It had been practised by the Irish 
establishment since 1789,12 with favourable results 13 and thi b ' 1 'd d . , s 0 VIOUS Y at e Its 
imposition upon the Army as a whole. The complete manual is a substantial work, and in 
an effort to address this, and make it more accessible to more than scholars of drills and 
manoeuvre, several authors abridged it into more manageable pieces. 14 The most notable 
was the edition intended for NCOS,15 while most famous of these was the pocket-sized 
XVIII Manoeuvres, 16 which reduced everything into its eighteen simplest evolutions, for 
use by junior officers. 
There does not appear to have been any direct opposition at the time of introducing 
the regulations, the need for such a system being universally accepted. However, as late as 
1795 the Adjutant General was still reminding Colonels of the necessity of adhering to the 
new Rules and Regulations, 
for the essential purpose of promoting uniformity in the Discipline of the Troops, 
and in order that equal progress may be made, as much as possible, amongst them, 
towards the general Establishment of one, and the same system, throughout the 
whole. 17 
This pre-empted the inspection reports of the same year, which still refer to the use of old 
systems by certain regiments. IS This is not necessarily a sign of opposition to the Dundas 
system itself, perhaps having more to do with the lack of inspection and control over an 
II Alfred H. Bume, The Noble Duke of York: The Military Life of Frederick Duke o/York and Albany 
(London, 1949) 19; R. Glover, Preparation, 118. 
12 Rules and Regulations for the Field Exercise and Movement of the Army in Ireland (Dublin, 1789). 
13 PRO WO/35/16/62-5 Marquis of Buckingham to Earl of Ross, 14th October 1788. 
14 For example Robert Smirke, Review of a Battalion of Infantry, including the Eighteen Manoeuvres (1799); 
Sergeant Thomas Langley, The Eighteen Manoeuvres for His Majesty's Infantry (London, 1794); Major 
James Cunningham, The Tactic of the British Army Reduced to Detail; with reflectiOns on the Service and 
principles of war (London, 1812); James Palmer, Details of the Line Movements prescribed in Part of the 
Fourth of His Majesty 's Regulationsfor the British Army, exemplified in 85 manoeuvres with diagrams 
(London, 1812). 
15 Rules and Regulations for the Manual and Platoon Exercises, Formations, Field Exercise, and 
Movements, of His Majesty 's Forces. For the use of the Non-Commissioned Officers of the British Army 
(London, 1807). 16 Anon. General Dundas' xvm Manoeuvres (1798). Houlding attributes this work to Captain George 
Dominicus of the 2nd Royal East-Indian Volunteers. 
17 PRO WO 3/28/89-91, William Fawcett to General Officers, 16th May 1795. 
18 PRO WO 3/14/82-3 , William Fawcett to Major General Ainslie, 24th July 1795. 
Anny in full-scale expansion. Generally the response had been good, with the new work
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fulfilling its 'essential purpose' of 'promoting 'Unifonnity in the Discipline of the 
TroopS.'19 
The drill of the cavalry was an entirely different matter. Houlding states that from 
1788, those in authority had expended all their energies developing a system for the 
infantry,20 and so the cavalry was left to its own devices. Glover writes that in 1790 'the 
drill of the cavalry was in a hopeless state of chaos. '21 When war broke out, the observed 
deficiencies in the cavalry were such that a cobbled together set of regulations was 
issued,22 consisting of a set of manoeuvres developed by Dundas when serving in Silesia,23 
and in even greater Prussian rigidity. It included a set of standing orders for the 2nd 
Dragoons, recently compiled by Lord Pembroke.24 This was not unusual, a stop-gap 
system having been introduced for the infantry in 1786-7.25 What is most surprising is that 
a new system was still contemplated in the face of full-scale war. The matter was only fully 
addressed during the winter of 1795-96, when Dundas, under General William Pitt, 
perfected a system of cavalry drill and manoeuvres with several regiments, of both 
dragoons and light dragoons at Weymouth.26 These were published as Instructions and 
Regulationsfor the Formations and Movements of the Cavalry.27 With its adaptations by 
Le Marchant in 1796,28 and 179829 the cavalry had obtained a uniform manual on a par 
with that of the infantry. 
Clearly the introduction of uniform systems of drill and manoeuvre would benefit 
the military effectiveness of the Army, at a time of its great expansion. It would enable 
units to operate together, and officers (and in theory men)30 to transfer between regiments. 
191bid 
20 Houlding, Fitfor Service, 249. 
21 R. Glover, Preparation, 135 
22 By His Majesty's Command Rules and Regulations for the Cavalry (London, 1795). 
23 R. Glover, Preparation, 135. 
24 Houlding, Fitfor Service, 249. 
251bid 231. . 
26 PRO WO 3/15/114 Wi11iam Fawcett to MG D. Dundas, 21 st April 1796; WO 3/15/129-30, Clfcular Letter 
to Commanding offiders of 1 st 2nd 3rd dragoons, 1I th, 15th 16th Light Dragoons, 8th May 1796; WO 
3/15/146, W. Fawcett to Lt. Col. Carnegie, II th LG, 20th May 1796. 
271 . ndR I t · fior the r"ormations and Movements of the Cavalry (London, 1796). 
nstructlOns a egu a IOns r' . 
28 The Rules and Regulationsfor the Attainment and Practice of the Sword Exercls~ (London, 1796). 
29 . . ,'h S IP t o-'HisMalj·esty 'sRegulationsfortheFormatlOnsandMovementsof An Elucuiatlon OJ t e evera ar s ~ 
Cavalry (London, 1798). . . 
30 Without a system of general service such transfers would prove impossIble. 
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The enforcing of the system with both military and political will would also serve to 
establish a degree of central control as yet unknown and h' h b , , one w IC was to e seen 
through all areas of the Army during the war years. The achievement of Dundas cannot be 
over-estimated. His system was rigid enough to enable regiments to manoeuvre together, 
but, as will be shown, of sufficient flexibility to be adapted to suit prevailing 
circumstances. Testimony to this would be that the systems were to be the basis of those 
for over fifty years. Of particular note, is that for the first time manuals of drill and 
manoeuvre were published by authority for the use, not only by officers, but also by non-
commissioned ranks. This may suggest an increased level of literacy, or perhaps an 
acceptance that the functioning of the enlarging Army, was going to depend heavily upon 
the effectiveness of the non-commissioned ranks, as well as those with commissions. 
5.3 EXPERIENCE 
The 1792 Infantry Regulations and the 1796 Cavalry Regulations, once established, 
were further developed by those performing them, through the experience they gained 
during the conflict. Active service was the first method by which the Army developed its 
newly acquired systems, although many theatres of campaign would not permit their use in 
printed form. India and Egypt had expanses of land which enabled an opponent to outflank 
the British forces, formed three deep, and deficient in cavalry. The West Indies, (and 
southern Britain for that matter), had few areas on which a battalion could form line, or 
over which a battalion could move in good order. It has already been noted that the Dundas 
systems were criticised for their rigidity, however this section will show that one of their 
strengths was that they were flexible enough to permit adaption to suit prevailing 
circumstances. 
On more open ground, by forming the infantry two deep, the commanders extended 
their lines, without a reduction in fire power. In this way British regiments gained an 
effective overlap on French forces, in particular when the latter were in column. This 
enabled fire to be directed, often against three sides, and can be seen to have worked to 
great effect in numerous engagements.31 This reveals the flexibility of the Dundas system, 
31 Chandler, On the Napoleonic Wars, 130-40. 
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w c ena e so mtnnsIc a change without adversely affecting its operation. However, 
this deviation was only sanctioned officially where numbers were low,32 although it was 
uncommon for infantry to be able to use their third ranks effectively when firing. Unless 
continually 'locked up', the length of the rear rank's muskets did not clear the faces of the 
front rartk men.33 Such a departure from the norm had been performed in the American 
War ofIndependence, and had therefore been termed the ' colonial system. '34 It was the 
cause of critical comment by many inspecting generals, who resented the vociferous 
protestations of those who had served in America.35 Despite its perceived advantages by 
those in the forefront of the war, the forming of the line two deep was rejected by those 
producing drill systems until 1870.36 Despite new methods of firing in three ranks being 
developed and practised, they met with little success, especially on active service, when 
numbers were often low, and the men were laden with their full equipment.J7 
Contemporary illustrations only show examples of British regiments formed two deep on 
active service.38 
The problem of enclosed or rough terrain was to prove more difficult to solve 
within the available systems. It was addressed in the American War ofIndependence by the 
development of light infantry tactics. While Dundas included a section concerning light 
troops,39 it was very limited, covering only nine pages, and concerning only the operation 
of the light company of a regiment without reference to the massing of light troops 
preferred by those commanding them.40 When the light infantry of revolutionary France 
shocked Europe, the need for such an arm became pressing, and the development of it 
within the existing structure was attempted.41 As established previously, light infantry and 
Grenadier companies were brought together for training, but this could only be oflimited 
effect due to the dispersed nature of the Army. The development of light infantry will be 
discussed in the following section. 
32 PRO WO 3127/109, General Orders, 23rd April 1792. 
33 Rules and RegulatiOns (1807) 114, 9th article. 
34 Houlding, Fitfor Service, 237. 
35 Ibid., 240. 
36 Field Exercise and Evolutions of Infantry (London, 1870) 41. 
31 JM-CUL Moore to David Dundas, 4th April 1804. 
38 ' NAM 961 1167 Painting by Major St. Clair Battle of Fuentes d'Onoro, 5th May 1811. See for example, ., ' 
39 Rules an Regulations (1792) 273-82. . . 
40 
. fth S th of the Several Corps Composmg the Command of General SIT GRE-A 200 'Return 0 e treng . . , 
, , b k d B b dos on the Expedition against Martmlque, 1st February 1794 . Charles Grey K.B. Em ar e at ar a 
41 See Section 5.4, Light Infantry, 171. 
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ctlve servIce would also highlight the need for a physically fit Army, as a soldier 
would be expected to march everywhere with all he required upon his back, in all 
conditions. This will be considered further in 7.4 Marching Regiments. 
A further development in the training systems came with the recruitment of 
thousands of civilians into the military, in the form of Militia, Volunteers and Yeomanry. 
Many formal manuals for such formations were written in simpler terms,42 reflecting the 
nature of their military experience, and their expected roles. In addition their training 
would often be disjointed, with the possibility of forgetting it between training days, and so 
a simplified system would prove more memorable. To this end several of the abridged 
versions of both the 1792 and 1796 regulations were written by officers serving with non-
regular units.43 Thomas Langley the author of The Eighteen Manoeuvres for His Majesty's 
Infantry was a sergeant in the militia. Another consequence of the war upon drill, would be 
in the calibre of recruit. The continued militia drafts introduced more and better educated 
men into the Army.44 This would clearly have had an effect, but whether this was to the 
good or ill of the service is not discernible from the evidence available. Whether better 
educated men were more likely to question a system that demanded unquestioning 
obedience, is not clear. Frederick the Great had certainly believed this to be the case, 
stating, 'If my soldiers began to think, not one would remain in the ranks. '45 It is not clear 
if the 1807 manual, printed for use by NCOs was issued as a response to increased literacy 
within the armed forces, although there would be little point in its production if there was 
not an audience.46 In addition, greater emphasis continued to be placed on attracting high 
calibre NCOs, one criteria of which was always seen to be literacy. 
The length of the Wars would result in many more men, of all ranks, gaining 
experience in the systems of training. To these men the systems would be second nature, 
both on the parade square, and in the field. Twenty-three years of repetition of any system 
would surely foster efficiency. This would create an indigenous training cadre which would 
ease the task of instruction for the unit officers. They would also have learned the skills 
needed to survive in hostile environments, which only experience could give, and this 
42 S ti I I t ' fior the Llanual and Platoon Exercise/or the Volunteers a/this Country ee or examp e nstruc /Ons iVJ' 
(London, c.1803-1808). 
43 Langley, Eighteen Manoeuvres. 
44 Beckett, Amateur Military Tradition, 1\o-I!. 
45 As quoted in Houlding, Fit For Service, v. 
46 See Section 5.6, Education, 184-6. 
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expe Ise wo e passed on to the newer soldiers. These men would possess the wisdom 
that there was a reason for training, beyond the drill square in Britain - that of survival. 
Many of these lessons would become incorporated into the standing orders of units, 
ultimately becoming the practice for the Army as a whole.47 Experienced enlisted men 
were also of use in more formal training methods. After the Peninsular War of the 200 , 
infantry formations, all quartermasters, and ninety adjutants were from the ranks.48 
The ability of the Army to adapt its methods and focus of training is significant in 
that it reveals a flexibility not apparent on an initial view of Dundas' systems, and certainly 
not expected from a system criticised for being too Prussian. It also reveals that there was 
an element of flexibility in all areas of the Army, but that this was achieved by means of a 
centralised system, which accepted such flexibility, and adapted to the prevailing 
circumstances. This would be tested in the extreme with the development of light infantry. 
5.4 LIGHT INFANTRY 
At the outbreak of the war in 1793, the British Army had already re-established its 
light infantry arm. This was achieved by the reintroduction of the tenth, or light company 
of every infantry regiment, after the Nootka crisis in 1790.49 Their training was adequate, 
bearing in mind that the perception of the needs oflight troops was merely to screen the 
front of a battalion, and would only be seen as deficient after the French used large 
formations of light infantry to great effect. 
To what system the light companies of each regiment were trained, prior to 1792 is 
unclear. It is possible that enough of the senior officers had experience of Lord Howe's 
system as practised in America,5o and that may have been used. There appears to be only 
one work on the subject published in English at that time, Lieutenant Colonel A. Emerich's 
The Partisan in War,51 and continental sources are also limited.52 Even after the 
47 fi I L M hant Le lIarchant 44-6. The ' Standing Orders for the 2
nd 
Dragoons', were to See or examp e, e arc . , JYI. , . 
become, Rules and RegulatiOns ... Sword ExerCise (1797). 
48 Hargreaves, 'Promotion From the Ranks', 200. 
49 Pimlott, 'Administration of the British Army', 35:. ". , 
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SI . 1) A E . h The Partisan in War: Or The Use of a Corps of Light Troops to an Army Lieutenant Co one . menc . , 1, 
(London, 1789), 
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such training was given to the light companies, as during the fIrst campaign in the West 
Indies, Grey and Jervis brigaded all such troops together, and used them as three separate 
'light' battalions. 53 Since no official system was in existence, one must have been worked 
out on the ground, or have been in place prior to the campaign, that has not survived. 54 
Regardless of which system was used, there was clearly a need for greater numbers of light 
troops, and this had not been addressed by those developing Army composition or training. 
The training of light infantry during the period under discussion was a specialist 
skill. Contemporaries did not have the experience of the later light brigade (subsequently 
division), nor of modem scholars used to seeing soldiers operating independently. The first 
obstacle that needed to be overcome was that of the perception of the establishment, who 
had to be convinced of the efficacy of such a regime, and prised away from their Prussian 
rigidity. To them the idea oflight infantry was of the irregular, epitomised by the Army 
that had returned defeated from America, and in direct contrast to the strict linear European 
formations. Such ideas were soon to be overturned by the experience of the French light 
infantry against the major continental armies. The need was clearly appreciated for greater 
numbers of British light troops,55 but as shown in Chapter 4, the size of the Army was 
small, and its role was such that it was either dispersed on policing duties, or abroad on 
campaign. As Glover points out, the opportunity by which light infantry experiments and 
training could take place came from an unusual source - the French.56 Their Army of 
England ensured that a large proportion of the British military would remain at home for 
several years, during which time their policing duties would be taken over by the militia, 
volunteers and Yeomanry, 57 and time would be available to develop all aspects of 
training,58 and in particular light infantry tactics, 'it being universally acknowledged, that 
52 Colonel von Ewald, Treatise on the Duties of Light Troops (London, 1803) German edition 1790. 
S3 GRE-A 200 'Return of Strength of the Several Corps Composing the Army Commanded by General Sir 
Charles G;ey, Embarked at Barbados on the Expedition against Martinique, 1st February 1794.' The light 
Infantry battalions consisted of the light companies of, I. 6~, 8th, 9th, 12th, 17th, 22nd, 23rd, 35th, and 70th 
regiments; 2. 15th, 31st, 33rd, 34th, 38th, 40th, and 41 st regunents; 3. 21st, 39th, 43rd, 56th, 58th, 60th, 
64th, and 65th regiments. . . . 
54 The light troops were involved in the heavy fighting during the capture of Martlmque, suggestmg that they 
were operating a battalions without difficulty. 
5S R C 11 ' C pon-1ence 11 331 Cornwallis to Arthur Wellesley, 23rd February 1798, 'The oss, ornwa IS orres u. . , , . ' . , 
system ofDavid Dundas and the total want oflight mfantry Sit heavy on my mmd. 
56 R. Glover, Preparation. 127. th 
57 PRO WO 11632/157.180, York to Windbam, 18 March 1806. 
58 R G1 B " t B 47 ' Peter Lloyd The French are Coming! The Invasion Scare of 1803·5 
. over, r/lam a ay, , , 
(Tunbridge Wells, 1991) passim. 
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S.C. Smith has suggested that this would have also been an excellent opportunity to 
train the amateur forces in the art oflight infantry warfare.60 He criticises Glover for 
suggesting that light troops would need a fIrm reserve on which to fall back, in the event of 
attack by cavalry.61 He states, ' It is difficult to believe that the local [militia] could not 
have dispensed with the pedantry of the eighteen manoeuvres and have substituted a 
simplified manual instead' and that the 'time needed to train a given number of recruits 
would have been lessened.' He sums up by suggesting that, 
the real objection was less tangible, since it pertained to the oligarchial perception 
of the lower orders' social role. Line infantry drill mirrored the class hierarchy of 
civil society, whereas the fluidity and individuality of Light Infantry training 
necessarily curbed the influence of officers.62 
The first point to make in criticism of this is that as stated above, the training of light 
infantry was a complex business, not something in which to enter lightly in the recruiting 
of masses of untrained men. Secondly, the essence of all light infantry tactics of the period 
was the reserve of fonned troops, usually at least equal in number to those skirmishing. 
Thirdly, to suggest that the light infantry manual was simplifIed, shows a lack of 
understanding of the complexity of light infantry training. The manual eventually adopted 
by the Anny states that a soldier must perfect the line infantry drills before progressing to 
the light infantry movements. 63 Fourthly, if such training was in addition to line drills, then 
the idea of it taking less time is flawed. In addition, it is notable that the French light 
infantry, that revealed the need for such troops, were in fact veteran soldiers, and not 
merely a lightly trained rabble.64 Finally, the idea that the development of light infantry 
somehow freed men from the yoke of a hierarchical class structure is again mistaken. The 
number of officers was increased in light infantry corps, and they remained of a different 
59 PRO WO 1/619/89, Harry Calvert to Lieutenant Colonel Calvert, 23rd March.1798; see also WO 3/19/4, 
Deputy Adjutant General to General sir Charles Grey, 6th Octob~r 1798; 82, AdJu~t General to General 
WilIiam Howe, 27th November 1798; 83, Adjutant General to LIeutenant Colonel Tlison, 27th November 
1798. 
60 Smith 'Loyalty and Opposition', 348. 
61 R. Glover, Britain at Bay, 234-5, 86-7. 
62 Smith, 'Loyalty and Opposition,' 348-50 ' " 
63 Regulations for the Exercise of Riflemen and Light Infantry; and InstructIOns for theIr Conduct In the 
Field (London, 1798). 
64 R. Glover, Preparation, 123 
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class. There is no evidence to suggest any greater proportion of men rising to 
commissioned status from the ranks of light corps. Indeed, in Chapter 4 it was shown that 
it was this type of unit that attracted a greater proportion of the nobility to its 
commissioned ranks. The troops were taught to think for themselves, but only within a 
further rigid structure, controlled by bugle rather than voice in the field, but nevertheless, 
still controlled. While the argument of this section is that light infantry gave a greater 
degree of flexibility in training, the contention is that such flexibility was in the hands of 
the officers, and not the men. The class structure of light regiments was progressive, but no 
more so than the more forward thinking line regiments.65 
The process by which the British established a light infantry training camp at 
Shorncliffe is one that has been covered by both Fuller66, and more recently Gates.67 Both 
see the work as being the responsibility of several key men.68 While David Gates sees the 
hand of Sir John Moore in the work, Glover, of course, would have us believe that the 
whole project was directed by the Duke ofYork.69 Clearly in his role as commander in 
chief, York would have been pivotal in sanctioning the establishment of the light infantry 
training. From 1797, he can be observed playing a major role in introducing the principles 
of light infantry to the Army as a whole, sending out copies of Dundas' light infantry 
exercise to commanding generals, encouraging them to pay special attention to the training 
of their light troops, and promising more of the same.7° However, it had taken five years of 
war for him to realise this, during which time, according to Gates, Britain had grown to 
rely upon foreign corps to fulfil the role oflight infantry.71 While it is clear that York' s 
influence was essential to the formation of the Shomcliffe experiment, from only recently 
available evidence, it is clear that Moore was even more responsible than has previously 
been suggested, being involved from an early stage in the minutiae of detail required for 
65 See for example, Standing Orders of the 7th (Royal) Fusiliers (J 812) Officers would be expected to serve 
in the line till they learned their trade, as observed within the light infantry; Buckley, Captain Thomas Henry 
Browne. passim. 
66 Fuller, Sir John Moore 's System of Training, 36-41. 
67 David Gates, The British Light Infantry Arm c.1790-1815; its creation, training and operational role 
(London, 1987) 89, 106. 
68 Sir John Moore, Robert Craufurd, Neil Campbell, Kenneth Mackenzie, William Stewart, Coote 
Manningham, and Baron Francis de Rottenburg. , . 
69 R Gl P aratl'on 127 'No clearer evidence of the soundness of York sJudgement of men could be 
. over, rep " 
asked than his selection of Moore for this task. ' 
70 PRO WO/3/31, Commander in Chief to all Officers Commanding Districts at Home and Stations Abroad, 
and also Regimental Agents, 17th March 1797. 
71 Gates, British Light Infantry Arm, 70. 
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to rely upon the assistance of foreigners such as General Jarry during the early stages of 
development,73 and this continued during the second phase of light infantry development in 
1808-9, when Baron de Rottenburg was responsible for training.74 
When a system for the whole British Army was adopted in 1798, it had merely a 
translation of a German work on the subj ect by de Rottenburg. 75 Despite the developments 
at Shomcliffe, the subsequent official publications on the subject were reprints of the 
original work,76 and much, including the bugle calls, were taken and used without 
alteration.77 There were of course privately published treatises throughout the period by 
officers trained at Shomcliffe, relating their views on the instruction oflight infantry.78 But 
it was not until 1823, that the system developed under Moore was published.79 This was a 
retrospect by Captain Cross, of the 52nd Regiment of Light Infantry. It was indeed a 
different system to that of Dundas, and certainly not merely a re-working of de Rottenburg. 
Even the manual exercise is transformed, disposing completely of aspects of line infantry 
drill, as being either impractical, or not efficient for the performance of the role of the light 
infantry,80 although essentially still fmding its basis in the movements ofDundas. The fact 
that this system was not published at the height of its use is not unusual, and the reason is 
the essence of the system of light infantry training, as developed at Shomcliffe, and later 
Braboume Lees. The importance of such a training system lay in its flexibility, in a world 
of rigid linear structures. To write it down would have been to suggest that something 
which needed to be constantly reactive, was in some way complete. 
72 JM-CUL, passim. 
73 PRO WO 3/35/276-7, Calvert to Colonel Manningharn, 3rd December 1802. 
74 Green, Vicissitudes, 22. 
75 RegulatiOns for the Exercise of Riflemen and Light Infantry (1798). 
76 Regulations for the Exercise of Riflemen and Light Infantry; and Ins.tructions for their Conduc:t in the . 
Field (London, 1803); Regulations for the Exercise of Riflemen and LIght Infantry; and InstructIOns for their 
Conduct in the Field (London, 1808). 
77 JM-CUL Moore to Calvert, 22nd January 1804. 
78 Cooper, ~ Practical Guide for the Light Infantry Officer.; Nei1 Carnpbe~l, Instructions for Light Injant'Y. 
and Riflemen: founded upon the Regulations for the ExerCIse of infantry In Close Order, and the RegulatIOns 
for the Exercise of Riflemen and Light infantry (London, 1813). . , . . 
79 Captain John Cross, A System of Drill and Manoeuvres, as pracllsed In the 52nd LIght infantry RegIment 
(London, 1823). . . . . 
80 For example, the musket position of 'Support Arms' is removed, and the frrmg POSItIon and procedure, IS 
changed completely. 
Officers of all light infantry corps were expected to keep a pocket book, and it is 1~6 
surviving examples of these that the development of the British light infantry system can 
be seen. 81 References to 'instead of the method directed by Dundas' appear in what seems 
to be a well-rehearsed training regime, as per Cross, alongside practical observations on the 
performance of the men in training, and in the field. In a similar way, the training regimes 
of Le Marchant in the light cavalry, must have remained in manuscript form, until directed 
to be developed at the Weymouth camp in 1795, for publication the following year.82 
Based upon this evidence it is possible to infer that much of the training given during the 
period was open to a certain degree of interpretation by those performing it, which suggests 
that in the Dundas' systems Britain had achieved a far more flexible regime than critics 
usually credit. 
This section has covered all British light infantry, including the rifle-armed troops, 
the 5th Battalion, 60th (Rifle) Regiment, and the three battalions of the 95th (Rifle) 
Regiment. While both light infantry and rifle units received the same training, in drill and 
manoeuvre, from an early stage in their development there had been an attempt on the part 
of the 95th 'to form something different from the rest of the Army' .83 However this desire 
had led to delays in achieving results, as it had been attempted, 
without having sufficiently considered, or seriously determined in what the 
difference was going to consist, [which] has prevented the regiment from being 
fonned upon anyone system. The internal changes which have been made, have 
occasioned inaccuracy in style, and uncertainty in movement.84 
Most importantly, the arming of the rifle regiments with a superior weapon, enabled them 
to operate at a greater distance from the enemy, and with a greater degree of accuracy, 
allowing them to develop a more flexible role.8s Although neither de Rottenburg, nor any 
of the other systems in print at the time,86 make any differentiation in role or training 
81 Examples of these note books can be found in, NAM 6807/161, (I am g~ateful to Ro~ert Yuill for pointing 
me in the direction of this reference); and the Block House Museum, Wellmgton, OntariO, Canada, (1 am 
grateful to Paul Fortier for pointing out this example). The first page of this book is headed, 'Peculiarities in 
the drill of the 52d Regt Lt Infantry as ordered by Sir John Moore.' 
82 Le Marchant Le Marchant, 43-7. 
, th 
83 JM-CUL, Moore to Dundas, 30 December 1803. 
84 [bid 
8S See for example, Captain Sir John Kincaid, Adventures in the Rifle Brig~de, and ran~om Shots from a 
Rifleman (London, 1909); Christopher Hibbert (ed.) The recollectIOns of Rifleman Hams (London, 1970). 
86 For example, General Jarry, Instructions Concerning the Duties of Light Infantry in the Field. (1803); 
Colonel Von Ehwald, A Treatise on the Duties of Light Troops, (1804). 
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een 19 t 1 antry and nfle armed troops, it was this flexibility that was to prove the 
essence of the difference between rifles and the other units of th Arm e y. 
The weapon in use by the other light infantry units at their conception was the 
standard infantry musket. However, its adaption to a weapon suitable for the purpose 
intended was completed in 1804, after trials with the 52nd under Moore. 87 The specification 
made it clear that it needed to be different from the line infantry weapon, 
The Barrel shall be browned, a grooved sight shall be fixed at the breech end of the 
barrel, and a canvass cover, similar to that used by the Austrian Troops, shall be 
provided for the purpose of covering and protecting the Butt and the Lock of each 
Piece.88 
Despite their weight, which was fourteen ounces heavier than the standard weapon, they 
were found to be suitable to the purpose intended.89 They were capable of normal infantry 
drill and firing, but they with the addition of the sights they could be aimed at targets with 
reasonable accuracy. To this end the regiments receiving them were issued with powder 
horns and a new pattern of pouch, to permit both loose and cartridge loading.90 There was 
also a greater emphasis placed upon the aiming of the piece, with shooting practice at 
targets performed as often as possible, despite the extra cost to the public of £ 140 per 
year.91 This was to be extended to battlefield tactics, as light regiments were not usually 
required to give volley fire, instead each man would level upon an individual target, and 
fire in his own time.92 This was the greatest deviation from the system of fire used by the 
rest of the Army, but one which in theory at least, would prove of great effect. 
In movement, the line infantry continued to use the Dundas system throughout the 
period under discussion. However, from 1803, the units at Shorncliffe experimented with a 
new style of marching.93 This was to become the standard mode for all light infantry and 
rifle units, although again the system from which it derives was not published until 1823.94 
87 IM-CUL, Moore to Calvert, 30th January 1804. 
88 PRO WO 3/152/56, Calvert to RH Crewe, 27th July 1803. 
89 JM-CUL Moore to Calvert, 22nd January 1804. 
90 JM-CUL' Moore to Garde of Piccadilly, 11th December 1803; Moore to CaIvert, 22
nd 
June 1804; Moore to 
Calvert, 16';' July 1804; WO 3/152/322, Calvert to Francis Moore, 23rd June 1804. 
91 JM-CUL, Moore to Calvert, 22nd January 1804. 
92 Cross, A System 0/ Drill and Manoeuvres, 68. 
93 Fuller, Sir John Moore 's System o/Training, 99-100. 
94 Cross, A System 0/ Drill and Manoeuvres, ii. 
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the body, thus the manual states that, 'stiffness in the knees, pointing of toes, stamping 
against the ground, flourishing with the feet, and all constrained positions are highly 
improper' ,95 referring to the perceived rigidity of the previous system. The notes of an 
officer of the 52nd Regiment, suggest why the changes were made, 
All flourishing of the feet and extreme distress of the knees are expressly prohibited 
as tending to render the body unsteady. Perhaps one or two handsome active men of 
a Company might be brought to practice this Parade sort of Marching, with 
tolerable ease and steadiness, but as this would only render the awkwardness of the 
other men more glaring, and sacrifice the steadiness of numbers to the gracefulness 
of a few, it is better to practice them in an easy and steady, though perhaps not 
elegant, mode of marching. The feet should be brought down without any exertion, 
or straining on knocking against the ground, which may tend to shake the body.96 
This method of marching was initially mimicked by,97 and was eventually to replace that 
performed, by the rest of the Army, clearly being of more use when marching greater 
distances, and over rough terrain. It has continued in use, with only minor modifications, 
until the present day. 
Apart from the differences outlined above, there were other differences which set 
apart the light troops from the line. First, finances were allocated for the training of light 
units, above the level of others.98 Secondly, live firing at specially developed targets 
became the norm, although Moore needed all his powers of persuasion to convince Horse 
Guards, and the War Office that such expenditure was necessary.99 Thirdly, an esprit du 
corps was evolved, which is clear from the many accounts left by the men serving in all 
ranks of the light regiments. 100 Fourthly, attention was paid to physical fitness beyond that 
described above, with football, running and even dancing forming part of the training 
regime.lol Finally, discipline was imposed less through the lash than through a respect for 
all ranks, a system which extended into the rest of the Army through imitation and popular 
95 Ibid 8. 
96 'Peculiarities in the Drill of the 52nd" 2. 
97 Booth, Charles Booth to Henry Booth, 26th July 1807. 
98 David Gates The British Light Infantry Arm, 146-8; 
99 IM-CUL, M~ore to Harry Calvert, 22nd January 1804; Moore to Secre~ at War, 30th June 1804; Moore 
to Secretary at War, 13 th July 1804; PRO WO 3/1 52/319, Calvert to Francls Moore, 21 st June 1804; 
Regulationsfor the Exercise afRiflemen and Light Infantry (1808) 12. 
100 JM-CUL Moore to Dundas, 30th December 1803; Booth, WiIliam Booth to Thomas Booth, 18th 
November 1806; Fuller, Sir Jahn Moore 's System afTraining, 150-3. 
101 Fuller Sir John Moare 's System of Training, 98-100. , 
d d 102 Th 179 eman . ese elements were more in keeping with modern Anny training than that of 
the early nineteenth century. 
Even in the perfonnance of the ordinary and mundane, the units trained at 
Shorncliffe and later Brabourne Lees had a flexibility and swiftness, which made them 
stand out from those brought up on the traditions of rigid lines and deliberate movements. 
Other units emulated the timing of the anns drill and marching, I 03 while in battle even 
greater differences can be observed. Private Green of the 68th Regiment of Light Infantry, 
writes that during the assault on Flushing in 1809 the 3rd Battalion of the 1 S\ 5th , and 35th 
Regiments of Foot received heavy casualties from an artillery barrage, while marching 
along a road with the 68th• The latter being light infantry were able to take cover, and thus 
escape injury, a sensible precaution, but not one included in the training of the majority of 
infantry. 104 It is also of note that such a drift to the flexible light infantry style had been 
observed during the American War ofIndependence, and as with that conflict, the 
developments made in the field of light infantry during the period in question were to count 
for very little in the Anny of the long peace. Regiments who were in the forefront of light 
infantry training during the early part of the century, would 'run to fat' on garrison duty,105 
and at the threat of war forty years later, the need for light troops, and a suitable system of 
training would still be apparent. 106 
5.5 PROGRESS 
Traditionally the training of the rank and file of both horse and foot was broken 
down into two phases. The first introduced the recruit to the rudiments of the military, the 
method of marching, for both anns (and horsemanship for the cavalry), the arms drill and 
firing. Only when perfected in this, would he be pennitted to move to the next stage of 
training, learning to operate within the battalion. The Dundas systems kept faith with this 
102 /b 'd 123' J K. Dinwiddy 'The Early Nineteenth Century Campaign against Flogging in the Anny', in 
E 1·'h·H' . ' : I R . vo' I XCVII (1982) 308-3 t· J R. Dinwiddy, Radicalism & Reform in Britain, /780 ng IS Istonca evlew, . , . 
- 1850 (London, 1992) 125, 127-32. . ., . 
103 B th Ch I B th to Henry Booth, 26th July 1807. 'All the ReglIJlents m Slclly are taught to go 
00, ar es 00 . " . . [43 rd] . . I ' through their file manoeuvres in double quick tlIJle and lIJlltate thIS regIment m every partlCU ar. 
104 Green, Vicissitudes, 31. 
105 Ward, Faithful, 145. ., 
106 Lieutenant Colonel Charles Leslie, A Treatise on the Employment of LIght Troops on Actual ServIce 
(London, t 843) passim. 
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established method of instruction, as indeed has every other manual since. However, 
beyond this the regulations of 1792 set a precedent by giving instruction in brigade and 
divisional training. Had war not followed closely upon their issue, such an inclusion might 
have been wasted, as the role of the peace-time Army scarcely permitted anything beyond 
battalion drill. Regiments rarely met for training due to the small scale of the peace-time 
Army, their policing duties, and public opinion against large encampments and 
manoeuvres. 
Once versed in all aspects of training, the recruit, along with the other soldiers of 
the battalion, would be practised, as often as the above constraints permitted, developing 
the unquestioning obedience necessary to function within the mode of linear warfare. 
Houlding suggests that during peacetime, such practice, towards a regular inspection, was 
so emphasised within the battalion, that the soldier rarely mastered anything more than the 
rudiments. I 07 This was obviously not the case from 1793, when all troops were trained with 
the expectation that every battalion would sooner or later be involved in active service. 
Greater troop assemblies were possible in Britain,108 as numbers increased along with the 
demands of the Wars. The consent of the populace was also forthcoming, as the acceptance 
and status of the Army improved. As the policing duties of regular units were taken over 
by the militia, yeomanry and eventually the Local Militia, regular forces were freed to 
perfect their active service roles. 
At the outbreak of war the satirists made much play of certain commissioned 
'gentlemen' who needed a crib sheet or an experienced sergeant, in order to perfonn the 
drills,109 and few doubt that in this there was at least a basis of truth. 110 That is not to say 
that all officers were in this mould. It was shown in Chapter 4 that by the time of this 
study, many within the commissioned ranks were career soldiers, in an Army increasing in 
popularity and social status. From this body would come the nucleus of the expanded war-
time officer cadre. This core would have, for the first time, a universal system of training in 
the regulations for infantry and cavalry, which would enable them to move between 
regiments with greater ease, and which would instruct them at every stage of their career in 
the handling of their men. 
107 Houlding, Fit for Service, ) 62-5. 
108 See for example, Green, Vicissitudes, 24. 
109 The Military Adventures of Johnny Newcombe by An Officer(London, ) 8) 6). 
110 R. Glover, Preparation, 117. 
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Entry into the Ordnance as an officer, had long been via a training course at the 
Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, I11 and their promotion had depended upon seniority. 
However, the Anny only introduced a similar training regime in 1798, with the 
establishment of the Royal Military College at Great Marlow, and subsequently High 
Wycombe. 112 The college curriculum was broad, including mathematics, French, 
drawing, 113 and incorporated the works of, and lectures by leading names in military 
science. I 14 The establishment of such an officer training centre was a further attempt to 
centralise control of the military, and indeed an officer passing out from the college would 
have been moulded to a certain form, which would have influenced his fellow officers. 
However, the effect of the Royal Military College on the commissioned ranks, during the 
period under discussion was minimal. Not only were places lirnited,ll5 but demand was 
questionable, since the war-time call for officers was such that commissions were relatively 
easy to obtain, and a gentleman's time could have been better spent obtaining 'practical ' 
experience with a battalion, than in academic studies. This is in stark contrast to the French 
officer cadre who often clubbed together to pay for lessons for each other, as their 
promotion under Napoleon frequently depended upon a better education. I 16 It is estimated 
that between twenty and forty percent of graduates from High Wycombe entered the Anny 
as members of the Adjutant General ' s or Quarter Master General's departments.ll7 
The uniformity of the training given to regiments would enable officers and men to 
be transferred, either individually or wholesale, between units, without the problems of 
different systems. However, such transfers were only practical within the commissioned 
ranks as most soldiers enlisted in one regiment and not for general service. Although 
I11 From 1788 entry into the Ordnance had only been possible foIlow~~ the successful compl~tion of a 
public examination at Woolwich. W.D. Jones, Records of the Royal MilItary Academy ~oolwlch: 1851) 68. 
112 PRO WO 40/10/A Barrack Office to Matthew Lewis, 11th December 1798; Brownngg to Major General 
De Lancy, 8th December 1798; General Order, 12th December 1798. Initia~ly the College was at Great 
Marlow, with a junior department established at H~h Wycombe the followmg year. 
113 PRO WO 3/19/418, Calvert to Charles Long, 5 January 1799. 
114 Offi the staff of the coIlege included General Francis Jarry and Major General Le Marchant. PRO 
Icers on tb 1 1 C I M' G I D WO 3/19/1 06A, Fawcett to General Jarry, 12 December 1798; WO 3 19 332, a vert to aJor enera e 
Lancy, 25 th April 1799. . 
115 Initially the students of the college were formed into one company one hundred strong. In 1808 thiS was 
increased to four companies. 
116 Bertraud, 'Napoleon's Officers', 94. , . 
117 Mark Romans, ' Eyes in the Hills: Intelligence and the Events at Alcantara , m C.M. Woolgar (ed.) 
Wellington Studies I (Southampton, 1996) 166. 
Houlding doubts whether this 'Anny-wide unifonnity' would be effective, liS it is clear 182 
from the substantial drafts from the militia during the period, that a certain level of actual 
standardisation had been achieved by the time of this study, and certainly by its close. 
Obviously there would be differences in the standards of training achieved, which were 
highlighted by regular inspections as previously shown. This system would also serve in 
time to address such a problem by creating a uniform standard expected by inspecting 
generals. 
The basic drill and manoeuvres were only parts of the training regime. When 
soldiers were trained to use their fIrearms, they did so initially without powder, and only 
once perfected through repetition, with blank rounds. The expenditure of powder allocated 
for each man from 1786 was the equivalent of between sixty and one hundred rounds, I 19 
which was pegged at sixty blank and twenty four live annually in 1799.120 In 1805, this 
was more than doubled, permitting the issue of sixty blank and thirty live rounds every six 
months. 121 Houlding suggests the allocations were sufficient, but such a quantity was only 
equivalent to two full infantry cartridge boxes annually. This meant that the fIrst time a 
soldier would fIre a substantial amount of powder, would be in a battle. The increase could 
have been an acknowledgement of the effectiveness achieved by aimed fIre within the light 
infantry corps. However, even this reform was tempered by the emphasis still placed on 
volley fIre, such that soldiers might experience the sensation of live fIring, but never be 
able to assess the effect. Throughout the period, target shooting was only directed for light 
troops. 
The use of close contact weapons, the sword and bayonet, was also of great 
consequence during the period under examination. Dr. Johnson wrote in 1773, ' It is absurd 
that our soldiers should have swords, and not be taught to use them. ' 122 Prior to 1796, no 
method for their use had been established. That year saw the culmination of the trials of 
Maj or Le Marchant of the 16th Light Dragoons, who developed a system of sword drill and 
fIghting technique in response to the poor performance of British cavalry in the campaigns 
in Flanders in 1793-4. During the engagements, not only were they invariably beaten by 
11 g Houlding, Fit for Service, 259n. 
119 Ibid. 143-5. 
120 GRE-A 2251156.7 General Order, 30th March 1799. 
121 PRO W~ 3/153/80~1 , Harry Calvert to Lieutenant Colonel Neville, BO, 27th April 1805. 
122 Quoted in R. Glover, Preparation, 139. 
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elf opponents, ut many of the wounds they sustained, were found to be self inflicted, 
due to poor swordsmanship. 123 His subsequent survey of all able sword fighters,124 led him 
to develop his system, which was put to the test at Weymouth in 1795. The system was 
published in 1796.125 The following year, after extensive tests and reports from those using 
the new system, together with Birmingham sword makers, Le Marchant was responsible 
for the adoption of new patterns of cavalry swords, developed specifically to be used 
within the new drill system.126 To ensure all units changed to the new weapons, the Board 
of Ordnance was instructed to issue new pattern swords on a new for old basis. 127 
Training in the use of the bayonet had also been neglected. It was not until 1804 
that Captain Anthony Gordon conducted experiments into its use,128 publishing his 
findings the following year. 129 This work was extended in experiments during 1815,l30 
which continued with various corps for over three years. l3l It seems inconceivable that an 
Army for which so much effort had been directed towards the development of drill 
systems, could have laboured for so long without equivalent systems for the use of their 
weapons in hand to hand fighting. Glover suggests that this is because all efforts were 
exerted towards the fIring of volleys, which broke the enemy, and consequently 'hand to 
hand fighting with the bayonet was rare.' 132 This seems to be correct, for as noted above, 
even when the issue of ammunition to troops was increased, it was expended in the practise 
of volley fire. In the development of both the sword and bayonet systems relatively junior 
officers were instrumental. This would tend to suggest that either those in authority were 
flexible enough to appreciate the work of enterprising officers of whatever rank, or that 
they were so out oftouch that it took a junior officer to realise what was needed on the 
ground. Perhaps both could be true, in that it took the junior officers to point out the 
deficiency, but that the military system was flexible enough to adopt their fmdings. 
123 Le Marchant, Le Marchant, 44. 
124 R.H. Thoumine, SCientific Soldier: A Life of General Le Marchant. 1766-1812, (London, 1968) 59. 
125 Rules and RegulatiOns ... Sword Exercise (1796). 
126 Thoumine, Scientific Soldier, 38-45; Le Marchant, Le Marchant, 49-51. 
127 PRO WO 3/17/135-6, Horse Guards Circular to regiments of Heavy and Light Cavalry, 20th April 1797. 
128 PRO WO 31152/68, Calvert to Francis Moore, 31 st July 1804. 
129 Captain Anthony Gordon, Science of the Defence. for the Sword, Bayonet, and Pike, in Close Action 
(London, 1805). . . 
130 PRO WO 313701233 1. Gardiner, Assistant Adjutant General, to LIeutenant Adjutant Faden, Royal 
Marines, 12th June 1815; wo 3/3701244, 1. Gardiner Assistant Adjutant General to Officer Commanding the 
Brigade of Guards, 13th June 1815. 
131 PRO WO 3/68/7, CaIvert to Major General Browne, 17th March 1818. 
132 R. Glover, Preparation, 142. 
184 
5.6 EDUCA nON 
It is not possible to assess the level of literacy within the Anny during the period 
under discussion. Officers were expected to be able to read and write, and a greater 
emphasis was placed upon this as the period progressed, with ever more technical systems 
of drill, manoeuvre, and economy. Both Regulations and General Orders were issued to all 
commissioned ranks, and certainly in Wellington's Peninsular Anny they were expected to 
know the contents of these works. 133 Colley suggests a high level of literacy among the 
commissioned ranks as being indicative of the store by which the upper classes held such 
training by this time. 134 
This line of argument is perhaps too simplistic. By 1807 the Rules and Regulations 
had been published in an abridged for the use ofNCOs. Furthermore, it was recognised 
that literacy within the enlisted ranks was a means by which high calibre NCOs could be 
cultivated. 135 By 1811 the aim of educating boys within regiments was openly to create 
potential NCOs, the Circular establishing the recruiting of further boys to regiments 
pointing to 
the Expediency of establishing a Regimental School for the instruction of such of 
them as discover abilities, in the necessary qualifications of Reading and Writing, 
with a view to their becoming hereafter, useful and valuable Non Commissioned 
Officers. 136 
The Regimental Schools referred to were established in every regiment of the 
Army, during 1811, under the direction of the Duke of York. 137 They were to cater 'for 
young soldiers and the children of soldiers'. Each was to have an establishment of a 
sergeant schoolmaster, suitably qualified to teach reading and writing. Each school was to 
133 Petty, 'General Orders', 143. 
134 Colley, Britons, 167-70. 
I3S PRO WO 26/39/351-72, Royal Warrant, 26th April 1805. 
136 PRO WO 3/585/76, Horse Guards Circular, Calvert to Colonels Commanding Regiments, 17th June 
1811. 
137 PRO WO 4/4161231 Palmerston to George Harrison, 30th August 1811; WO 3/54/471, 'Instructions for 
the General Manageme~t of the Regimental Schools of the Anny.', 8th December 1811; WO 4/464/85, War 
Officer Circular No. 79, 27th December 1811; WO 412131289, Clrcular Letter, Palmerston to Colonels of all 
Regiments, 27th December 1811. 
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be given a room when in quarters, and an allowance of £I 0 per year for all expenses. 
Beyond their formation there is little evidence concerning such schools, and certainly 
nothing that would suggest if they were able to raise the level ofliteracy. Clode suggests 
that it was the influx of greater numbers of Scottish recruits that raised the level of literacy 
generally, as they had a better system of elementary education than either England or 
Ireland, and that these men increasingly became NCOS.138 While it is surely not possible to 
discover either a level, or a cause for that level of literacy, all the evidence available 
confIrms that more and more NCOs could read and write, and that this became a criteria for 
promotion to that rank. 
Another area of Army involvement in the basic education of soldiers' children had 
been in place since 1801. The Asylum School, attached to the Royal Hospital in Chelsea,139 
was formed under the direction of the Duke of York, and designed to give elementary 
education to the orphans and children of non-commissioned officers and soldiers. It catered 
for no more than 1000 boys and girls at its conception,140 a figure which was raised to 1140 
in 1809. 141 The school was established along strict military lines, with scarlet uniforms, and 
drill parades for the pupils, who were divided into companies. 142 They were taken through 
their evolutions by the senior students who were given ranks, such as lance-corporals, 
corporals and colour corporals,143 which they were often permitted to keep upon enlisting 
in regular Army service. l44 Such an institution might appear to be an ideal training ground 
for Army recruits, instilling in them military discipline, together with an education. 
However, the evidence of the discharge of Asylum pupils, suggests that only one quarter of 
the boys leaving the school from 1805 to 1819, enlisted in the military,145 which appears to 
point to a failure in the system. However by the terms of its establishment, pupils who 
reached a suitable age to leave were to be, 
138 PRO WO 4/426/ 11 , Palmerston to Harrison, 3rd August 1812; Palme~ston to H~ison, 22nd August 
1812; This was certainly the case by 1840, when up to 16% of Scots servmg becommg NCOs. Strachan, 
Wellington Legacy, 51. . 
139 PRO WO 40/12/9, General De Lancy to Matthew Lewis, 27th May 1799; De Lancy to Matthew Lewls, 
lOth December 1799; WO 40/ 14/ 15 , Vansittart to Secretary at War, 14th September 1801. 
140 PRO WO 26/39/351-72, Royal Warrant, 26th April 1805. 
141 PRO WO 26/41174-5, Royal Warrant, 24th February 1809; WO 412071161 , Francis Moore to Lieutenant 
Lugand. Adjutant, Royal Military Asylum, 2nd March 1809. 
142 Clode Military Forces of the Crown, 11, 62-3. 
143 The u;e of a pseudo-rank structure was also to be found in Eton. CoIley, Britons, 169. 
144 G.C.T. Bartley, Schoolsfor the People (London, 1871) 237. 
145 Linn, ' Military Families' . 
d' d 186 
Ispose of, when ~e proper age, at the discretion of the Commissioners [of the 
Asylum] as Appre~tlces, or Servants, or, if Boys, to their being placed, with their 
own free consent, ill Our Regular Anny, as Private Soldiers. 146 
Another answer to this is suggested by a visitor to the school in 1819, who remarks that, 
'During the last Wars, the surprising activity of industry and commerce offered 
employment of the most advantageous description for the talents of every man who could 
merely read and write.' 147 He continues that many pupils would enter a civilian calling, 
'but the greater part of the boys prefer the profession of arms, and it is worthy of remark 
that even those who leave the school to enter an apprenticeship to some civil trade, usually 
finish by returning to military life.' 148 If this was the case, then the Asylum School would 
have played a small part in raising the level of literacy in the other ranks in the armed 
forces during the period. 
The emphasis placed upon the education of children within the Anny structure is 
significant for several reasons. First, it was developed at a time when a greater emphasis 
was being placed upon the education of all ranks, but particularly NCOs. Secondly, since 
the Army were finding it difficult to recruit suitable NCOs, it was sensible to consider their 
development within the Anny. Thirdly, this would also be in keeping with a suggestion by 
Colley, that education was used to 'mobilise' the children in Sunday schools, towards 
patriotism. 149 The indoctrination within the military education system was obvious, and not 
lost upon those involved in its instigation. Fourthly, the idea that welfare facilities could, 
and indeed should be provided by the Army took on greater significance in the light of the 
New Military Plan. Although the fonnation of the Asylum School predates this by six 
years, its provision was limited. The Regimental School system came as part of a host post-
Windham reforms mentioned above. It was introduced Army-wide, giving over one 
hundred children per regiment the opportunity to achieve a level of literacy sufficient to 
progress through the non-commissioned ranks, or become a more marketable commodity 
in the field of employment. However, there was never even an inference that these children 
could progress into the non-commissioned ranks. Such training was not developed until 
1847, under Lord Fitzclarence.150 
146 PRO WO 26/39/351-72, Royal Warrant, 26th April 1805. 
147 Clode, Military Forces of the Crown, I1 , 48. 
148 Ibid, 62. 
149 Colley, Britons, 226-7. 
150 Strachan, Wellington 's Legacy, 31. 
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5.7 CONCLUSION 
The most significant aspect of the development of the Army during the period under 
discussion, is the emphasis placed upon training. The Duke of Marlborough had taken 
months to assimilate his forces prior to the Blenheim campaign, and had stamped on them 
a typical Marlboroughian system of training. Wellington would not be permitted the 
extravagance of his own treatise on training. The troops were already proficient in the 
system developed by Sir David Dundas, and specialists in other areas were working on 
new manuals for the cavalry, light infantry, and weapons training. By the end of the period, 
the regular Army, and its non-regular components, would function as a uniformly trained 
body, with educational services preparing men and boys for positions as future officers and 
NCOs. The systems adopted would be the model of those used throughout the century. Of 
overriding significance is that the training of the Army was drawn increasingly under the 
control of Horse Guards, with the War Office taking little part, except to sanction finances. 
Despite the subordination of the Commander in Chief to the secretary at War in all other 
areas, in the training of the forces, the Army hierarchy were given free rein, and York's 
idea of a uniform, Army-wide system was able to take shape. 
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CHAPTER 6 SUPPLY 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Parts I and 11 the level of control of the army by the civilian administration was 
examined. Part III will extend this investigation to the area of logistics. It has been 
established that from 1783, the fmancing of the army was drawn ever-closer to the 
authority of government and away from the army hierarchy. This enabled the various 
ministries to control army policy, as regards both structure and composition, leaving the 
military to direct only areas of specific martial expertise. This part will therefore consider 
whether the same dominance of finances resulted in the central civilian control of the 
logistical system. It will concentrate on the supply of the army with food, clothing, and 
equipment, both at home and on foreign service, together with the means by which these 
items were transported to theatres of operation. It will not attempt to quantify the volume 
of stores produced, nor dwell upon the many relatively minor modifications to 
specifications. Instead it will focus on the areas of more substantial change, and those that 
materially affected either the army, the war, or wider historical issues. It will concentrate 
on the structure of the supply of the army, examining the supply system and the changes 
which affected it. 
The supply of the army was divided into two distinct areas, during the period under 
discussion. The first was the traditional sphere controlled by the colonel of each regiment, 
which survived only in matters concerning the supply of most military clothing, and at the 
beginning of the period in certain areas offood provision. These supplies were the 
responsibility of the colonels, through their Agents, at all stages from purchase to delivery. 
The second area was that covered by the increasingly pervading control of the civilian 
administration, which was responsible for all other supplies through the well established 
contract system. These items would be purchased and distributed through the Board of 
Ordnance during peace-time, and in conjunction with the Commissariat during a war. The 
wars with France were the largest and most expensive Britain had ever fought, and the 
system of supply was required to function in these exceptional circumstances. How this 
was achieved is the subject of this chapter. 
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6.2 COMMISSARIAT AND THE CONTRACT SYSTEM 
The preceding chapters have observed an increasing dominance of the civilian over 
the military administration of the army. They revealed how the Commander in Chief 
became subordinate to the civilian Secretary at War, nullifying all his independent 
authority outside the internal organisation of his force. This was particularly evident in 
areas of army finance, with all decisions concerning expenditure passing through the War 
Office, for sanction by the Secretary at War. As the supply of arms, clothing and 
equipment involved the spending of vast quantities of public funds, it should not be 
surprising that even before the period under discussion, constitutional safeguards existed 
which ensured that there was a check on this expenditure. In general, as a result of Burke' s 
Pay Office Act, the Secretary at War became the arbiter of all military finance, while in 
times of war a separate department, the Commissariat, was established under direct 
Treasury control. Therefore at all times, all expenditure on the supply of the army was 
processed through civilian departments, thus completing the picture of a constitutional 
army, dependent upon the civilian administration for everything except its internal 
organisation. 
That the supply structure of the army only included the Commissariat during times 
of war, would clearly create problems at the outbreak of hostilities, as has been observed 
with the office of the Commander in Chief. It would take time for its members to 
assimilate to the state of war, and the duties required of them. The wars with France proved 
to be no exception. In 1793, the provision of supplies was divided between several 
agencies. Regimental clothing was the responsibility of the colonel of the corps, and will 
be discussed later. In Britain, when the men were in barracks, their supplies of food, wood, 
straw, forage and all other equipment, was arranged by the Barrack Master General, or by 
the individual Barrack Masters. Only in camps were the troops supplied by the 
Commissary General, although his authority only extended to Britain.' When regiments 
were on foreign service, their food was supplied by the Commissioners for Victualling, 
while all other stores were provided by the Commissioners for Transports, co-ordinated on 
the ground by the local Commissary General, who was directly responsible to the 
I Jlth RCME (1812) 251. 
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Treasury.2 Every item, except clothing, was provided under contract, or special order from 
the Treasury, and included in the Extraordinary Account of the army.3 Clearly such a 
system, made up of so many elements, had the potential to break down under the pressure 
of the vast war-time requirements. 
In 1797, Commissaries were appointed to each military district in Britain. To that 
date the Commissary General on home service had no direct recourse to any public funds, 
with all transactions being conducted through bills drawn on the Bank of England. As such 
an arrangement would have proved impractical for District Commissaries, they were given 
recourse to cash, and the authority to arrange small local contracts by advertisement. 
Although overseen by the Comptrollers of Army Accounts, this arrangement was in 
contradiction of the policy to avoid the necessity for anyone to be a public accountant. In 
1798, on the recommendation of the Select Committee on Finance,4 this was addressed, 
and the Commissary General was given control over all the Commissaries in Britain, the 
superintendence of all supply departments, and of their accounts. He was also required to 
submit estimates for all expenditure to parliament, although it took until 1806 for all the 
changes to take effect.s However, it was not until 1809, sixteen years into the wars, that the 
whole Commissariat, at home and abroad, was brought under a similar control. 
The first campaigns in both the Low Countries and the West Indies brought major 
supply difficulties, and subsequent post-mortems regarding the Commissariat 
arrangements.6 Richard Glover highlights one response to the failure of the Commissariat 
in the Low Countries, by including Havilland le Mesurier's A System for the British 
Commissariat, 7 as an appendices of Peninsular Preparation. However, le Mesurier' s work 
by no means typifies the structure and organisation of the Commissariat service, or even 
anything that was achieved during the period under discussion. His short tenure as 
Commissary General in the Low Countries, was the only time during the wars that the 
Commissariat of the army on active service worked according to either his suggested 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
• Jfjh RSCF (1797) Appendix 82, 312-3. 
, uth RCME(1812)25J. . h 
6 See for example, I1h RSCF(1797)395; 1h RCME(18?9)p.asslm.; Ilt RCME(1812) 249. 
7 HavilIand le Mesurier, A System for the British Commlssarwt (London, 1796). 
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model,8 or even the less stringent instructions laid down by the Treasury.9 The 
Commissioners of Military Enquiry, who investigated the failings of the Commissariat in 
the West Indies, recommended the introduction of reforms that they believed would ensure 
f 'l-': • 10 an e llClent system. However, the West Indian Commissariat, as with those at other 
foreign stations, had worked effectively during all periods of peace, and therefore any 
reform proved to be merely cosmetic, working well at all times except during conflict. II 
All commissaries on foreign service reported directly and individually to the Lords 
Commissioners of the Treasury until 1809. 12 In that year, as stated above, the home and 
foreign Commissariats were brought under the control of a single Commissary in Chief, 
Lieutenant Colonel Gordon. 13 He had been the military secretary of the Duke of York since 
1795, and was therefore well aware of the intricacies of both the military and Commissariat 
services. His duties included the provision of bread and forage to troops in Barracks, 
Cantonments and Quarters; bread, wood, straw and forage to those in encampments; and 
all stores for the Barrack, Quarter Master General's, Inspector of Army Hospital's and 
Surgeon General's Departments. In addition he was to act as an exclusive channel of 
communication with commissaries abroad, and compile reports from information passed to 
him by his deputies, of the available resources of all the countries in which they operated. 14 
He was also responsible for the submission of monthly estimates and annual accounts to 
the Comptrollers of Army Accounts and the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, to 
whom he was directly responsible. 15 Therefore, from 1809, a single Commissariat system 
was in place, which, for the first time, had jurisdiction over the supply of all the British 
forces, at home and abroad. 
All supplies in Britain, except those costing less than five pounds, or those needed 
in an emergency, were obtained through contracts made in London, after a public 
8 Also, Havilland le Mesurier, The British Commissary (~o,ndon~ .180 I).. " 
9 RHK-M 3/B4/-, 'Instructions to Commissariat Officers ; AddItIOnal Instructions to Conumssanat 
Officers', no date. 
10 <lit RCME (1809) 301-47, 358-64. 
11 It/it RCME (I 812)302. 
:: ~:~~: ;~~: 278; He was responsible for all Commissariat arrangements except those in the East lndies and 
Ireland both of which had a separate department. I. Ibid.: 253. 
IS Ibid. 254. 
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advertisement, and allocation to the cheapest reputable bidder. 16 They were of varying 
composition, depending upon the items to be supplied. For example, contracts for bread, 
forage and oats were for six months duration and for the supply of individual counties, 
whereas those for coals, candles and straw, were allocated for twelve months across the 
whole Barrack Department. 17 Contractors were expected to give securities in case of 
default, but the Commissioners of Military Enquiry observed that this was very rare. ls 
Only in the supply of forage and provisions had any element of profiteering been noted. 
Prices for oats being fixed at a maximum of £ 1 ° per 37 pounds in weight, as certain 
persons had attempted to influence prices in order to make more money. 19 Similarly it was 
suggested that bread and forage prices had been affected by the manipulation of weights, 
particularly at times of high prices?O Prior to 1810, bread supply had been negotiated at 
regimental level, with contractors being paid by the paymasters of the corps. After 
recommendations by the Commissioners of Military Enquiry/I this was changed to a 
county contract,22 which enabled a more effective check to be made on the whole system 
by the War Office Accounts Department,23 thus linking the two areas of civilian army 
administration.24 However, it was not until 1812, that the Commissary in Chief was fmally 
given authority over the purchase of all 'bread, meat and forage', thus consolidating the 
army purchase power and enabling supply in bulk and subsequent discount to the public.25 
In this way the saving to the public on meat alone was £80,000 in the first year of 
operation.26 The Commissariat continued to work to these methods to the end of the war, 
but despite being required to ensure that both the home and foreign Commissariats were 
performing in the same way, it proved impossible for either Gordon, or Charles Herries 
• . 27 
who succeeded him, to achieve this on actIve servIce. 
16 Ibid.. 264; Appendix 1,310, Examination ofL.B. Morse; Appendix 12,339, Examination ofJoseph Stee1e. 
17 Ibid.. 264. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 265-6. 
20 Idll RCPE (1811) 1018. 
216'11 RCME (1808) 326. 
22 18'11 RCME (1812) 266. 
23 Id" RCPE(1811) 1018-20, 1022. 
24 CUL Percival 46 George III to Percival, 22nd February 1810. 4/442/7 11 
25 ' T 7th November 1811; -. 
PRO WO 4/440/347-9, Merry to orrens, . Ch ' f 27th May 1812' 323-8. Palmerston to 
26 PRO WO 4/442n-ll Palmerston to Commander ID le, . ' 
. . ' 1812' 366-8 Palmerston to Hamson, 30th September 1812. Commander ID Chief, 12th September , , 
27 18th RCME (1812)302. 
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Despite such apparent failure, during the course of the wars the Commissariat 
developed clear structures for its operation on active service collowm' th aI , 11 g e sever severe 
failures during the early campaigns. Upon his appointment, Gordon established a Board of 
Commissaries that formulated a new system for campaigns,28 but it was stressed that every 
operation was different and required a different approach. 
The mode of procuring the Provisions and Forage, the Labour, Conveyance, &c. 
required on Foreign Service, must necessarily vary with the circumstances of the 
Station and Country, and the nature of the Service in which the Troops are 
employed.29 
Brook Watson, the Commissary General in Flanders and Holland, used 'one great 
contractor', Mr. Eckhardt, to supply all his needs,3o while Mr. Crelinger supplied all items 
required by the army in Elbe during 1805_6.31 This was not the system preferred as a mode 
of supply by the Treasury, who complained vociferously at its continuance.32 Such a 
system was not practised in the Peninsula, whether as a result of the Treasury objections, or 
because it was impossible to implement in Portugal and Spain, where the scale of the 
conflict precluded single contract supply. The Commissary General in Britain stated that 
'the Commissariat [in the Peninsula] is so inadequate to the Duties of the Department with 
such large Annies' .33 Local supply systems were developed, particularly under Kennedy as 
Commissary General. The Commissioners of Military Enquiry described the four methods 
developed by the Commissariat in the Peninsula, to supply the army. These were, 
provisions sent from Britain; items by contract; by local purchase; and by requisition.34 
Ward suggests that the latter method, requisition or 'embargo', was used by the whole 
army in the early days of the campaign, but was soon restricted to the Commissariat, and 
then only in exceptional circumstances.35 Any deficiency could always be made up by 
28 PRO WO 3/50/86-9, Calvert to Lieutenant General Ross, 13th July 1810; J8'h RCME (1812) 278-9. 
29 J8'1I RCME(1812) 280. h 
30 RHK-M 21B3/-, 131 vouchers and receipts from 'Mr. Eckhart' , 1795-6; ut RCME (1812) 280. 
31 Ward, Wellington's Headquarters, 81. 
32 PRO WO 40125/16, Brownrigg to Trotter, 4th November 1805; Trotter to More, 5th N~vember 1805; 
Harrison to Secretary at War, 22nd March 1806; Vansittart to Secretary at ~ar, 24th Apnl 1806; Secretary at 
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33 pp xi (IS09) Erskine to Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, 17th October 1808. 
34 ntll RCME (1812) 281. 
35 Ward, Wellington's Headquarters, 81-2. 
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direct supply from Britain.36 Indeed, it was often the only recourse, as in the supply of 
fresh meat during the early West Indian campaigns.37 It was a system which became 
increasingly efficient as the wars progressed. In 1809, for example, an order for a large 
quantity of flour received on 13th June, had been fully loaded by 29th June, and an order 
for 1.4 million pounds of salt meat received on 13th October, had been loaded onto four 
ships and was ready to sail by 30th November.38 But despite such efficiency, this method 
of supply was expensive in both money and time, and was itself only resorted to after other 
methods had been exhausted. Local purchase could be successful on occasion, as in the 
acquisition of local beef herds in 1811, when cattle owners chose to sell their cattle rather 
than lose them to the French.39 However, there was a generally held belief that prices rose 
by at least fifty per cent whenever the British entered a deal with the local population, 
despite a ruling that prices should be kept in check by a local magistrate.4o Attempts at 
raising contracts were not always successful. The system of production in Portugal was at 
little more than subsistence level,41 and while certain items could be locally produced,42 the 
contract supply of foodstuffs proved almost impossible. 
In many cases the Commissariat contracts for provisions had to be awarded to the 
only merchant offering to supply, and therefore the system did not prove as advantageous 
to economy as the same system in Britain.43 Under these circumstances in the Peninsula, 
one house proved most successful in the supply of the army, obtaining a near monopoly by 
1809. Henrique Teixeira de Sampaio, and his brother F.Teixeira de Sampaio, were able to 
supply the army with almost anything they required, through an international network 
which extended to the Barbary Coast, Morocco, the Greek Islands, several South American 
36 NAM Marsden Papers, 7701136124, 84 & 92. 
37 GRE-A, 18680 Henry Dundas to General Charles Grey, .6th D~cember 1793; I 86b, George Rose to Evan 
N 6th D b 1793' 186c Commissioners for Vlctuallmg the Navy to George Rose, 29th epean, ecem er , , 
November 1793. 
38 Hall, British Strategy. 32-3. 
39 RHK-M I1B11226, 31 st July 1811. . ' . 
40 0110 W'II' Graham "'ravels Through Portugal and Spam. durmg the Pemnsular War la RCME(1812)281; I lam ,1, 
(London, 1820) 52. 
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states, and the United States of America.44 From 1809, they were responsible for the 
provision of virtually all foodstuffs for the army. Ward has suggested that a smaller 
operator could not have been able to cope with either the supply of items on such a large 
scale as was required, or remained solvent amid slow government payments.45 Bread was 
invariably the item in shortest supply to the army, and perhaps the Sampaios' greatest 
achievement was during the winter of 1812, when, at the instigation of Kennedy, they 
organised the importing of several thousand tons of grain from the United States of 
America, alleviating the problem of the supply of this vital commodity. 
During 1812 it had become increasingly obvious to Kennedy that there 'was a great 
risk of the Army experiencing want [of flour] since none could be found on the Lisbon 
Market', and all his other efforts to procure it had failed.46 By December the army's 
supplies were said to be 'adequate only for five months consumption.'47 However, this 
problem had already been addressed by Kennedy. On 2nd September he had contacted the 
Sampaios, 'encouraging them to ship for this Port [Lisbon] with all expedition possible as 
much supplies as they could prudently accomplish to purchase,' and confmning that the 
British government would pay the highest market price for any grain finding its way 
Lisbon.48 The Sampaios then wrote to their agents in the United States of America, 
in terms the most decisive and unequivocal, animating them to unceasing exertions 
and assuring them that they not only would receive the highest prices of the Corn 
Market on the dates of arrivals but that he bound himself to remit the whole 
proceeds within eight days after the entry of each cargo for all arrivals within six or 
. d I 49 
seven months from the date of his aforementlOne etter. 
This speculative venture proved a success. Despite Britain being at war with America, the 
Commissariat in Lisbon purchased flour to the value of more than £1 00,000. 
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Notwithstanding Kennedy ensuring that the army in the Peninsula was fed, he and the 
Sarnpaios still received criticism. The influx of such a massive quantity of flour had caused 
its price to crash on the Lisbon markets, ruining several traders, which was not an 
acceptable outcome for Britain's oldest ally. However, despite the enquiries into the 
transaction extending until after the wars, the estimated £131,762 saved in flour costs, 
together with more than £30,564 through exchange rates, must surely have sweetened the 
attitudes of the investigating Treasury officials.5o Unlike the investigations into the 
accounting process of the Commissariat discussed in Chapter 3, the passage of time and the 
distance from the conflict ensured that no official action was taken beyond the initial 
investigation into the import of grain from America. 
The problem of the deficiency in bread supply was also addressed by resort to the 
use of biscuit as a replacement. As early as 1795 the Commissariat were issuing Ships 
Biscuit to troops in the Low Countries,51 in lieu of, or to supplement, the bread ration. This 
had been done on occasion during both the Seven Years' War and the American War of 
Independence.52 It was also used by the French, but their reliance on local bakers with the 
skills to produce it, ensured that it was not always readily available.53 Biscuit had long 
been a transportable alternative to bread for the Royal Navy, being both easy to store, and 
relatively successful in transportation. The issuing of it in vast quantities to the army was 
made possible by the introduction of a new industrial process into its production during 
1804. It was co-ordinated by the navy's Victualling Office, at a factory in Deptford. Here 
biscuit for 2040 men each day was produced, which Emsley sees as the first example of a 
production line. 54 By the close of the Peninsula campaign, biscuit had become the standard 
army active service ration, being issued when bread was unavailable, without any reference 
to the absence of the latter.55 This was achieved by the co-ordinated efforts of the 
Commissariat who received several thousand tons of biscuit from the Board of Ordnance, , 
but also produced enough for the whole army, by requisitioning local bakeries, and 
50 RHK-M 2fB51-, Sampaio to Kennedy, 24th July 1819. , 
SI RHK-M 21B3/- 'State of the Magazine at Rethen to I st December 1795 . 
52 Edward E. Cudis, The Organization o/the British Army in the American Revolution (London, 1926) 93, 
95, 111. . 
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developing baking techniques themselves, rather than relying on indigenous skills as did 
the French.56 
The Commissariat had developed over the course of the period under discussion, 
becoming more efficient, despite glaring inadequacies at the beginning of campaigns,57 and 
increasing size of armies.58 The consolidation of all Commissary services under one 
Commissary in Chief, ensured the co-ordination of all services from 1809 and the , 
accountability of the whole to the government, and in particular the Treasury. On active 
service the system of supply ensured that requisition was rarely used, in complete contrast 
to the traditionally held view, inspired by Clausewitz, that field armies of the period under 
discussion, placed little reliance upon supply from the rear. 59 A rank structure was 
developed within the Commissariat, running parallel to that of the regular forces, with each 
officer having an equivalent commissioned rank in the army, with authority over those 
below him, in both his department and all other forces. 6o However, despite successes in 
supply, the logistical arrangements of active service continued to pose problems. By 1815, 
it had become clear to even the Commissary in Chief, that his department was incapable of 
the effective supply of the myriad items for which they had become responsible over the 
course of the wars. After discussions with the Treasury and the Storekeeper General, it was 
decided that the most effective system would be to pass all items except food and forage 
through the department of the Storekeeper General.61 This department, a creation of the 
wars, had emerged as both an effective and efficient supply organisation during the period 
under discussion. 
56 August Ludolf Freidrich Schaumann, On the Road with Wellington: The diary of a war Commissary in the 
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6.3 STORES AND THE STOREKEEPER GENERAL 
The emergence of an efficient, flexible and centrally controlled Commissariat occurred at 
the same time as the supply and storage system of a variety of equipment was also 
undergoing significant change. To 1797, camp equipment was supplied by each individual 
regimental colonel, for which he was given the full cost for the full establishment of his 
corps. At the close of each conflict these stores were sold, and the proceeds became part of 
the remuneration of the colone1.62 Thus he would gain from the number of men below 
establishment that he had to supply, as well as from the re-sale of the camp equipment. 
During the crisis of 1787, the government was unsure as to which units would need to be 
sent overseas in the event of hostilities, and so the Secretary at War ordered a quantity of 
camp equipment to be issued to whichever regiments were ultimately despatched abroad. 
The order for equipment was placed with Messrs. Trotter and Co., who had supplied the 
army since at least 1775.63 The prices that an army-wide order enabled Trotter and Co. to 
charge were far cheaper than any colonel was able to negotiate. When the crisis passed, the 
head of the company, John Trotter, suggested that the equipment purchased should be kept 
by Trotter and Co. on behalf of the government, for use in any future conflict, rather than 
being sold on to the benefit of the colonels. This idea was accepted by the Secretary at 
War, and the same equipment was used for both the 1790 Nootka Sound crisis, and the 
1792 camp at Bagshot, before being issued to troops at the beginning of the wars in 1793.64 
At the outbreak of the wars with France, the colonels were also permitted to 
contract for the supply of their corps with camp equipment, as had been the common 
practise previously. However, as stated above, the prices Trotter and Co. could charge 
benefited from substantial discounts obtained through bulk purchases, with which 
individual colonels could not hope to compete. When their agents submitted bills for the 
full price of these items, the War Office settled their accounts, based not upon the actual 
prices paid, but on those available from Trotter and CO .. 
65
Jt was clear that against such 
discounted prices the colonels could not compete. Therefore, in 1794, the Secretary at War 
gave Trotter and Co. the order to provide camp equipment exclusively for the whole army, 
62 8th RCME (1809) 152; 241-3, Appendix 24A, Fitzpatrick to Harrison, 19th May 1806. 
63 1bid , 151 ; 226-232, Appendix 23A, Examination of John Trotter. , 22nd June 1807. 
64 Ibid., 152. 
65 Ibid 153. 
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and to establish the first in a series of countrywide depots.66 In this way only the required 
quantity was purchased and issued, thus saving the public substantial sums of money. Even 
with such obvious advantages, it is surprising that there was no opposition to the move 
from among the colonels. They were effectively losing a lucrative aspect of their 
regiments, which must have had a great deal to do with the diluting of their power through 
the drastic army augmentation, during the early stages of the wars, for as the Wars 
progressed, they became a much stronger lobby against change. 
Trotter and Co. continued exclusively to supply the army until 1798. Under the 
arrangements, at the close of each campaign or expedition, all camp equipment was taken 
back by Trotter and Co. and either stored, repaired, or if unserviceable, sold, and the 
proceeds returned to the War Office.67 In addition, Trotter and Co. began to build up a 
surplus of stock, which enabled them to supply from their stores, 100,000 infantry and 
20,000 cavalry immediately. This they achieved without any order or advance of funds 
from the War Office, for either goods or storage, and it was only due to war-time inflation 
that this speculation produced profit. 68 
To 1798 Trotter and Co. were neither under contract to the government, nor governed by 
·fi . tructure The whole operation functioned as a gentleman' s agreement, any SpeCI IC pnce s . 
that their prices would be cheaper than could be obtained from any other supplier, or 
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It was not until 1805 that unusual position of Trotter and Co. came under serious scrutiny. 
In that year, due to pressure from other contractors, the War Office insisted upon the 
submission of tenders by all interested parties for the supply of tents for the army. Despite 
no contractor being able to supply at a lower price, Trotter and Co. declined to supply the 
items on a standard contract, instead offering to provide the equipment at the tendered 
price, but under the previous, non-contract, system. When the War Office insisted on 
contract supply, Trotter and Co. permitted their principal clerk, Mr. D.H. Wilson, to 
contract for the tents with the War Office at the tendered price. Despite the introduction of 
another middle-man, the army still received tents at prices below those quoted by any other 
supplier.72 Wilson held the contract for two years, being succeeded by an independent 
contractor, Mr. Maberley, in 1808,73 who obtained the contract on the strength of his 
pledge to supply tents for the army at 5% below the prices of Trotter and Co. for three 
years. 74 This effectively introduced the open contract supply system to the purchase of all 
army equipment, as for the first time Trotter and Co. were faced with effective competition. 
During the course of the wars, through their complete supply regime, Trotter and Co. must 
have saved the public substantial amount of money. However, there had been a blurring of 
the demarcation between the stores of Trotter and Co., and those of the Commissary 
General, the Barrack Master General, and the Transport Board, in the several depots which 
were run and paid for by Trotter and CO .. 75 Although criticism of this state of affairs was 
rare,76 with the introduction of contract supply for tents under Maberley, the final quirk in 
the supply system was addressed. It was stated that in future all stores were to be supplied 
by public contract, following an open advertisement. The whole was also to be placed 
under the jurisdiction of the newly created public office of Storekeeper General.77 
Although it was stressed that there was no suggestion of any impropriety on the part of 
72 8th RCME (1809) 155; 243-6, Appendix 25B, Comptrollers of Anny Accounts to the Right Honourable, 
the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, 13th June 1806; 16th RCME (1812) 8-9. 
73 Ibid, 243, Appendix 25A, Francis Moore to Peter Grant, Commissioner of Military Enquiry, 19th July 
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Trotter and Co}8 it was deemed expedient not to permit a private company to persist with 
an effective monopoly on the supply of the army at a time of its greatest expansion. 79 
On 8th March 1808, John Trotter, a junior member of the Trotter family, was appointed to 
the post of Storekeeper General,80 a post that he had effectively held for over a year as part 
of the Trotter and Co.' business.81 The Commissioners of Military Enquiry reported that, 
the satisfaction which the Lords of His Majesty's Treasury had received from an 
examination into the conduct and management of the House of Messrs. Trotter, in 
the supply of Army Stores, had influenced their Lordships to recommend to His 
Majesty one of the persons concerned in the management of their business to be 
Storekeeper General under the new Arrangement. 82 
The new system inevitably cost more than the previous one, with the establishment of a 
dedicated supply department without the ability to absorb overheads in a wider business 
organisation, and detailed instructions as to how it was to operate.83 This was in part 
alleviated by a contraction in the number of depots, and a general streamlining of the 
system of supply.84 The latter included the development of an in-house packing service, 
which was estimated to save the public £ 1 ,000 per year in packing, and £2,500 per year in 
the 'wharfage, lighterage, and shipping of all other articles' .85 With the consolidation of 
supply in the hands of the Storekeeper General, it also became possible, for the fIrst time, 
to establish a uniform standard of supply throughout the whole army. This was due in part 
to the necessity of simplifying and reducing the cost of the system, but it was also in line 
with what became known as 'Mr. Trotter's Plan'. The aim of this plan was, 
to construct the several articles of Camp Necessaries, invariable of the same shape, 
size and pattern, so that every separate part of each may apply equally to the 
relative part of every other Article of the same description; any strap will fIt any 
78 8th RCME (1809) 159; Appendix 23, S4. 
79 PRO WO 4012912, lM. Leake and J. Erskine, Comptrollers of Army Accounts, to the Lords 
C 
. . fH' M ' ty's Treasury 13th June 1806' Harnson to Secretary at War, 15th June 1808. 
omOllSSloners 0 IS aJes , ' . 
80 PRO WO 4/4521189, Royal Warrant, 8th March 1808; Harrlson to Secretary at War, 15th June 1808. 
81 8th RCME (1809) 160. 
82 [bid. C ., f H' M ' , 
83 PRO WO 4012912, 'Instructions from the Right Honourable Lords omml~sloners 0 IS aJesty s 
Treasury to John Trotter Jnr. Esq. Storekeeper General of all Military Stores, 19th March 1808. 
84 8th RCME (1809) 162,250; /lthRCME(1810) 43, 128. 
85 11th RCME (1810) 42-4 
202 
Canteen, the lid of one Camp-Kettle will fit every Camp-Kettle in the Service, the 
upper half of every Tent-pole will exactly fit the lower half of every other, and the 
like in endless instances. ,86 
In this way all stores became suitable for issue to any regiment, thus establishing another 
area of uniformity within the army. As a result, 
It became necessary to abolish the distinguishing colour of Regiments in Tents, 
Knapsacks, flags &c. which being henceforward considered as equally applicable to 
any Regiment, could not properly carry the particular Mark of one. 87 
This simplification in specification also ensured that further savings could be made through 
even larger bulk orders. 
The system was such a success, that in 1810, the Commissioners of Military Enquiry 
recommended that it be introduced into the Ordnance.88 The suggestion was never acted 
upon, and the Ordnance supply system continued to be criticised through the Peninsular 
campaign, due to failures in their operation.89 This confidence was further endorsed at the 
end of the wars, when, as stated above, the Storekeeper General's department took over the 
complete responsibility for all army stores, except food and forage. 9o 
6.4 CLOTIllNG AND EQUIPMENT 
The examination of the clothing and equipment supplied to the army, returns the 
discussion to the issue of the colonels' profit derived from their corps, first raised in 
Chapter 3. It was noted above that the Contract System was believed to save the public 
substantial sums of money, by opening bids to supply the army to tender, camp equipment 
being removed from this area as a result of intervention of Trotter and Co .. However, an 
86 8th RCME (1809) 157; 1 Ith RCME (1810) 43. 
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equivalent system was never extended to cover the supply of the majority of clothing for 
the anny, despite several suggestions that this would save money and avoid corruption. 
As outlined in Chapter 3, under the terms of Burke's Pay Office Act, the 
responsibility for estimating the establishment of regiments, was transferred from the army 
to the Secretary at War. He therefore also became responsible for the estimates by which 
the Colonels received their emoluments from the Clothing Fund, which was determined 
from the number of men on establishment, and was worth about 25% of the pay bill for the 
corps.91 However, despite the army loo sing its ability to estimate its own strength, the 
colonels did not forfeit any part of their profit. Not only was the money from the Clothing 
Fund, the so-called 'Off-reckonings' based upon the regimental establishment as opposed 
to the number of effective men, but any additional expense incurred by the Colonel was 
covered effectively by the receipt of the pay of the fictitious' Contingent Man', in the 
proportion of one to every twenty four soldiers.92 This would earn over £900 per year for a 
colonel of a battalion of 1000 rank and file, above that produced by off-reckoning. In 
addition, it was accepted that any excess costs, beyond normal wear and tear, were paid for 
by either the soldier or the public, and were not incurred by the Colonel.93 The profit on his 
regiment was thus secure. 
The stated profits received from a regimental colonelcy varied according to the 
constituency and agenda of those reporting, but was generally accepted to be in excess of 
£200 per year. Charles Greenwood, of the largest army agencies Greenwood and Cox, 
suggested that the profit ranged between five hundred and seven hundred pounds per year 
in Britain and when overseas this would be reduced to between two and three hundred 
, 
pounds.94 The return was never constant. It fluctuated not only because of the differences 
between home and foreign service, but also due to the differences in the charges imposed 
by those providing the clothing.95 However, since most of the work involved in achieving 
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the profit was perfonned by the Agent, as described in Chapter 3, a colonelcy clearly 
remained a lucrative sinecure. 
In 1798 Williarn Windham, as Secretary at War, described to the Finance 
Committee the system by which clothing was procured for the army, established under 
Royal Warrant in 1781. It had remained unaltered, even after Burke's Pay Office Act had 
removed other fmancial dealings from the army, and placed them under the control of the 
Secretary at War. 96 Windharn stated, 
No contracts are entered into by Government for the supply of the Clothing or 
Accoutrements of the Anny. The Colonel of each Corps makes his own 
engagements for them with such Tradesmen as he may think fit to employ. The 
Clothing for the Cavalry is provided once in every two years, for the Infantry every 
year, according to the Patterns approved by His Majesty, and deposited at the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Accounts of the Anny, after being sealed by the 
Board of General Officers, appointed annually under His Majesty's Regulations to 
inspect and examine the Clothing of the Anny. 
When made up, the Clothing is personally inspected by one of the said 
General Officers, whose Certificate of its conformity to the Sealed Pattern is 
necessary for authorizing the Board to pass and allow the Colonel ' s assignment of 
the off-reckonings, or sums provided on the establishment of the Corps, for the 
Clothing of the whole number of Non-commissioned Officers, Trumpeters, or 
Drummers, and private Men, borne on the said Establishment. ... The surplus, after 
satisfying every charge ... remains to the use of the Colonel, or his 
R . 97 epresentatlves. 
Items of uniform, which had been submitted by the Comander in Chief, were passed by the 
Clothing Board, and by the addition of the seals of three of their number, became the 
' Sealed Patterns', which were lodged at the office of the Comptrollers of Anny Accounts. 
They were the standard to which all regiments and their clothiers had to keep.98 
96 As amended, 23 Oeo. III c.50, s.19. nd 
97 35111 RSCF (1798) 625; Appendix 01,667, William Windham to Charles Abbot, 2 March 1798. 
98 See for example, ORE-A, 2251 , Orderley Book, 1 st May 1799. 
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Clothing was traditionally issued on the 25 th December each year, and therefore all 
sealed patterns for that issue had to be in place by the first week in the preceding May.99 
The regimental colonels, or their agents, would then assign the contracts for the clothing to 
a clothier, who would produce it in time for the issue date. 100 In order for clothing to reach 
the regiments by the prescribed date, wherever they were serving, regulations were issued 
requiring them to order clothing in October for home service, including the Channel 
Islands; July for the West Indies, Gibraltar, Malta and the Ionian Islands; May for the Cape 
of Good Hope; and February for the troops in the East Indies and North America. 101 Prior 
to 1800, a single Board member would check each order upon completion, before a 
certificate could be issued which released the clothing to the regiments, and the off-
reckonings to the colonels. 102 After this date, the [mal check was made by two permanent 
Clothing Inspectors, employed at £1 per day, who would examine the clothing and issue 
certificates to the regiment, the clothier and the Board. From 1813, they were to be assisted 
by 'experienced persons' with 'habits of business', and the following year their pay was 
increased to that of a staff officer. Only after this issue could the clothing and the off-
reckonings be released. I 03 This took the responsibility for the sanctioning of funds away 
from the Generals who made up the Clothing Board, who, as colonels of corps themselves 
had a vested interest in the clothing of the army, and gave it to independent civilians, 
answerable only to the Treasury. 
In 1793 the Public Accounts Committee recommended that the Clothing Board 
should be made responsible for all matters relating to the clothing of the army. It was to 
involve the Board taking the responsibility for the purchase of all items from the individual 
colonels and instituting a scheme of contract acquisition. 104 This would have resulted in 
any excess funds remaining in the Paymaster General ' s Account, rather than being passed 
on as profit to the colonels, which stressed that they would lose none of their financial 
advantage. IOS• Even with a proposed compensation package for the colonels, nothing 
99 (/' RCME (1808) 373; Appendix 80. 620, Evidence of Mr. WilIiam Walmsley. 4th March 1808. 
100 17th RSCF (1797) ii. 80a-81b. 86b-87a.b. 
101 General RegulatiOns and Orders (1811) 63. 
1026'11 RCME (1808) 371. . . . 
103 PRO WO 26/381126-42, 'Regulations to the Clothmg and Half Mountmg of the Infantry, ~d to the 
. . fth A Personnel' 1801 ' WO 4/4261230, Palmerston to Harnson, 28th Inspection of the Clothmg 0 e rmy ' . • 
August 1813; 378-9. Palmerston to Harrison. 26th Apn11814. 
104 rjll RCPA (1783) 21. . I Cl th· and the Pay and Emoluments of 
10S PRO WO 377/1/-, 'Off-Reckonings, Expenses of Reglffienta 0 mg, 
the Colonel. History from 1737-1813', c.1813. 
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resulted from the suggestion. Nor did the reiteration of the suggestion by the Finance 
Committee of 1797,106 or the Commission of Military Enquiry of 1808,107 bring about the 
proposed change. The latter report stopped short of recommending the complete alteration 
proposed previously, instead suggesting that the Colonels only receive the off-reckonings 
for the effectives, and an additional amount ofpay.108 This had been the case in Household 
Regiments from 1780. 109 The indigenous system had the support of many influential 
figures, not least the Duke of Wellington, who believed that it 'probably conduced to 
economy, as it was both the duty and interest of the commanding officer to see that the 
clothing of the regiment was fairly used by the men.' 110 However, those able to exert 
greatest influence, and add the weight of military experience to their argument, were just 
the same group who stood to benefit most from maintaining the status quo - the colonels. 
Wellington himself being a colonel of the 33rd Regiment ofFoot. 111 With such defence, it 
is not surprising that there was no change to the system of supply, and that the colonels 
continued to enjoy the full profit on their regiments until 1855.112 
While all reports were at pains to point out that they were not accusing any party of 
dishonesty, the casual manner in which the clothing of the army was managed ensured that 
such dishonesty was always possible. I 13 Since the amount of money the colonel received 
was based upon the establishment rather than the effectives, not only was there a financial 
effect of any dishonesty, but also a material effect upon the strength of the army. For if a 
colonel chose to gain money through maintaining a low effective strength, his regiment 
would be consequently weaker, which was a matter of even greater concern during the 
wars. Due to the problems in recruiting outlined in Chapter 4, any dishonesty would be 
difficult to trace, as most regiments were regularly below their establishment. 
However, it was the factor of economy around which the argument to maintain the 
system of supply revolved. The Commissioners of Military Enquiry could not conceive 
106 /9'h RSCF ( 1797)3 54. 
107 (/h RCME (1808) 367-70, 384-5. 
10& Ibid., 385-7. 
109 Cl ode, Military Forces of the Crown, n, 568. . . . 
110 • 'd b fi the FI'nance Committee 15th Apn11828, as quoted m Cl ode, Duke ofWelhngton's eVI ence e ore ' 
Military Forces of the Crown, I, 108, n.3 , 
111 Army List (1807). 
112 Clode, Military Forces of the Crown, 11, 570, 
113 19'h RSCF (I 797)355; 6'h RCME(1808)307. 
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that a new mode of clothing the army could be cheaper and as effective, 114 despite the 
'd fth· . 115 eVI ence 0 e preVIOUS corrumttees. They stated that the price allowed for a complete 
suit of clothing for a regular army soldier by off-reckonings was £2.5s.112/3d., 116 while the 
actual price for a Marine, who wore identical clothing, was £1.18s.5Yzd.,1l7 and for a 
Gunner in the Royal Artillery it was £2.5s.7Yzd 118 It was suggested by the Commissioners 
that due to the vast numbers of garments required, and the great variety of styles, a contract 
system as practised by the Board of Ordnance and the Admiralty would not be viable in the 
119 Th' b d' army. IS seems to e a contra IctOry argument. By the very nature of a contract 
system, the greater the number of units produced, the cheaper the unit cost would be, 
therefore the greater numbers requiring clothing in the army would have served to reduce 
the cost. The scale of such an operation certainly did not preclude one contractor, John 
Maberley, from speculating by offering to supply the whole army with their clothing in 
1809.120 The variety of styles seems also to have been somewhat of an exaggerated 
problem. By 1808 the clothing of the army was at its most uniform since the outbreak of 
the wars, with the only major differences being between the different arms. In 1802/3, 
Clothing Regulations were issued detailing precisely what was to be worn by the army, and 
the standard to which the Clothing Inspectors and Inspecting Generals were to examine. 121 
At the time of the issue of these regulations, sealed patterns were sent to the headquarters 
of every corps, and it was made clear that the colonels were to be made responsible for the 
adherence to the standard, upon pain of court martial. 122 This preoccupation with 
conformity to the sealed patterns and clothing regulations continued throughout the period 
under discussion. Colonels were warned that they would be held responsible for any 
deviation. 123 This was reiterated regularly,124 and by every set of General Orders from 
1811. These stated that, 
114 rJh RCME (180S) 387. , .It ' 
liS Vh RCPA (1793) passim,; IVIt RSCF (1797) pasSim,; 35 RSCF(1798) pasSim, nd 
116 35,h RSCF {I 798) 625, Appendix G I ,667, WiIIiam Windham to Charles Abbot, 2 March 179S, 
IJ7 Ibid, 624, I Art 'll db Mr D' k 
118 1b 'd A d ' E3 661-664 'Estimate of Clothing for the Roya I ery, prepare y , IC ey, I " ppen IX, ' 
Anny Clothier' . 
1196'" RCME (1808) 384. , E I B " h S 'ty 150 
120 John Maberley to Cecil Jenkinson, 19th April 1809, as quoted rn, ms ey, rills OCle , . 
121 PRO WO 26/39/146-90, Royal Warrant, 7th December IS03. 
122 rJh RCME (1808) 371-3 . ' 
123 • G d C' lar 2Sth April 1810' Horse Guards Circular, 30th Apnl1SIO. PRO HO 50/416/-, Horse uar s ITCU , • ' " 
124 I ' fi th Clothing and Apporntments of the Army , 22nd Apnl 1810 and 
PRO HO 50/416/-, 'ReguatlOn ore , h 1806 and 23rdJul IS10 
23rd July 1810; 'Regulation for Inspection of Great Coats, 19th Marc y . 
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Commanding Officers are responsible that the Arms, Accoutrements, and Clothing, 
and all other Appointments, both of Officers and Men of their respective 
Regiments, are in strict confonnity to His Majesty's Regulations. 125 
and, 
His Majesty's Warrants, which have been issued at different times, .. .. contain the 
Instructions to be observed regarding the Clothing and Appointments of the Anny, 
and no deviation from the Regulations contained in those several Warrants is to be 
. d 126 penmtte . 
With such rigid uniformity across the whole army, it is difficult to see a problem in 
supplying by contract. In addition most units completely dismantled and re-tailored their 
whole clothing issue, therefore any minor regimental modifications could be made by the 
units themselves. 127 The objections to the adoption of the contract system can therefore be 
seen to be unfounded. It appears more likely that the reasons behind the objections were 
the same as those that prevented the abolition of the agency and purchase systems. That the 
authorities feared the upheaval that such a change would bring during the wars, or that the 
vested interest of the colonels proved too great to overcome. 128 
The clothing of the regiments had been supplied made up since 1794, as units on 
active service found it difficult to make up and issue new clothing. 129 Since it was 
impossible to make to measure every item, clothing was usually supplied in four different 
sizes, numbered one to four. One in thirty would be of the larger size four, while the 
remaining sizes would be supplied in equal proportions. 130 It was supplied to the regiments 
packed in bales by the clothier, and at the expense of the colonel, 13I whose responsibility it 
125 General Regulations and Orders (1811) 90. 
126 Ibid.. 62. 
127 rJlr RCME (1808) 374-5, 559, 609; For a detailed account of the issue of clothing at regimental level, see 
G. A. Steppler, 'Redcoat: The Regimental Coat of the British Infantryman, c. 1808-15', in Military 
I/lustrated (Past and Present) (1989) Number 21, 10-13. . . 
128 Wilson, House o/Commons. passim. There were seventy eight MPs who were Army Officers m 1808, 
constituting 12.07% of the Commons. 
129 PRO WO 26/35/423, General Order, 13th October 1794. . 
130 Keith Raynor, unpublished notes on infantry clothing; ~is often neceSSitated even more work for the 
Regimental tailors, if the proportions of sizes of the men did not correspond. See for example, CUL Moore, 
Moore to Calvert, 18th August 1804. . ' . , 
131 35'11 RSCF (1798) 623-4; 644, Appendix E3, ' Estimate ofclothmg costs by Mr. Dickey, Army Clothier. 
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was to ensure delivery. Until 1813, assistance would only be given to the Colonels by the 
C . .. . 132 OmmIssanat ID extreme Clrcumstances. However, in that year the Treasury gave 
permission that all clothing would be carried on regular supply transport, providing that the 
additional capacity did not raise the required tonnage for the journey. m Upon arrival at the 
corps the bales were cut open, and the clothing was 'shrunk, by being thoroughly wetted 
with Clean Water', before being issued to the men. 134 A general officer would then inspect 
the corps, and report any deficiencies. 135 
There were only minor inroads into the control of the area of supply of clothing by 
the colonels, with certain items removed completely from their jurisdiction. These had 
been highlighted by failings in their supply during the early campaigns in the West Indies 
and the Low Countries. 136 From 1801, greatcoats were supplied jointly by the colonels and 
the War Office, and issued free of charge to the men. l37 In 1808, as a result of the 
recommendations of the Commissioners of Military Enquiry, the responsibility for supply 
of greatcoats was removed from the colonels altogether, and their purchase was 
administered under an open War Office contract,138 while their inspection was still 
performed by the Clothing Inspectors. 139 The supply of the coats by contract appears to 
have functioned well, with no complaints as to their quality, although the clothing 
inspectors did uncover a fraud in their supply during 1808, in which the contractor Messrs. 
Esdaile attempted to sell coats made of inferior quality cloth to the army. The deception 
was discovered before any coat reached the forces. 140 During 1809 and 1810, the 41 si 
Regiment stationed in Canada did not receive any coats, which ensured that they were 500 
short in a climate in which a greatcoat was indispensable. The problem was only solved by 
132 RHK-M I1B1I179, Murray to Kennedy, 12th July 1811; I1B11186, Murray to Ke~~dy, 13th July 1811 ~ 
lIB 11219.1, Murray to Kennedy, 27th July 1811;11B1f21~.2, Lieutenant Colonel WIlllams to Murray}6 
July 1811' IIB11221 Murray to Commissary General, 29 July 1811; 31B8/-, Murray to Kennedy, 23 
Decembe; 1813; 2S.h December 1813; 28th December 1813; 30
th 
December 1813. . 
133 PRO WO 4/426/199, Harrison to Palmerston, 29th July 1813; WO 4/4261237, Palmerston to Harrlson, 
13th September 1813. 
134 General Regulations and Orders (1811) 63. 
I3S Ibid 62-3. nd . ' , ' 37 8' D ffy S id' 
136 GRE-A, 278, Henry Dundas to Grey, 22 Apnl 1794; Emsley, BritISh SOCiety, -, u ,0 lers, 
Sugar and Seapower, 68, 
137 PRO WO 3/33/519, Calvert to Colonels of Regiments, 11th March 18? I: ' ' , 
1386''' RCME (1808) 372; lh RCME (1808) 130; PRO WO 41206/231-5, Crrcular Relative to the ProvISIon 
of Great Coats for the Army,' 12th August 1808, , , 
139 PRO WO 26/40/40-3, Royal Warrant, 'Regulations for the InspectIon of Great Coats , ~9th March 1806, 
140 R b d '''N t lyan artl'c!e of comfort'" British Infantry Greatcoats durmg the War of 
o ert Hen erson, 0 mere . 
1812', in JSAHR 75 (1997) 29. 
2lO 
the purchase of local cloth and the manufacture of the coats by the regimental tailors and 
the women of the corps. 141 The Commissariat in Spain also struggled to maintain a 
constant supply, resorting to issues from stock obtained from the Portuguese army during 
142 
1811. These examples can be put down to the early teething troubles of the contract 
system, as by 1812, a substantial stock for issue and replacement was able to be maintained 
in Commissariat depots in both Spain and Canada. 143 
Another essential item that was not supplied by the colonels was army footwear. 
Infantry shoes had been supplied by War Office contract since 1749,144 and continued to be 
obtained in this way throughout the period under discussion. However, the increased 
demands of active service resulted in numerous shortages, and consequent hardships for the 
troops. Each soldier received a pair of shoes annually as part of his clothing allowance, and 
would be expected to purchase a further pair as a 'necessary', along with any needed due to 
the previous pairs wearing out. Even in light marching order, the second pair was supposed 
to be carried,145 enabling a man to replace his shoes, especially on the march. However, 
there are so many comments regarding problems with shoes, it would appear that this state 
of affairs was either unsuccessful, or not adhered to. 146 The main problem for those 
supplying shoes was one of scale, and this resulted in breakdowns in either quality or the 
system of distribution. An inspection system as had been imposed upon the supply of 
clothing was impractical for an item that needed to be replaced so often, through the 
normal exigencies of the service, and therefore difficulties were noticed at the point of 
issue, rather than, as was shown with greatcoats, prior to their distribution. However, 
despite anecdotal evidence to the contrary, there are few examples of footwear of inferior 
qUality. In Egypt, shoes were reported to have fallen apart due to their construction with a 
clay rather than a leather sole,147 'which caused an insufferable heat to the foot in dry 
weather, and in wet, mixed with water and dissolved away.' 148 Despite the prosecution of 
141 ibid 26-7. 
142 RHK-M lIBln3, Murray to Kennedy, 1ih February 1811. 
143 RHK-M 3188/-, 'Commissariat Memorandum respecting Great Coats', 31 st December 18\3; Henderson, 
'British Infantry Greatcoats', 28. . 
144 PRO WO 4/47/69, H. Fox to Captain Levett, 25th January 1749; H. Fox to Earl ofHahfax, 25th January 
1749; 70, H. Fox to King Gould Esq., 25th January 1749. th, . 
143 P.J. Haythornthwait, 'Uniform and Equipment of the 78 ,~JSAHR 67 (1989) 233-50. 
I~ S fi 1 Banks Sergeant William Lawrence, 35; Llddle-Hart, PrIVate Wheeler, 102. 
ee or examp e, , d Sh 1 . . S b 
147 John H. Thornton, 'Brunei the Bootmaker', Journal of the British Boot an oe nslltutlOn, eptem er 
1969,1-2. 
148 Lady Celia Noble, The Brunels, Father and Son, (London, 1838) 28. 
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the manufacturers of these shoes,149 similar problems were faced by the forces in the early 
stages of the Peninsular war. One soldier stated that while retreating to Corunna 'shoes 
failed and many were barefoot' , ISO while another recalls that the British soldiers resorted to 
stealing the boots of the French prisoners, 'we returned to Colonia, ... taking with us the 
prisoners, who had walked along barefooted, as we had availed ourselves of their boots.'lsl 
However, while the Egyptian example is clearly one of poor quality footwear, supplied by 
an unscrupulous contractor, there appears to be very few instances of problems experienced 
due to the quality of manufacture of shoes. Indeed, a survey of all sources reveals reports 
of only three, despite containing the details of the processing of several hundred thousand 
pairs.152 Even these three examples were part of one defective batch, mistakenly issued 
after suffering damage during the Corunna campaign.I S3 In each case Boards of Survey 
were set up at the scene, and reports submitted, as it would be in the interests of the several 
parties with pecuniary involvement to formalise such proceedings. Therefore it would seem 
likely that had more such incidents occurred, the proceedings of at least some of the 
subsequent enquiries would have survived. The inference must be that the shoes supplied 
to the army were not regularly of an unserviceable quality. 
One reason for the failure of shoes referred to in contemporary accounts must be 
their unsuitability to the terrain over which the army was to operate. Military shoes had 
never been items produced specifically for the purpose, and were manufactured in the 
simplest straight-lasted style. IS4 Therefore, when subject to the rigours of campaigns over 
rough terrain, it is not surprising that they gave out. The army had not learned from similar 
experiences during the American War oflndependence. lss By 1811, the Peninsular army 
had been issued with spare soles and heels, to enable the repair of their shoes, in an effort 
149 Thomton, ' BruneI the Bootmaker' , 2. 
ISO Liddle-Hart, Private Wheeler. 102. 
151 Banks, Sergeant William Lawrence. 35. th •••• 51 • 
132 WD vii, 49, WeIIington to Liverpool, 15 December 1810; Vll, Welhngton to Liverpool, 31 March 1811 , 
PRO WO 11847/125 Harrison to Lieutenant Colonel Bunbury, 16th February 1811 ; 129, Gordon to 
H · 4th F b ' 1811 ' 133 John Trotter to Commissary in Chief, 2nd February 1811; WO 3/200/161 , arTIson, e ruary , , I 642 ' Pr d' f B d f 
H C I Th P qUI'er 3IstDecemberI811'RHK-MJlBll . , ocee mgso a oar 0 arry a vert to omas au , ' th 
S h Id M Ri ·, 3rd July 1811 ' RHK-M IIBI/164.1 Murray to Kennedy, 5 July 1811. urvey e at onte anJo " . 
IS3 PRO WO 1/847/125 Harri50n to Lieutenant Colonel Bunbury, 16th February 1811 , 129, Gordon to 
H · 4th b '1811 ' 133 John Trotter to Commissary in Chief, 2nd February 1811; WO 31200/161 , arTlson, Fe ruary , , 
Harry Calvert to Thomas Pauquier, 31 5t December 1811 . . 
154 Bennen Cuthbertson, A System for the Complete Internal Management and (Economy of a Battalion of 
Infantry (Dublin, 1768) Article XVI. od uoted in R Arthur Bowler I S~ PRO 30/1 1182181-82, Comwalli5 to Balfour, 22 November 1780, as. q . , 
Logistics and the Failure of the British Army in America. 1775-1 783 (Prmceton, 1975) 149. 
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to alleviate this problem. 156 However, the later stages of the war in Spain saw the 
introduction of the first specially designed army boot, produced by Marc BruneI. Prompted 
by his observation of the soldiers returning from the Corunna campaign,157 BruneI turned 
his engineering skill to the industrial manufacture of military shoes. His Battersea factory 
employed twenty-five wounded soldiers, each performing a single task by the use of a 
machine, which resulted in the production of one hundred pairs of shoes each day, at a unit 
cost two shillings less than previously paid. 158 The shoes were made by riveting on the 
soles, (a technique used in the production of army boots till the introduction of the 
composite sole),159 which not only strengthened the construction, but also reduced the wear 
on the sole, since the metal would be in contact with the ground. The government 
sanctioned the development of Brunei's factory in order to meet the whole army's 
demands,16O the first boots being introduced to regiments for test from 1813.161 They were 
issued to General Lambert's Brigade, which was part of the 6th Division, the General being 
'requested to make special reports on the nailed shoes to ascertain the relative advantages 
of these shoes compared with those already issued to the soldiers.' 162 Evidently these trials 
were a success since in 1815 the factory was in full production, making boots for other 
ranks, and perhaps officers, since some are described as being produced with the addition 
of a lining and binding. 163 BruneI was negotiating to supply the new French government, 
when Napoleon escaped from Elba, and production was increased to meet British army 
demands. l64 Despite each soldier being issued with a pair of the boots as a present for 
service at Waterloo,165 80,000 pairs were left unsold after 1815, which eventually led to 
BruneI's bankruptcy. 166 It is not clear if the whole army was equipped with the new boots 
prior to the Waterloo campaign, although it would seem likely. If the figures for the daily 
production are correct, then the factory could have produced in excess of one million pairs 
from 1812 to 1815, and as only 80,000 were left unsold after Waterloo, the inference must 
rh 
156 WD vii, 49, Wellington to Liverpool, 15 th December 1810; RHK-M I/BI!l64.1 Murray to Kennedy, 5 
July 1811. 
!S7 Noble, The Brunels, 28. . . . , 
!S8 PRO WO 4/427/363 , Palmerston to Harrison, 26th July 1815; Phllhps, A Mornmg s Walk, 45-8. 
159 Thomton, 'BruneI the Bootmaker', 2. 
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161 RHK-M 3188/- Murray to Kennedy, 20 July 1813. 
, th 
162 RHK-M 3188/-, Murray to Kennedy, 25 December 1813. 
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25 th September 18 I 5. 
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be that a substantial number of officers and men, if not the whole of the army was wearing 
BruneI's boots by the end of the period. This development and change to army footwear 
had been possible, not only through BruneI's innovation, but due to the purchase power of 
the contract system. 
That the problem of design was alleviated by the end of the war, only partly 
addresses the question of army footwear. The second problem area identified was that of 
actual supply, and this can be observed from the earliest years of the war, in particular in 
the West Indies.167 Although it was suggested that much of the problem was caused by the 
government' s failure to allocate sufficient funds to footwear,168 the rate at which shoes 
wore out ensured a constant demand. These requests were to continue throughout the 
Peninsular campaign,169 and are reinforced by references in contemporary dairies to the 
failure of the shoes to reach the men, such as on the retreat to Corunna when men were 
barefoot while casks of shoes were destroyed by the Commissariat. 170 This was in part due 
to the insistence by that department for the submission of a return for every pair of shoes 
issued, which Colonel Murray, the Quarter Master General in the Peninsular believed 
caused soldiers to wait up to three days for replacement footwear. 171 To alleviate this 
problem, in March and April 1811 , a supply of 500 pairs of shoes was despatched to each 
divisional Commissary, to be ' distributed to the British Regiments' at the direction of the 
general commanding the division. ln Through this measure a soldier would be able to draw 
a new pair of shoes almost immediately his old ones wore out. In addition, Wellington 
requested 'that the shoes sent to the army should be of the best quality for wear, and should 
be made of the largest size' ,173 which as a compromise enabled a stock of footwear to be 
available, if perhaps on the large side for many of the troops. These improvements to the 
supply of shoes is borne out by contemporary accounts, as no diarist appears to experience 
166 Thomton 'Brunei the Bootmaker', 6. 
, ~ 
167 GRE-A, 278, Henry Dundas to Grey, 25 March 1794. . .. 
161 A. Forbes, A Short History of the Ordnance Service (London, 1921) 1,156, as quoted m Emsley, Brrllsh 
Society,37-S. ,I 1809·· 52S W 11· 169 S fi I WD · 378 Wellington to Castlereagh, 31 May , VI, , e mgton to 
ee or examp e, IV, , . . si h I 
Liverpool, 20~ October 1810; vii, 423, Wellington to Liverpool, 31 Marc SI I. 
170 Ruth W. Vemer (ed.) Reminiscences ofn;.iIIiam Verner (1782-1871) 7th Hussars. (London, 1965) 16. 
17lRHK_MIIBIll29ReynetttoKennedy,8 AprillSl1. th si· 
172 RHK-M I1B1/1l7-120 and 122 Murray to Kennedy, 30 March to I Apnl 1811; IIBlI129, 131, 133 & 
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173 WD vii, 423. Wellington to Earl of Liverpool, 31 SI March 1811. 
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problems with footwear after this date, and there are no examples of complaints of shortage 
within the Commissariat papers. 
Despite the maintenance of the colonels' involvement in the supply of uniform to 
the army, the war years saw a steady increase in its quality and uniformity. Through the 
imposition of high standards, which were rigidly adhered to by the Clothing Inspectors, 
together with strict new regulations, the army was clothed as never before, in a discernible 
'uniform' fashion. Many of the items previously supplied by the colonels, were supplied 
through contract by the government, thus resulting in both uniformity and economy. In 
addition, by the improvements in supply, fewer soldiers would experience hardship due to 
the adverse effects of a campaign on his clothing. While many suppliers made vast profits 
from their Army business, there is little evidence of profiteering throughout the period 
d d· . 174 un er ISCUSSlon. 
6.5 WEAPONRY 
The final area of supply is that of arms and ammunition, which was the 
responsibility of the Ordnance Department. While the supply of all other army weapons 
was able to keep pace with demand, the weapon which caused most problems in the area of 
supply was the infantry musket, and it is on that which this section will concentrate. In 
1793 the standard infantry weapon was the Short Land Pattern musket. It was produced 
only through contract by the more skilled manufacturers, as the Ordnance specification was 
considered too high for most journeymen and less skilled craftsmen, the work on the Short 
Land Pattern being considered as 'more nice than what they have lately been used to.' 175 It 
had a 42 inch barrel, and had been adopted in 1768.
176 
Richard Glover supported his argument that the army was unprepared for war, by 
listing several areas in which the Ordnance Department failed in its initial supply of small 
174 See also Beverley Lemire, Dress, Culture and Commerce: The English Clothing Trade before the 
Factory, 1660-1800 (London, 1997) 11-32. 
m PRO HO 50/370/59-61 , Richmond to Dundas, 11th October 1793 . .. . 
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arms to the army at the outbreak of war. First, he blamed the inadequate peace-time 
purchasing policy, which failed to create a stock-pile of weapons sufficient to prosecute the 
war. Secondly, he pointed to the method of production of the muskets, which did not 
enable a vast increase in production volume. Thirdly, Glover observed that the Ordnance 
was in direct competition for the muskets produced. Finally, he accused the administration 
of interference in the supply of the weapons, which frustrated the efforts of the 
O dn 177 Thi . h . r ance. s IS a somew at questlOnable use of the available evidence, from which it 
does not appear that the Ordnance was unprepared for war. In 1793 there were 62,500 
muskets in store in Britain,178 which was more than three times the number of men in the 
army, all of whom were already fully armed. Production of Ordnance weaponry had 
actually been reduced due to there being such substantial stores of weapons. 179 This would 
mean that the army was able to expand to more than three times its number, and still have 
enough weapons. In Chapter 4, it was established that from a peace-time establishment of 
17,013 men in 1793, the army expanded within a year to 27,289: 80 If the subsequent 
expansion had been along the lines planned in the wake of the American War of 
Independence,181 the supply of weapons to them would not have been a problem. However, 
the unforeseen nature of the conflict ensured that the army needed to be expanded beyond 
previous assessments, and the army estimates for 1794, which included militia and 
fencibles, revealed that the total of muskets required was 265,000,182 leaving a deficiency 
of over 200,000 weapons. 
The criticism of the reaction of government and the Ordnance to the problem of 
lack of weaponry is also unfounded. Although Glover infers that each department 
conflicted with others in their responses, it is clear that the response was wide-ranging, and 
far from conflicting. The Duke of Richmond, as Master of the Board of Ordnance, had 
spent the previous ten years overseeing trials into a new infantry musket,183 and lost no 
time in introducing a number of measures which ultimately alleviated the supply problem. 
He, along with Pitt, negotiated for the purchase of several thousand muskets either of 
177 R. Glover, Preparation, 51. . 
178 PRO HO 50/3681289 'Return of the Small Arms in Force at the Tower and the Out Posts and Places In 
Great Britain as collected from the Returns last received', February 1793. 
179 Bailey and Harding, 'The "India Pattern" Musket', 48. 
110 Clode, Military Forces of the Crown, 1,274,398. 
III Pimlott, 'Administration of the British Army', 360-1. 
112 Fortescue History of the British Army, iv, 218. 
183 Bailey and Harding, 'The "India Pattern" Musket', 49. 
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foreign pattern or manufacture. 184 Far from creating a conflict of interest, these purchases 
ensured that muskets of some description were available, and despite their diversity, they 
would have served in an emergency. They certainly proved of a quality sufficient to be 
offered to foreign powers in 1799,185 and to several Volunteer corps in 1803. 186 
In an effort to stimulate the production of army muskets, in October 1793, 
Richmond contacted all reputable gun manufacturers, and encouraged them to increase 
their production of Ordnance weaponry, I 87 while establishing contracts with six further 
d 188 Thi . " d th pro ucers. s mterventlOn raIse e number of muskets produced to between 500 and 
1000 per week,' 89 enabling the delivery of 31 ,000 in the first twelve months of the conflict, 
which was more than had been delivered during the first year of any previous war. 190 
However, there were concerns that this was all that could be achieved, as there were 
conflicting orders from the Irish and East Indian authorities, which diverted the attentions 
of many of the gun makers. 191 Both these customers required a lower standard of finish, 192 
and did not delay payments as traditionally was the case with the Ordnance. The former 
enabled less skilled workmen to complete the muskets, while the latter ensured that such 
conflicting contracts had to be taken to prevent many manufacturers going out of business 
through lack of funds. In 1794 it was believed that payment could be delayed as long as six 
months, while in 1787, the Ordnance admitted that it could often take as long as thirteen 
months to process payment. 193 With this in mind, in October 1793, Richmond opened 
negotiations with the Board of the East India Company with a view to taking over the 
stocks of muskets in the Company's store in Britain. 194 Although these weapons were 
considered inferior, they had proved serviceable in protracted conflict in India, and were 
184 SRO GD5 111162611 , Matthew Lewis to Henry Dundas, 20th October 1794;GD5 1111626/4, Horse Guards 
to War Office, 21 st October 1794; R. Glover, Preparation, 53-5; Bailey and Harding, 'The "India Pattern" 
Musket',49. th 
18S PRO WO 46125162-3, R.H. Crew (Secretary to the Ordnance) to the Chevalier d' Almeida, 27 May 1799. 
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thought to be what the army 'must put up with in an emergency'. 195 By February 1794, the 
Directors of the Company agreed that all weapons in England, and in the process of 
manufacture would be sold to the government. 196 Within eight months over 33,000 
weapons had been delivered in this way, with further quantities following at various points 
during the conflict. By 1815, 142,970 small-arms had been delivered in this way. 197 
Significantly, by February 1795, the Ordnance Department had begun ordering India 
Pattern muskets directly from gun manufacturers for the use of the non-regular formations, 
thus enabling the work to be carried out by the expanding but less-skilled workforce. 198 
The intention was to ensure that the army proper received the Short Land Pattern weapon, 
but even this proved to be beyond the capacity of the industry. In April 1797 all contractors 
were directed to cease production of all but the India Pattern musket, which enabled over 
72,600 complete weapons, and components for over 30,000 more to be delivered by the 
end of that year. 199 The transfer of production from the Short Land Pattern to the India 
Pattern proved a great success, and from 1795 to 1815 at least 2,834,485 India Pattern 
muskets had been produced under Ordnance contract.200 While it was not without its post-
war critics, who blamed the inferior quality and mass production of the weapon for a high 
number of unserviceable muskets during the course of the conflict,20I the adoption of a 
musket of inferior, although obviously serviceable, quality, enabled the army to prosecute 
the war without fear of arms shortages. In addition it enabled the Ordnance to engage in the 
supply of arms to other governments. 
The first government to benefit from the restructuring of the Ordnance supply 
system was the Irish. Their establishment had been equipped with similar weapons to those 
supplied to the East India Company, and so resulted in the same problems of diverted 
production?02 In 1797, the British and Irish Ordnance Departments agreed that all 
purchases for both establishments would be conducted by the British,203 thus removing one 
competitor from the market. Another state relying upon British armaments was Portugal. 
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Following the Spanish declaration of war against her in 1795, it became even more 
essential to procure arms. However, as has been shown, it was not in the best interests of 
Britain to permit even an ally to divert armament manufacture away from the supply of 
Ordnance weaponry. The solution was to maintain the control of the market, and to supply 
the Portuguese directly.204 At first the Ordnance discouraged them from placing 
independent orders,205 but in 1799 an attempted order for arms was intercepted by the 
Ordnance, and the Portuguese were informed that they could no longer negotiate for arms 
in Britain, except through the Ordnance, who offered them a supply of the foreign arms 
they held in reserve.206 Thus all serious competitors had been removed from the market, 
and the Ordnance held a monopoly on the purchase and supply of muskets. Only the East 
India Company were permitted to contract with manufacturers, and they had already shown 
their willingness to comply with the wants of the army. 
It was shown in Sections 6.3 and 6.4 above, that although the office of the Secretary 
at War assumed control of Army Estimates in 1783, the allocation of money to regiments 
for supplies, was never able to be geared to the effective strength of the unit, with colonels 
always receiving the emoluments for the full strength of their corps. Until 1799, this 
system of assessing the quantity of supplies issued to the regiments was also used in the 
supply of weaponry. This resulted in extensive supplies of arms, that were not required by 
a unit with a lower establishment than estimate, being stored, often under conditions which 
made them unfit for service when returned to the Ordnance.207 From 1799 all requests for 
arms were submitted through the Adjutant General to the Secretary at War, (the two offices 
processing returns) who would cause the number required to be checked against the 
establishment and effectives.208 It is impossible to asses how many weapons this saved the 
Ordnance. In Chapter 4, it was noted that few regiments were ever able to maintain their 
effective strength, but all were recruited up to that strength as often as possible. In addition 
the life of a weapon was estimated to be twelve years,209 therefore most units would have 
received at most only two full issues of weaponry during the period under discussion, and 
would also have required a full establishment of muskets on occasion, depending upon 
204 PRO WO 46/24/50-1 , Crew to the Chevalier d' Almeida, 5th August 1796; R. Glove:, Preparation, 52-3 . 
20S PRO WO 46/25/15-18, Comwa11is to Dundas, February 1797; R. Glover, Preparallon, 53 . 
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their ability to recruit and maintain their strength. The savings made could therefore have 
been minimal, but it did remove a system that was based on unsound principles, to the 
benefit of the supply of the army as a whole. 
With the purchase of arms monopolised by the Ordnance, and their supply to the 
army based upon actual strengths, the control of the issue of weaponry can be seen to have 
been put into a state of order since the beginning of the conflict. However, a major 
development was still to be introduced that would greatly expand the capacity of the 
Ordnance, and change the supply of arms to the present day. In Chapters 2 and above, 
referring to the system of agency, it was observed that it was decided to maintain the status 
quo during the course of the wars, fearing the upheaval caused by change. However, such a 
change was introduced in the area of the Storekeeper General during 1808, and it had also 
been introduced within the supply of muskets. As early as 1794, the take-over of arms 
production by the Board of Ordnance had been advocated. It was suggested that, 'the only 
method that can be taken to prevent in future the present complaints is to have a 
Manufactory of Small Arms upon the Establishment of the Ordnance,.2IO However, 
Richmond was wary of implementing the idea, fearing the drawing of trained men away 
from the existing gun manufacturers, to the detriment of the whole service, and of the 
ethics of government involvement in business.211 Ten years later, the scheme was again 
suggested, with the main argument being the high cost of the weapons on the open market. 
In 1793 the government had sanctioned the purchase of muskets at 11s.8d., which 
by 1796, had risen to 25s., and by 1803, it had reached upwards of 34s. 2I2 This, together 
with the vast number of new weapons required for the Volunteers, prompted the 
establishment of an Ordnance Office in Birmingham, under the superintendence of an 
Inspector of Small Arms, Lieutenant Colonel James Miller.213 His task was to ensure the 
quality of the weapons produced by the manufacturers of the town, and to encourage their 
increased production. He was patently successful. From April to December 1803,40,699 
muskets were delivered to the Ordnance from Birmingham, while the following year, the 
210 PRO WO 46/24/91-2, Crew to Hadden, 25 th July 1794. 
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220 
town supplied 167,749 muskets, and by 1809 this had reached 248,366.214 However, the 
most significant intervention in matters previously considered open only to private 
enterprise was the formation of a 'grand manufactory' for small-arms at the Tower of 
London, in 1804.215 Here muskets were fabricated, repaired, and distributed to the army, 
with the whole enterprise coming under Miller's jurisdiction? 16 This measure proved a 
success, and was developed in 1808, when further arms were required for the Spanish 
forces, and the Local Militia, by the establishment of a complete factory manufacturing 
weapons at Lewisham.217 With this addition to the capacity of musket production, the 
Ordnance was able to assure its supply to the army, while enabling the government to 
pursue a policy of aid through armament, to Spain in 1808-9, and to Prussia, Russia and 
Sweden in 1813.218 Manufacture so increased, that in 1814, the stores the Tower of London 
armouries were deemed full, and subsequent deliveries were diverted to Chester, 
Chelmsford, Dover, Edinburgh and Tynemouth for storage.219 Typically, in an enquiry into 
arms supply in 1817, the Board were criticised for having too many weapons in store.220 
The supply of small-arms to the army was further consolidated in 1813, with the 
establishment at Birmingham of a proofing house, principally for the barrels of small-arms, 
again under the Inspector.221 During the period under discussion, the production and supply 
of muskets had moved from a haphazard collection of private contracts, to a monopoly of 
production by the Ordnance, which now had its own facilities to process every stage of 
weapon production, thus ensuring it would not have to be a captive of the vagaries of the 
market in the future. 
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6.6 CONCLUSION 
The supply system which developed during the course of the period under discussion 
reveals an ever-increasing control from the central authority of government. The 
Commissariat, at home and abroad, was united under one head by 1809; weaponry was 
supplied under a Board of Ordnance monopoly of production, which ensured issue to the 
anny, and enabled the policy of arming British allies; and the Storekeeper General was 
appointed to oversee the purchase, packing and distribution of stores, despite it resulting in 
an increase in cost to the public, amid the constant preoccupation with making savings, 
however small. The traditional control of the purchase power and supply structure of the 
anny was maintained, and in most areas expanded. In only one area did the old system 
prevail. The Colonels, through their agents, were still permitted to supply all but a few of 
the items of clothing for the soldier, although even this area was not without inroads of 
civilian control. Clothing Inspectors had been appointed to impose increasing regulation 
upon the uniform supply of the regiments. However, despite several reports pointing out 
savings that could be made to the public, and despite guarantees to the colonels that none 
of their profit would be lost, most of the colonels' power over clothing was maintained. It 
was considered inopportune to proceed with such change during the wars, despite just such 
a change having been accomplished within the Storekeeper General's Department, and 
within the area of anns supply. This suggests that vested interest had more to do with the 
decision to maintain the status quo than the fear of disturbance to an established system in 
time of war. Above all, the structures developed during the period were, in the most part, 
successful. However, despite the successes, active service conditions still greatly affected 
the issue of many items. The Commissariat, in particular, found it difficult to maintain a 
level of efficiency under field service conditions, ultimately relinquishing the supply of all 
but food and forage to the newly established Storekeeper General ' s Department. This 
changed occurred too late to assess its effectiveness. 
Despite the exception of the colonel's control over his regiment, all other areas 
were developed along modem administrative lines, with full accounting and accountability, 
and clear hierarchical structures. By 1815, the army had lost all ability to dictate its own 
purchasing. It is in this area, above all others already discussed, that the influence and 
control of the Treasury can be seen. 
CHAPTER 7 TRANSPORT 
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7. I INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter established that the supply of the Anny was traditionally based 
on a haphazard system of checks and balances. It was shown that this system was developed 
into an effective and centrally controlled organisation, under the direct authority of the 
civilian administration. 
The system by which the goods so supplied were transported to the Anny is of equal 
importance. Despite substantial improvements in the Commissariat arrangements during the 
course of the Wars, it was found impossible to make such improvements effective under 
active service conditions. In particular, transport proved to be a constant difficulty, with 
many problems of supply being directly attributable to failings in this area. 
This chapter will examine the transport system. It will explore all areas, not just 
those relating directly to the supply offood and equipment, but also the means by which 
men were moved to the theatres of conflict. The chapter will also examine how 
communication was maintained between those theatres and Britain. It will particularly look 
for signs of the centralisation of authority in these areas, as has been established in all other 
aspects of the Army in previous chapters. It will examine the effectiveness of the transport 
and communication systems, and their ability to function under the pressures of the Wars, 
observing the effects upon them of a global conflict, through which they were forced to 
expand beyond any previous expectations. 
7.2 SIDPPING 
At the outbreak of the Wars there was no co-ordinating body for transport. The 
movement of both men and supplies was a haphazard affair, which was not assisted by the 
immediate need for 40,000 tons of shipping.l The Navy Board was responsible for the bulk 
of transport, while individual departments had to hire their own shipping for any other 
d 
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utles. For a year this state of affairs persisted, until, due to the 'unparalleled present war', 2 
and to maintain a further check on the public money involved, in July 1794, the Transport 
Board was formed.3 As with all areas of supply, the control of this single civilian body was 
kept firmly in the hands of the Treasury. Its aim was 'to consolidate the business once , 
managed by too many hands, into one direction, for the greater precision and economy' . 4 It 
was charged with the task of initiating, organising and maintaining all seaborn military 
operations, and as a result proved an excellent training ground for the organisation of large 
expeditions. One captain at least made admiral due to his abilities shown in the Transport 
Board. S It consisted of three commissioners for general transport, two for prisoners of war, 
and had a staff of twenty one. By 1797 it had hired 278,216 tons of shipping, at a cost of 
£4,088,524.3s.5d,6 and was maintaining a fleet of 160,000 tons.7 Despite its recent 
formation, and the departmental reforms outlined in previous chapters, it still functioned 
through the levying of fees on each of its transactions.s Despite suggested reform,9 it was 
maintained in its original form to the end of the period. 
The transporting of men and supplies by sea was to be an ever increasing problem to 
those responsible for the organisation of campaigns. As the size of armies required in the 
field increased, so too did the need for shipping in ever greater numbers, using a fleet of 
merchant ships whose owners were more interested in more lucrative tasks and destinations. 
As early as 1795, the Abercromby-Christian expedition to the West Indies expanded beyond 
the merchant fleet's capacity to supply ships to transport them, 10 and even with the 
assistance of shipping brokers, excessively high prices resulted.11 By 1797, the estimated 
total British merchant shipping capable of travelling to the West Indies, was estimated to be 
650,000 tons,l2 and since Grey's expedition was estimated to be around 100,000 men, 13 
2 J8h RSCF (1797) 344, 355, AppendiX (A), 'Examination of WiI1i~ Harding', :oth J~: 179:. 
3 The best study of the early work of the Transport Board is covered m, Condon, Admirustratlon of the 
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eac requmng one and a half to two tons of shipping on voyages of such distances,14 it is 
clear that to transport the whole force would have tied up over one third of the total 
merchant fleet, at a time when the employment of British shipping was at an all-time high. IS 
Despite attempts to obtain sufficient vessels, including ships from Germany, Denmark, 
Sweden, and America,16 the expedition was only saved by the arrival of the East India 
Company fleet, which was not committed until the following season, and so was able to 
transport the force to the West Indies, after a substantial, yet speedy, refit. 17 However, this 
was not seen as a complete success due to the high costs of employing East India Company 
ships. 18 A regular transport cost thirteen shillings per ton per month, those on three month 
contracts thirty shillings per ton per month, while the East India fleet received £20 per man 
per voyage. 19 This would mean that a 400 ton vessel, with a capacity to carry 200 men, 
would have cost £260 per month if hired as a regular transport under a contract for a 
specific task. The same ship would have cost £600 per month if hired on a three monthly 
contract. An East India ship, contracted to carry two hundred men would have cost £4000 
for the same task. Even if the voyage had taken three months to complete, it would still 
have cost the public twice as much to hire East India shipping. 
The conflict between the needs of merchant shipping to ply their trade, and thus 
make money, and the Army's need to transport men and supplies, would continue 
throughout the period, often resulting in ships, hardly seaworthy, being used as transports.20 
One diarist related, 
It was a universal complaint, the description of the Boats that were hired as 
transports, not only were they wholly unfit for the service, but in many instances 
they were unsafe, as not being seaworthy. It is only necessary to look back to see 
the number of brave fellows who were lost, by being exposed to these old crazy 
unserviceable boats.21 
14 PRO ADM 10S/30/1S, Rupert George to Captain Culverhouse, 14th June IS06; WO 1IS06/1, Transport 
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In dd·· h 225 a ItlOn, t ere was a conflict for manpower between the merchant ships and the navy, 
with numerous instances of crews being pressed into naval service, resulting in their ships 
being unable to sail. 22 
Occasionally the needs of the Army could coincide with those of a merchant shipper, 
such as was the case with Edmund Thornton, who contracted to supply meat to the Army, 
receiving as part-payment a proportion of the outward cargo capacity, and the whole of the 
capacity on the homeward journey.23 Similarly, the East India Company were willing to 
contract for a one way journey to the West Indies during 1795-6, as there was rarely 
enough cargo for the outward trip.24 
In 1794, Grey had suggested that his troops could be sent to the West Indies on 
board Royal Navy ships, but this was rejected by the Admiralty, due to a perceived 
discipline problem, and a reluctance to move away from the established system.25 However, 
such were the demands for transport ships, as the years of conflict progressed, that the use 
of navy vessels to transport men became a unavoidable,26 and even supplies were 
transported when necessary.27 Certainly after Trafalgar there would be fewer demands on 
the fleet, and in addition the greater speed of naval ships would mean a more efficient use of 
time. 
Whatever means of sea transport was used, it would still mean cramped conditions 
for the officers and men, 28 and a diet of ships' biscuit and lime juice. 29 The suggestions that 
22 The Times, 7th January 1794, 3, d. Reported upwards of si>...1y merchant ships stranded on the Thames, 
and seven East lndiamen at Gravesend, the crews of which had all been impressed; See also, lR 
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154. 
23 GRE-A, 186, Commissioners Victualling the Navy to George Rose, 29th November 1793. 
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all men should be accommodated in berths with hammocks,30 proved impractical due to the 
lack of space, for all but those officers unlucky enough to be without their own berths.3 ) 
Most other ranks were forced to sleep on the floors oflower decks.32 One observer noted 
of those travelling in Anny transports, that, 
their H~alth is often impaired, ... if not actually diseased, yet exposed to Mephitic 
ExhalatIons; and where the lads, altho' sometimes latent of Malign Infection - may 
have actually possess'd their Blood, on Cloathing; for the Man must be destitute of 
Medical Knowledge, or big with Effrontary, who will advance, that the matter of 
Infection does not exist, because it has not as yet appeared, where Persons are 
crowded and lodged in a filthy State without a constant supply of pure Air, and 
where Morbic - Exhalations arising from the various Excrementatious Discharges of 
the Human Body being ... rendered more virulent from their long retention, aided by 
the perpetual influence of successive heated Animal Exhalations and Moisture; the 
very Instigator ofPutridity.33 
Even the quickest of ships could take anything from three to six days, in good conditions, to 
make the trip from Portsmouth to Lisbon,34 and invariably an expedition would be forced to 
wait off the English coast, until the whole force was assembled.35 Such confinement could 
easily become a breeding ground for disease, as occurred in Grey's West Indies fleet, prior 
to sailing in 1795, when typhus ravaged the expedition on board the ships anchored off 
Plymouth.36 This state of affairs would change little throughout the period, even with the 
appointment of Sir Jeremiah Fitzpatrick as 'Inspector of Health for the Land forces with a 
particular view to their situation when on board transports. '37 The basic requirements of a 
transport vessel were laid down, and guidelines for their operation introduced. 38 However, 
due to the demand for shipping, many were not up to the standard required, and by 1798 
30 MacDonagh, The Inspector General, 162-3; DuffY, Soldiers, Sugar and Seapower, 353 . 
3) See for example, PRO WO 116621175, Sir William Pitt to ~atthew Lewis, 1 ;th. Octo~r 1794. Complaints 
from officers that 'neither Comfort nor Health has been suffiCiently attended to , III thelf cramped 
transports; Buckle}', Journal of Captain Thomas Henry Browne, 11. 
32 See for example, Liddle-Hart, The Letters of Private Wheeler: 24. 
33 PRO WO 11897/592-3, Sir 1. Fitzpatrick to General Fox, April 1798. 
34 Hibbert, A Soldier of the 7Ist, 39; RHK-M, 31B2/8 'Route by which Commissary General Kennedy 
travelled from London to Lisbon', 1812. 
35 See for example, Vemer, Reminiscences of I!'i/liam Vern~r, 11. Vemc; recal1
04 
Ths lyin7g1ltoffal PortsmOUthboarfor 
six weeks prior to sailing for Spain in 1808; Hibbert, A Soidler of the 71 ,1 . e so were on d 
six weeks prior to sailing to America in 1815. 
36 Duffy, Soldiers, Sugar and Seapower, 138-9. 
37 MacDonagh The Inspector General, 160-5; Duffy, Soldiers, Sugar and Sea power, 353 . 
38 Stewart Henderson, A Letter to the Officers of the Army under orders for, or that may hereafter be sent, 
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Itzpatnc was reportmg condItions on board transports contrary to his regulations.39 and 
throughout the conflict shortages were observed. 
The final area of shipping used during the period were the supply ships. These 
vessels were privately owned, and hired for military purposes by the Transport Board, on 
behalf of the Board of Ordnance, the Commissary General, or regimental agents. The latter 
would deliver clothing and equipment to the regiments represented by the agents, and 
during the Peninsula campaign, at least one would be stationed permanently off the coast, to 
act as a floating regimental head quarters.40 Those ships designated 'Ordnance Transports' 
were initially used exclusively for the transport ofmunitions.41 However, as the demands on 
shipping increased, it appears that the designation between Ordnance shipping and any other 
kinds was relaxed, and there is evidence of ordnance transports delivering consignments of 
new uniforms,42 and of munitions and other stores being transported on Royal Navy vessels, 
providing that this did not conflict with the premier duty of the ships.43 The 1794 Convoy 
Act, and the 1798 Compulsory Convoy Act forbade any merchant ship to sail without a 
convoy, and so convoy duty became a substantial part of the navy's role.44 
The co-ordination of transport by the Transport Board had been successful in many 
ways. In the American War ofIndependence the various agencies charged with transport 
and supply had often competed against each other, thus raising the freight prices even 
higher.45 However, despite massive rises in the price of hiring ships during the Wars, the 
average price of tonnage by 1798, had not exceeded the average of the previous conflict.46 
It was only as the demands for shipping elsewhere in the expanding trade empire conflicted 
with the needs of the Transport Board, that prices began to rise beyond their peak of the 
39 PRO WO 1/897/591-604, Sir J. Fitzpatrick to General Fox, April 1798. 
40 RHK-M, IIBl/32.2 Captain William MacKenzie to Murray, It" January 1811; Hawker, Journal ofa 
Regimental Officer, 18. 
41 JRUL Leith, 2 Rear Admiral De Courcey to Leith, 18th September 1808. 
, , M th 
42 JRUL Leith, 4 'ReturnS of Ordnance Transports', 22 September 1808; 12, 8 October 1808. 
43 See fdr exampl~, JRUL, Leith, 8, Captain Digby oflfMS Cossack, 5th October 1808; 3rt RSCF (1798) 
488. 
44 G.J. Marcus A Naval History of England, 2. The Age of Nelson (London, 1971) 120, 365-6; Patrick 
Crowhurst, Th; Defence of British Trade, 1689-1815 (Folkestone, 1977)71 ;. ~ .R Jones, 'Limitations of 
British sea power in the French Wars, 1689-1815 ', in Jeremy B1~ck and Philip Woodfine (eds), The British 
Navy and the Use of Naval Power in the Eighteenth Century (LeIcester, 1988) 41; see for example, PRO 
WO 1/813/173, Transport Board to Earl Bathurst, 5th January 1812; Transport Board to Earl Bathurst, 21st 
January 1812; Transport Board to Earl Bathurst, 27th Jan~ 1812; See also, ~ra1d G. Graham, Empire 
of the North A tlantic: The Maritime Struggle for North Ar.nerlca 0"0ronto~ Ontarlo~ 195~) 223-36, 247-51. 
Thank you to Suzanne Phillips for her assistance in tracking the mformatlon on this subject. 
45 3rt RSCF (1798) 488. 
46 Thin 
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early 1780s. In 1799, Henry Dundas was infonned by the Transport Board that there were 
no more available ships to be used, and they felt they 'must tell him that they will not be 
able to transport another Regiment, as scarcity will increase with the approach of Spring. '47 
However, the Board maintained a substantial quantity of all types of transport in their 
employ,48 and were able to maintain the regulated rate of nineteen shillings per ton per 
month until 1806, when the pressure from the shipowners forced it to twenty five shillings. 49 
By 1810250 shillings per ton could be charged on certain non-military routes, so and 
therefore the shipowners had to balance the regular income of Army supply, with the risks 
of the open market. Simon P. Ville has suggested that shipowners chose to tie on average 
ten percent of their fleet to the Transport Board contracts, the income from which enabled 
them to diversify and expand.sl Clearly enough of their number chose this arrangement, as 
in 1812, the Transport Board were able to exert their control over shipping by cutting the 
prices they were willing to offer shipowners. From April of that year the maximum rate was 
reduced from twenty five to twenty one shillings per ton per month, which saved the public 
£ 166,615 .4s. in twelve months. 52 Although not publicised as such, it was a flexible 
maximum. 53 Rates were increased whenever the need for shipping outstripped the available 
fleet. 54 In this way the demand of the Army for transports for both men and supplies was 
met, with only occasional shortages, and without conflicting with lucrative trade routes. ss 
The transport of men and supplies had therefore developed from a haphazard free-
for-all, into a centrally controlled organisation, the Transport Board. This body was able to 
supply the massive demand ofthe military for shipping. It was able to keep prices at a 
realistic level, despite high shipping rates being available in other areas. This saved the 
public substantial amounts of money, and the regular income enabled shipowners to 
diversify into other markets. Without the Transport Board the supply of men and equipment 
to the theatres of conflict throughout the world, would have been impossible. 
47 PRO WO 11800/145 Transport Board to Henry Dundas, 21st July 1799. 
48 See for example, PRO WO 11803175-7, Transport Board to W~dham, 14th October 1806; WO 11803/85, 
'Abstract showing the state of the Transport Service, February 6 1806, and the Amount2fTonnage, on 
Monthly Pay and Discharged and Engaged between that pe:od and the Date hereoff', 14 October 1806. 
49 PRO WO 11803175-7, Transport Board to Windham, 14 October 1806 .. 
so . '11 E I ' h h ' wnl'ng during the industrial revolutIOn: Mlchael Henley and Son, London SlIDon P. VI e, ng IS s IpO 
shipowners 1770-1830 (Manchester, 1987) 126. 
SI Ibid. 152-3. th F b 1813 
S2 PRO WO 11813/173, Transport Board to Earl Bathurst, 19 e ruary . 
53 Ibid. 
S4 Ville English shipowning, 128. -' r h r..~ L - 100Q 
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7.3 TRANSPORT OVERLAND 
The developments in the supply of the Army during the Wars has been dealt with in 
the previous chapter. However, tied closely to this were the problems encountered in 
transporting those supplies to the troops on the ground. The established mode ofland 
transport of supplies in 1793, was the employment of men with the means of transport, from 
the areas over which a campaign was to be fought. Richard Glover suggests that this 
continued until the experiences in the Crimea in 1854, brought about the formation of the 
Royal Wagon Train.56 The first point to be made in the discussion of this area is that the 
failings of the common system were noted far sooner than during the Crimean war. While 
'wagons of the country' were easily obtained in the campaigns in the Low Countries, 57 such 
transport did not exist in areas such as the West Indies,58 or Egypt,59 and it was in these 
areas, and not the Crimea, that the failings of the traditional Army transport system were 
first addressed, and a corps established to deal with them.60 
In this development both Egypt and the West Indies were notable in that neither had 
a substantial and available indigenous system of supply transport. In the West Indian 
campaigns problems were experienced in the transport of all manner of items, across rough 
terrain, at a great distance from Britain, and in an area without a substantial local transport 
system, nor the local inhabitants to operate it. The solutions found were first, to establish 
depots on the coast which could be supplied from the sea,61 a method to be made great use 
of during the Peninsular war. Secondly, to utilise the troops, but in particular the sailors, in 
the expeditions, to haul the supplies on their backs,62 and thirdly to build a road system, by 
felling trees, linking the various areas of activity. 63 In Egypt the main problem was the 
supply of water in sufficient quantity to maintain an Army on the move, and here too the 
local system was to prove inadequate.64 The difficulties were exacerbated by the general 
56 R Glover, Preparation, 257. Glover suggests that it was the failure of the C~mean army to obtain 
' wagons of the country' that precipitated the formation of the Royal ~agon Tram. . . 
57 RHK-M, 21B3/-. Details the system of contractors which was orgarused by the Conumssanat through a 
local businessman, Mr. Eckhart between August 1794 and May 1796. This is supported by AO 11209/686/-, 
passim. The settled accounts of Mr. Eckhart. th 
58 GRE-A, 2243/57-63, Grey to Henry Dundas, 17 July 1794. 
59 NAM, 8002-78, 2, Lt. T.F. De Havilland to Captain Elphinstone, July 31"
1
1801. 
60 Fortescue,Army Service Corps. 49. 
61 Ibid .. 46. 
62 Fortescue, History o/the British Army. XlI, 355. 
63 Ibid. 360. 
64 FnnpcM1P A,.",,, '\:p,.. ,irp rfl""~ 'iQ-I'\l 
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lack of horseflesh. 6S Most were left behind due to the length of the passage, the likelihood 
of injury to the beasts, and the perceived availability of cheap Arab mounts.66 Stop-gap 
solutions such as the development of staging posts, and the use of camels to escort convoys 
of troops, 67 needed precision planning and often ended in failure.68 The findings of reports 
into both campaigns were that the transport system had failed the troops on the ground, and 
that a solution should be sought. 69 
The solution, or rather the attempt at a solution can be seen in the second point to 
be examined, that of the formation of an Army corps specifically responsible for transport. 
As mentioned Glover points to the formation of the Royal Corps of Wagoners in 1855 as 
the starting point. However, as early as 1794 a 'Corps of Royal Wagoners' was raised, with 
attending failure.70 As Sir James Craig, the Chief of Staff observed, 'A greater set of 
scoundrels never disgraced an Army. I believe it to be true that half of them if not taken 
from the hulks have at times visited them. '71 While another contemporary account states, 
'its miserable state became proverbial in the Army; it failed completely in every part, and the 
only trace remaining of it is a heavy charge on the half pay list for the reduced officers. '72 
The author went on to recommend the reversion to the traditional system of transport by 
contract, without reference to those areas of the globe in which such a system had, and 
would in the future, prove impossible. 
That this was the case was further borne out by the re-formation of the Corps of 
Royal Wagers, or the Royal Wagon Train, in 1799.73 Whether the Army had learned from 
its experience, or through necessity was forced to make the system work, is unclear. 
6S NAM, 8002-78, 1, Lt. T.F. De Havilland to Lieutenant Lawrence, July 28th 1801. 
66 RHK-M, 2fB51-, 'Proceedings of Board of Claims': 16th October 180l.
th 
67 NAM, 8002-78, 4, Lt. T.F. De Havilland to CaptaIn Falconer, May 27 1802. 
68 Fortescue, Army Service Corps, 60-1. . 
69 Anon., Facts Relative to the Conduct of the War in the West Indl~s, ~7-8, 166, 168-9; Lambert (ed.) 
House of Commons Sessional Papers of the Eighteenth Cen~, (WilmiDgton, Delaware, 1975) vol. c, 2. 
70 PRO WO 4/291/244-8, George Rose to Evan Nepean, 17 March 1794; HO 50/457111 , Secretary at War 
to James Poole, 11th March 1794; 12, Lord Moim to Nepean, 24th May 1794; HO 51/147/235, Henry 
Dundas to Amberst, 5th June 1794. 
71 As quoted in Fortescue, Army Service Corps,.49-50.. . 
72 . AS fi th Brl'tl'sh CommIssarIat as quoted iD, R Glover, PreparatIOn, 273 . Le Mesuner, »Istem or e ' th , 
73 PRO WO 3/20/82-3 , Calvert to Officers Commanding Regiments, 8 Au~ 1799. ~o recommend Men 
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nearly worn out iD e eM , . . nd 
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Whatever the case, the Royal Wagon Train was established, and continued with numerous 
augmentations,74 often running in conjunction with, or alongside local contractors. 
The final point which can be made in this area, is that in many cases, the local 
vehicular transport and the Royal Wagon Train, often proved insufficient, and therefore 
needed to be augmented by other local means of transportation. In Egypt, the use of camels 
continued to be a useful addition to the supply train;75 while in India, oxen, and even 
elephants were brought into service.76 However, the most significant use of an indigenous 
transport system was that which augmented the supply of the armies in Portugal and Spain, 
and which was to become the common pack animal of the British Army for over one 
hundred years, the mule. 
In 1801 , the Army in the Peninsula possessed 190 mules,77 and by 1808 the 
commissariat was attempting to increase this figure to 500.78 However, in 1811 Wellington 
decided that even the sturdiest of the local wagons was unsuitable for the rigours of the 
campaign, 79 and therefore ordered that the mule would be used exclusively for land 
transport, at divisional level and below, in the Peninsula. 80 By July 1810, the total number 
of mules in service with the Army in Spain had reached 4,025, and by July 1813 there were 
7,082 Commissariat mules alone,81 which would suggest around 15,000 mules for the Army 
as a whole,82 together with an unknown number privately owned by officers and used for 
their personal baggage.83 The mule, the means of transport of the Portuguese and Spanish 
74 See for example, PRO WO 41189/409, Charles Yorke to Lieutenant Colonel Hamilton, 4th June 1803; 
Following an inspection in October 1812, the Royal Wagon Train was used as an ambulance corps, to the 
end of the war. NLS, Murray Papers. Gordon to Wellington, 9th October 1812. 
75 NAM, 8002-78, 4, Lt. T.F. De Havilland to Captain Falconer, May 27th 1802. 
76 NAM, 713-51, 68, General Orders, 2nd September 1801. 
77 RHK-M 41B1I- note book entry, 21't August 1801. 
, , th 
78 RHK-M, 31B6/-, Kennedy to the D~rector General of Supplies, 30 Nove~ber 1808. . 
79 Lieutenant Colonel Dickson to Major-General MacIeod, D.A.G., RA., 3 July 1811, as quoted ill Ward, 
Wellington's Headquarters, 88. 
80 RHK-M, I1B11100.l , Murray to Kennedy, I't March 1811; IIB1I100 .2, 'Memorandum Respecting the 
Public Mules of Regiments', 14th February 1811. Although it is stated by neither document, a pool of mules 
must have been kept at H.Q. by the Commissary General, which was continually drawn upon by the staff 
and regiments, see for example RHK-M I1B1I25 . Murray to Kennedy. - Cartaxo - 8th Jan~ 1811, 'Colonel 
Murray presents his complements to Mr. Kennedy, and requests he wlll be so good as furnish to the officer 
of the 50th Regt., who is the bearer of this note, a mule to convey a soldier of that Regt. , to Valada, who is 
unable to march to Lisbon, to which place he is directed to proceed to attend a Court Martial. ' 
81 RHK-M, 21B4/-, Annual Returns. 
82 See for example, NAM, 7512-124, 'Daily State of Supplies of the 7th Division, under the Command of 
General Walker at Ustaritz, ' 18th December 1813, in which are listed 246 commissariat mules and 268 
regimental mules. 
83 See for example, Hawker, Journal of a Regimental Officer, 119; Vemer, Reminiscences ofWilliam 
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therefore used to carry every kind of impedimenta of the Army, from medicine and 
armourer's panniers, to tents and clothing; as the Army expanded and developed, so too did 
its reliance on mule transport.84 The mules were organised into brigades of an undefined 
number,8s and worked by a local muleteer, controlled by conductors or Capatresses. 86 
Beyond the general use of mules had been established an elaborate system of breeding; 87 
purchases;88 replacement of worn out, or 'unserviceable' animals with new ones;89 and the 
recovery of those unserviceable mules thought likely to survive, at depots.90 Such was the 
dependence of the commissariat upon mule transport, that in 1829, when the Peninsular 
accounts were eventually settled, 113 parcels of documents relating to mules were 
submitted to the Comptrollers of Army Accounts.91 
In addition to the mules, the Army in the Peninsula also made use of bullock carts to 
ferry goods continually between depots. Initially these were obtained through local purchase 
or requisition.92 However, as the demand for their services increased, the Spaniards refused 
to supply any more vehicles.93 As a result, in 1811 Wellington ordered the construction of 
800 carts of an improved design, to take place at Almeida, Lisbon, Oporto and Vianna, as 
well as in England.94 These carts were to form the core ofa new level of transport, directly 
controlled by the Commissariat, organised very much along military lines, in Grand 
Divisions of 400, and known as the Commissariat Car Train.9s Such was the success of 
these vehicles that a further 700 were delivered from England in June 1812,96 materially 
84 See for example, RHK-E, 7807-22124, Murray to Kennedy, 29th May 1811, 'As in the operations ... 
before Badajoz the want of water is likely to be very much felt by the troops upon duty ... thus water must be 
brought up to them in water casks to be carried on mules' ; RHK-M, IIBlIllO, Murray to Kennedy, 13
th 
March 1811 'The Commissary General will furnish some Mules to go back to where the firing began 
yesterday to bring up the Knapsacks of four Companies of the 9
th 
Regiment. ' 
8S Ward suggests that the number of mules per Brigade could be anything from twenty to fifty. However, 
evidence ex;sts of greater numbers, see for example, NAM, 7512-124, 'Daily State of Supplies of the 7th 
Division, under the command of General Walker at Ustaritz,' 15th December 1813, refers to a brigade of 62 
mules sent to Sec6a for biscuit. 
86 For a copy of the Standing Orders Concerning Mules, (Cartaxo, 1812), see NAM 68071221. 
87 RHK-M, 21B6/-, Lord Anglesey to Kennedy, 12th September 1813. th 
88 RHK-M, 4IB1I-, Sampayo to Kennedy, 5~ March 1814; Kennedy to Sampayo, 19 March 181~. ~ules 
were also purchased from Regiments returrung to England, see for example, RHK-E. 7807-22/381, 6 
December 1813- 7807-22/38ii, 21" December 1813. 
89 RHK-M, 1I1I75.l, Murray to Kennedy, 14th February 181~, 'replacement mule in exchange for the one 
said to have become unserviceable'; Reynett to Kennedy, 22 February 1811. 
90 RHK-M, 2IB51-, 'Notes and Accounts', 24th November 1814. 
91 RHK-M, 2IB4/-, passim. . , 
92 Schauman, On the Roadwilh Wellington, 8; Ward, Wellmgton s Headquarters. 89. 
93 WD. vii, 440-1, Wellington to Charles Stuart, ~th April 1811. th 
94 WD, viii, 406-7, Wellington to Bissett, Commtssary General, 20 November 1811. 
9~ lbid 
96 w!> .. tt W"lIinat"n·., '·">tulnt/n,.t",.., IlQ 
.. . h 233 
asslstmg m t e supply of the forces to the end of the war. The system of supply was based 
around a number of depots which were supplied by the cars in a staged relay, and from 
which the divisions were maintained by means of their mules.97 Based on the success of this 
system, by the end of the conflict various carts had been developed supplies, with various 
degrees of success. 98 In addition, experiments into the transporting of men in carts or 'horse 
bus' were conducted.99 
The use of inland water transport was also developed during the period, for both 
transport and the crossing of waterways. Its use as a means of transporting men and 
supplies was desirable, being cheaper, and for the most part more efficient than either the 
carts or pack animals employed during any stage of the conflict. 100 During the early 
campaigns; in the Low countries during 1799, operations were only possible in canalised 
areas due to the severe lack of wheeled transport to supply the troops,101 and boats were 
drawn from every source possible. 102 During 1804, Wellesley caused a pool of wicker boats 
covered with hides to be manufactured, which together with local craft enabled him to cross 
every unfordable river from Serringaptam to Poona, and so fight through both famine and 
flood. 103 
The manufacture of boats in India is unusual, for in other locations there are 
references only to the use of local craft. However, the numbers of craft needed to support 
an Army was far greater than that normally used by the indigenous population, and so 
substantial planning was clearly essential. During the Peninsula campaign the British forces, 
used the various kinds of local vessels to ferry all manner of goods as well as men along the 
Tagusl04, Mondego l05 and Douro.106 This was first tried as an 'experiment' in 1809.107 In 
97 PRO WO 37/10/29-30, 'Outline of the Arrangements for the Daily Supply of the Army', no date; 31-3, 
'General Plan', no date. 
98 PRO WO 3/43/321, Calvert to Lord Paget, 15th August 1807; WO 112051227 
99 Patrick Crichton, Observations on a Machine for the Speedy Conveyance of Troops; and report of an 
experimentfor that purpose, begun on Friday, the rt of June 1804, and continuedfor the five succeeding 
days, under the sanction of General Earl Moira. (Edinburgh, 1804) pas.s~m. ; Scha~, On the Road with 
Wellington, 39; R. Glover, Britain at Bay, 45; R. Glover, 'The Royal MilItary Canal ,AQ, October 1953, 
97-105 ' Cbristie Wars and Revolutions, 262. 
100 WZ), v, 194, Wellington to Liverpool, l it August 1811. 
101 Fortescue Army Service Corps, 55-9. 
, th 1 102 RHK-M, 4/811-, note book entry, 26 August 180 . 
103 Fortescue History of the British Army, 89. 
104 PRO WO'37/6/- The Diary of Sir George Scovell, 11th April 1809; Schauman, On the Road with 
Wellington 55' W~d, Wellington's Headquarters, 89; RHK-M, 4182/- 'Concerning the Passage of the 
Douro, Mo~de~o, and Tagus' . Undated. The Tagus was navigable by small river boats, or fragatas, as far as 
Abrantes. 
10S Thi" Th .. Mnnti .. un w<lC nllviu"hl .. in unnt .. r tn Fn7_nlln in Cl1rnm .. r tn R"h,,, 
-----------------------
234 
order to utilise the quantity of shipping needed to move cargoes beyond that normally 
transported by the civilian boatmen, substantiallogistical planning, was required, together 
with a monopolising of all craft, and the expansion of the available fleet. However, it does 
appear that with the co-ordination of the efforts of the Commissary General's and Quarter 
Master General's departments enough local craft were made available. 108 In addition 
intelligence reports were commissioned, outlining the available ferries and crossing places 
on all rivers in the Peninsula,109 while regular use was made of bridges ofboats.llo 
In Britain too there was a realisation of the efficacy of the use of inland waterways, 
for the transporting of men and supplies. The system of military canals were developed as a 
measure to be used in the event of invasion. III They enabled the movement of large bodies 
of men to any point on the system, often linking key installations. 112 In 1809, the Royal 
Military Canal opened, lirIking Shomcliffe Camp with Rye. 113 This particular section was 
significant in that the private contractors, Hollingsworth, Bough and Dyson were employed 
to excavate it, rather than the Royal Sappers and Miners, in order that it should be 
completed on time, since the Ordnance department were dragging their feet. 114 In addition 
to creating a system of military waterways, the construction of the canals assisted in the 
development of trade in the locality, making it easier to move goods, while generating 
revenue through tolls for such passage. m 
The transporting of men and equipment on the ground was addressed in several 
ways. Most notable was the sheer diversity of methods used in an active service situation, 
which reveals a great flexibility. From this flexibility emerged, in particular, the use of the 
mule as the main means of transporting heavy supplies at divisional level, and which, as a 
106 Jbid.; WD •. v, 194, Wellington to Liverpool, 1" August 1811 . The Douro, the most important of the 
rivers had a highly developed system of navigation, with large boats, or maitrizes, plying throughout all 
seasons to the Vale de Lucaia near Lamego, and smaller boats, or trafegueiras, to Quinta dos Carvalhos 
near St.' Joao-da-Pesqueira, in summer, while in winter, and after the Engineers had improved the bed of the 
river in 1812, it could be navigated safely to the Portuguese frontier at Barca-de-Alva. 
107 DILo/c/18/43/227-32, Stewart to Castlereagh, 6th July 1809. 
108 RHK-M 2/B8/- 'Memorandum Concerning Boats on the Douro', 2200 ApriI1813 ; RHK-E, 7807-22/3 
Murray to Kennedy: 6th November 1811. 
109 JRUL, Leith, 15, 'Intelligence report on Ferries and crossings by 1. Eastman', 20th October 1808. 
110 See for example, Hawker, Journal of a Regimental Officer. 72. 
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solution. was to last over 100 years. Inland waterways were also used to great effect, as a 
means of transporting both men and supplies, and within Britain as a means to link military 
districts and key installations. But despite the diversity of means of transport used during 
the Wars, the main mode of moving troops overland was still to march them. 
7.4 MARCHING REGIMENTS 
The movement of troops on land changed little until the advent of the railway 
permitted thousands of men to cross continents with greater ease and in reasonable comfort 
during the late nineteenth century. Prior to this, if an Army was to be moved over land, it 
had to march. The effectiveness of marching men depends on several factors; the health of 
the troops; the quality of their clothing and equipment; the terrain over which they must 
move, the weather; and for a cavalryman, to this list must be added the condition of his 
mount. It has been shown in the previous chapter that the health of the troops improved, as 
regular supplies of food became available through an improvement in supply; that their 
clothes and equipment also improved; (in particular after 1812, a supply of good shoes, 
designed specifically for the Army was always available). However, no reform could be 
introduced to alter the weather or terrain over which regiments had to march. Clearly in a 
war that would become a global conflict, lasting twenty two years, these factors would be 
completely different from one location to another, and from season to season. Little could 
be done to affect this, save more thorough planning at head quarters, and better training for 
the troops to enable them to cope with such conditions. 
The first training a soldier would receive throughout the period, was to be taught to 
march. The method being laid out in Dundasl16 was little different from the drills performed 
throughout the eighteenth century.117 The Rules and Regulations of 1792 stated that, 
In marching the soldier must maintain, as much as possible, the position of the body. 
He must be well balanced on his limbs. His arms and hands without stiffness, must 
be kept steady by his sides, and not suffered to vibrate. He must not be allowed to 
stoop forward, still less to lean back. His body must be kept square to the front, and 
thrown rather more forward in marching than when halted, that it may accompany 
the movement of the leg and thigh, which movement must spring from the haunch. 
116 Rules and Regulations for the Fonnations, Field-Exercise, and Movements, of His Majesty's Forces, 
(London, 1792) 6. . . 
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The ham must be stretched, but without stiffening the knee. The toe a little pointed, 
and kept near the ground, so that the shoe-soles may not be visible to a person in 
front. The head to be kept well up, straight to the front, and the eyes not suffered to 
be cast down. The foot, without being drawn back, must be placed flat on the 
ground. I IS 
This regulation did not change throughout the period. The length of the pace from heel to 
heel was to be thirty inches, and the soldier was to be able to march at the 'Ordinary Step', 
of seventy five paces per minute, instinctively, only occasionally being permitted to move 
more quickly. The faster paces were the 'Quick Step'119, which was 108 paces to the 
minute, and used for the movement of small bodies of men, and the manoeuvres of 
battalions, such as column into line, and the 'Quickest Step'120, also known as the 'wheeling 
march', which was 120 paces to the minute, or the equivalent of covering 300 feet in each 
minute. It was used, as its name suggests, chiefly in the performance of the wheeling 
manoeuvre. Neither of the quicker paces were to be used to move large bodies for any 
distance, 'otherwise fatigue must arise to the soldier, and more time will be lost by hurry 
and inaccuracy, than is attempted to be gained by quickness. ' 121 
The desired effect of such marching appears to have been the swift forward 
movement of the battalion of men as a solid body, and all aspects were geared towards the 
performance of this function. The step is surprisingly long, and requires a great amount of 
flexibility to perform for any length oftime, if the thirty inch pace is to be maintained. It 
clearly must have been, since great emphasis is placed on the use of the pace stick; the 
sergeants and officers would march within the body of the unit; and even the slightest 
individual variance would have caused disorder to the battalion whose function was to act 
as one. 
Line Infantry continued to use this system throughout the period under discussion. 
However, from 1803 certain regiments had been converted to a Light Infantry role, and 
experimented with a new style of marching. 122 This was to become the standard mode for 
118 See for example, Rules and Regulations ... Formations. Field-Exercise. and Movements (1792) 6; Rules 
and Regulations Formations. Field-Exercise. and Movements (1801) 6; Rules and Regulations ... ~anual 
and Platoon Exercises. Formations. Field-Exercise. and Movements (1806) 6; Rules and Regulations ... 
Formations. Field-Exercise. and Movements (1815) 6. Despite minor revisions in other areas of the 
Regulations, the details of marching remain the same in all editions, even featuring on the same page. 
119 Ibid. 13, 
120Ibid 14. 
121 Ibid. 14. 
122 ""lip .. . f::i,. Inn" ""nnrp'~ .f::lI~fpm nfTrni"i"u QQ.l nn 
all light infantry and rifle units, although the system from which it derives was not PUbliS~~ 
until 1823.123 These units needed a means of moving swiftly at all times, without causing 
undue strain on the body, and the manual states that, 'stiffuess in the knees, pointing of 
toes, stamping against the ground, flourishing with the feet, and all constrained positions are 
highly improper'124, referring to the perceived rigidity of the previous system. The 
comments of an officer of the 52nd Light Infantry, suggest why the changes were made, 
All flourishing of the feet and extreme distress of the knees are expressly prohibited 
as tending to render the body unsteady. Perhaps one or two handsome active men of 
a Company might be brought to practice this Parade sort of Marching, with tolerable 
ease and steadiness, but as this would only render the awkwardness of the other men 
more glaring, and sacrifice the steadiness of numbers to the gracefulness of a few, it 
is better to practice them in an easy and steady, though perhaps not elegant, mode of 
marching. The feet should be brought down without any exertion, or straining on 
knocking against the ground, which may tend to shake the body. 125 
This method of marching was initially mimicked by,126 and was eventually to replace that 
performed, by the rest of the Army. It was of more use when marching greater distances 
and over rough terrain, and was to continue in use, with only minor modifications, until the 
present day. 
During the early campaigns of the Wars, there appears to have been a lack of 
understanding of the suffering experienced by the troops on the march. Expeditions were 
landed often at great distances from their objectives, 127 with fully laden knapsacks,128 and 
with insufficient water to survive, without a victory. 129 Even with the success of the 
departments of supply, outlined in the previous chapter, the problem of marching great 
distances was not one that could be avoided, in a global conflict extending to areas far from 
the coast. However, its effects could be reduced by making troops ready for such exertions 
through better training. From 1803, the regime at Shorncliffe Camp encouraged officers to 
train their men to keep fit through many activities, including marches, and experimented 
with various methods of conducting a march. 130 During 1812, the 23rd Regiment in Spain, 
acclimatised their men to long marches in the Iberian heat by marching them several miles 
123 Cross, A System of Drill and Manoeuvres, ii. 
124 Ibid. 8. 
od . t' 2 125 'Peculiarities in the Drill of the 52 Regunen, . 
126 BP, Charles to Henry Booth, 26th July 1807. 
127 Fortescue History of the British Army, 397. 
128 Hibbert, A Soldier of the 71", 49-50; Bell, Soldier's Glory, 59. 
129 F ortescue, Army Service Corps, 60-1 . 
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each day, to keep them in 'good wind' .131 This practice was to become the standard for t!!8 
whole Army under Wellington. 132 
This realisation is also reflected in the load expected to be carried by a soldier. In 
1810, an infantryman described his burden, 
My knapsack contained two shirts, two pairs of stockings, one pair overalls, two 
shoe brushes, a shaving box, one pair spare shoes, and a few other articles; my 
greatcoat and blanket above the knapsack; my canteen with water was strung over 
my shoulder on one side, my haversack with beef and bread on the other; sixty 
round of ball cartridge, and the camp-kettle above all. I33 
This is supported by Private Wheeler, who states that what he carried, 'was load enough for 
a donkey. '134 Through the period equipment lists show a reduction in the heavy burden 
carried by the troops. The intrenching tools were placed on transport mules,135 the cast iron 
camp kettle were replaced by the same item made in tin, 136 and other articles, such as great 
coats, were returned to Regimental stores when not perceived as being needed. 137 As stated 
in the previous chapter, the supply of shoes was improved to enable a much speedier issue 
to troops. However, even with such practical reforms, it would still prove impossible to 
prevent soldiers loading themselves down with the spoils of war, 138 or to avoid the 
privations experienced when an Army was forced into full retreat. 139 
7.5 HORSEFLESH 
While infantry regiments could be trained to a level of fitness, it proved increasingly 
difficult for mounted troops to be maintained. Horses were a constant problem throughout 
the period, being difficult to transport, and needing constant attention and food, even when 
their riders were forced to do without. Horses were often not taken with armies travelling 
great distances, since it was believed they did not travel well, and that local mounts could be 
131 Buckley. Journal of Captain Thomas Henry Browne, 151-2. 
132 Petty, 'General Orders of Wellington', 146. 
133 Hibbert, Soldier of the 71", 49-50. 
134 Liddle Hart, Letters of Private Wheeler, 51. 
135 RHK-M, 1/Bl/58, 63.1. 76.1 Murray to Kennedy, 4th, 6th, 17th February 1811. 
136 RHK-M. 1/Bl/86 Murray to Kennedy, 21~ February 1!11. 
137 WD viii 354 Wellington to the Earl of LIverpool, 23 October 1811. 
138 See'for ;xam~le, Hibbert, Soldier of the 7 r', 9-10; Ha,:k~r, Journal of a Reg:mental Office:, 64-5 . 
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purchased. During the Grey-Jervis expedition in the first year of the war, dragoons 
remained dismounted,14O due to the reluctance to transport horses from England, and the 
difficulty of obtaining new ones in the colonies.141 The same was the case for the 
Abercromby-Christian expedition, the horses for which were to be purchased from 
America.142 As stated above, the problem of transport was again envisaged in the 
preparations for the Egyptian campaign in 1801, and therefore few horses, if any, were 
taken with the expedition.143 Reports later in the period were to suggest that sea crossings 
were not particularly injurious to horses, and so more were to be shipped greater 
distances. 144 This seems to have had more to do with the necessity of constantly obtaining 
fresh mounts in the Peninsula, than with a genuine improvement in the condition of 
transported horses. Problems were still being experienced with horses during the Peninsular 
campaign. In 1809, the horses of the 14th Light Dragoons had become quite sick on board a 
transport. 14S This situation was to continue throughout the period. 146 
The Peninsula was to prove problematic for mounted troops in every respect. The 
terrain was rough, the climate harsh, and fodder was difficult to obtain. 147 By 1809, the 
horses were 'dying by hundreds in the week.'148 By 1811, there seems to have been little 
improvement, as the whole ofthe cavalry mounts were said to be in a sad state, 'being ill 
provided .. . with provisions and forage,' according to the commissary of the cavalry. He 
stated that 'the whole number of horses .. . [were] incapable of performing the review, ... 
being sick, weak, or lame.' 149 The Corunna retreat had exacerbated the problem, but had 
brought about several minor reforms, such as the introduction of spare horse shoes and 
nails and courses to teach even the officers to shoe their mounts. ISO 
, 
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The effects of the climate, or the harsh campaign are understandable. However the 
failure of the cavalry to appreciate even the basic rudiments of horse management is 
unbelievable among troops with centuries of experience in this field . It can be observed 
repeatedly, such as when the Lifeguards landed at Lisbon in 1812, with horses in such a bad 
condition that Wellington was forced to insist on the issue of curry combs and brushes by 
the colonels. 151 Such neglect is even more surprising as horses were in such a great demand. 
In 1811 there were attempts to improve the condition of the mounted arm of the 
Peninsula Anny. A Depot for Sick and Lame Horses, with attendant veterinary surgeons 
was established, 152 along the lines pioneered by the French since the outbreak of the Wars. 
153 Remount Depots were also set Up,IS4 where horses from all sources were collected prior 
to their distribution to regiments. This would include those imported from the usual sources 
such as Ireland, m and from as far afield as the United States of America 156 and Brazil. m 
Each cavalry regiment was also permitted to appoint its own veterinary surgeon.1S8 and a 
vet was also stationed at Portsmouth to check horses prior to their embarkation for active 
service. 159 By 1812, all such activity was co-ordinated from three consolidated 'Depots of 
Cavalry' in England.I60This enabled all units of the Army to make improvements in the 
condition of their mounts. 
7.6 MAPS 
Despite improvements in the means of transport, difficulties were still experienced, 
often as a result of a lack of local knowledge, and a deficiency in maps. At the outbreak of 
war the available plans and maps covered few areas outside the familiar battle grounds of 
151 WD. ix, 589, 1" December 1812, Wellington to Major General Peacocke. 
152 NAM, 68071221 , ' Standing Orders of the Commissariat, 1811' ; RHK-M, I1B1I220.1 Murray to 
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m WD. ix, 408, 31" May 1813. ., 
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function, this situation obviously needed to be remedied. 
Admiralty charts were available to the early West Indian expeditions, but more 
reliable were the captured French maps or private surveys, which revealed inland details as 
well as those on the coast. 162 It was not until 1808 that reliable British maps of the islands 
were produced.163 
By the time of the campaigns in Portugal and Spain, little had improved. The maps 
which Wellington took to the Peninsula, known as the Lopez Maps, are by modern 
standards impressionistic, and even by contemporary standards, quite poor. 164 They have no 
annotations, no scale, and omit the names of several towns. 165 They were clearly of limited 
use, and were intended to be used with other sources. 166 In addition, ever greater emphasis 
was placed on reconnaissance. The intelligence papers of Sir James Leith are filled with 
requests for information about the land over which the Anny was to move,167 and orders to 
send back sketches,168 suggesting an absence of reliable maps. Even the coastline was 
poorly charted, and information was continually sought from the navy. 169 Throughout the 
campaign reports and memoranda were compiled concerning every possible detail of 
Portugal and Spain, 170 and these, together with sketch maps,171 were copied and distributed 
to the commanders of divisions. I72 No opportunity was missed to gain useful information, 
161 Similar problems were experienced at the outbreak of the American War ofIndependence. Douglas 
William Marshall, 'The British Military Engineers, 1741-1783: A Study of Organisation, Social Origin and 
Cartography' , unpublished PhD thesis (Michigan University, 1976) 198. 
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with officers being required to submit an itinerary of each journey they made to the 
Quartermaster General in the Peninsula, detailing the length of each stage of their journey, 
together with the nature of the terrain over which they passed. 173 In addition this 
information was sent via Lisbon, to the Repository for Military Knowledge in London. 174 It 
would not be until the end of 1810 that anything of greater accuracy was produced. By this 
time 'sketching' officers of the Quarter Master General's department had mapped virtually 
the whole of central Portugal, on a scale of four miles to the inch. 175 This task continued 
even after the end of the campaign, the finished result being published in 1841 .176 
The mapping of Britain was in a no more advanced state at the outbreak of the war. 
Scotland had been surveyed by William Roy between 1748 and 1755.177 Following his death 
in 1790 his mantle had been taken up by the Duke of Richmond, who was responsible for 
placing the Ordnance Survey on a permanent footing. 178 In conjunction with the 
development of the defences on the south coast, the areas were surveyed up to 1801, 
mapping being seen 'as much a part of the defence infrastructure as fortification and 
shipbuilding. '179 The emphasis was on the relief and use of the land, concentrating on its 
military usefulness, a theme common in military works of the day. 180 This was also the 
essence of several of the lectures given by J arry at the Royal Military College, Wycombe 
from 1799.181 
The production of maps for use by the Army had been taken over by the Ordnance 
at home and abroad, thus centralising their making. As a result of the developments during 
the Wars, detailed maps would continue to be an integral part of any future military 
campaign. In addition, the Ordnance Survey had become a dedicated and permanent 
cartography department. 
173 See for example, RHK-M, 2fB51-, 'Route by which Sir Robert Kennedy proceeded from Lisbon to Head 
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7.7 COMMUNICATION 
While improvements in cartography eased the movement of the Army over the 
globe, equivalent improvements in the standards of military communication were not 
forthcoming. By the standards of today, with instant satellite battlefield communications, the 
dissemination of information within the Army, during the period under discussion, 
functioned at a snail's pace. However, the speed at which orders and information could be 
passed was only relative, since little had changed in centuries, and there was no expectation 
of anything faster. Improvements in this area were concerned with responding to the needs 
of the moment, rather than an innovative change. 
At the outbreak of the conflict, orders issued to the troops through all staff levels, 
whether from Horse Guards or a local commander, were issued in long-hand. In most cases 
they were copied, at least for the sender and the recipient, if not more. This practice was 
that used in previous conflicts, 182 and one which would continue throughout the century. 183 
It involved the employment of numerous clerks and copyists, who maintained the flow of 
written orders. The administrative staff increased in number as the war progressed. At the 
outbreak of the war, these tasks had been undertaken by officers, and occasionally N.C.O.s, 
as the need arose,184 but in 1804, the post of 'civilian clerk' was introduced.18s In 1809, the 
Adjutant General's department and the Quartermaster General's department, each employed 
seven such clerks, 186 in an Army of 133,922 men.187 By 1816, within the Army of 
Occupation, the former had twenty two clerks, and the latter twenty seven, 188 and that for a 
force of only 30,000 men. 189 Such a proliferation of clerical staff is mirrored in other civilian 
departments, and Brewer suggests that it is one measure of the developing state.190 It is 
another sign of the exerting of control over areas of the military by the civilian authority, for 
182 See for example, GRE-A, 2240, 'Military Orderly Book', General Orders, 9th June 1778. 
183 See for example, GRE-D, V9/I , Memorandum, 1854. 
184 Clode, Mi litary Forces 0/ the Crown, 1, 388. 
18S Ibid, 389. 
186 1111t RCME (1810) Appendix 14(A). 
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188 Ward, Wellington's Headquarters. 207. . . . . 
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Communication between commanders and Horse Guards was essentially regular. In 
Britain, with its developed postal system this was relatively swift and straightforward. 
However, on active service, this could prove difficult. In Portugal, the local post-office was 
used as the basis of the Anny communications network, but little else, due to its primitive 
nature,l92 while in Spain from April 1811, the Army had to rely on its own resources. 193 The 
communication within the staff was essentially constant. Wellington could be in contact 
with his commanders hourly, 194 and for this system to function troops, particularly cavalry, 
were attached to headquarters.195 As the Anny expanded, the numbers of cavalry needed to 
be engaged in these duties increased to such an extent, that in 1814, one brigade of cavalry 
had thirteen letter parties and one full troop so employed.196 The establishment of the Corps 
of Mounted Guides in 1809, under Sir George Scovell, 197 went only a small way towards 
alleviating the problem of tying up of cavalry in these duties. In 1813 it had expanded from 
eight officers and thirty four other ranks, to twelve officers and one hundred and ninety 
three other ranks, 198 but Cotton still considered this insufficient, in an Anny that had come 
to expect a high level of communication. 199 Experiments in the use of telegraph were tried, 
and met with reasonable success.200 The initial dictionary for use with the telegraph, was the 
standard naval signal-book, the Marine Vocabulary,201 which by 1810 had been given a 
more military content,202 although the system was dependant upon naval personnel to run 
it. 203 Despite its limited use,204 the telegraph was clearly developed further, as in 1813 
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urray ms ruc e t at a IVlslonal system was to be introduced.20s The signals used in this 
case were, according to Ward, a clear ancestor of the twentieth century semaphore.206 
However, throughout the period the system was never to be as advanced as that established 
in France, and used to great effect throughout the occupied territories.207 
During the course of the war little was done to improve the communication between 
Britain and her armies. Orders could take as little as six days to reach headquarters in Spain 
from London,2og while the West Indian orders could take as many months. During the 
Peninsular campaign, a regular packet was instituted from Lisbon to England, which sailed 
every Sunday, from 1809.209 However, for much of the communication with Horse Guards 
and troops along the Iberian coast, the Army headquarters had to rely upon the co-
operation of the navy.210 Initially the relationship was infomlal, with individual officers 
making local arrangements for communication. In November 1808, Captain Hanhian of 
H.MS. Unicorn wrote to General Leith requesting that 'from time to time I be informed of 
the movements of the Anny that I might position the ships under my command along the 
coast, for the purpose of keeping up a communication' .211 The following year the support 
of the Peninsula Anny by the navy was fOmlalised, and Admiral Berkeley was sent to the 
Tagus with this purpose in mind.212 Communications could be held up by various problems, 
and contemporary gaps in letter series are not uncommon.213 The most common cause of 
loss or delay was the weather. During October 1808, the westerly gales off the coast of 
Spain were so strong as to make the landing of all mail at Corunna impossible for two 
weeks.214 Obviously, in a study of the Army at war, the action of the enemy must also be a 
factor influencing the transmission of orders. In 1804, the Admiral A/pin was captured by 
the French, and the contents of the letters and despatches she was carrying published in Le 
Moniteur.215 In order to minimise the damaged caused by such a loss, a numerical cipher 
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was introduced for use with certain of the intelligence reports after 1810,216 although suc~46 
codes had been in use for some time for diplomatic despatches.217 By 1812, the French also 
had a military cipher in operation.218 Despite the problems of communication experienced 
by the British, Wellington stated that they were better off than their opponents, 'The French 
armies have no communication and one Army no knowledge of the position or 
circumstances in which the other is placed; whereas I have a knowledge of all that passes on 
all sides. '219 Despite his confidence, communication between Britain and her armies was in 
no way swift, and so commanders often acted independent of government orders. This 
meant that political fluctuations at home could often be ignored by the field commander. 
But, it could also lead to accusations that the commander had overstepped his authority, 
such as those directed at the Generals in South America and Egypt during 1806,220 or those 
who negotiated the Convention of Cintra. 221 Thus, as discussed in Chapter 2, making the 
appointment of trusted Generals to field commands vital. 
The conveying of orders to smaller formations, such as battalions, was of equal 
importance, for it was these units that would put into practice the orders of the commanding 
generals. This was done either verbally, or musically, with all commands emanated from the 
commanding officer, and being passed down through the rank structure. In battalion 
manoeuvres, when one voice would be difficult to hear, the commander would call the first 
part of an order. This 'preparatory' would then be repeated by all other officers in unison. 
The unit would wait to act upon the second part of the order, 'the executive', when shouted 
by the commander, and emphasised by the majors.m Even after repeating men often found 
it difficult to hear such orders, and often the whisper of the N.C.D.s could be heard in the 
ranks, ensuring an order was carried out. 223 Under such circumstances, it was essential to 
know the voice of those in command, in particular that of the commanding officer. As 
difficult as hearing the commander's voice might be under normal circumstances, it would 
be doubly so under battle-field conditions, despite the Rules and Regulations stating that, 
'In the midst ofSUITounding noises, the eye and the ear of the soldier should be attentive 
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on music to pass his commands. The drum is a centuries old means of conveying orders, and 
continued in use throughout the course of this study. However, during this period greater 
emphasis was placed on extended formations, and so the bugle became increasingly popular. 
Although not a new idea, (the horn being used in medieval armies),22S and the trumpet by 
cavalry, it was a departure from what had become the norm within infantry. The system 
adopted for the Army was that developed by Baron de Rottenburg.226 The bugle calls were 
first used by the light infantry units training at Shorncliffe under Moore,227 and they formed 
the basis for those used throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.228 The light 
infantry units also developed the use of whistle calls in the field .229 These bear an uncanny 
resemblance to those traditionally used with dogs by hunters,230 and perhaps shows 
something of the mentality of those developing such systems. 
Routine information from the Commander of an Army, which needed to be 
disseminated to the whole of his force, was issued in the form of General Orders. The 
development of the General Orders of Wellington's Peninsular operation is an obvious 
milestone in British military administration. The regular issue of edicts via the Adjutant 
General, enabled the control of the largest Army to take the field in living memory, 
operating over difficult terrain, in countries allied to Britain, and therefore not open to the 
abuse which characterised the French campaigns over the same soil. However, such means 
of control were not new, and had been deployed earlier in the period under discussion, in 
both the West Indies in 1793-4,231 the Low Countries in 1794-5,232 North America in 
1800,233 and Egypt in 1801.234 The majority of General Orders were copied long-hand, 
from the commander in chiefs office, whether at home or on campaign.235 Those of the 
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ey- ervts expe ItlOn took this form completely, and differ little from those issued in the 
Le' 236 ow ountnes or the Peninsular.237 The orders were of a uniform appearance, which 
continued through all the campaigns covered in this study. Grey's previous military 
experience had been during the American War of Independence, and his note books reveal a 
system of General Orders covering the same topics, and taking the same form as those of 
subsequent campaigns.238 While it is not suggested that Grey was responsible for the 
system, it is clear that it was in place prior to the outbreak of war in 1793. A feature which 
was to develop during the period under discussion, is that several General Orders series 
were translated into the local language, in the same form as the English version.239 This 
would enable a common military discipline to be spread across all forces under British 
control. 
The most significant feature of the issue of General Orders during the period under 
discussion, is that from 1812, and throughout the advance through Spain, three printing 
presses were carried with the headquarters, on which updated general orders were issued.240 
Prior to this orders had been printed, but only on occasions when headquarters were 
situated in towns with such facilities. 241 Another aspect of their issue, is that in 1811, after 
thirteen years of warfare, the collection from 1808 were considered uniform and constant 
enough to be published by authority.242 This publication was repeated with little alteration in 
1815,243 and was the basis of future such works well into the nineteenth century.244 The first 
published set of operating procedures for the Army as a whole, was the General 
Regulations and Orders jar His Majesty 's Forces, issued in 1786,245 which can be seen to 
be the origin of the General Regulation and Orders of 1807.246 and are little different from 
the 1811 edition. The 1786 work is, for the most part, a printed form of the General Orders 
contained in the notebooks of Grey.247 Prior to the appointment ofWellesley to the 
Peninsular command, General Orders were being issued from Moore's headquarters, which 
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ear more an a passmg resemblance to those issued later by Wellington's office, and those 
printed in the Regulations and Orders, of 1807 and 181 I.248 Wellington can be said to be 
responsible for their tightening up, and ensuring that all troops were aware of their contents 
and adhered to them. Through the summer of 1809 General Orders were issued enforcing 
the reading of all such orders to troops at the earliest oppOrtunity;249 the endorsing of such 
orders by the officer receiving them;2So a reply to be made to the brigade commander within 
a week of receipt, informing of compliance;2S 1 and the annotating of all weekly returns with 
a statement as to which General Orders were missing.252 Attempts to tighten up the issue 
and acknowledgement of General Orders had been attempted before,253 but never in such a 
prolonged and concerted manner. Dupin observed, 
The general regulations applicable to troops on home service, are extended to the 
forces serving abroad, a rigorous discipline has enforced the execution of these 
regulations, and an exactitude and punctuality have thus been maintained, which 
were formerly altogether unheard of in the English service.254 
, 
That Wellington was not the sole author of the General Regulations and Orders is 
clear. However, he was able to refine the use of the General Orders beyond that achieved by 
previous commanders. Within six months of the death of Sir John Moore, the first series of 
orders was issued, which was to be repeated annually.255 This was possible due to the 
distance of the Army from Horse Guards, which enabled Moore to assert his authority upon 
the whole force, supported by a fast-improving logistical system. The Grey-Jervis 
expedition at the outbreak ofthe Wars, was dogged by deficiencies in the supply of men, 
food and equipment. This resulted in their command being run in terms of subsistence, 
rather than being able to establish an effective system of General Orders. 256 Other 
campaigns were over too quickly to enable a system to be introduced, whether through 
success or failure. The early campaign in the Low Countries became one of raids out of the 
canalised areas and so the General Orders took on a form akin to garrison duty in Rethin 
, 
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and Osnabruck. 257 Although the Egyptian campaign, 258 generated detailed General 
Orders,259 its nature meant that most concerned experiments in supply, and the division of 
the bounty.260 Clearly the nature of the conflict dictated the fonn which orders would take. 
Another means of disseminating information to the Army was through Standing 
Orders. Usually for individual units, no other period produced as many versions of such 
works. The proliferation of Standing Orders during the period under discussion, is clearly 
what sets it apart from that prior to 1793. Many of the privately produced sets of rules were 
printed for the consumption of a much wider audience, despite being written for a more 
specific market. The standing orders of the Experimental Rifle Corps, were merely the 
operating regulations for an experimental cadre. But, such was the interest in irregular 
formations, that within a year of the completion of the experiment, these regulations were 
published,261 and formed part of subsequent light infantry training.262 It is possible that in 
previous generations of officers, ideas as to interior management and economy could be 
passed down through practice and association. Whereas in a global conflict, many military 
thinkers and innovators would neither meet nor have time to spend in experimentation, due 
to the dispersed nature of the conflicts, or their premature exit from the service. In these 
circumstances it was better to publish such workings and ideas, and so generate debate and 
development. There was of course a market for military publications of all kinds, stimulated 
by an interest in the war, and a level of patriotism. 263 This was further fuelled by the 
expansion, not merely of the regular military forces, but also of the temporary and part-time 
COrpS.264 The volunteers in particular lacked any great official direction in their training, 
especially after the removal of their Inspecting Field Officers by Windham. Printed standing 
orders and other treatise would therefore be a great asset to an aspiring commander's 
library. Even regular officers would benefit from such works, since formal training was at a 
minimum. The form taken by standing orders throughout the period in question, did not 
alter, and had changed little from those of previous dates.26s Indeed, the previous works 
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were republished to meet the renewed demand,266 along with the more up-to-date treatise, 
thus perpetuating best practice from one conflict to another. 
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7.8 CONCLUSION 
The changes brought about in the transport systems of the Army during the period 
reveal much about the nature of the British military machine of the time. As with other 
areas, the underlying principle is one of centralisation, drawing the control for many aspects 
of the various transport systems to the centre, and in particular the civilian centre. It is most 
notable that the two departments responsible for the supply and transport of the largest 
armies Britain had ever put into the field, were the Transport Board and the Commissariat, 
both civilian, and both ultimately responsible to the Treasury. The Transport Board can be 
seen to have played a pivotal role in organising the transport of men and supplies to the 
countries over which the Army campaigned. Theirs was a crucial position, being responsible 
for a task that could so easily have brought them into conflict with those involved in 
lucrative foreign trade, on which the maintenance of a strong economy, and so that of the 
war, depended. The principle of Transport Board operations was its use of private 
enterprise, and for all it was a major employer of shipping throughout the war, it never 
entered into ownership of vessels. Instead it relied on a market, in which demand for 
shipping already outstripped supply. When the market failed to produce enough ships, the 
Board were able to resort to a reluctant Royal Navy, to transport both men and supplies. It 
was the central control that would permit such flexibility, without any loss of co-ordination 
ofetfort. 
The second tier of transport, that organised and maintained by the Commissariat, 
was also steadily brought under central control, as the period progressed. Traditionally, it 
was a role fulfilled by the local private contractors in the areas of conflict. However, the 
scale of the Wars from 1793 would mean that the centralised control of such private 
enterprise was essential, taking the risk away from individuals, while increasing the level of 
co-ordination, of the numerous elements, from the Commissary, and ultimately the 
Treasury. In addition, as with the Transport Board, the central control enabled greater 
flexibility, permitting the use of diverse indigenous means of transport, when conventional 
ones were insufficient, but always within a rigid system of supply. 
The mode of moving men over land changed little. The manner in which soldiers 
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Horse Guards. It was also an area that would see development during, and as a direct result 
of, active service. The fitness of the men was to become of unm' ense . rt h Impo ance, as t ey 
were expected to function in extreme conditions. This too was to come under the scrutiny 
of authority, and a centralised regime imposed. 
Inland waterways were of great utility in the transporting of heavy and bulky 
cargoes, including men. This was taken a stage further in Britain by the development of a 
system of military canals by the government, primarily for military purposes, but able to 
fund itself from the use made of it by private traffic. This also developed a certain element 
of control over civilian boats and their cargoes. Inland waterways were long an area where 
central government wielded its power within continental Europe, where canals were state 
owned enterprises. However, in Britain they were a departure from the norm of private 
canal development, and another sign of the state encroaching on all areas of the military. 
The realisation that to fight a global war, a country needed maps and charts was 
brought home to the authorities at an early stage of the conflict. This was to prove too late 
for certain areas of campaigning, where there was a reliance upon local reports and 
sketches. However, this deficiency would stimulate the production of detailed maps of the 
south of England, (the area of potential invasion), firmly under government control. It 
encouraged the training of new officers with an awareness of the needs ofa global war, who 
were able to contribute greatly to later campaigns. The resulting centrally controlled body 
of military map-makers, the Ordnance Survey, was to dominate British cartography from 
the Wars to the present day. 
The methods by which the Army communicated also underwent significant change. 
As improvements were made, there was a consequent increase in the expectation of the 
military for improved communication. This was not always possible, and often tied up many 
people in the task. It was also to bring about the formation of an Army corps dedicated to 
the performance of this function. Through the employment of civilian clerks, soldiers could 
be released from their involvement in communication, to martial duties. However, of greater 
importance here was that in doing so another element of military function was taken over by 
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placed on more traditional forms of communication over land, and via the navy, which were 
labour intensive, and could so easily be affected by natural factors and enemy action. 
On the battle field, the increasing operation of troops in extended formations, 
brought the adoption of the bugle as the main means of communication. This change was to 
last for over a century. Away from the field of conflict the traditional method of 
communicating orders for dissemination to the troops had always been the General Order. 
While the period saw this repeated, for the first time these orders were officially imposed on 
the troops, and checks introduced to ensure their adherence. This was possible due to the 
Army being in a relatively constant form and location for a long period, while engaged in 
the Peninsula campaign. The final aspect of communication of martial ideas was the 
proliferation of printed treatise, often in the form of Standing Orders. This reveals a market, 
beyond the usual military men, interested in the workings of the Army. 
In all areas of transport and communication during the period under discussion, a 
steady move towards greater centralisation can be observed. This reflects the need to co-
ordinate the transport and communication systems of an Army, fighting for the first time, a 
global war. It also reveals evidence of the on-going tightening of civilian control over the 
military. The area of transport and communication was another area of governmental 
dominance of the Army, which this thesis has shown to have pervaded all areas of its 
development through a firm grip on the purse strings. 
CHAPTERS CONCLUSION 
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S.l The Most Complete Machine? 
In 1794, Charles James Fox warned that the Crown in England would know no 
bounds if continental monarchy triumphed over Revolutionary France. I However, when in 
1815 the French were finally defeated, it was the British nation that was perceived to be 
triumphant, and the Crown was merely a symbol of that nation. Twenty three years of war 
had brought about such significant change to Britain that Fox's prophecy could not come 
true. lbrough changes in every area of society, the institutions of the British state had been 
brought under even greater parliamentary control, sidelining the Crown, and leaving it with 
only its influence and minimal powers. 
The Army, the tool by which European absolute monarchs had dominated their 
states, had been paramount in the British strategy to defeat France. However, over the 
course of the Wars the Army had become a tool of the British nation, and not of the Crown. 
The Wars had touched every Briton in some way, and so were no longer conceptualised as 
being fought by and on behalf of the Crown. Instead it was the British nation dominated 
the iconography of victory.2 But, of even greater importance, the real control of the British 
fighting force had passed from the King and his servants, to parliament, the representatives 
of the British nation. This thesis has shown how this came about. 
I Ch . tt' D I' d RI ' . Brl'tal'n 218 ' Walpole had feared the same would occur had the royal 
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The study of the emerging state, stimulated by Brewer's Sinews of Power has been 
advanced through this thesis. From Burke's Pay Office Act in 1783, increasingly the Army 
became part of the parliamentary structure, with a central civilian administration and 
ultimate authority at all levels vested in the civil, rather than the military departments. In 
particular, control over its fmancing was tightened and brought under either direct Treasury 
control or the authority of the Secretary at War. The cost of the Wars was vast, and 
particularly when compared with those that had been fought before. The parliamentary 
response was to control all finances directed towards the military, and centrally co-ordinate 
Army administration. Economy was a constant preoccupation, with savings in the smallest 
degree encouraged. The fmancial structures, set in place to fund the prosecution of a 
century of war, ensured a frugality which was all-pervading, but which never stood in the 
way of progress or a more efficient system of operation. For example, the co-ordination of 
the transport services, and the purchase and delivery of stores were brought under the 
central control of the Transport Board and the Storekeeper General's Department 
respectively. The improvement in the efficiency of both was deemed to be of more 
importance than the resulting higher costs to the public. 
Such control would not have been possible in previous conflicts, but the Wars with 
France were unlike any previously fought Wars, in both scale and in purpose. Britain was 
fighting as much against an ideology as for territorial gain, and this produced an almost 
universally united political front. The continued prosecution of the Wars ceased to be a 
partisan issue, with only their fmancing and mode of execution providing any serious 
debate. Even Fox accepted that the idea of making peace with Napoleonic France was 
unrealistic.3 Neither was the increasing control of the Army divisive within parliament. The 
3 Christie, Wars and Revolutions. 272. 
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nee or the vast cost to Britain, in every kind of resource, to be controlled by central 
civilian rather than military men, gained a universal political acceptance. It was also aided 
by an ailing monarch, a disinterested regent, and an office of Commander in Chief 
emasculated by political assault and scandal. 
Nevertheless, despite such extensive civilian control, the Army was pennitted, to a 
great extent, to reform its own internal structures. This was possible for several reasons. 
Primarily, parliament could now be confident that due to its fmancial control of the Army 
it had ultimate authority over change within the military. Secondly, there was a large 
parliamentary Army lobby which would always be inclined to support the self-
determination of the military. Finally, there was also an acceptance by parliament as a 
whole of the military expertise of high ranking Army officers. The Commander in Chiefs 
authority over the organisation of his troops was never questioned. However, in the 
hierarchy of the central military command this post was increasingly by-passed. With 
external campaigns the Commander in the Field would have ultimate military authority, 
under the Secretary of State for War and Colonies. Administratively the War Office, under 
the Secretary at War, took precedence over Horse Guards; the office of the Commander in 
Chief. The Commander in Chief s control was reduced to immediate Army concerns, in 
which spheres his expertise was acknowledged. In these areas, as this thesis has shown, the 
reforms were numerous. A uniform fighting force was produced, with which general 
officers, under the direct authority of parliament, were able to perform with increasing 
effectiveness throughout the Wars. Single drill systems were introduced in both cavalry 
and infantry, which were for the first time enforced Army-wide. These uniform drill 
systems were the first step towards a standardised Army regime which included all aspects 
of the internal economy and clothing of a regiment. Under the direction of the Duke of 
York the British Army moved towards a single 'system' which made it the most unifo~58 
British fighting force ever to take the field, and which would be the benchmark of those 
who followed. 
Despite the Commander in Chiefs refonn of the internal workings of the Army, 
overall administrative control of this institution shifted, in favour of a powerful office of 
the Secretary at War. This important change hitherto has failed to be recognised by 
historians. It was this member of the government who controlled the extensive military 
bureaucracy on a day to day basis. Surprisingly without a cabinet position from 1809, the 
office still dominated the Army through its finances and administration. It was the office 
from which Army estimates emanated; Regiments were financed; and the movements of 
the troops were ultimately sanctioned. With direct access to the Treasury and the Secretary 
of State for War and Colonies, to whom he was jointly responsible, the Secretary at War 
was vital to the administration of the Army. Far from being the 'rather mysterious 
functionary' described by Fortescue, the Secretary at War was the lynch pin of the Army 
during the Wars with France. Without the emergence of this key figure, much of the 
development of the Army would have floundered on the remaining military vested 
interests. The fear for much of the eighteenth century had been that one man - usually 
perceived to be the King - would take control of a powerful Army, and so checks and 
balances had been put in place to prevent just such abuse. At the outbreak of the Wars 
these proved to be such a hindrance to the effective working of the Army, that one by one 
they were removed. What resulted was an Army effectively under the control of one man. 
Not the King, not even one of the King's cabinet ministers, but the Secretary at War. 
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The Wars also produced extensive refonn of the bureaucracy of the state, which 
extended to the Army itself. Through the Committee on Public Accounts; the Committee 
on Public Expenditure; the Select Committee on Finance; and the Commission of Military 
Enquiry, by the end of the conflict the central military bureaucracy was more efficient, 
despite being vastly expanded due to the pressure of the Wars. Practically all sinecures 
were removed, and in their place were clearly defined jobs, with established career 
structures. The taking of fees and gratuities was all but removed, in favour of salaries and 
superannuation, and the Treasury, through the Secretary at War, had a greater control than 
ever before of the bureaucratic purse strings of the Army. Changes to Officer entry, 
promotion and training also enabled the development of a clear' corps' of high social 
standing, despite the rank of colonel being maintained as a virtual sinecure. This thesis has 
shown that the professionalisation of institutions, identified by Brewer, and extended by 
Colley and Corfield, also played a significant part in the development of the Army. Indeed, 
patterns of change observed within the Army and its administration, often were forerunners 
of those observed subsequently in many other professions. 
The Wars saw the development of a new way of thinking about the role and 
composition of the military. In return for the commitment of service, the state was prepared 
to pay high bounties; improve living conditions; reduce harsh discipline; and increase the 
pay of the other ranks. The provision of these 'welfare' arrangements exercised a greater 
influence on recruiting than the notion of men being 'pushed' into service through their 
worsening domestic conditions. Many of these arrangements predate nineteenth century 
ideas of the responsibility by the state for welfare provision, as well as those concerning 
the standing of soldiers in society. 
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The Anny was by no means at the leading edge of innovation during the Wars. 
Many of the principles implemented were part of a much wider development of the British 
state. The bureaucratic reforms formed only one element of a general reform of the 
administrative structures, and the centralisation of power was merely a reflection of other 
departments, and of the state itself, which in 1800 implemented the ultimate policy of 
centralisation in the Act of Union. Technologically the Army was more of a testing ground 
for external ideas. The production of every item required by the Army enabled 
manufacturers to experiment in the type of mass production that would become 
commonplace during the industrial revolution, while the mobilisation of vast quantities of 
manpower across the globe, was a pre-cursor to the many expeditions within the expanding 
empire. 
However, despite the developments in the control of the Army, other less 
centralising ideas were also at work, and their effects able to function alongside, and even 
within, the new structures. The central authority of the Transport Board, functioned only 
through compliance with the private ship owners, who supplied the vessels. The logistical 
problems of transport on the ground, was also solved by resort to private contract, despite 
the overall control of the Commissariat. And, in the supply of almost every item of food, 
clothing and equipment, market forces were permitted to prevail, despite the ability to 
control purchasing centrally. Even in the procurement of manpower, the force of the 
market was dominant, and without recourse to either conscription or the press, the ranks of 
the Anny were filled to a greater or lesser extent by volunteers through the Wars. Such 
flexibility and policies demonstrated the growing acceptance of laissez faire among the 
ruling elite. 
This thesis has been primarily concerned with change. Every chapter has 
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emphasised this as each area of the Army has been examined. In such an environment it 
would be easy to perceive that all such change was positive and beneficial. Certainly all 
contemporary evidence would support such a hypothesis. Wellington described his 
Peninsular Army as his 'most complete machine', while Dupin, the French Officer sent to 
study the British Army in 1816, concluded that in every respect improvements had been 
made for the better. By 1812, the Army had commenced a series of victories in Spain 
which culminated in the defeat of the French in 1814. This thesis has shown that by that 
date, significant change had taken place in every aspect of the Army, which enabled it to 
achieve its ultimate victory. 
However, there were areas within the Army in which vestiges of the old order were 
maintained. Army Agency was still inefficient, excessively expensive, open to abuse, the 
subject of popular criticism, and so tied up in vested interests and influential circles, that 
allegations of corruption were easily made. Even with the evidence of substantial savings, 
this system was barely reformed. Similarly, the question of the purchase of Army rank was 
side-stepped, even though such dated systems had been abolished by law in every other 
area of public service, and in the civilian administration of the Army itself. It appears that 
those reforming the Army had too much to lose themselves, and therefore chose to 
maintain the status quo. These continuities in Army practice, ensure that the study of the 
Army in this period can not be simplified to one that is a feature of either a 'long' or 'short' 
eighteenth century. While Burke's Pay Office Act clearly began the reform process in 
1783, several aspects of the Army remained unchanged into the nineteenth century. The 
anomalies of 'old corruption' in the Army remained well beyond the period under 
d' . ual'fy' 262 Iscusslon, q 1 mg contemporary enthusiasm for the otherwise positive reforms that had 
been made during the Wars with France. 
The most important contribution of this thesis to the study of the Anny during the 
Wars with France, has yet to be made. Despite a multitude of works on the subject, at 
present there is little academic debate. This thesis is written in the hope that it will, through 
its original suggestions, stimulate discussion at an academic level that will contribute not 
only to the study of the Anny, but to the study of the development of the state. 
8.2 Epilogue 
The victory for the forces of Britain and her allies on the field of Waterloo marked 
the zenith of military advancement for many years to come. Despite the experience of the 
debacle at the outbreak of hostilities in 1793, the demands of peace proved more pressing 
on the fmancial commitments of the emerging empire than the continued development of 
the world's premier fighting force. 
There were six destructive influences which conspired to undo those developments 
which the Wars with France had seen. First, the budgetary constraints which had been 
prominent, though not dominant, during the Wars, remained. With the removal of the 
French threat, few could argue for such high taxation and extensive expenditure, and so the 
Army budget suffered under the pressure for economy, in order to service the national debt 
resulting from the Wars. Secondly, the deployment of the Army in garrison duties at home 
and across the expanding empire, resulted in the breakdown in communication, and the 
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dislocation of uniform systems of training. Regiments were described as having 'gone to 
fat'4 on the relatively easy life of colonial policing. Thirdly, the main function of the forces 
at home was in the suppression of civil disorder, which destroyed much of the goodwill 
towards the Army and its soldiery which victory in the Wars had generated. The division of 
cohesive units to perform such duties served only to disrupt established regimental 
regimes. Fourthly, the traditional fears of a strong standing Army were still present, 
together with renewed apprehension of monarchical involvement. Therefore parliament 
were more comfortable in the reduction of the forces than in their reform. All these factors 
had been present prior to the Wars with France. The fifth factor emerged along with the 
empire. The powerful mercantile lobby were strong supporters of a pacific foreign policy, 
that would not hinder their trade, and therefore saw a strong and expensive Army as the 
diametric opposite of their aims. Finally, the Army hierarchy were to prove to be their own 
worst enemies. Wellington and several of his Peninsular lieutenants maintained a strong 
opposition to change of any kind. This so-called 'Torres Vedras' mentality5 ensured that 
the Army would be seen as a conservative institution, and not the reformed body which it 
had become by the end of the Wars. As a result of these factors, little was done to advance 
the reforms which have been the topic of this thesis. 
By the outbreak of the Crimean War, although most of the developments of the 
Wars with France remained in place, this still left the Army almost forty years behind the 
other major world powers, with America, France, and even Russia reforming their military 
forces, in the light of the experience of the Wars of 1793 to 1815. By the end of 1854, as 
had been seen in 1793, the Army had received a shock to its system and the long-awaited 
4 PRO WO 27/198, Inspection Return of the 68th Regiment of Light Infantry, by Major General Sir George 
Bingham, November 1829. 
5 United Service Gazette, 8th July 1854. 
264 
refonns were begun in earnest. In typical British fashion substantial military change only 
proved possible during a war, and the Anny was forced once again to re-invent the wheel. 
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APPENDIX 1 
REPORTS OF THE COMMISSIONERS OF MILITARY ENQUIRY 
Appointed by Act of 45 GEO. Ill. Cap. 47. 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
An Act to appoint Commissioners to enquire and examine into the Public 
Expenditure, and the Conduct of Public Business, in the MILITARY 
DEPARTMENTS therein mentioned; and to report such Observations as shall occur 
to them for correcting or preventing any Abuses and Irregularities, and for the 
better conducting and managing, the Business of the said Departments. 
21 st March 1806 Office of the Barrack Master General. 
Arrears of Barrack Office Accounts. 
18th July 1806 Establishment of the Barrack Office. 
22nd December 1806 Office of the Barrack Master General - Stores/Supplies. 
3rd March 1807 Office of the Barrack Master General - Buildings. 
1 st March 1808 Medical Department. 
25th June 1808 Office of the Secretary at War. 
Establishment of the War Office. 
Regimental Accounts. 
Agency and Clothing. 
Supplement to 5 Medical Department. 
20th January 1808 Office of the Secretary at War. 
Department of Foreign Accounts. 
Chaplain General. 
20th January 1809 Office of the Secretary at War. 
Miscellaneous Accounts Department. 
14th April 1809 Army Expenditure in West Indies. 
41 Geo. Ill, cap. 22. 
26th February 1810 Royal Military College. 
26th February 1810 Departments of the Adjutant General and the 
Quartermaster General. 
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12 27th February 1810 Office of the Ordnance. 
Treasurer of the Ordnance. 
13 27th February 1810 Master General of the Board of Ordnance. 
14 27th February 1810 Ordnance. 
Estimates. 
15 23rd July 1812 Ordnance. 
Fortifications and Buildings. 
Barracks. 
Small Gun Department. 
Shipping. 
16 23rd July 1812 Ordnance. 
Contracts. 
Royal Laboratory. 
Inspector of Artillery. 
Royal Carriage Department. 
17 9th January 1812 Ordnance. 
Military Accounts. 
Field Train Department. 
Royal Artillery Drivers. 
Deputy Adjutant General Artillery. 
Medical Department. 
RMA Woolwich. 
Trigonometrical Survey of Britain. 
18 20th March 1812 Office of the Commissariat. 
19 20th March 1812 Royal Hospital Chelsea. 
Commissary General of Musters. 
Royal Military Asylum. 
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KEY OFFICE HOLDERS, 1793-1815. 
COMMANDER IN CHIEF 
1788 Lord Amherst (Acting) 
1793 Lord Amherst 
1795 Duke of York 
1809 David Dundas 
1811 Duke of York (to 1826) 
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (AND COLONIES) 
1794 Henry Dundas 
1801 Lord Hobart 
1804 Lord Campden 
1805 Viscount Castlereagh 
1806 William Windham 
1807 Viscount Castlereagh 
1809 Lord Liverpool 
1812 Lord Bathurst 
SECRETARY AT WAR 
1783 Sir George Y ounge 
1794 William Windham 
1801 Charles Yorke 
1803 Charles Bathurst 
1804 William Dundas 
1806 Colonel Richard Fitzpatrick 
1807 General Sir James Murray Pultney 
1809 Granville Leverson Gower 
1809 Lord Palmerston (to 1828) 
PRIMARY 
Public Record Office, Kew. 
ADM Admiralty Office. 
1. 
108. 
Admiralty Secretariat Papers 
Transport Department Records 
AO Audit Office. 
1. Audit Office General Correspondence 
6. Minutes 
11. Establishment and Registers 
16. Miscellanea 
C Chancery 
114. Chancery: Unknown Masters' Exhibits 
CO Colonial Office. 
5. America and West Indies Original Correspondence 
138. Jamaica Entry Books 
153. Leeward Islands Entry Books 
158. Malta Original Correspondence 
318. West Indies Original Correspondence 
HO Home Office. 
30. Home Office: War and colonial Office Correspondence 
50. Home Office: Military Correspondence 
51. Home Office: Military Entry Books 
100. Home Office: Ireland: Correspondence and Papers 
SP State Papers 
44. Secretaries of State: State Papers: Entry Books 
T Treasury 
28. Treasury: VariOllS Out Letter Books 
47. Treasury: Victualling Lists 
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64. Treasury: Miscellaneous Records 
83 . Treasury: Royal Military Canal Commission 
WO War Office 
1. Secretary at War in Letters 
2. War Office Indexes and Correspondence 
3. Commander in Chief Out Letters 
4. Secretary at War Out Letters 
5. Marching Orders 
6. Secretary of State Out Letters 
7. Departmental Out Letters 
8. Ireland Out Letters 
9. Accounts 
12. General Muster Books and Pay Lists 
13. Militia and Volunteers Muster books and pay Lists 
17. Monthly Returns 
24. Establishments 
25. Various Registers 
26. Miscellany Books 
27. Inspection Returns 
28. Headquarters Records 
30. Miscellanea 
31. Commander in Chief Memoranda Papers 
34. Amberst Papers 
35 . Ireland 
37. Scovell Papers 
40. Selected Unnumbered Papers 
43 . Secretary at War: Correspondence 
44. Ordnance Office In Letters 
46. Ordnance Office Out Letters 
47. Ordnance Office Minutes 
57. Commissariat Department In Letters 
58. Commissariat Department Out Letters 
59. Commissariat Department Minutes 
60. 
62. 
Commissariat Department Accounts 
Commissariat Department Miscellanea 
63. Commissariat Department Ireland 
68. Militia Records 
74. Army Purchase Commission Papers 
78. Maps and Plans 
80. Murray Papers 
97. Royal Hospital Chelsea Soldiers' Documents 
103. War Office and Associated Departments: Submissions for Royal 
Approval 
107. Quartennaster General 
123 War Office and Associated Departments: Army Circulars, 
Memoranda, Orders and Regulations 
133. Brownrigg Papers 
134. Peacocke Papers 
135. Harry Smith Papers 
162. Adjutant General 
University of Cambridge Library. 
Papers of the Right Honourable Spencer Percival MP, 1806-1812 (Add.8713) 
Sir John Moore: Letter book, 1803-1805; Report on the possible invasion of Britain 
(Add.9340) 
Lieutenant-Colonel Sir William Lee: regimental orders, Windsor, 1798-9 (Add. 4379) 
Lieutenant-General Sir P.K. Roche: copies ofletters received, 1808-17 (Add. 7521) 
Durham County Record Office 
Londonderry Papers. (DILotc) 
University of Durham Library. 
Grey Papers 
A 1st Earl 
D General Charles Grey 
Baker-Baker Papers 
270 
Southampton University Library. 
Wellington Papers. 
Scottish Record Office, Edinburgh 
Register House Papers (RH 1) 
Miscellaneous Military Papers (GOt) 
Cunningham of Thornton Papers (G021) 
Lothian Papers (GD40) 
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Melville Castle Muniments, Scottish Record Office. Papers of Henry Oundas, 1st Viscount 
Melville. (GD51) 
National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh 
Murray Papers (Advocates Manuscripts 4531-4611) 
John Rylands University Library, Manchester. 
Papers of Sir Henry Clinton. 
Letters of Lieutenant General Cradock to Vice Admiral George Berekeley (English MSS 
1227) 
Journal of Major E.R.1. Green. 
Correspondence and Papers of Sir Robert Hugh Kennedy (English MSS 1308) 
Correspondence and Papers of Sir James Leith (English MSS 1307) 
Melville Papers (English MSS 694,927) 
Pitt Papers (English MSS 1271) 
National Army Museum 
NAM 7512-124. 
'The State of Supplies in the Peninsula - 1813' 
NAM 68031111 
Papers of Sir George Nugent 
NAM 8002-78 
Bound Letter Book - Lt. I.F. De Havilland - Madras Engineers 
Egypt 1800-1802 
NAM 6807/221 
Four Ledgers Beloning to Commissary Nathan Jackson 
NAM 6807/453 no.22 M7/453/22 
'Notes on the Duke of Wellington's Views on Army Baggage' 
Nottinghamshire County Record Office, Nottingham. 
Miscellaneous Military Papers (DDIMICA) 
East Sussex County Record Office, Lewes. 
Miscellaneous Anny Papers (5440) (SHR) 
Military Canal (pLIWOIEIMP/19) 
University of Wales Library, Bangor. 
Papers of the Marquis of Anglesey. 
GOVERNMENT REPORTS 
51h _ 9'h Reports of the Committee on Public Accounts (1781-83) 
Proceedings and Measures of Government on the Finance Reports 1797-8 (1798) 
Reports of the Commission of Naval Enquiry (1802-6) 
1SI, 5th, 1 dh, 13lh Reports of the Committee on Public Expenditure. (1807-12) 
lh Report of the Select Committee on Apprenticeship (1812-13) 
gd', 19'h 22nd 251h 26'h 36'h Reports of the Select Committee on Finance (1797-98) 
11 3rd Reports of the Select Committee on Finance (1817) 
Reports of the Commission of Military Enquiry (1806-2) 
272 
lh Report of the Select Committee on the state of the Public income and Expenditure of the 
United Kingdom (1828) 
PRINTED PRIMARY 
Anon. The Army Agent (London, 1780) 
The Present State of the British Army in Flanders; with an 
Authentic Account of their Retreat from Before Dunkirk. By A 
British Officer in that Army, who was living on the 24th of 
September (London, 1794) 
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Facts Relative to the Conduct of the War in the West Indies (n.d.) 
An Humble Address to the Members of the Honourable House of 
Commons. in behalf of the Subaltern Officers of the Army (London, 
1795) 
The Officer 's Manual in the Field; or, a Series of Military Plans, 
representing the Principal Operations of a Campaign (London, 
1800) 
The Speech of Richard Brinsley Sheridan, Esq. in the House of 
Commons. (8'h December 1802) on the motion for The Army 
Establishment for the ensuing year (London, 1803) 
New Military Plan. The Speech of the Rt. Hon. Wm. Windham. 
Secretary of State. &c. Relating to the Regular Army. Militia and 
Volunteers. Delivered in the House of Commons. on Thursday. 
April 3. 1803. (Norwich, n.d.) 
The Military Mentor. Being a series of lectures recently written by 
a General Officer to his son. on his entering the army (London, 
1804) 2 volumes. 
Letters Intercepted on board the Admiral Alpin. Captured by the 
French and Inserted by the French Government in the Moniteur, 
(London, 1804). 
The Bonne-Bouche of Epicurean Rascality; dedicated to the worst 
man in His Majesty 's Dominions; containing more ample 
elucidations of the conduct of His Royal Highness the Duke of 
York, as Commander in Chief; with some remarks on the policy of 
his commanding the army in case of invasion: to which is added a 
postscript, containing a corrosive Styptic to the poisonous Effects 
James Anton, 
Aaron Arrowsmith, 
A. Aspinal (ed.), 
A. Aspinal (ed.) 
Jane Austen, 
James Aytoun, 
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